Would the air force have any better off in Vietnam if they'd used the F-104 for air to air instead of the F-4?

I'm not talking about factoring in built-in air to ground capability,
I'm talking about strictly air to air and escort.

"Scott Ferrin" wrote in message
...

I'm not talking about factoring in built-in air to ground capability,
I'm talking about strictly air to air and escort.

The F-104 was used in the Vietnam War. Fourteen were lost with 4 pilots
lost and 2 POW. Units included 436TFS of the 479TFW which arrived at Danang
on 20 April 1965. They proved too short range for their intended escort
role and were sometimes used for air-to-ground. The answer to your query in
the title line is no.

Tex Houston

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 12:56:38 -0700, "Tex Houston"
wrote:


"Scott Ferrin" wrote in message
.. .

I'm not talking about factoring in built-in air to ground capability,
I'm talking about strictly air to air and escort.

The F-104 was used in the Vietnam War. Fourteen were lost with 4 pilots
lost and 2 POW. Units included 436TFS of the 479TFW which arrived at Danang
on 20 April 1965. They proved too short range for their intended escort
role and were sometimes used for air-to-ground. The answer to your query in
the title line is no.

Tex Houston



IIRC weren't most of them lost because they tried to use them in the
air to ground role? I'm talking about strictly air to air.

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 19:31:04 GMT, Scott Ferrin
wrote:


I'm not talking about factoring in built-in air to ground capability,
I'm talking about strictly air to air and escort.

A number of factors are involved. One, is the loss of scheduling
flexibility by adding another discrete system to the total package.
More supply, maintenance, avionics, engine, operations, etc. Keep in
mind that the A/A mission was very limited. While MiGs were a threat,
they operated almost exclusively in the defensive intercept role and
predominantly in Route Pack VI. Missions anywhere else had little need
for escort or CAP.

The F-104 didn't have particularly good endurance for the CAP role and
didn't have much of an A/A radar for running its own intercepts.

The probe/drogue refueling system adds additional tanker requirements
(although limited drogue tankers were flown for F-100F and B-66
support).

Low altitude engagements with the early AIM-9 (during the 65-66 time
frame when they were deployed, the version was AIM-9B) weren't very
reliable. The seeker head was virtually useless against ground clutter
and needed high altitude/blue-sky to discriminate. Gun engagements for
F-104 vs MiG-17 wouldn't be very successful as the high-wing loaded,
large turn radius 104 wouldn't match the -17's manueverability.

When F-104s were tasked as escort for F-105 Wild Weasel flights in RP
VI, a pair were lost on 1 August '66. Without RHAW, the airplane was
restricted after that to more permissive environments flying limited
interdiction missions.

Overall, the 104 performance in SEA was less than stellar.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 20:32:54 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 19:31:04 GMT, Scott Ferrin
wrote:


I'm not talking about factoring in built-in air to ground capability,
I'm talking about strictly air to air and escort.

A number of factors are involved. One, is the loss of scheduling
flexibility by adding another discrete system to the total package.
More supply, maintenance, avionics, engine, operations, etc. Keep in
mind that the A/A mission was very limited. While MiGs were a threat,
they operated almost exclusively in the defensive intercept role and
predominantly in Route Pack VI. Missions anywhere else had little need
for escort or CAP.

The F-104 didn't have particularly good endurance for the CAP role and
didn't have much of an A/A radar for running its own intercepts.

The probe/drogue refueling system adds additional tanker requirements
(although limited drogue tankers were flown for F-100F and B-66
support).

Low altitude engagements with the early AIM-9 (during the 65-66 time
frame when they were deployed, the version was AIM-9B) weren't very
reliable. The seeker head was virtually useless against ground clutter
and needed high altitude/blue-sky to discriminate. Gun engagements for
F-104 vs MiG-17 wouldn't be very successful as the high-wing loaded,
large turn radius 104 wouldn't match the -17's manueverability.

When F-104s were tasked as escort for F-105 Wild Weasel flights in RP
VI, a pair were lost on 1 August '66. Without RHAW, the airplane was
restricted after that to more permissive environments flying limited
interdiction missions.

Overall, the 104 performance in SEA was less than stellar.

Thanks. This month's Airpower/Wings sure talked the thing's
performance over Vietnam up. I'd read long ago that it didn't do all
that well over ther so I thought I'd come here for the lowdown :-)

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 20:51:48 GMT, Scott Ferrin
wrote:

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 20:32:54 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

Overall, the 104 performance in SEA was less than stellar.

Thanks. This month's Airpower/Wings sure talked the thing's
performance over Vietnam up. I'd read long ago that it didn't do all
that well over ther so I thought I'd come here for the lowdown :-)

Airpower usually is pretty well researched. Can't imagine a positive
review of F-104 SEA performance.

Let's be sure to note that the airplane itself had excellent
performance and the 479th Wing (435th TFS, particularly) were
instrumental in development of modern two-ship air/air tactics. Let's
also note that the airplane in NATO service for a whole flock of
countries served reliably for forty years.

In SEA, the aircraft didn't live up to its potential.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"Scott Ferrin" wrote in message
...

IIRC weren't most of them lost because they tried to use them in the
air to ground role? I'm talking about strictly air to air.

1965 5 losses (2 Close Air Support, 1 to MiG while CAP, two midair while
RESCAP)
1966 5 losses (3 CAS or Armed Recce, 2 to SAMs while CAP)
1967 4 losses (1 Armed Recce, 3 while CAP)

5 Air to ground, 9 CAP so again the answer is no. From my two years in an
F-104 outfit the general pilot take was that it was a good interceptor, a
mediocre dog fighter and so much fun to fly they wondered why they were
getting paid.

Tex Houston

On Mon, 29 Dec 2003 15:00:52 -0700, "Tex Houston"
wrote:


"Scott Ferrin" wrote in message
.. .

IIRC weren't most of them lost because they tried to use them in the
air to ground role? I'm talking about strictly air to air.

1965 5 losses (2 Close Air Support, 1 to MiG while CAP, two midair while
RESCAP)
1966 5 losses (3 CAS or Armed Recce, 2 to SAMs while CAP)
1967 4 losses (1 Armed Recce, 3 while CAP)

5 Air to ground, 9 CAP so again the answer is no. From my two years in an
F-104 outfit the general pilot take was that it was a good interceptor, a
mediocre dog fighter and so much fun to fly they wondered why they were
getting paid.

Tex Houston

I like that last comment :-)

Tex Houston wrote:

5 Air to ground, 9 CAP so again the answer is no. From my two years in an
F-104 outfit the general pilot take was that it was a good interceptor, a
mediocre dog fighter and so much fun to fly they wondered why they were
getting paid.


According to the "Kellys' Way" video from the Flight Test Historical
Association, in 1951 Kelly Johnson visited AF units in Korea to find
out what the pilot's wanted. The answer is described as higher speed,
greater altitude, and less complexity. And that's what he tried to
deliver with the F-104.

So what went wrong? Why didn't he hear a request for greater
maneuverability?

On 29 Dec 2003 20:44:43 -0800, (Paul A. Suhler)
wrote:

Tex Houston wrote:

5 Air to ground, 9 CAP so again the answer is no. From my two years in an
F-104 outfit the general pilot take was that it was a good interceptor, a
mediocre dog fighter and so much fun to fly they wondered why they were
getting paid.


According to the "Kellys' Way" video from the Flight Test Historical
Association, in 1951 Kelly Johnson visited AF units in Korea to find
out what the pilot's wanted. The answer is described as higher speed,
greater altitude, and less complexity. And that's what he tried to
deliver with the F-104.

So what went wrong? Why didn't he hear a request for greater
maneuverability?

They probably figured they had adequate maneuverability. They should
have made sure they said they wanted to keep it AND get more speed
instead of trading one for the other.