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#21
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and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large failed to live up to the hopes and fears of the generals The "Strategic Bombing Survey" conducted after the war came to the same conclusion. German production actually increased during the war. And note that the purpose of "USBUS" was to prove that strategic bombing worked, and that therefore the U.S. Air Force should be created as a third branch of the military forces. It appears the most valuable service provided by the 8th Air Force was not in damaging German war production, but by shooting down LW fighters in preparation for the invasion. Without air superiority, the Allied ground forces would have had a much tougher time, if indeed the invasion could have succeeded at all. "A War To Be Won" notes that the Germans had more 88 mm flak guns at home, aimed at the USAAF and the RAF, than it had on the eastern front defending from Russian tanks. Along the same line (and same source): the life of a German fighter pilot over the homeland was as endangered as that of a footsoldier on the eastern front. And the life of an American airman over Germany was as brief as that of a marine in the Pacific. It was a bloody, bloody campaign. I forget how many fatalities the 8th AF suffered over Germany, but it was whole divisions! all the best -- Dan Ford email: (put Cubdriver in subject line) The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org |
#22
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In message , vincent p.
norris writes The point I was making was that the "Fortress" was unable to protect its crews as the USAAC (and other air forces) had fondly believed before the war..... I don't think anyone could possibly dispute that! and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large failed to live up to the hopes and fears of the generals The "Strategic Bombing Survey" conducted after the war came to the same conclusion. German production actually increased during the war. German production increased after about '43 because they drafted women into the factories and also put most of the factories on a 3-shift 24 hour day. Mike -- M.J.Powell |
#23
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German production increased after about '43 because they drafted women
into the factories and also put most of the factories on a 3-shift 24 hour day. Ah, but there were still factories! That's the point. We couldn't destroy them. vince norris |
#24
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I forget how many fatalities the 8th AF suffered over Germany...
I seem to recall the nunber 28,000, but I wouldn't bet on it. vince norris |
#25
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Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: vincent p. norris Date: 4/16/04 6:56 PM Pacific Daylight Time Message-id: German production increased after about '43 because they drafted women into the factories and also put most of the factories on a 3-shift 24 hour day. Ah, but there were still factories! That's the point. We couldn't destroy them. vince norris Sure we could. But why bother? Just destroy the oil and no matter what the factory turns out it isn't going anywhere. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#26
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WalterM140 wrote in message ...
Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the USAAF that largely deprived the GAF of fuel. I suggest people actually look up the Speer oil reports, they show the credit for the reduction in avgas production was much more evenly shared between RAF and USAAF raids than Walter prefers. I suggest that the people check what the leader of the RAF said: "But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said Portal, "it is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have been too costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.' Here was a remarkable admission from the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of American air policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat. Not surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area campaign. He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and none whatever in the this present oil policy'. --"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings Bomber Command was defeated over Germany in the spring of 1944. It was the Oil Campaign, largely pursued by the Americans that deprived the GAF of fuel and that allowed the RAF back over Germay with any chance of not being shot to pieces. Bomber Command's Harris had to be ordered to bomb oil targets and sloughed that off whenever he could. Walt |
#27
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Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the
USAAF that largely deprived the GAF of fuel. The destruction of the oil plants was a joint effort prosecuted by both the USAAF and the RAF In the crucial period it was largely pursued by the Americans. Look at what the leader of the RAF said: "But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said Portal, "it is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have been too costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.' Here was a remarkable admission from the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of American air policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat. Not surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area campaign. He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and none whatever in the this present oil policy'. --"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings Harris, for his part, sloughed off bombing oil targets as much as he dared, although all the key players except him saw it as the most important target class by far. He continued to send German cities to his "bonfires" and detracted, perhaps decisively, from Bomber Command's considerable potential to help the war effort. Returning to the main point, the review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away" that appeared in the WSJ did a disservice to the memory of U.S. fliers and U.S. air power in Europe during WWII. Walt |
#28
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I wrote:
I read your review on the WSJ of "A Long Way to Bombs Away". It's true as far as it goes to say that, for a time, 63% of B-17 crew failed to complete their tours. It's true that the USAAF largely joined the RAF in terror bombing in 1945. Incorrect, once the USAAF adopted radar as a method for dropping bombs their accuracy became comparable with the night bombers on those raids. I didn't say anything about that (at least in my post that you quote). What are you talking about? This review in the WSJ was a serious over-simplification of what really happened. As you show below, you have little of substance to add. The USAAF started using radar in late 1943, initially with less accuracy than the Butt reports figures for night bombers in 1941, the sort of expected result as the new idea was tried. As for terror raids the answer is up to the individual, the bombers hit things and people. So you don't disagree with what I said. It is also true: That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far worse than the RAF did. Walter has a careful selection of quotes from a few Germans to "prove" this. So you don't disagree with what I said. That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming point using visual means. Walter likes to highlight what he perceives as the best USAAF results, if this means ignoring the problems or using non typical raids so be it. So you don't disagree with what I said. Percentage of bombs dropped by the 8th Air force using visual sighting, 1943 56.5 1944 41.2 1945 41.5 overall 42.1 So you don't disagree with what I said. 100% of the bombs dropped by visual means were dropped by visual means. And over 1/3 of those bombs landed within 1,000 feet of the aiming point during 1944. The USAAF was capable of some pretty fair accuracy for the time. Again, this review in the WSJ gave a poor and false impression of what happened. In good visibility according to the USSBS, 8.5% of bombs dropped over 3 miles from the target in the period September to December 1944. And for the year 1944, over 1/3 did land within 1,000 feet of the aiming point. So you don't disagree with what I said. That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to which the Germans could find no answer. In 1943 the Germans found the answer, the USAAF response in 1944 inflicted a defeat on the Luftwaffe day fighters, in 1945 the Luftwaffe response was really beginning to worry the USAAF, the Me262. So you don't disagree with what I said. That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the unescorted B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid. Walter likes to run this line, last time he tried to do this he simply counted the Luftwaffe training units in Germany as proof of the concentration of fighters. So you don't disagree with what I said. The first 8th Air force raid on Germany sent 72 bombers, apparently 6 is "few", the next was 91 bombers sent, both in January 1943, so the claim is the Luftwaffe "denuded" the "other fronts" around January 1943. Ninety-one bombers are a few dozen, last I checked. The March 18, 1943 raid to Vegesack included IIRC, 73 B-17's and 24 B-24s. I'd say that's a few dozen. The fact is that the Germans began returning their day fighters to Germany when USAAF raids consisted of just a few dozen heavy bombers. "In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention over the British raids on our towns." "The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland So you don't disagree with what I said. That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil production by 50%. Walter does not like to actually look at the Speer reports that shows the first group of USAAF synthetic oil raids cut avgas production from around 5,850 tons/day to around 4,850 tons/day. I don't see a source for that. My source says the -Americans- knocked out 90% of German aviation fuel production, and produced a 50% reduction in --three days--. "But now in May 1944 all that changed. Eighth Air Force's attacks against the synthetic oil industry in the Reich complemented raids by the Fifteenth Air Force out of Foggia in Italy against Romanian refineries and production facilities. The first strike from Britain came on 12 May; 935 bombers sortied against the synthetic oil plants at Zwickau, Merseburg-Leuna, Brux, Lutzkendorg, Bohlen, Zeitz, and Chemnitz. Allied bombers and escorting fighters encountered severe resistance. The results, while encouraging, were not decisive. The great Leuna plant, though damaged, lost only 18 percent of its capacity. Speer was, nevertheless enormously worried. ....After feverish efforts, production had come close to regaining preattack levels by the end of May. On the 28th, Eighth returned to attack oil targets throughout Germany. Over a two day period, it lost 84 bombers, but this time it badly damaged the petroleum industry. Combined with fifteenth Air Force's raids on Ploesti, American attacks cut petroleum production in half. [exactly as I said] The impact of the raids was apparent almost immediately...May's attacks were a prelude to punishing raids over the succeeding months. After a two-week pause, during which Allied bombers supported the invasion, the Americans staged a series of new attacks that knocked out 90 percent of aviation fuel production, so that by the end of the month total production had sunk to a miniscule 632 tons." -"A War to be Won" p. 328-29 by Murray and Millett Even if what you said were true (instead of being a lot of blue smoke and mirrors) it shows that the USAAF was capable of very great accuracy. I mean --three days-- of raids for the reduction you suggest? That would be fabulous. Especially when you consider what the various bombing surveys found after the war for the effects of five and half years British bombing -- that the British bombing of Germany was useless. In any case, this review in the WSJ gave a very skewed view of what was actually accomplished. The second group of strikes cut production from around 5,550 tons/day to around 2,800 tons/day. This is avgas, all not synthetic oil. Walter likes to simply ignore the difference. So you don't disagree with what I said. By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers, the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation. The Speer reports reproduced in the RAF history give the daily avgas output for May, June, July and September 1944. They show production drops after RAF and USAAF raids, for example after the RAF attack of 12 June avgas production drops from around 2,100 tons/day to 1,100 tons/day, the RAF raids of 22 June dropped production from around 1,250 tons.day to 600 tons/day. And so on for the various raids, the drop in production to 120 tons/day in late July 1944 was after a group of USAAF and RAF raids. So you don't disagree with what I said. That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command could not have operated over Germany at all. Walter ignores the reality RAF Bomber Command was operating over Germany long before the USAAF appeared. So you don't disagree with what I said. He has a careful selection of quotes that tries to "prove" his claim. So you don't disagree with what I said. Arthur Harris' despatch on operations has a graph of missing rate for heavy bombers sorties against targets in Germany. The war peak is in June 1944, there is a dramatic drop in mid July, after the capture of a night fighter showing the latest Luftwaffe radar and radar homing devices, and another dramatic drop as the coastal radar network and associated western airfields were lost in September 1944. So you don't disagree with what I said. That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft than all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though B-17 gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and dangerous. When I ran a basic back of the envelope calculation it looked like in 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 2 fighters shot down by the bombers per 3 B-17/24 it shot down. In early 1944 the ratio was 1 to 2. So you don't disagree with what I said. At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months in combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's. Apparently this is all the justification to claim the USAAF bombers were really heavy fighters in disguise. So you don't disagree with what I said. Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no invasion of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's, and her stablemate, the B-24. Walter likes to have the B-17 in the spotlight alone if he can. He simply ignores the reality that either the Luftwaffe fought for control of French airspace in early 1944 or it would not be able to intervene effectively against the invasion. The Germans did not generally fight over France in early 1944. They fought with, were engaged by, and were defeated over German targets by "strike packages" that included B-17's and B-24's. Unless it could keep the allied air forces away from its airbases it could not conduct effective operations. So either the Luftwaffe does not fight, and the result is basically as per history, or it does fight, and therefore loses more quickly because more allied fighters could make it to France than Germany. In the event British fighters played a limited role in this because they simply didn't have the range to get to areas the Germans were determined to defend. As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp, but did not persevere for the kill. This gives an idea of Walter's search for quote, Weigley wrote a history about the land campaign, but it is such a nice quote Walter will keep repeating it. See, Sinclair, this is when your bias and lies are most easily exposed. Dr. Weigley (who recented passed away) didn't write an account of the "land campaign", he wote an account about Eisenhower's --lieuttenants--. This included Spaatz and Doolittle, and also Montgomery, Tedder, Leigh Mallory, and for a time Harris also. Dr. Weigley may have meant to evoke with that title the mamouth work of Douglas Southall Freeman, "Lee's Lieutenants". But you are trying to denigrate Dr. Weigley's work as a history of the land campaign. Too bad that any fair minded person can see that the Allies -did- hold the key to victory to airpower in their hands. And a big part of that key squatted on hardstands in East Anglia while the crews slept in underheated Quonset huts in East Anglia. That was the B-17/B-24 force. Max Hastings suggested much the same thing as Dr. Weigley. But that is no fault of the B-17/B-24's or their crews. However later on Walter will attempt to denigrate the crews by over claiming their successes, rather than accurately recording what they did or could do. I have shown what they can do. The Germans knew: "The Americans' attacks, which followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous. It was in fact these attacks which caused the breakdown of the German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would have sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render Germany defenseless.--Albert Speer" --"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker. Back in December 2003 a) Walter managed to write the words "Err Staff" instead of air staff. b) accused me of writing them c) decided someone who wrote such a word invalidated themselves as a source on the air war in question. I don't recall ever using the term "err staff". I Thought you did. You don't much like what they said, since they were critical of the sainted Arthur Harris. If you didn't first use that tem, I wont make that point any more. The fun thing about it is a) Walter is at best either completely confused about what he says or at worst is into rewriting history, and too foolish enough to realise how he keeps presenting the evidence against himself. So you don't disagree with what I said. Or rather, you can't gainsay what I said. b) Unable to correct the record when shown to be wrong, c) Is manufacturing the most trivial excuses to try and avoid coping with the gap between reality and his preferred fiction. Think about it, a totally trivial complaint, after all Err will pass through a spell checker. So you don't disagree with what I said. Or rather, you can't gainsay what I said. "I don't know that these city strikes were launched on bad weather days. You don't either. What I do know is that the Err Staff thought Harris was not properly applying his force, and they -did- know the weather day by day." By the way the Air Staff complaint was in January 1944, Walter was trying to prove it related to the third quarter of 1944. I couldn't find the post that would show that you used this term first. I do know that the moderator of the WWII group who is from Australia has a serious hard-on over me. He sent me a very nasty e-mail. Maybe he made that note of yours disappear, the way so many of the notes I sent just disappeared. Well, this is not the moderated WWII group. And as I suggest above, you can't gainsay anything I said. You've only made a fool of yourself. Walt |
#29
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"WalterM140" wrote in message ... WalterM140 wrote in message ... I suggest that the people check what the leader of the RAF said: "But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said Portal, "it is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have been too costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.' Here was a remarkable admission from the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of American air policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat. Of course at no point did he say anything of the sort. He never used the word defeat and was careful to refer to possibilities. Not surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area campaign. He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and none whatever in the this present oil policy'. --"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings Bomber Command was defeated over Germany in the spring of 1944. It was the Oil Campaign, largely pursued by the Americans that deprived the GAF of fuel and that allowed the RAF back over Germay with any chance of not being shot to pieces. Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a remarkable claim. Bomber Command's Harris had to be ordered to bomb oil targets and sloughed that off whenever he could. Indeed but he did so when ordered and the RAF played a major part in the oil campaign. Keith |
#30
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"WalterM140" wrote in message ... Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the USAAF that largely deprived the GAF of fuel. The destruction of the oil plants was a joint effort prosecuted by both the USAAF and the RAF In the crucial period it was largely pursued by the Americans. Look at what the leader of the RAF said: Context please Keith |
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