Why not use the F-22 to replace the F/A-18 and F-14?

JL Grasso wrote:

On Mon, 01 Mar 2004 17:58:20 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

You would dismiss photographic evidence ? I can see I'll have to ferret out that tape if it still
exists.

All that I've seen is the photographs (stills) on the airdisaster.com
site, and I don't feel that there is any signicance whatsoever in what is
shown there. Still, I'm open to whatever arises, and will gladly admit
that I'm wrong should I be shown compelling evidence which supports your
assertion.

I'd also be more than interested in viewing the documentary(s) that you
reference. If you know how / where I could purchase one, please let me
know.

I found a link that gave a number to order a copy of the Channel 4 Equinox programme - need to
backtrack and find again. Actually, I have a feeling they did more than one programme on this - but no
matter.

It's likely to be UK PAL though - can you view that ?

We need to get this resolved before you start trying to tell me that a 757
did not hit the Pentagon!

LOL, Graham

On 2/29/04 8:58, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...

Not at all; your argument was so lacking in logic that I saw little reason
to bother. But if you are so interested in improving yourself, here goes:

Quite the condescending gentleman aren't you?

"CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it
SNIP

What you ignore is that the "capping" (by which you actually menat
"stacking", I presume) is utterly dependent upon a number of external
factors that don't necessarily impact the operations of a STOVL aircraft.

'Round and 'round. First of all, stack is not a verb. It's a noun. If I'm
in the CAS stack, I'm capping.

You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a commodity
SNIP
the ground commander's needs. He wants some CBU-105's in the mix? SNIP

You make a correct argument. The nearer an airfield/CV is to the battle,
the more sorties you can generate. Afghanistan is a good example of a place
that was hard to get to by both CV and the USAF.

I'm saying it's not worth the risk/extra cost, and I disagree with your
assessment of how many scenarios make the concept worth the cost. The
decision has been made. I disagree with it.

SNIP
It was actually YOU that suggested that the USAF was trying to make nice
with the USMC.

No, it was not. I was being quite facetious with that query. That you found
it palusible is rather telling of your grasp of this situation.


I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
intelligent discussion.

Firstly, if the STOVL version were axed, the USMC would most
SNIP
They are already onboard. They just seem to grasp the importance of being
more versatile a bit better than you do.

I grasp what's useful and what's not.



Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
SNIP
that last one shouldn't count... Not unique to the STOVL discussion. I
was on a roll.)

Meaningless. Compare the accident rates per hours flown and get back to me.
Then tell us how that applies to the F-35B, a different aircraft with a
different lift system.


You asked. I answered. The data for more experienced pilots stacks up the
same. I included the 500 hrs or less data because it's what I had at my
fingertips. Most military pilots will tell you that the AV-8B's mishap
rates are above other military aircraft--and it's a maintenance hog.


According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
SNIP

So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an indictment of
the STOVL concept itself.


That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
meted this out.


SNIP

Unless you can't support the operation adequately with the CTOL aircraft.

Brooks


Which you can.

--Woody


Now ask me if I think it's a good idea that the F-35 is a single engine
aircraft or whether I think it's a good idea that the Navy guys have
decided not to put an internal gun on their version.

--Woody

Pooh Bear wrote in message ...
JL Grasso wrote:

On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 21:40:20 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

So the radio altimeter was accurate ? I think not. And that was known to be one of the weak
spots in the A320's systems at that time IIRC.

I'm guessing that Capt Asseline realised that the radar altimeter was malfunctioning and
reverted to baro readings.


Regds, Graham

You need to know that at 12:45:11, the aircraft was still well off the
airport area by several thousand yards. They were over a hilly,
partially-forested area (Hardt Forest) to the right of the approach end of
runway 02 (which was the actual runway they were supposed to parallel
during the flyover).

Ahh - the problem with the briefing !

You should also know that radar altimeters report the
distance between the transceiver antennas and any objects below.

Yes indeed - I do.

So, if
the topography of the area below varies, or the altitude varies, the
readings change nearly immediately.

Agreed.

So let's check the topography then ? The flight path etc. From my own experience, that general area
is pretty flat but I'm interested in seeing any info.

Changes in the attitude of the
aircraft can sometimes have effects on the readings also.

I can see that too - indeed you could possibly call it a deficiency of rad alts.

This is
something that an experienced Captain would know, and something a
planespotter would not.

Can't resist being Bertei's pal ? If only I had the time to go spot planes ! Last time I had a
look-around I saw some nice kit at Panshanger. I'd rather spend my time 'spotting' attractive women
- and getting to know them actually.

If you would actually read something comprehensive concerning this accident, you could see that
the RadAlt was consistent while over the relatively level terrain of the airfield - just as one
would expect.

Indeed it is.


I also assume that if the radar altimeter was broken, it would have been
deferred MMEL and cited as such in the investigation.

I never asserted it was broken. Simply that the implementation at that time in the A320 had given
rise to concerns about its accuracy.

Actually - you succeeded in diverting my attention from what I consider to be one of the more
intruiging aspects of this crash - notably a suggested compressor stall.


Graham

nope no comressor stall.

according to tarver, airbus's crash at the end of the runway because
its unknown and unmapped.

"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...
On 2/29/04 8:58, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...

Not at all; your argument was so lacking in logic that I saw little
reason
to bother. But if you are so interested in improving yourself, here
goes:

Quite the condescending gentleman aren't you?

Not really. I was willing to let that particular passage go unanswered, but
you are so all fired up to debate it that you wanted to make a big point of
it, so you got your answer.


"CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it
SNIP

What you ignore is that the "capping" (by which you actually menat
"stacking", I presume) is utterly dependent upon a number of external
factors that don't necessarily impact the operations of a STOVL
aircraft.

'Round and 'round. First of all, stack is not a verb. It's a noun.

Better check the ol' dictionary again. It is indeed also a verb; my
handy-dandy Webster's defines it as "to pile up in a stack".

If I'm
in the CAS stack, I'm capping.

Whatever you say, pal. I had assumed you were referring to some
verb-transformed version of CAP, as in "combat air patrol". If so you might
want to clue DoD in on your change to the definition of CAP, which is, "An
aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the
critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defense area, for the purpose
of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their
targets. Also called CAP. See also airborne alert; barrier combat air
patrol; patrol; rescue combat air patrol." Don't see any reference to CAS
usage there. ( http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/c/01033.html )
Of course, to be completely honest, there is no reference to the term CAS
stack in that publication, either. So why don't we just both claim victory
regarding this particularly weighty matter and be done with it?


You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a
commodity
SNIP
the ground commander's needs. He wants some CBU-105's in the mix? SNIP

You make a correct argument. The nearer an airfield/CV is to the battle,
the more sorties you can generate. Afghanistan is a good example of a
place
that was hard to get to by both CV and the USAF.

And it was also one where the inability to provide specific weapons loadout
requests in a timely manner was problematic, as witnessed by the Anaconda
fight, where the aircraft were not always optimally loaded out to handle the
requirments of the ground force at that given moment--this is another
advantage of the STOVL platform, which can hit a FARP to load out the
required munitions.


I'm saying it's not worth the risk/extra cost, and I disagree with your
assessment of how many scenarios make the concept worth the cost. The
decision has been made. I disagree with it.

Fine. Disagreement within our military is, IMO, what makes it great. As
Patton once said, "If everybody is in agreement, then somebody is not
thinking" (or something similarly worded--been a few years since I read that
quote). I'll take the opposite stance, in that I view increasing our
versatility as a key requirement for our future military needs, especially
in view of the environment that we find ourselves in and facing for the
foreseeable future, where a lack of specific threat characterization until
that threat is immediately immenent is the norm.


SNIP
It was actually YOU that suggested that the USAF was trying to make
nice
with the USMC.

No, it was not. I was being quite facetious with that query. That you
found
it palusible is rather telling of your grasp of this situation.


I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
intelligent discussion.

Apologies if you were offended. The sarcasm introduced in my original
comment regarding whether you thought the USAF was merely making nice to the
USMC was IMO rather mild--hang around Usenet long enough and you will
experience much worse, I promise you. Suffice it to say that the USAF is not
pursuing the purchase of the STVL version of the F-35 as a minor portion of
their overall F-35 buy due to any desire to make things easy for the USMC,
OK?


Firstly, if the STOVL version were axed, the USMC would most
SNIP
They are already onboard. They just seem to grasp the importance of being
more versatile a bit better than you do.

I grasp what's useful and what's not.

If you can't grasp the "usefulness" of versatility in the modern and future
military picture, then I beleive you need to reconsider. Had I told you in
August of 2001 that we needed to be able and ready to go into Afghanistan
with a combination of airpower and landpower, you'd have laughed at me. The
plain fact of the matter is that we don't *know* where, when, how, or what
the next threat will be or its nature. That requires versatility on the part
of the military forces. The USAF has probably been one of the more energetic
proponents of improving the versatility of its units and platforms; the USMC
another. The Army and Navy have been IMO relative late bloomers in this
regard, but now we are seeing some real movement in their camps as well. The
flip-side of this versatility card is that those forces that *don't* become
versatile, or can't become more versatile, become prime fodder for
elimination by being labled as "non-transformational" (the Army, for
example, is *finally* moving towards the concept of the brigade combat team
being its primary unit of action, as opposed to the Cold War
mentality-inspired division; this helps a bit in making their heavy
formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF
tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL
F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which
is solely A model equipped.




Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
SNIP
that last one shouldn't count... Not unique to the STOVL discussion. I
was on a roll.)

Meaningless. Compare the accident rates per hours flown and get back to
me.
Then tell us how that applies to the F-35B, a different aircraft with a
different lift system.


You asked. I answered. The data for more experienced pilots stacks up
the
same. I included the 500 hrs or less data because it's what I had at my
fingertips. Most military pilots will tell you that the AV-8B's mishap
rates are above other military aircraft--and it's a maintenance hog.

OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping
together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident
rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not
equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently
more risky than CTOL.



According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
SNIP

So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
indictment of
the STOVL concept itself.


That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
meted this out.

And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K
hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then
why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate
than their earlier ancestors?

Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?



SNIP

Unless you can't support the operation adequately with the CTOL
aircraft.

Brooks


Which you can.

You can't guarantee that. Imagine a scenario where the fight in Afghanistan
had not been able to rely as heavily as it did upon the Northern Alliance in
the ground combat role. When US lives are on the line in that ground
environment, the demand for CAS will inevitably increase. The demand for
tanker support to keep the C-17's flowing into the intermediate staging
base, or even directly into the area of operations' aerial port of
debarkation (APOD), will increase, meaning less available to support the use
of CTOL fighters in the loooong range CAS effort. Or, imagine a scenario
where we are forced to (gasp!) take on two different simulataneous combat
operations in different theaters, one being a more major conflict that
consumes the lions share of the available tanking and bomber (read as
"really long range and high capacity CAS platform, in addition to its BAI
and "strategic" roles") assets. You don't have the option of just saying,
"Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
Versatility rules.

Brooks


--Woody


Now ask me if I think it's a good idea that the F-35 is a single engine
aircraft or whether I think it's a good idea that the Navy guys have
decided not to put an internal gun on their version.

--Woody

On 3/1/04 21:44, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...
SNIP
Not really. I was willing to let that particular passage go unanswered, but
you are so all fired up to debate it that you wanted to make a big point of
it, so you got your answer.


Fair enough. I'll put it to bed.


"CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
SNIP
stack in that publication, either. So why don't we just both claim victory
regarding this particularly weighty matter and be done with it?


I'm done with this point too.


You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a
SNIP

I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
intelligent discussion.

Apologies if you were offended. The sarcasm introduced in my original
comment regarding whether you thought the USAF was merely making nice to the
USMC was IMO rather mild--hang around Usenet long enough and you will
experience much worse, I promise you. Suffice it to say that the USAF is not
pursuing the purchase of the STVL version of the F-35 as a minor portion of
their overall F-35 buy due to any desire to make things easy for the USMC,
OK?


OK. Now we're ebbing and flowing. Any offense taken on my part was
certainly minor. I hope that I haven't given you the impression that I'm
the thin-skinned type. I've been dealing with critique and criticism for
years (not just since I started conversing on RAMN in about 1995 either).
Frankly, the more I learn about aviation and tactics, the more I realize I
don't know.

Honestly, any speculation on my part about why the USAF is buying STOVL
F-35's is just that.

SNIP
formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF
tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL
F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which
is solely A model equipped.

Yes it is. It also provides them a shot at expansion and secures a foothold
in what they probably consider to be a growth area in tactical aviation.
The blue-suited brethren are fairly savvy folk.

Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
SNIP

OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping
together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident
rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not
equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently
more risky than CTOL.


F-8 and AV-8B are apples and oranges (old apples, young oranges?) due to
their operating in mostly different eras. During a portion of the F-8's
life span, many of the safety programs that were input in later years (e.g.
the NATOPS program IIRC) were not in effect. Compare the F/A-18 or F-14
rates with the AV-8B.

The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal), speaks
to the larger issue. On the way to dinner tonight, I polled a couple of
(Hornet) pilots as to how they thought the AV-8B stacked up to the F/A-18
from a safety standpoint. Death trap was the general consensus. Granted,
they think neanderthal, like me.



According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
SNIP

So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
indictment of
the STOVL concept itself.


That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
meted this out.

And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K
hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then
why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate
than their earlier ancestors?


Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
that were put into effect).

Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?


Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still relies
on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

SNIP
"Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
Versatility rules.

Brooks


Ironically, I also find myself arguing from the same perspective when I talk
to USAF dudes who say that CV's are washed up and not cost effective, so
believe me when I say, I see your points.

--Woody

"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...
On 3/1/04 21:44, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...

snip


OK. Now we're ebbing and flowing. Any offense taken on my part was
certainly minor. I hope that I haven't given you the impression that I'm
the thin-skinned type. I've been dealing with critique and criticism for
years (not just since I started conversing on RAMN in about 1995 either).
Frankly, the more I learn about aviation and tactics, the more I realize I
don't know.

Shoot, I don't know diddly about actual air tactics beyond what I have read,
so you are light years ahead of me. I have had some experience with the CAS
planning cycle from the groundpounder's perspective, and one of the biggest
gripes we had was the lack of responsiveness and that 72-48-24 hour
timeline. To give the USAF credit where it is due, it sounds like that
situation has improved mightily over the past couple of years.


Honestly, any speculation on my part about why the USAF is buying STOVL
F-35's is just that.

SNIP
formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A
USAF
tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the
CTOL
F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one
which
is solely A model equipped.

Yes it is. It also provides them a shot at expansion and secures a
foothold
in what they probably consider to be a growth area in tactical aviation.
The blue-suited brethren are fairly savvy folk.

That is true too. Though my take is that the term "joint" now has a
significantly more concrete meaning in all of the services than it did even
five or six years ago.


Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or
any
SNIP

OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not
lumping
together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the
accident
rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does
not
equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is
inherently
more risky than CTOL.


F-8 and AV-8B are apples and oranges (old apples, young oranges?) due to
their operating in mostly different eras. During a portion of the F-8's
life span, many of the safety programs that were input in later years
(e.g.
the NATOPS program IIRC) were not in effect. Compare the F/A-18 or F-14
rates with the AV-8B.

Twin engined aircraft with single engine aircraft? I don't think so. Take
the F-16, which does indeed have a significantly lower accident rate (a bit
under three per 100K hours IIRC). I can see your point, and acknowledge that
the AV-8 is indeed more accident prone than its contemporaries--but that
does noy IMO yield a concrete conclusion versus the F-35B.


The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal),
speaks
to the larger issue. On the way to dinner tonight, I polled a couple of
(Hornet) pilots as to how they thought the AV-8B stacked up to the F/A-18
from a safety standpoint. Death trap was the general consensus. Granted,
they think neanderthal, like me.

Yeah, I once attended a joint course with a polyglot of participants,
including both an F-18 pilot and a P-3 bus driver. The Hornet driver was
ceaseless in his hammering of the Orion guy--I think he was mainly ****ed
because to him "deployment" meant six months on a CVN halfway around the
world, while the VP folks were pulling up to 179-day (in order to keep it
under that TDY pay maximum) rotations to Iceland, where the fishing is
outstanding (I don't recall him decrying the VP folks also having to do
those tours during the winter months...). Definitely neanderthal... :-)




According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
SNIP

So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
indictment of
the STOVL concept itself.


That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B
has
meted this out.

And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per
100K
hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate,
then
why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident
rate
than their earlier ancestors?


Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
that were put into effect).

I have no doubt that those factors are important. But when all is said and
done, the fact is that as aircraft complexity has increased, the accident
rate has generally decreased. This is true even *since* such safety programs
were initiated--witness the low rate for the F-16, which has within its own
career grown increasingly complex (compare a F-16A Block 10 to the F-16C
Block 52). I do believe that its accident rate is abit lower than that of
the F-4, which had that whole extra engine included...


Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with
that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically
different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?


Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still
relies
on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Maybe. But then again, maybe not. For all we know the typically "increased
risk" associated with operatins from a CVN may lead to the C model having a
worse accident record. I don't think there is enough information that
*could* be available at this point to postively conclude either way.


Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

OK. But go back to those folks and ask them to earnestly try to put
themselves in the boots of the brigade commander on the ground who has
troops in contact, is outnumbered (as we can expect to be in many cases),
and needs to shift his air support quickly from one target set to a whole
new class of targets, while also needing/desperately wanting an increase of
maybe 30% in the CAS sortie count--and oh, by the way, the nearest CTOL
fighter airstrip is 1000 miles away, since they have yet to reconstruct the
airfield in his AO that is supporting him via C-130 shuttle. Do you think
that *he* might value having a squadron (USAF type, with 24 birds) of SOVL
assets capable of hitting a FARP ten or twelve klicks to the rear of his CP?

Or alternatively, when the CVN's are all clustered in (choose body of water)
handling the major contingency going down with (choose potential foe), and
your USMC BLT is forced to devite from its transit to that area while
enroute and FRAGO'd to execute operations independently elsewhere, would you
want the services of some F-35B's operating as part of your parent amphib
strike group?


SNIP
"Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
Versatility rules.

Brooks


Ironically, I also find myself arguing from the same perspective when I
talk
to USAF dudes who say that CV's are washed up and not cost effective, so
believe me when I say, I see your points.

OK. I personally find the CVN to be of immense import--in specific
circumstances and conditions. Much like the F-35B--it ain't the best
all-around strike/CAS platform available, but it does have its niches.
Neither is necessarily the best tool for *all* potentialities.

Are you still at China Lake? Wonderful place (note my sarcasm)...right next
to that other gardenspot I used to frequent on occasion, FT Irwin (even more
sarcasm). Last time I went through that area I spent the night in that
little town near the main entrance to China Lake, enroute to Lone Pine for a
few days fishing in the higher elevations.

Brooks


--Woody

Pechs1 wrote:

ice- On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s or
B-2s. BRBR

Maybe B-1s, but not the B-2...particularly when the sun comes up.

Don't see why, the B-2's got a far better ceiling than the B-1, as well as being
radar/IR stealthy.

ice- (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover the
same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?
BRBR

One F-18, after the B-1 gets bagged....

Up to now, at least, its the F-18s that have been getting bagged.

Guy

Guy- Don't see why, the B-2's got a far better ceiling than the B-1, as well
as being
radar/IR stealthy. BRBR

Wingy to lead-"What's that thing at right 2 oclock?"

"HS, a B-2, lead's in hot."

Get in front of it and strafe it like a truck.
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

On 3/2/04 0:18, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Woody Beal" wrote in message
SNIP

Shoot, I don't know diddly about actual air tactics beyond what I have read,
so you are light years ahead of me. I have had some experience with the CAS
planning cycle from the groundpounder's perspective, and one of the biggest
gripes we had was the lack of responsiveness and that 72-48-24 hour
timeline. To give the USAF credit where it is due, it sounds like that
situation has improved mightily over the past couple of years.


I know a bit--all from the perspective of Naval Aviation. I know what we
bring to the table.

SNIP

Twin engined aircraft with single engine aircraft? I don't think so. Take
the F-16, which does indeed have a significantly lower accident rate (a bit
under three per 100K hours IIRC). I can see your point, and acknowledge that
the AV-8 is indeed more accident prone than its contemporaries--but that
does noy IMO yield a concrete conclusion versus the F-35B.


Concur that it does not yield a concrete conclusion, but it does yield a
tendency based on several possible single point failures. If lift fan doors
don't open, if lift rotor fails to engage properly, if engine fails during
transition to STOVL life gets tough at a very critical and low altitude
moment. These problems (though not identical) are similar to those
experienced in the AV-8B.

Mechanical failures in the STOVL regime are unforgiving because of their low
altitude locale.


The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal),
SNIP
those tours during the winter months...). Definitely neanderthal... :-)


Beating up on P-3 guys is a standard Hornet pilot sport. I choose not to
participate--kind of like clubbing baby seals--no sport in it.

SNIP
Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
that were put into effect).

I have no doubt that those factors are important. But when all is said and
done, the fact is that as aircraft complexity has increased, the accident
rate has generally decreased. This is true even *since* such safety programs
were initiated--witness the low rate for the F-16, which has within its own
career grown increasingly complex (compare a F-16A Block 10 to the F-16C
Block 52). I do believe that its accident rate is abit lower than that of
the F-4, which had that whole extra engine included...


Complexity is not the sole issue as you point out. Sometimes it goes toward
mission accomplishment, sometimes survivability, and some of that complexity
goes toward increasing flight safety. In the case of the F-16 or the
F/A-18, the mechanical complexity associated with the flight controls
actually keeps those aircraft in the air. In the case of the F-14, the DFCS
makes the jet more stable. The complexity of the F-35B when compared to the
C or the A only gives it an additional option for landing--a complexity with
several possible single point failures in a critical flight regime.


Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with
that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically
different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?


Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still
relies
on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Maybe. But then again, maybe not. For all we know the typically "increased
risk" associated with operatins from a CVN may lead to the C model having a
worse accident record. I don't think there is enough information that
*could* be available at this point to postively conclude either way.


My experience tells me that the STOVL will crash more than the CV which will
crash more than the CTOL.


Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

OK. But go back to those folks and ask them to earnestly try to put
themselves in the boots of the brigade commander on the ground who has
troops in contact, is outnumbered (as we can expect to be in many cases),
and needs to shift his air support quickly from one target set to a whole
new class of targets, while also needing/desperately wanting an increase of
maybe 30% in the CAS sortie count--and oh, by the way, the nearest CTOL
fighter airstrip is 1000 miles away, since they have yet to reconstruct the
airfield in his AO that is supporting him via C-130 shuttle. Do you think
that *he* might value having a squadron (USAF type, with 24 birds) of SOVL
assets capable of hitting a FARP ten or twelve klicks to the rear of his CP?


Absolutely. There aren't many scenarios like this in the world, though.
China maybe? Even in OIF, aircraft from ship's in the north (much further
than in the south) transited only about 350NM ro so to get into theater.

Or alternatively, when the CVN's are all clustered in (choose body of water)
handling the major contingency going down with (choose potential foe), and
your USMC BLT is forced to devite from its transit to that area while
enroute and FRAGO'd to execute operations independently elsewhere, would you
want the services of some F-35B's operating as part of your parent amphib
strike group?


Again, a luxury. "All the CVN's" tells me that you could easily spit one to
support the strike group--up to the elephants to fight out.

SNIP
OK. I personally find the CVN to be of immense import--in specific
circumstances and conditions. Much like the F-35B--it ain't the best
all-around strike/CAS platform available, but it does have its niches.
Neither is necessarily the best tool for *all* potentialities.


And I would like the U.S. Military to buy every weapons system out there...
Including F-35B's (which they will). I'd like them to have the money to
continue to recapitalize filling Carrier decks, and ARG's and MAG's with
aircraft. I'd like them to buy SATCOM for all of my Army buddies on the
ground--you get the picture.

I disagree with the way we've decided to spend our limited funds (F-35B, CV
version with no gun, F-22, etc).

Are you still at China Lake? Wonderful place (note my sarcasm)...right next
to that other gardenspot I used to frequent on occasion, FT Irwin (even more
sarcasm). Last time I went through that area I spent the night in that
little town near the main entrance to China Lake, enroute to Lone Pine for a
few days fishing in the higher elevations.

Brooks

Nope. Left there for the fleet in 1996. Loved living there though. Best
flying I've ever done. Worked for a great boss. Learned a LOT about RDT&E,
BRAC, civil servants, and the ins and outs of large organizations.

--Woody

Pechs1 wrote:

Guy- Don't see why, the B-2's got a far better ceiling than the B-1, as well
as being
radar/IR stealthy. BRBR

Wingy to lead-"What's that thing at right 2 oclock?"

"HS, a B-2, lead's in hot."

Get in front of it and strafe it like a truck.

And how many layers of CAP are they going to have to get through before they'd
even have the chance? That is, assuming we haven't destroyed every runway and
taxiway in the country first with cruise missiles or other weapons, and it's
pretty damned unlikely that we'd risk a B-1 or B-2 by day before we had air
supremacy.

Guy