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Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944



 
 
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  #201  
Old July 21st 04, 03:36 PM
The Enlightenment
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nt (Krztalizer) wrote in message ...

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW

190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav

features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the

Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching

Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I

have
interviewed.


I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials.


The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the
only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program
were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility.
As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard
daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are
right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but
it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day
fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact
subject as part of our interview.


You no doubt have great personal experience in these matters: however
so many variants of the Me 109G series are described as 'dirty weather
fighters'. Also there was in squadrans sometimes only a few pilots
with an instrument rating and I have the impression not all 109s had
artificial horizons.


This is from "Heinz Knoke's" wartime diary "I flew for the Fuhrer"
recently reprinted and obviously a leary publishers title. He was an
Me 109 pilot of 63 victories. Here he describes a dirty weather
interception and shootdown of a Mosquito. Probably Fug 16 and Wurzburg
directed. I believe this is one of the Mosquitos that embarased
Goering in Berlin during an political rally.

*******
6th November, 1942.

12oo hours: from Division Headquarters comes a report of two
Mosquitoes approaching. At the same moment there is a ring at my
telephone. Lieutenant Kramer, our Fighter Control Officer at Division,
calls to ask if 1 can fly in the bad weather.

I reply in the negative. Cloud ceiling is down to 100 feet, and
visibility is impossible. I cannot even see across to the other side
of the field.

" Sorry, Kramer, it cannot be done. Anyway, in this sort of muck the
two Tommies will come down on their snouts without our help."

For several hours it has been raining-a steady, persistent drizzle.
The pilots sit around, playing cards or writing letters home, or lie
sleeping on camp-cots in the next room.

I plot the progress of the Mosquitoes from the position reports as
they come in. They actually fly inland over the heart of the Reich.
Inside of an hour they are reported to be over Berlin, and our flak
opens up on them. Those lads must have guts all right. Weather like
this makes flying anything but a picnic.

The telephone rings again.

" No. 5 Flight; Lieutenant Knoke here."

The call this time is from Colonel Henschel, commanding fighter
defences in the North Sea coastal area. How is the weather at your
end, Knoke ? just as bad as it can be, sir. I can see only for a few
yards." Knoke, you will have to fly, and that is all there is to it. I
have just had a telephone call from Reich-Marshal Goring He is in one
of his rages. Why are we not in the air? The weather is too bad for us
to fly; yet those confounded Tommies can get over Berlin. Do you
imagine 1 would tell that to the Reich-Marshal ? Those Mosquitoes are
to be shot down at all costs. Do you understand?

" Yes, sir."

" Which of the pilots are you going to send?

" Flight Sergeant Wenneckers and myself, sir."

" Very well-and the best of luck to you!

" Thank you, sir."

Wenneckers and I are the only pilots in the Wing with experience in
blind flying. This is not the first time that we have set off together
in dirty weather.

Take-off 133o hours.

I can see hardly anything ahead. This blasted rain! Keeping down low,
we hurtle over the roof-tops, trees and power-lines. Radio reception
from the ground is good. Lieutenant Kramer directs me.

The Tommies are heading north-west over the Bremen area. From past
experience they may be expected to cross the East Friesian Islands.

I head for the coast. The weather over the sea is not any better.

The most recent report gives

the Position Of the Mosquitoes

as map reference sector Berta-Quelle-eight, on course threeone-five.
At any moment now we may sight the *******s, if we keep our eyes
peeled. If only it would stop raining! We have to concentrate our
attention on not running into some obstruction.

Time: 1347 hours.

I am unable to see anything at all ahead. It is maddening. Base calls:
" You should see them now. Try a little to the left."

I do not answer. For a shadow suddenly looms out of the greyness
ahead. It is a Mosquito.

He has spotted me also, and whips round to the left in a vertical
bank, almost dipping his wing-tip in the sea. Now he twists round to
the right. Then he dodges to the left again.

" No, no, my friend, it is not such a simple matter to shake off
Knoke." Every time he turns I fire in front of his nose.

We are flying low, very low, heading out over the open sea now. My
Tommy leaves a faint trail of smoke. At full throttle he follows a
steady course of three-two-zero. He moves at such a blasted high
speed. But my good Gustav is just able to maintain the pace. I stay on
his tail. Wenneckers

gradually falls behind. The terrific speed is too high for his plane.

I want to fire at only the closest possible range, and hence

try to close the gap between us. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, I draw
nearer to my opponent. I shut the radiator flaps, and the range drops
to 150 feet. He is squarely in my sights.

" Fire, Knoke, fire-NOW!! "

I press both firing-buttons. The burst catches him in the left engine.
The plane is constructed of wood. The wing goes up in flames at once
and shears off at the root. A few seconds later one De Havilland
Mosquito vanishes into the green depths of the North Sea.

That was my third.

Nothing but a sludge of oil is left on the surface. I mop the sweat
from my face.


*******

Knokes diary is interesting becuase he often speeks of improvements to
the electonics or engine boost for his Me 109 but seldom mentions the
series he is in. One is left with an impression of the power of the
30mm armament on the 109 he seemed to have no trouble bringing down
the mighty P47 with it.




Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights.


Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no
controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard
that from every NJG pilot we tracked down.

They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators:


Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they
did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight
combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively
overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide
single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not
done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting
Viermots over citiesl

I believe mosquitoes were the main
target.


There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April
1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc.,
but these
were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program.

The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again.


Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all
of them knew
by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already
been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was
immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S
was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After
that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it
was not going to be an effective tracking tool.

I believe that the death rate of wilde sau squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.


The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their
general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was
everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a
wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.


I know their songs Its difficult for me to call professional
nightfighter airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was intentional.

Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the

ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the

war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers

switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.


I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip....

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide

a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The

Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a

couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.


It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it?


Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will
forward some more info about it.


I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.


Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early
1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.


Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I
didn't copy that file when I saw it.

Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large

bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its

day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were

slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.


The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal.


Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn...

I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.


Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a
distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to
launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it
was unbearable.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

  #202  
Old July 21st 04, 04:39 PM
Chris Mark
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Was that in the MTO?

Yep.


Figures.


Whether a guy flew into Germany from the East or South makes so much
difference?

As a data point, these boys lost 18 pilots shot down in the last two months of
the war, including the group CO. They lost five on April 15, 1945. But, being
the MTO, this is of no significance or interest.


Chris Mark
  #203  
Old July 21st 04, 10:11 PM
Brett
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"WalterM140" wrote:
I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort

or
that he communicated such with Lovett.

So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
Eaker's period of command?

You seem to have just made it up.

Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.

You lied. You got caught. Again.


Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
facts that ruin his preferred fiction.

Sinclair wrote:

Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.

Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst.
SecWar Lovett such as you said he did.


I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett

conversations,

You made the statement. You can't back it up.


He did back it up, your comments and sources on the subject appear to be
very thin.

You lied.


No that's your problem.

You got caught.


He caught you several times.

Eaker did not discuss the development of a long range fighter with Lovett

when
Lovett came to England in the Summer of 1943. Eaker did not urge the

rapid
development of such an aircraft at that time.

You lied. You got caught.


If Eaker didn't discuss it with Lovett during the Summer of 1943 who did
discuss it with Lovett during that time? Lovett came back from that visit to
England in the Summer of 1943 pushing for the development of a long range
fighter.

You can start here for a reference:

The Neglect of Long-Range Escort Development Dduring The Interwar Years
(1918-1943) by Major Robert A. Eslinger.

research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay1997/acsc/97-0126A.pdf

But you have already demonstrated you have an inability to read anything but
the simplest text on any subject.





  #204  
Old July 22nd 04, 05:43 AM
Geoffrey Sinclair
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WalterM140 wrote in message ...

My text, deleted again it seems.

Firstly some deleted text I wrote, on what Eaker said to Lovett,
the source for my comments,

Williamson Murray in his book Luftwaffe, quoting Boylan, in The
development of the long range fighter escort, pages 90 to 91
and 121.

This has to be deleted. It cannot exist if Walter is to try and smear.

I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or
that he communicated such with Lovett.

So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
Eaker's period of command?

You seem to have just made it up.

Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.

You lied. You got caught. Again.


Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
facts that ruin his preferred fiction.

Sinclair wrote:

Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.

Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst.
SecWar Lovett such as you said he did.


I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett conversations,


deleted text,

"to make this claim but I doubt it. Alternatively he has read the Boylan book
I referenced, but I doubt that as well."


Yes folks, whenever I back up the claim the information has to be
deleted it seems, otherwise the next sentence cannot be written.

You made the statement. You can't back it up. You lied. You got caught.


This is becoming very funny, every time I post the source for the
information Walter deletes the reference and announces "lies".

Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
facts that ruin his preferred fiction.

Eaker did not discuss the development of a long range fighter with Lovett when
Lovett came to England in the Summer of 1943. Eaker did not urge the rapid
development of such an aircraft at that time.


Note by the way the new addition to the Walter claims, "the rapid
development one". Another standard tactic, introduce a different
claim and go on about it. I have little doubt Eaker would not be in
the "rapid development" camp, but it appears he had a foot in the
"good idea to develop one" camp. He was also doing it, with the
efforts to put drop tanks on P-47s. I also note the new claim the
idea Lovett did not discuss the idea of long range fighters with
the commander of the air force he was visiting. Why not? Since it
is clear the idea was going around, why did Lovett fail to raise the
topic?

It appears Eaker is set up as the 2 dimensional bad guy, so the fact
the 8th did improve escort range and numbers during his command is
to be ignored, the fact people have noted Eaker did understand the
idea of long range escorts has to be dropped.

You lied. You got caught.



Silly isn't it? It seems Walter's idea of "bye" is to simply repeat claims
of lies over and over.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.


  #206  
Old July 22nd 04, 05:31 PM
Peter Stickney
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In article ,
"Emmanuel Gustin" writes:
"OXMORON1" wrote in message
...

I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more

reliable/efficient
than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available
to him during WWII.


There is an interesting thing about post-war bombing
and that is that, on the whole, it was based on British
WWII tactics more than anything else. The debate about
which force used the better tactics during WWII, the
RAF or the USAAF, is fairly pointless. At the time, both
did the best they could, and in the end they were both
reasonably successful.


Just so. And the two efforst were complimentary. The Germans werent'
able to get away with building one Air Defence System - they had to
build two. (Well, actually, they could have built one, if they'd
organized it right)

But soon after the war was over, the USAAF tactics
became a historical curiosity. With the exception of
some B-29 operations in Korea, no post-war bomber
force tried to fight its way into enemy territory in
daylight and close formation. The preferred tactics
were an extension of those preferred and developed
by the RAF in wartime years -- a fairly diffuse approach,
based on suppressing or misleading enemy air defenses
and moving in bombers, if possible, unseen; defensive
armament largely disappeared from bombers. Of course
this trend was stimulated by the appearance of nuclear
weapons, guided missiles, and, in recent years, stealth.


I think the big sea-change here wasn't that the RAF tactics were
superior, but the incresdible jump in the lethality of an individual
bomber. When the goal changed from getting an X-ton bomb pattern on a
particular target to getting a single airplane over that target, the
large close foramations of bombers became redundant.
It's worth noting that in Korea, when the B-29s were bombing targets
using conventional bombs, they used large, mutually supporting
formations. Until they ran out of targets, that is. (It also makes
the job of escorting the bombers a lot easier, if you have then all in
one place, rather than spread out all over the sky. If the bombers
can't protect themselves, at least the interceptors will be
concentrating on one target, so that the escorts can gat at them.)

Until the advent of SAGE, the big limitation of bomber defence was the
limited ability of the GCI networks to handle interceptions. A
Canadian study on the tactical use of the CF-105 Arrow specifies that
interceptors can be vectored at targets at a rate of 1/minute. If the
interceptors don't have a significant speed advantage over the
bombers, and sufficient radius to be able to intercept a target that
isn't obligingly flying directly at the interceptor's airfield, (Not a
trivial issue, by any means), then it's fairly easy to saturate the
system by flying in singletons at spacings of 30-40 seconds through
the same GCI sector. In some respects, that's what teh British were
doing with the Bomber Streams - concentrating teh airplanes through
specific points to saturate the very, very brittle German GCI system.
The bomber streams also helped by reducing the volume of sky that a
bomber would be found in - Even with AI radar, the field of
view/search of a night fighter was very limited. In order to find
the targets, they had to get themselves pointed at teh target within a
fairly short distance. The long wavelengths of German AI radars meant
that angular discrimination was fairly poor, and the minumum range of
teh radars was large, so they couldn't be used for the attack. (This
also was a problem with the early Allied radars) This meant that at
some point in the interception, the fighter would have to acquire the
blacked-out bomber visually.
Of course, once the fighters got into the bomber stream, they had an
easier time of it, since the targets were fairly concentrated.
Keeping the fighters out of teh bomber stream was aided by chaff,
decoy and spoof raids, and buggering with the GCI net.

For all its failings, Bomber Command pioneered modern
air warfare, with its high emphasis on "blinding" enemy
air defense systems. It is an interesting question whether
eventually the nature of the problem will shift back, with
increasingly sophistication creating tight air defenses that
again can only be countered by a frontal assault with
overwhelming strength. I expect not.


I agree. Back then, an attacking airplane had only one option - fly
over the target and place itself at teh proper point with enough
precision to drop a load of dumb bombs. Nowadays, the attackers have
much more flexibility - the systems on board the airplanes allow than
to attack from any direction, speed, or height, and to acquire targets
on the fly with very high accuracy. With PGM's and todays' standoff
weapons, there's no need ot get close to the target. That increases
the volume of space teh defence needs to be able to monitor and be
able to intercept in tremendously. As the attackers become more
stealthy, it also becomes necessary to increase the number of sensors
(Radar/IR/Ground Obcervers/Ouija Boards) by an even more astronomical
amount.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
 




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