Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

http://www.p-38online.com/p38j.html
In spite of all the advances and improvements, the P-38 J would suffer in
the European Theater of Operations. Lockheed did all the testing in the
United States, and were never tested in conditions similar to those in
Britain. Once the P-38 J arrived in Britain, problems were encountered
immediately. In addition to the new problems, many new, inexperienced pilots
were beginning to fly. The problems would take time to work out, but the 8th
Air Force was not able or willing to wait. At this time, P-51 D Mustangs and
new versions of the P-47 Thunderbolt were available to perform long-range
escort and strike missions. This was the beginning of the end of the P-38 in
the ETO.

-HJC

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was
split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up
independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization;
next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing
orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance
and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick
A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
low
relatively late.

If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
have been overcome.

The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need,

They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
had tumbled onto it.

and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
opportunity
for them to work out the bugs.

Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
equipment of new units."

Perhaps what it comes down to is this:

Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
started to hurt the Fortresses?

You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.

The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
been provided.


It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat,
the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why?

Because they got their asses handed to them.


The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to
attack the
heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and
were
inflicting only light to moderate casualties.

That's right. It's all a big what if. All I am saying is, "what if Eaker and
Hunter had seen the need for a long range escort?"

But they didn't. And they didn't see the need either of them, until after it
was plain to everyone else that the bombers needed help. It's tragic, but
there it is.


We were still flying shallow
penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven)
until
January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the
poor
weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo
tanks
that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was
possible.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been
screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production
was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
single
P-38 they could get.

Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
this is the most important fighter we have? The USAAF was sold on the
Thunderbolt. Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

If someone had said, "yes we are handling the GAF now but they might produce
new tactics, new equipment and strongly reinforce," then it might have been a
different story beginning in the summer of '43.


You make some very good points and I appreciate them.

Walt

There is an interesting thing about post-war bombing
and that is that, on the whole, it was based on British
WWII tactics more than anything else. The debate about
which force used the better tactics during WWII, the
RAF or the USAAF, is fairly pointless.

As far as tactics go, perhaps.

The RAF was attacking targets that couldn't help bring Germay closer to defeat,
certainly not in relation to the losses the RAF suffered.

At the time, both
did the best they could, and in the end they were both
reasonably successful.

The RAF was -not- successful. If not for the USAAF, they couldn't have
appeared over Germany at all after D-day.

Walt

The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy
escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts
in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared.


I would like to point out that the "least effective fighter" may
not be taking an overall view. Most of the problems with P-38
operations were the result of early doctrine and poor training
of aircrew in multi-engine operations. They suffered through
comparatively high loss rates in early operations where their
writ was not to pursue the enemy, but to provide close escort,
much as the Luftwaffe fighter force was in the Battle of Britain.
Being unable to pursue an enemy limits your kill potential, but
they DID cause a significant drop in bomber losses.

In 1945, P-38s which were still flying escort missions under
the later doctrine (and in equal or superior numbers to the
defenders) had about the same results as their
brethren in -47s and -51s.

MNr. Sinclair's preferred method is not to disagree with what you say 90% of
the time. It is to nitpick over the other 10% so he can parade his pedantry.

Walt

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was
a
factor.

Gee, that is -my- point.

And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
it.

Yes folks, Eaker and Hunter are the designated Black Hat wearers
of the moment, all evil comes from them.

I have said that it might have been beyond anyone to make such a determination.
But for whatever reason, they didn't make it, didn't tumble onto it after many
others had, and were sacked in large part because of it.

snip pedantic rant

I'll look in later notes in the thread, but you seem to not responded to this
piece of text:

Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.


Source?

I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement.

"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commanmder of the VIII Bomber
Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."

-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton

"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At
an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for
escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter reavealed his
misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Ar Force in the
summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior
fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly
long escort missions."

ibid, p. 114

I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that
he communicated such with Lovett.

You seem to have just made it up.

Walt

In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
nations economy and infrastructure.

For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added little to
the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better.

Walt

WaltBJ wrote:

I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons
installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were
pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks.

We talked about this a few months ago - thread was called "Has there
ever been an off-center gun?" As far as I can tell, all ventral
mountings, apart from the Sperry ball turret, suffered from either an
enormous amount of drag (dustbins), or a restricted field of view
(periscopes, little windows etc). Good visibility seems like a
prerequisite for locating night fighters, but the added weight and drag
of the dustbin turrets was deemed a liability by the crews, who were
instrumental in their removal (apparantly).

The Canadian Halifax "Preston Green" mountings were installed in place
of the missing H2S scanner, when radar production was running behind
bomber production. When the radar became available it was fitted in the
place of the gun.

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
nations economy and infrastructure.

For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added
little to
the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better.

Walt

The RAF layed a major part in the oil war in that period.

Which targets do you think were more important ?

Keith

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
ubject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Keith Willshaw"

hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
as being unsuitable for combat use.


Why do you think we gave them to the Brits?

You didnt 'give' then to us, we bought them.
This was before lend lease.


Keith

"WaltBJ" wrote in message
om...
I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons
installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were
pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks. I can well
believe that - looking up through the top of a canopy at a firing 50M2
at say 100 feet would probably be the last thing an LW Nachtjaeger
pilot saw.
Walt BJ


Trouble is a fight between an aircraft armed with 30mm cannon and
one armed with a single 0.5 will mostly favour the fighter.
The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre

Keith