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#21
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"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. .. This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon. There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and the arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning radar that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's dropping GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles. In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to an end. -- Raymond Chuang Sacramento, CA USA |
#22
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"Paul F Austin" wrote in message ... "Kevin Brooks" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If you can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place. I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas where ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube arty fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70 klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those submunitions going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of those that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know. But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very supportable postion IMO. Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use this much support for ingress and egress? You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems? You're taking it as a given that AHs are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than any other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set. Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and waiting). I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I? If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's not clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days. They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on their use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z program as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile? Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases. Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I or anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads at the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet. Although why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question. Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use terrain masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots? The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the analysis space to consider other alternatives. Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long preparation. The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the target heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is not going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example. Ever wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing situation's requirements. The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for UAVs. They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in coverage over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and that's hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that in light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program replans, to cut its losses. You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get in closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing UAV's can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned around, take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again. Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the fight, and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use your FARP's is an advantage. AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from them (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment, the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops* he disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than a heavy loadout on a few platforms. No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address. You also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still need those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have a role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the attack helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist in terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical conclusion. Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a real question whether they're the best way to do it. In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace their capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV programs and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in five years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be ready to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point, unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's" are ready and fully fielded? A platform that flies in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet. Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that. In any case, you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms. Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are working towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and will be, the manned scout helo. No single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the future. To do so would be stupid. Who ssaid it would? There are two missions here. The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the take will be available to all the forces. You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division* level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or platoon leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you want to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed by lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the foreseeable future? It doesn't. The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd. Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use. An AH integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way, that's one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's still another. One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the war you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error. Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last conflict (in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that) and apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts. Brooks |
#23
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"Felger Carbon" wrote in message nk.net... "Paul F Austin" wrote in message news The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for UAVs. They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in coverage over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and that's hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that in light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program replans, to cut its losses. I've read the above three times, and I still can't see where UAVs get credit for saving our side's human lives. Heli pilots fully expendable?? I don't think I said that. UAVs have an advantage over manned platforms for extremely hazardous missions like SEAD because of the reduced risk to crews but another advantage is the option of extremely long mission times because the "crew" can change without bringing the aircraft back to base. Manned aircraft do put aircrew at risk but you have the advantage of a human being on the spot. One hump UCAVs will have to get over is the reluctance that "higher" has in turning an autonomous weapon loose with reduced human supervision. Certainly at first, the "trigger" will remain firmly in human hands. Probably the_last_"trigger" to be turned over to robotic killers will be air-to-air weapons, since the pilots' union will be extremely reluctant to share the sky with them. |
#24
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"Raymond Chuang" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon. There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and the arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning radar that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's dropping GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles. No single sensor sees all and knows all. For example, JSTARS is extremely limited in mountainous terrain (because of limited sight lines). Likewise, very high fliers like U-2 and G-Hawk have trouble with some sensors and some angles. It takes (and we're deploying) a wide range of sensorcraft that complement each other. Some of the key ones (U-2, G-Hawk, Rivet Joint and JSTARs) are extremely over-committed right now. In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to an end. That may be true in the future, which isn't here yet. |
#25
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"Kevin Brooks" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote "Kevin Brooks" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If you can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place. I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas where ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube arty fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70 klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those submunitions going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of those that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know. But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very supportable postion IMO. Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use this much support for ingress and egress? You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems? You're right about that. I'm a swivel chair hussar with no practical knowledge of which weapons are appropriate for which particular mission. And if it makes you feel better, I don't think all the AHs should be thrown on the junk heap. I'm a conservative after all. You're taking it as a given that AHs are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than any other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set. Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and waiting). I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I? If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's not clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days. They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on their use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z program as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile? I don't and I didn't focus particularly on the 11th's engagement. What I paid more attention to was the air campaign over Afghanistan with the_extremely_long mission times required. Yep, the guys on the ground in the Anaconda op needed a great deal of CAS. I just want to open the box a bit on how to deliver those fires, considering what would have happened if the SF teams had needed urgent support before the Marines opened up shop at Camp Rhino. The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the analysis space to consider other alternatives. Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long preparation. Neither one is necessarily true. Because e.g. G-Hawk-can-fly intercontinental missions, the temptation on the part of mission planners is to use the endurance that way. The same endurance can result in multi-day time on station using a regional base. The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the target heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is not going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example. Ever wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing situation's requirements. The Marines love their organic air because of institutional memory that goes back to Guadalcanal, when the Navy sailed away, leaving the Marines holding the bag (and I'm an ex-sailor). I understand the virtues of organic assets. But. The Army's institutional experience with CAS systems is strongly colored by the Key West Agreement and the limitations that put on the kinds of aircraft the Army was allowed to operate. Helos were allowed so the Army got expert in helicopters. I have a submariners's prejudices that helos are unnatural contrivances. Yes, quick response is the key and since Comanche is dead (and we both agree that was the right decision), now is the time to determine the best way to generate responsive CAS. My prejudices say that the CAS assets should be organic to the Army but that's Unjoint. The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for UAVs. They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in coverage over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and that's hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that in light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program replans, to cut its losses. You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get in closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing UAV's can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned around, take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again. Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the fight, and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use your FARP's is an advantage. AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from them (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment, the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops* he disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than a heavy loadout on a few platforms. No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address. You also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still need those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have a role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the attack helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist in terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical conclusion. If the PBI can't talk to the UAV operator a hundred klicks back, he likely can't talk to the orbiting CAS either. You miss a key point. We do CAS very well now. We-don't- do the 30 second sensor to shooter against a moving target well at all and that's a hole in our capabilities. The reality is that we do most things very well indeed, so that we're filling in the corners that were missed the first time around. Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a real question whether they're the best way to do it. In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace their capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV programs and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in five years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be ready to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point, unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's" are ready and fully fielded? Use AHs. It may come as some surprise that I don't think UAVs are the Swiss-Army-Knife of airborne systems. The Army has a long and crappy history of UAV development (I worked on the tail-end of Aquilla). The various Unions seem to be getting their **** together now, in light of real combat experience but it will take years to field the right systems in the right numbers. A platform that flies in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet. Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that. I don't. I can go into no detail. There are specific terrains where medium altititude sensors are at a disadvantage because of geometric issues but in terms of militarily useable sensor resolution, there's nothing much to choose. In any case, you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms. Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are working towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and will be, the manned scout helo. No single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the future. To do so would be stupid. Who ssaid it would? You're right, that's a bit of a strawman. And the sensor net is nothing like complete yet. But it is the future. And once the future is here, it's not clear what role manned scout helos will play. There are two missions here. The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the take will be available to all the forces. You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division* level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or platoon leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you want to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed by lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the foreseeable future? It doesn't. As I said, I may be premature on the data dissimination issue. You tell_me_what a manned helo brings to the party as a sensor platform. The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd. Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use. No, they don't. The reality is that helos are what the Army is allowed, not that helos have specific mission properties that are unique. They are maintenance intensive, expensive and based on the Kosovo experience, not very mobile strategically. To earn their place, they have to deliver better than the alternatives. An AH integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way, that's one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's still another. One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the war you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error. Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last conflict (in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that) and apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts. Didn't do that. As I said. You're the one that obsesses on that engagement. And you still don't address the fleeting target. |
#26
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On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 17:26:04 -0500, Paul F Austin wrote:
"robert arndt" wrote Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs. This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon. That's my take on it too. -- "It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia (Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk) |
#27
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On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 19:35:35 -0800, Hobo wrote:
In article , (robert arndt) wrote: Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs. Rob Of course, it was the Germans who invented the uncompleted program. At least they had a good excuse, like losing the war. There would have been some interesting designs if WW2 had gone into 1946 or 47. -- "It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia (Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk) |
#28
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"Paul F Austin" wrote in message news "Kevin Brooks" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote "Kevin Brooks" wrote "Paul F Austin" wrote As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If you can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place. I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas where ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube arty fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70 klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those submunitions going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of those that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know. But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very supportable postion IMO. Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use this much support for ingress and egress? You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems? You're right about that. I'm a swivel chair hussar with no practical knowledge of which weapons are appropriate for which particular mission. And if it makes you feel better, I don't think all the AHs should be thrown on the junk heap. I'm a conservative after all. The plain fact of the matter is that the indirect fire systems can't acheive the same results that the Apaches can in the EA. For example, the standard DPICM bomblet, while it can be lethal against troops in the open, thin skinned vehicles, and even light armor, is not likely to kill an MBT *if* it hits it. The Apache can kill that MBT quite easily, as we have seen in the past. Artillery is becoming more capable of killing point targets, but we are not yet at the stage where we can hand-off all of the killing to such indirect fire systems. But indirect fire systems can (right now) provide excellent suppression against the kind of threats that the Apache has to concern itself with while it ingresses and egresses. Nor are they limited to providing that kind of support to rotary assets; ATACMS has been used in the SEAD role in support of fast mover efforts (the SEAD role being one of ATACMS primary reasons for existing). You're taking it as a given that AHs are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than any other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set. Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and waiting). I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I? If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's not clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days. They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on their use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z program as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile? I don't and I didn't focus particularly on the 11th's engagement. What I paid more attention to was the air campaign over Afghanistan with the_extremely_long mission times required. No, your original statement that I took exception to said nothing of the sort, and was evidently directly related to that single deep attack mission by the 11th AVN: "This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire..." Now where do we see any reference to Afghani operations in that statement? And who in heck has claimed that the Apache should be the *primary* CAS/BAI platform, especially in long range engagements like those that typified the early stages of OEF? Yep, the guys on the ground in the Anaconda op needed a great deal of CAS. I just want to open the box a bit on how to deliver those fires, considering what would have happened if the SF teams had needed urgent support before the Marines opened up shop at Camp Rhino. You are delving into METT-T concerns, not indicting the continuing valid roles of attack helos. No single system can perform all roles across the spectrum of combat, and throughout the depth of the battlespace. That the Apache can't do that either means nothing. The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the analysis space to consider other alternatives. Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long preparation. Neither one is necessarily true. Because e.g. G-Hawk-can-fly intercontinental missions, the temptation on the part of mission planners is to use the endurance that way. The same endurance can result in multi-day time on station using a regional base. OK, first off, nobody is talking about using Global Hawk in the CAS/BAI role that I am aware of. And yes, it does take a while to get fixed wing UAV's regenerated and back into the fight, and yes, their basing requirements will normally put them some distance from the FLOT. The ground commander needs a whole plethora of different platforms to support him, including UAV's, and ideally also including manned helos. The VTOL aircraft, and its ability to use a FARP and conduct quick turnarounds with task-driven weapons loadout, contributes to his versatility much more than any of the current (or soon to be available) crop of armed UAV's can. The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the target heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is not going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example. Ever wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing situation's requirements. The Marines love their organic air because of institutional memory that goes back to Guadalcanal, when the Navy sailed away, leaving the Marines holding the bag (and I'm an ex-sailor). Who cares about "organic"? The USMC loved the support it got from its AH-1W's during OIF. Period. Granted that giving the ground force commander his own dedicated and owned source of CAS/BAI can also be valuable, but the key fact from the above is that the attack helo was deemed to still be an important asset by the USMC. I understand the virtues of organic assets. But. The Army's institutional experience with CAS systems is strongly colored by the Key West Agreement and the limitations that put on the kinds of aircraft the Army was allowed to operate. Helos were allowed so the Army got expert in helicopters. I have a submariners's prejudices that helos are unnatural contrivances. Yes, quick response is the key and since Comanche is dead (and we both agree that was the right decision), now is the time to determine the best way to generate responsive CAS. My prejudices say that the CAS assets should be organic to the Army but that's Unjoint. I don't in the end care *who* owns the assets, my concern is that we need to ensure the commander has *all* of the tools that he can get which contribute to his versatility and agility on the battlefield. Right now, and for the foreseeable future, that includes the manned helo; yes, it faces threats from groundfire (but so does the UAV), but it can perform in environments that might be difficult for the UAV (ie., effective enemy ECM). The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for UAVs. They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in coverage over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and that's hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that in light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program replans, to cut its losses. You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get in closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing UAV's can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned around, take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again. Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the fight, and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use your FARP's is an advantage. AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from them (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment, the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops* he disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than a heavy loadout on a few platforms. No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address. You also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still need those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have a role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the attack helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist in terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical conclusion. If the PBI can't talk to the UAV operator a hundred klicks back, he likely can't talk to the orbiting CAS either. Bullpoopie. His basic FM *can* let him talk to line-of-sight targets, but he is not going to be able to hit that UAV site without a retrans chain (and then only problematically). You miss a key point. We do CAS very well now. We-don't- do the 30 second sensor to shooter against a moving target well at all and that's a hole in our capabilities. The reality is that we do most things very well indeed, so that we're filling in the corners that were missed the first time around. But that does not imply in any way that the attack helo is a product of a bygone era. Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a real question whether they're the best way to do it. In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace their capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV programs and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in five years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be ready to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point, unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's" are ready and fully fielded? Use AHs. It may come as some surprise that I don't think UAVs are the Swiss-Army-Knife of airborne systems. The Army has a long and crappy history of UAV development (I worked on the tail-end of Aquilla). The various Unions seem to be getting their **** together now, in light of real combat experience but it will take years to field the right systems in the right numbers. A platform that flies in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet. Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that. I don't. I can go into no detail. There are specific terrains where medium altititude sensors are at a disadvantage because of geometric issues but in terms of militarily useable sensor resolution, there's nothing much to choose. Unless things have changed dramatically since OAF, then I can't buy that. One of the lessons learned there was that the UAV's could not find the targets with the desired reliability. Terrain and vegetative cover, enemy camouflage efforts (including multi-spectral systems)--they all can degrade sensor performance, especially from increased range. In any case, you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms. Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are working towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and will be, the manned scout helo. No single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the future. To do so would be stupid. Who ssaid it would? You're right, that's a bit of a strawman. And the sensor net is nothing like complete yet. But it is the future. And once the future is here, it's not clear what role manned scout helos will play. There are two missions here. The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the take will be available to all the forces. You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division* level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or platoon leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you want to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed by lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the foreseeable future? It doesn't. As I said, I may be premature on the data dissimination issue. You tell_me_what a manned helo brings to the party as a sensor platform. Ability to operate in a rigorous ECM environment for one. Better fieild of view provided by the mark-one eyeballs of a couple of crewmembers. Observation in 3-D versus the more sanitary 2-D of UAV optical sensors. And most importantly, the ability to reason while absorbing sensory input. Add in the fact that we can data link their onboard sensors just as we do that of the UAV's (demonstrated similarly by USMC AV-8B's during OIF providing datalinked images from their targeting pods to ground commanders). The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd. Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use. No, they don't. The reality is that helos are what the Army is allowed, not that helos have specific mission properties that are unique. Huh? They don't? Ever try to turn around an A-10 at a FARP cut into the brush immediately to the rear of the FLOT? How long was it before we had operational fighter strips up and running in Afghanistan? We had Cobras operating there in quick fashion (and could have had them even more quickly if we had so desired). Ever have your A-10 direct your arty? Armed scout helos do that routinely. They are maintenance intensive, expensive and based on the Kosovo experience, not very mobile strategically. To earn their place, they have to deliver better than the alternatives. No they don't. They have to complement the other systems, as i said earlier. You really need to look up the concept of "combined arms warfare". Each system uses its strengths to help overcome the weaknesses of the other systems. Sort of like the JAAT (joint air attack tactics) missions that the A-10's and Apaches/Cobras used to sometimes train on. An AH integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way, that's one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's still another. One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the war you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error. Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last conflict (in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that) and apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts. Didn't do that. As I said. You're the one that obsesses on that engagement. "This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire..." Your words, not mine. And you still don't address the fleeting target. Neither does the 81mm mortar--are you going to want to can them, too? Brooks |
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"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
... No single sensor sees all and knows all. I think that's the point. The total awareness concept called for 5000 Comanches in service. Pfft.. 5000 UAVs is doable. |
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Kevin Brooks wrote:
I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But be careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF. I'm not looking only at that attack. There are a bunch of incidents, from Operation ANACONDA on, that suggest that attack helos are going to get hit fairly often, and that those hits will come from optical or IR weapons. I did not like Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom of including a strike capability in your cavalry scout birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as planned, the Sure, but I question the scale of the armament actually selected. With the stub wings (which I think were deferred from the most recent production plan), a Comanche could carry 14 Hellfires, almost 90% of the armament of an Apache. That's a lot of targets of opportunity. And the requirement for internal carriage for part of that load added both cost and complexity. Personally, I think they should have started building a much less complex scout sometime in the early 1990s, starting with AH-58 capabilities but built in into a more combat-worthy airframe. It would look strikingly like an early AH-1 or the Japanese OH-X in general outline. Sensors consist of Londbow above the mast and Comanche optics above the cockpit but below the rotor (the second-best spot,a fter the mast it taken by radar). Armament of perhaps 4 Hellfire (or two rocket pods) and 4 Stinger (for UAV killing as much as for self-defense) on stub wings plus maybe a GAU-19 .50-caliber gatling in a chin mount for small arms suppression. Don't worry about radar LO; concentrate on IR, front-aspect visual, and maybe acoustics. With luck and planning, the same dynamic system can be adapted for that long overdue Light Utility Helo requirement (shades of UH-1/AH-1 in reverse?). -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
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