The Corps - no to the Super Hornet

Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

you are right and that is why there is a need for a COIN Air Component
right now a full spread of platforms just for insurgency and that would
come with the assault ships





wrote in message
oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or
no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

wrote in message
ups.com...
The "big deck" assault ship idea is all right, but it seems you forget
about one of the most important things: DEPLOYMENT CYCLES...

Having only one such a ship would not make much sense, because that
would be usauble through only 6-to-9-month period within every 27
months (plus extensive overhauls required for such a weary vessel).

Sure, that would be a great tool for showing off (I can see the
headlines: "The situation in Bla-Bla Gulf is so tense, that the
President decided to send there a special assault ship, USS Kitty
Hawk, with over 50 Marine strike aircraft on board..." But it could
mean much more deterrence if the carrier was stationed at Guam, or
Japan...

P.S. To correct the squadron info: this fiscal year Marine Corps is
deactivating not one, but two deployable F/A-18 units, namely
VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-212.

For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest, and this
is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the ships that they
need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they should own every gator,
and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got a little more resolved either
by having truly dedicated USMC gunships.

As it is, right now the USN "loans" out assets to support their amphibious
force. It's always been a struggle to get the Navy to provide that support -
gators aren't as sexy as the other ships are. The hell of it is, a deployed
Marine unit is probably one of the best and most flexible assets that NCA
has.

As far as ships go, that can support F/A-18's, my point remains. If flown by
Marines, they will *try* to support Marines. But as long as their floating
airfield is Navy, the planes will frequently be tasked for things that do
not support Marines. I myself totally support short-deck planes, because
they tend to be available for moving mud. So as much as I think the Hornet
is a nice plane, it's not what the Corps needs all that badly.

AHS

wrote in message
oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

The Navy has noticed - so has the Marine Corps - that if you want very short
response times for CAS, going into places like Iraq and Afghanistan, you
aren't going to ship-base anyway. When we handled AV-8's in Camp Lejeune,
they routinely touched down on a main road aboard base, after they got there
from Cherry Point...little bit of training doing that, then back up in the
air to attack G-10 impact.

During GW1 Harriers and Cobras did most of the CAS and CIFS for Marines.
Close to 70 Harriers actually operated from airbases on land, and they were
closer to Iraq than any carrier air. Only 20 Harriers were at sea. The
average turnaround for the land-based planes was about 25 minutes.

Considering that I was in one of the first planned assault waves for more
than one Kuwait landing, I got a warm fuzzy from seeing a mean AH-1 perched
on the deck. We usually had a few on USS RALEIGH.

The problem with an area like the Gulf and the North Arabian Sea is shallow
water and Iran. You just are not going to want to get that close. As fast as
planes fly, CAS is no good if it takes an hour to get there. You need it in
10 minutes.

AHS

Arved Sandstrom wrote:
For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest, and this
is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the ships that they
need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they should own every gator,
and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got a little more resolved either
by having truly dedicated USMC gunships.

No.

There is no place in the USMC for a program to train marines to operate
and maintain large ships.

The Marines need to stay focused on the riflemen and those that directly
support the riflemen.

-HJC

We are all talking around the wheel and not realizing that the world is
now "JOINT" - so there can be labor management but the mechanisms today
allow the Army to own a lot of ships and a lot of flying vehicles.

But you are right in the pinning down of "ownership" - and I think what
we are suggesting is that an aviation assault ship, even a full deck
carrier refurbished to be one, will still have a Naval Officer as
Captain but the mission commander will be an officer reporting to the
Amphibious Expeditionary Force Commander and this guy could be an Air
Force three star but probably would not - it would be a Marine. What
would happen is that the physical ship itself would take a drastic
make-over as it switched from a naval aviation ship to a command assault
aviation ship. The mixture of aircraft. MV-22's, and helicopters would
all form a Marine Corps Air Group not a Naval Air Wing but they may
still call it a CAG - stuff like that


"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message
news
Arved Sandstrom wrote:
For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest,
and this is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the
ships that they need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they
should own every gator, and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got
a little more resolved either by having truly dedicated USMC
gunships.

No.

There is no place in the USMC for a program to train marines to
operate and maintain large ships.

The Marines need to stay focused on the riflemen and those that
directly support the riflemen.

-HJC

Jacek,

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...

Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.

Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.

There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.

So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.

Two codas to the above:

* 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.

* Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)

Owl sends

--
Mike Kanze

"It's easy to delegate once you've learned to let a toddler spend 23 minutes buttering toast without an overwhelming urge to intervene."

- Jared Sandberg, Wall Street Journal, 5/29/2007

wrote in message oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

Thank you for putting some light on the facts behind the story
depicted in Coonts' book. As far as I remember squadrons like
VMA(AW)-224 or VMA(AW)-533, who happened to deploy aboard USN aircraft
carriers, also did not have their own KA-6Ds, so they had to borrow
some (from VA-42 or VA-128 at least in one of these cases, IIRC?)...

Best regards,
Jacek Zemlo


On 24 Cze, 00:34, "Mike Kanze" wrote:
Jacek,

Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...

Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.

Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.

There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.

So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.

Two codas to the above:

* 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.

* Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)

Owl sends

--
Mike Kanze

If so, I would not be much astonished to see the Corps saying goodbye
to their F/A-18s earlier than doing the same with Harriers they're in
a better control of...

Sad to hear that... Now planes from the carrier flying five-plus-hours
XCAS missions, with not fewer than three refuelings and some (I
believe not much) loiter time "in the box", and it is all for
nothing?...

On the other hand, an aircraft carrier is a nice tool to deliver some
Marine TACAIR to a base ashore (if available) when something happens
in the region given, especially when Marine units are better suited/
trained to fulfill the task. I have heard such a practice (of having
several birds rotating at not-fully-equipped land airfield and fully
maintained on the Boat) was positively tested recent years.

Best regards,
Jacek


On 23 Cze, 17:08, "Arved Sandstrom" wrote:
The Navy has noticed - so has the Marine Corps - that if you want very short
response times for CAS, going into places like Iraq and Afghanistan, you
aren't going to ship-base anyway. When we handled AV-8's in Camp Lejeune,
they routinely touched down on a main road aboard base, after they got there
from Cherry Point...little bit of training doing that, then back up in the
air to attack G-10 impact.

During GW1 Harriers and Cobras did most of the CAS and CIFS for Marines.
Close to 70 Harriers actually operated from airbases on land, and they were
closer to Iraq than any carrier air. Only 20 Harriers were at sea. The
average turnaround for the land-based planes was about 25 minutes.

Considering that I was in one of the first planned assault waves for more
than one Kuwait landing, I got a warm fuzzy from seeing a mean AH-1 perched
on the deck. We usually had a few on USS RALEIGH.

The problem with an area like the Gulf and the North Arabian Sea is shallow
water and Iran. You just are not going to want to get that close. As fast as
planes fly, CAS is no good if it takes an hour to get there. You need it in
10 minutes.

AHS

Jacek,

Late in the Vietnam conflict, all carrier-based A-6 squadrons - including 224 during its CVW-15 deployment - had A-6Bs and KA-6Ds. In 224's case they likely received them from whichever USN A-6 squadron had just returned from deployment at the time they started their workups, likely one of the NAS Oceana-based squadrons since they were working up at MCAS Cherry Point.

533's carrier deployments all came after the Vietnam War, and only during one of these (1984, aboard SARATOGA) did they have Ks. By that time all of the Bs and Cs were gone, with the remaining usable airframes converted to Es.

I can't speak for VA-42, but VA-128 had few or no Ks during my tenure with VA-95. Again, with a war ongoing, the limited number of Ks were promptly cross-decked between returning and deploying outfits, with some Ks never going any closer to the U.S. than NAS Cubi Point. The Bs and Cs were even fewer, and never found in the FRS. This of course doesn't include those birds that were cycled into depot-level maintenance at NARF Alameda when required.

--
Mike Kanze

"It's easy to delegate once you've learned to let a toddler spend 23 minutes buttering toast without an overwhelming urge to intervene."

- Jared Sandberg, Wall Street Journal, 5/29/2007

wrote in message ps.com...
Thank you for putting some light on the facts behind the story
depicted in Coonts' book. As far as I remember squadrons like
VMA(AW)-224 or VMA(AW)-533, who happened to deploy aboard USN aircraft
carriers, also did not have their own KA-6Ds, so they had to borrow
some (from VA-42 or VA-128 at least in one of these cases, IIRC?)...

Best regards,
Jacek Zemlo


On 24 Cze, 00:34, "Mike Kanze" wrote:
Jacek,

Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...

Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.

Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.

There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.

So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.

Two codas to the above:

* 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.

* Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)

Owl sends

--
Mike Kanze