Angry [More Info]

Matt Whiting wrote:
This was more of a judgment issue than a flying skills issue. Most pilot
training, at least short of the airline's CRM training, rarely covers much
about judgment. Some instructors are much better in this regard than
others, but it simply isn't high on the list typically.

I totally agree. Please see my reply to "Morgans". Our certificate
requirements include very little about decision making, and clearly not
enough instrument training for the Private. While these are the leading
causes of fatal accidents, the PTS changes are primarily maneuvers additions
and removals. For example, if our 3 hours of instrument Private training
was sufficient, the why do non-IFR Private pilots only last 178 seconds in
IMC?

Hilton

Hilton wrote:

Matt Whiting wrote:

This was more of a judgment issue than a flying skills issue. Most pilot
training, at least short of the airline's CRM training, rarely covers much
about judgment. Some instructors are much better in this regard than
others, but it simply isn't high on the list typically.


I totally agree. Please see my reply to "Morgans". Our certificate
requirements include very little about decision making, and clearly not
enough instrument training for the Private. While these are the leading
causes of fatal accidents, the PTS changes are primarily maneuvers additions
and removals. For example, if our 3 hours of instrument Private training
was sufficient, the why do non-IFR Private pilots only last 178 seconds in
IMC?

I almost wonder if it would be better to not require the hood time at
all. I wonder if it doesn't build a false sense of security as any
instrument pilot knows that three hours just isn't sufficient to give
you any real capability at all, especially if you don't get recurrent
hood training.

I thought that hood flying was pretty easy when I got my private. Then
I began instrument training and had to not only fly the airplane, but
talk to ATC, navigate, check the weather, handle equipment failures,
etc. All of a sudden, it didn't seem so easy ... until about 40 hours
later! :-)


Matt

Nick Danger wrote:


I also suspect that the number of twin engine aircraft that have
suffered an engine failure in flight in IMC and then landed without
incident is also quite low.

Based on what? Published statistics? Personal experience? For me it's
4/4. You rarely hear about any of the majority which conclude without
further incident.


The risk comparison between single engine vs multi engine for a flight like
this in reality is probably close, although psychologically it may seem like
there is a vast difference.

Since the risk came primarily from the pilot, and not from the airplane,
you may be correct. Such a mental attitude would be fatal in any airplane.


Jack

Recently, Hilton posted:

Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
finished the training and checkride to do just that?

As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it sounded like
he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely outcome is that he
would have crashed elsewhere.

Neil

Recently, Hilton posted:

Matt Whiting wrote:
This was more of a judgment issue than a flying skills issue. Most
pilot training, at least short of the airline's CRM training, rarely
covers much about judgment. Some instructors are much better in
this regard than others, but it simply isn't high on the list
typically.

I totally agree. Please see my reply to "Morgans". Our certificate
requirements include very little about decision making, and clearly
not enough instrument training for the Private.

Being able to teach decision making is the one difference between
trainers/schools. I don't know how any of these "quick-course" schools can
teach good decision making, as the student doesn't have any practical
experience to associate with the theory (even if they could remember the
theory, which test scores suggest otherwise). This case is a prime example
of someone not knowing when to make a "no-go" decision.

While these are the
leading causes of fatal accidents, the PTS changes are primarily
maneuvers additions and removals. For example, if our 3 hours of
instrument Private training was sufficient, the why do non-IFR
Private pilots only last 178 seconds in IMC?

Simple: because they don't use 90 of those seconds to reverse course and
get out of IMC. Those that do so survivie and don't become part of the
statistic.

Neil

"Jack" wrote

Then "they" aren't worth listening to. One guess why the safety record of
twin-engine light planes isn't better...

Agreed. I forgot the smiley! g


The cost of maintaining and operating a twin, along with the absurd
insurance rates, mean that the only ones operating twins are people with a
good bit of money to throw around. If they have that money, those that have
to work for it are too busy (possibly)to keep current and do recurrent
training, and get in over their heads.

That's my theory, anyway! g
--
Jim in NC

Neil Gould wrote:
Recently, Hilton posted:

Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
finished the training and checkride to do just that?

As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it sounded like
he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely outcome is that he
would have crashed elsewhere.

He took off, turned east, flew a few minutes, and entered IMC. Kinda
obvious the airport was west. Sure he asked ATC to get back to the airport,
but he wasn't lost in the sense that he didn't know his (approximate)
position.

Saying "...the likely outcome is that he would have crashed elsewhere."
doesn't make sense. I have heard numerous ATC recordings of people that fly
into IMC and had ATC to help them to a VFR airport. Had this pilot
maintained control of the aircraft using instruments, I have no doubt ATC
could have vectored him back to E16 or even SJC.

Hilton

Recently, Hilton posted:

Neil Gould wrote:
Recently, Hilton posted:

Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
finished the training and checkride to do just that?

As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it
sounded like he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely
outcome is that he would have crashed elsewhere.

He took off, turned east, flew a few minutes, and entered IMC. Kinda
obvious the airport was west. Sure he asked ATC to get back to the
airport, but he wasn't lost in the sense that he didn't know his
(approximate) position.

What lead me to this conclusion is that he only flew "... a few
minutes...", which isn't very far in a 172, before calling ATC. He should
have still been in visual range of the airport. Therefore, I suspect that
the much of the area (if not all of it) was IMC, and he chose to take off
in it anyway.

Neil

On 2006-01-01, Matt Whiting wrote:
I almost wonder if it would be better to not require the hood time at
all. I wonder if it doesn't build a false sense of security as any
instrument pilot knows that three hours just isn't sufficient to give
you any real capability at all, especially if you don't get recurrent
hood training.

On the flip side - how many pilots does hood training save? This is
simply an unknown. If the hood training means more pilots manage to save
themselves when they do screw up compared to how many would be lost in
the same situation, then it's worth keeping. The trouble is it's very
difficult to measure. How many non-IFR pilots make an ASRS report when
they get themselves in a VFR-into-IMC situation?

The trouble is to have a good study of it you have to ask pilots to
incriminate themselves and face FAA action if you're to find the ones
who have a false sense of security and deliberately enter IMC without
the rating.

In article . net,
"Hilton" wrote:

Neil Gould wrote:
Recently, Hilton posted:

Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
finished the training and checkride to do just that?

As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it sounded like
he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely outcome is that he
would have crashed elsewhere.

He took off, turned east, flew a few minutes, and entered IMC. Kinda
obvious the airport was west. Sure he asked ATC to get back to the airport,
but he wasn't lost in the sense that he didn't know his (approximate)
position.

Saying "...the likely outcome is that he would have crashed elsewhere."
doesn't make sense. I have heard numerous ATC recordings of people that fly
into IMC and had ATC to help them to a VFR airport. Had this pilot
maintained control of the aircraft using instruments, I have no doubt ATC
could have vectored him back to E16 or even SJC.

Hilton

There is another factor not mentioned here. About 10 years ago, a friend
did some radar surveying for San Jose and found a radar hole in the
vicinity of South County, up to about 3000 ft. It is possible that the
pilot, thinking he would have instantaneous radar, took off, attempted
to raise SJC Approach and maintained heading right into the hills.

There is no excuse for his instructor(s) or flight school to turn him
loose without at least a rudimentary knowledge of the risks involved
with scudrunning (especially at night, in the hills).

--
Remve "_" from email to reply to me personally.