F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.

On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
wrote:


"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.


And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
to winning the war.

Jack Love wrote:

On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
wrote:


"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.


And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
to winning the war.

They're hardly the only ones to suffer from that misconception (cough).

Guy