NTSB Preliminary report on HPN crash

I think if you can't get the GS then you go missed and start over. Trying to
re-brief a new approach chart on final is a bad plan.

"Guillermo" wrote in message
...
If you cannot get the GS in an ILS apporach, then it turns into a
localizer
approach, which has higher minimums.

On 2005-05-05, Gary Drescher wrote:
Third, if the controller's radar
shows your altitude, you can get an altitude alert (as the HPN pilots did).

Except the report made it sound like they acknowledged it and kept going.
Hard to believe a CFII wouldn't know offhand from that comment that they
were in trouble (being at a familiar airport).

--
Ben Jackson

http://www.ben.com/

CFI's last medical was on Mar 7, 2003 which means it was expired.
Neither
of the pilots was licensed to be up there.

Any medical issued to a pilot under 40 (which the CFI was) is good for
3rd class privileges for 3 years, which is all that is required for
flight instruction. The CFI was instrument rated, and presuming he was
current he had a legal right to be up there.

Michael

"Ben Jackson" wrote in message
...
On 2005-05-05, Gary Drescher wrote:
Third, if the controller's radar
shows your altitude, you can get an altitude alert (as the HPN pilots
did).

Except the report made it sound like they acknowledged it and kept going.
Hard to believe a CFII wouldn't know offhand from that comment that they
were in trouble (being at a familiar airport).

Yes, he had to know by then that they were too low.

--Gary

According to this article, the CFI was 45 years old.

http://tinyurl.com/b8p8s

Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring
to the
entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing
when
an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything
that
stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant

mistake. What did I miss?

I think that's pretty much the point. This is the reality of most
accidents. The pilot is qualified (at least on paper) and there are no
red flags likel buzzing, running out of fuel, drugs, alcohol, or a
blatant mistake or disregard for the regulations. There is simple
mishandling of the airplane in the takeoff/climb or approach/landing
phase of flight. That's what accounts for most accidents and
fatalities.

The last reported weather was 200 and 1/2 - not great, but certainly
legal and acceptable on an ILS. I've shot that particular ILS into
HPN, and there's nothing special or tricky about it - it's a garden
variety approach. The airplane was new, well equipped for IFR, and
very simple, slow, and stable.

So how could something like this happen?

It's important to remember that just because someone is qualified on
paper doesn't mean he is qualified in reality. There is a huge
difference between giving instrument dual in actual and instrument dual
under the hood. And while 900 hours sounds like a lot of experience
(and it can be), it's not much at all if it consists of 300 hours of
preparing for checkrides and 600 hours of sitting in the right seat of
a trainer preparing other people for checkrides.

Let me tell you a story.

Imagine a student pilot, getting close to the checkride, who already
has some hood time. The student already meets the PTS standards for
emergency instrument flight, and there's still well over an hour of
instrument time to go, since 3 hours are now required. The CFI is also
a CFII. An IFR-certified C-172 is available, and the student already
has about 6 hours of C-172 time, VFR. And the CFI/CFII is not
comfortable.

The student can't understand why, and keeps pushing. Eventually, the
CFII runs out of excuses. After months of waiting, there is benign IMC
- ceilings in the 1000 ft range, good vis underneath, high freezing
levels (well above what a 172 will cruise), no convective activity, and
the weather is only forecast to improve. So he grits his teeth, files
IFR, and off they go.

The student does a reasonable job in IMC - gets vertigo, but keeps the
plane upright and keeps on trucking. In the meantime, the transponder
fails. ATC pressures the CFI to cancel IFR (which he can't - they're
IMC) and he gets further and further behind the ball. The student is
flying the LOC BC approach and botches it badly. The needle is pegged,
and as the CFI sits there muttering to himself "We shouldn't be doing
this" the student descends below minimums with the needle pegged and
the runway not in sight.

Fortunately they don't hit anything, the student is familiar with the
area, identifies a water tower, turns towards the airport, and lands.
Had the conditions been worse, we would have read about the fatality.

So how does this sort of thing happen? More importantly, why?

The CFI/CFII in question had made ONE flight in actual IMC prior to
this. This was his second, and he was attempting to teach. According
to the FAA, he was well qualified to make this instructional flight -
but there's a big difference between a pilot who has just read the
books and gone through the motions, and one who has real experience.

A real instrument pilot would have told ATC to deal - a transponder is
not required outside Class B/C airspace below 10,000 ft, and in any
case it had failed in flight.

A real instrument pilot would have recognized that the approach was
being botched, and either talked the student through a recovery or
missed approach, or done those things himself. A real instrument pilot
would certainly not have permitted descent below minimums with the
needle pegged and the runway not in sight.

In the end, it was the student's local knowledge and level headed
action that saved the flight. The instructor became a passenger.

The CFI has gone on to bigger and better things years ago, has
thousands of hours, and from all reports has become quite a good pilot.
The student went on to complete the private (with another instructor),
and is now considered a very good pilot, quite capable on instruments -
but did not get an instrument rating for many years, until the fear of
IMC wore off.

Those two were lucky. As this accident shows, it could have been much
worse.

Michael

On 5 May 2005 11:48:24 -0700, "Michael"
wrote:

CFI's last medical was on Mar 7, 2003 which means it was expired.
Neither
of the pilots was licensed to be up there.

Any medical issued to a pilot under 40 (which the CFI was) is good for
3rd class privileges for 3 years, which is all that is required for
flight instruction. The CFI was instrument rated, and presuming he was
current he had a legal right to be up there.

Michael


Actually, no medical is required for flight instruction.

The only requirement is to be pilot in command, which he obviously had
to be in this case.

In article 2005050421420215925%bodhijunkoneeightyeightjunkat macdotcom@junkjunk, Tom Fleischman wrote:
If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it.
*
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC05FA075&rpt=p

I had an Angel Flight mission scheduled last the week. Night before,
looking at the forecast, I was thinking the flight was doable but
a bit below my comfort level. I called my instructor to ask if he'd
come along. Didn't need him as an instructor, but as an extra pair
of eyes and hands to shed that critical workload. Conditions were
forcast for near minima, but better at the destination and scheduled
to improve.

He looked at the forecast and said he wouldn't do it without a second
engine, second alternator, second vac, ...

What he said was particularly articulate. It would be a doable
flight *if* nothing went wrong.

Wound up cancelling the trip, despite the self-induced pressure
to go. Next morning, when the actual conditions were reported, I
knew it was the right decision.


Morris

Matt Whiting wrote:

To show him what an instrument approach looks like? If the instructor
was qualified and current, this shouldn't have been a problem.
Descending below minimums is the problem, it doesn't matter who is
flying or who is in the right seat.

Matt

He may not have been far from his minimums if he was flying the ILS. DA
for the ILS was 639 MSL, and based on the accident report, combined with
terrain elevations north of the approach end, and 75' tree height, he
may have impacted the tree at about 610 MSL. This would have been
possible if he was below glideslope, and then initiated go-around at his
DA (DH). He would have had some height loss expected before the aircraft
responded.

JPH

"J Haggerty" wrote in message
news:sQzee.4525$Ri4.3415@okepread07...
Matt Whiting wrote:

To show him what an instrument approach looks like? If the instructor
was qualified and current, this shouldn't have been a problem. Descending
below minimums is the problem, it doesn't matter who is flying or who is
in the right seat.

Matt

He may not have been far from his minimums if he was flying the ILS. DA
for the ILS was 639 MSL, and based on the accident report, combined with
terrain elevations north of the approach end, and 75' tree height, he may
have impacted the tree at about 610 MSL. This would have been possible if
he was below glideslope, and then initiated go-around at his DA (DH). He
would have had some height loss expected before the aircraft responded.

But he was still a mile out when he crashed. Well above the DA, he'd have to
have been fully below the glideslope, which calls for an immediate
missed-approach execution. The DA has no relevance in that situation.

--Gary