ATC says wrong position

I think my approach would be to emphasize to the student the
importance of situational awareness in all instances, and the
attitude that he is the one flying and responsible...I think students
(and advanced pilots) sometimes fall into the trap of
allowing/expecting too much hand-holding from ATC.

I agree with all you said.

I've been aware of this problem with ATC for a while and use it to
illustrate to students how important it is for THEM to be in charge.

I was just curious as to 1) how often others had noticed this, and 2)
who was using this information in order to descend to intermediate
altitudes.

From a controllers point of view, the part about "you're X miles from X"
is just checking a box that needs to be checked. It's probably the one
messed up the most as either 1) you clear aircraft on multiple approaches
to multiple runways (not at the same time usually) and occasionally say
the wrong fix, or 2) you don't vector much for approaches and just
screw it up once in a while. I'm willing to bet all those other items,
(heading, altitude, approach clearance) are fairly accurate most of
the time. If I'm vectoring someone on a 100nm range (200nm from one
side of the scope to the other) and I say 3 miles instead of 3.5 or 4,
I suspect I wont get too much grief over it. If so, well, there's always
arcs and PT's.

For this reason, I tell students to never rely on ATC's
distance statements to make a descent.

Unless the mileage is off by some really high amount, I'd agree with
that approach, no pun intended. I assume most of you ignore the first
part of that clearance, as that is the only part of that transmission that
really is NOT a clearance anyway. Now if they give you the wrong
airport, runway, or approach, major warning flag.
But at a big airport with 12 ILS's and even more VOR, NDB, and GPS
approaches, and all the IAF's and FAF's to go along with all of those,
which are often not the same for a given runway - I'd be willing to cut
them some slack every now and then.

Chris

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 11:42:51 -0700, wrote:

Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide much information at
all with vectors to approach courses.


I thought that was more of a training issue. I have been told that up
until that accident, the training at the airlines (at least at TWA) was
that when ATC cleared you for an approach, descent to the initial charted
altitude on the approach plate was safe.


TWA, the Air Force, and some other operators taught that in training, as you
say. Others did not, but even those who didn't were still often in the lurch
with the ATC radar vector procedures in vogue at the time. With the
clearance TWA 514 received, those "who knew better" would have ended up far
too high to land, unless they could have gotten a fairly weak controller to
step them down on the MVA chart. Also, the approach chart was deficient as
to profile portrayal.


I was undergoing my instrument training at that time, and both I and my
instructor were surprised that TWA descended based on that approach
clearance. It was a number of years later that I discovered that their
descent was in accord with the then current TWA airline procedures.

So, you guys would have probably flown to the FAF at 7,000 then descended to
touchdown (300 feet) in some 5 miles. ;-)



There have been more unsafe situations resulting from vectors over the
years than anyone really knows. The NASA database is full of them, but
the FAA ignores the issue. Some are controller errors, some are pilot
errors, and some are a combination of the two.

Concur.

Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

Tarver Engineering wrote:



There have been more unsafe situations resulting from vectors over the
years than anyone really knows. The NASA database is full of them, but
the FAA ignores the issue. Some are controller errors, some are pilot
errors, and some are a combination of the two.

That is because FAA is afraid of opening ATC controllers up to civil
liability. What FAA fails to comprehend is that "gross negligence", or
"restraint of trade", is required to win a lawsuit in such a situation.
Human error is not gross negligence and the issue could be safely addressed.

If the controller is reasonably acting within the scope of agency, there is no
way a controller is going to be held personally liable in any civil lawsuit. In
any case, the feds would indemify the controller in such a very unlikely event,
unlike the private sector.

The FAA is far more concerned about the NTSB and the industry "knowing too
much," thus forcing a change in entrenched ATC procedures. The handlers at the
FAA see every challenge at ATC procedures, if succesful, perhaps reducing
"capacity."

It's all about moving traffic and nothing about safety.

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 19:49:50 GMT, Greg Esres wrote:

I think my approach would be to emphasize to the student the
importance of situational awareness in all instances, and the
attitude that he is the one flying and responsible...I think students
(and advanced pilots) sometimes fall into the trap of
allowing/expecting too much hand-holding from ATC.

I agree with all you said.

I've been aware of this problem with ATC for a while and use it to
illustrate to students how important it is for THEM to be in charge.

I was just curious as to 1) how often others had noticed this, and 2)
who was using this information in order to descend to intermediate
altitudes.


I cannot recall ever hearing ATC give me a "distance from" an incorrect fix
during an approach clearance. 90% of my flying is in the NE receiving
radar services.

Also, my recollection (and I could be wrong here), is that during the times
I get a "maintain ....ft until established" clearance, it's for a precision
approach. For non-precision approaches, I've received a "maintain ...ft
until crossing xyz"


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

wrote in message ...

Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide
much information at all with vectors to approach courses.


TWA 514 wasn't vectored for the approach.

wrote in message

The FAA is far more concerned about the NTSB and the industry "knowing too
much," thus forcing a change in entrenched ATC procedures. The handlers
at the
FAA see every challenge at ATC procedures, if succesful, perhaps reducing
"capacity."

Blakey seems a little less interested in such nonsense. Let us hope there
will be a third zero.


It's all about moving traffic and nothing about safety.

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 18:02:26 -0700, wrote:

So, you guys would have probably flown to the FAF at 7,000 then descended to
touchdown (300 feet) in some 5 miles. ;-)

I don't have a copy of the approach at hand, and I cannot recall how I
would have flown it. Clearly your supposition is ludicrous. However, I
would NOT have descended from 7,000' until I was on a charted portion of
the approach.

If you have a copy of that approach, I would be able to give you more
precise information.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

Also, my recollection (and I could be wrong here), is that during the times
I get a "maintain ....ft until established" clearance, it's for a precision
approach. For non-precision approaches, I've received a "maintain ...ft
until crossing xyz"


"Crossing" is to be used if they vector you to a non-published extension of an
approach course. "Established" is to be used if they vector you onto a
published segment of an approach. Precision or non-precision makes no
difference.

(Ref 711065P, 5-9-1, and all associated notes, and 5-9-4, and all associated
notes.)

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:

wrote in message ...

Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide
much information at all with vectors to approach courses.


TWA 514 wasn't vectored for the approach.

Well, technically you're correct. In fact the FAA tried to argue, and lost,
that he was a non-radar arrival. Washington Center vectored him onto the
Armel 301 radial (which eventually became the final approach course) some 35
miles prior to the VOR, told him to maintain 7,000 then handed him off to
approach control. Approach control simply cleared him for the approach
while the flight was still on the non-published portion of the 301 radial,
and the approach clearance contained no altitude restrictions.

If it smells like a vector, it is a vector. It would be more like a
7110.65P 5-9-4 vector than a 5-9-1 vector.

But, your assertion that 514 was not vectored for the approach is pure
Steve-techo-bablle bull****. It was that kind of attitude that created the
atmosphere at the FAA to set the stage for the crash.