Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

Aargh! Need to correct some brain farts.

Guy Alcala wrote:

WalterM140 wrote:

snip

B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the altitude
at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.

Again, due to the superchargers. Both US mediums and the British heavies used
single-stage two-speed superchargers while the B-17 and B-24 used turbochargers
(feeding superchargers). That generally gave them max. power and top speeds ain
the range of 13,500 - 15,000 feet.

'Them' in the above sentence refers to the US mediums and British hevies, not the B-17
and B-24, which put out max. power up to 25 or 30,000 feet, owing to the turbochargers.

snip

Our conclusion was that the simplest and quickest method for the Brits to go over
to US style daylight bombing against well-defended targets in the fall of 1943 was
to use B-24s diverted from US groups in training (the 8th preferred the B-17), at
least until they could produce a high altitude bomber engine (preferably a Bristol
Hercules air-cooled radial, either turbocharged or with a two-speed supercharger)
in adequate numbers.

"two-speed" should of course be "two-stage," usually two-stage, two-speed.

snip rest

Guy

formation turns. So we figured they were likely restricted to tight
formation
flying at altitudes of around 18,000 or at most 20,000 feet for Lancs or
Halifax
IIIs, although we knew we'd have to lighten the bombloads to get them that
high
(owing to the need to increase the defensive armament, armor, crew, and fuel
loads).

Guy



That's interesting. Didn't the RAF typically operate at @ 15,000 feet over
German targets?

On at least one occasion, B-17' were briefed to attack Berlin at 27,000 feet;
once to beat the clouds a group bombed from 30,000.

Walt

Bernardz wrote:

In article 40fa0ce6$0$1289$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
01.iinet.net.au, says...

snip

What do these escort fighters do?

Not sure of the question, but overall the idea is two fold, prevent bomber
losses and shoot down the interceptors. At night this meant flying around
the bomber stream, known Luftwaffe night fighter airfields and known radio
beacons.

A fighter is much smaller, more mobile and generally faster then a
bomber. Finding a bomber and recognizing it was hard enough in WW2 how
successful were fighters in finding and identifying interceptors at
night?

The RAF didn't seem to have too much trouble finding and identifying many of
those same Luftwaffe interceptors (used instead as bombers, i.e. the Ju-88 and
Do-217) by night over England. It could be a real pain trying to sort through a
returning bomber strike, as virtually every target was friendly. Here's an
account of such sorting by C.F. Rawnsley, John Cunningham's radar operator, in
his book "Night Fighter":

"The Luftwaffe kept up their attacks [Mid-43], making the most they could of
their limited numbers by sending in mixed raids of FW-190s, ME-410s and JU-88s.
This mixture of fast and comparatively slow types, and the presence all the time
of so many of our own bombers returning from raids, made the job of
identification by ground control extremely difficult. Visual recognition by the
night fighters became even more essential than before; and it helped a great
deal when we were issued with Ross night binoculars. Though they had no great
magnification, these glasses had an amazing power of collecting light. We
tried them out after dark, standing at the door of the crewroom. A vague blur
to the naked eye two hundred yards away took on with the help of the binoculars
the clear outline of a Mosquito, wth the squadron letters plainly readable on
the fuselage. . .
Halfway through August the Germans put on a sharp raid on Portsmouth . . .
Three times during the course of the raid they [the GCI station] gave us
contact, and each time I sweated after our target -- they were all coming in
fairly fast -- and brought John into visual range.

"The first one was flying as straight as an arrow. We were closing in quickly,
and I brought my new binoculars to bear. it turned out to be a Beaufighter.
The second waited until we were within three thousand feet, but before John
could see it the pilot started a tight turn to port. That was a little
puzzling, for he could hardly have seen us, unless the Germans were now equipped
with radar tail warning. But that pilot had chosen the wrong man for a winding
match, and after a couple of turns John was well inside and rapidly closing in.
Our target then steadied up and we saw that it was another Beaufighter.

"Our third customer was moving a great deal faster, and although he flew
straight on it took us some time to catch him. At John's word I looked up from
the A.I. set. The strap of the glasses caught in my harness, but even without
them I could see that this was no Beaufighter. The fuselage was much to slim
and delicate for that; it was far more likely to be an ME-410. I fumbled
impatiently with the strap and finally got the glasses to bear. Our target
leapt into clear profile. this time it was a Mosquito!"

Admittedly they usually had good GCI to get them close, but fighters pretty much
had to be around the bomber stream or their airfields to be effective. Besides,
there weren't any four-engined night fighters over nighttime Germany, which
allowed the bombers to be separated from the potential targets fairly easily ;-)

Guy

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone
1942.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it.
But they did not.


It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.


Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have
been increased.

I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace
any
more than it was.

I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in
the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close
friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it.


Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting
units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine
on
t/o.


The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than
for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942.

ibid p. 14

Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted
in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still
made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense
from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Guy


Second Scheinfurt was late in the game.

Walt

(WalterM140) wrote in message ...
Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the
P-38 was the best allied fighter.


Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.

Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
109 that may not have been as profitable.

(WalterM140) wrote in message ...
Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the
P-38 was the best allied fighter.


Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.

Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
109 that may not have been as profitable.

Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that
the
P-38 was the best allied fighter.


Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.

Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
109 that may not have been as profitable.




You're right about Galland. There was another high scoring German ace who
spoke well of the P-38.

The P-38 was the first "energy" fighter. The top two Americans aces of the war
did fly the thing, after all.

P-38's didn't have to dogfight with the Germans any more than it did the
Japanese. The idea was to keep the Germans from massing and to keep the
ME-110's out of the game.

If the range was shorter than the Mustang, it was still adequate. Also, for a
long time, there -were- no Mustangs.

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
in height to minimise flak damage.



That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type
could
fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.


It has more to do with the doctrine of the self defensing bomber
that was adopted by the USAAF. You'll find that B-24's
also flew in such formations.

I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I
shouldn't
think as at high an altitude as the B-17.

B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the
altitude
at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.


True but irrelevant since bomber command didnt fly defensive
formations by day after 1941.

Keith

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?


It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF

Not material to what is being discussed. The USAAF was not running night
bombing raids over Germany.

You're making excuses.

Walt

No I'm explaining that the overall loss rates were similar, if
the RAF was defeated by a loss rate of 3.6% so was the
USAAF

In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
nations economy and infrastructure.

Keith

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...


The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
you need to find the target.

Keith


How about take off a few pounds of bombs and do both?


For one thing there wasnt the physical space to fit both.
The Lancaster had a very large bomb bay and it would
have required considerable modifications to the aircraft
to allow this to happen.

Even had they done so its doubtful it would have made much
difference. Even a .50 calibtre turret would have been
outranged by the 30mm cannon used by the German
nightfighters and the chances of a gunner even spotting the
aircraft were low. Its much easier to spot a plane above
you at night than one below especially in blackout conditions.

The best defence against the NF was the bomber stream and
flying a varying course. This of course was tiring and a pain
for the navigator but it made the job of the nightfighter
very much harder.

Keith