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#11
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RTFM
On Apr 29, 8:56*am, Mike Ash wrote:
In article , *Dudley Henriques wrote: The ultimate failure here seems to have been the lack of experience of the tech on the power levers. I'm sure much of the investigation centered on this, and as well the process and people responsible for putting him in the left seat to conduct the test. Power reduction to idle *HAD to be accomplished before braking could be effective. This should have been a trained reaction to the emergency rather than a checklist task item that he missed. Shame. It was a beautiful aircraft to be lost in this way. As with most accidents it's a chain of events, but pulling power is an obvious last step that would have saved the day. I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they never leave the ground, how hard can it be?" -- Mike Ash Radio Free Earth Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon Actually, in my opinion anyway, the pulling of the power should have been the FIRST step rather than the last as the emergency developed. The reaction chain as the aircraft started to move forward seems to have been backwards with power reduction at the end of the reaction chain. Power reduction prior to brake application is absolutely necessary in this incident and should have been a trained reflex action by anyone checked off as competent to make the test. There is much to be learned from the incident of course, but I'd be seriously taking a long hard look at whatever criteria was used to classify the guy on the throttles as current. Of course keep in mind that my area of expertise lies in warbird accident investigation and flight safety and I'm not at all familiar with the procedures used by the airline industry. These opinions of mine are just random thoughts based on how we approach these things in our community. -DH |
#12
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RTFM
Actually, I didn't even need to read the accident report to know that
this story was just talking bull****. An airplane where pulling one single circuit breaker would be enough to disable all brakes would never be certificatd. Just imagine that circuit breaker blowing while landing. |
#13
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RTFM
"Mike Ash" wrote in message ... snip I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they never leave the ground, how hard can it be?" Mike Ash I think the expression is, 'If you think that safety is too slow or expensive, then just try having an accident'. Safety does not happen by accident, it requires planning, commitment and training. Happy landings, |
#14
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RTFM
In article ,
"Private" wrote: "Mike Ash" wrote in message ... snip I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they never leave the ground, how hard can it be?" I think the expression is, 'If you think that safety is too slow or expensive, then just try having an accident'. I like that one, I don't think I've heard it before. So true, though! -- Mike Ash Radio Free Earth Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon |
#15
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RTFM
In article
, Dudley Henriques wrote: On Apr 29, 8:56*am, Mike Ash wrote: In article , *Dudley Henriques wrote: The ultimate failure here seems to have been the lack of experience of the tech on the power levers. I'm sure much of the investigation centered on this, and as well the process and people responsible for putting him in the left seat to conduct the test. Power reduction to idle *HAD to be accomplished before braking could be effective. This should have been a trained reaction to the emergency rather than a checklist task item that he missed. Shame. It was a beautiful aircraft to be lost in this way. As with most accidents it's a chain of events, but pulling power is an obvious last step that would have saved the day. I wonder just how much training these technicians got on the aircraft. I have no idea if it's a lot or a little, but seeing as how they never leave the ground I could imagine that they are being put out there without enough. I can certainly see some penny-pinchers saying, "they never leave the ground, how hard can it be?" Actually, in my opinion anyway, the pulling of the power should have been the FIRST step rather than the last as the emergency developed. The reaction chain as the aircraft started to move forward seems to have been backwards with power reduction at the end of the reaction chain. Power reduction prior to brake application is absolutely necessary in this incident and should have been a trained reflex action by anyone checked off as competent to make the test. There is much to be learned from the incident of course, but I'd be seriously taking a long hard look at whatever criteria was used to classify the guy on the throttles as current. Of course keep in mind that my area of expertise lies in warbird accident investigation and flight safety and I'm not at all familiar with the procedures used by the airline industry. These opinions of mine are just random thoughts based on how we approach these things in our community. I think we are in agreement. When I say pulling power is the last step, I mean from the perspective of preventing the entire incident in the first place. Prior steps would include using chocks, better training for the technician, and generally following the written test procedure. Obviously it should have been the first thing to be done once the plane started moving, but the chain of events started long before that. As for the guy's currency, since he was just a technician and not a pilot, I wonder just what sort of requirements they have at all. I could easily see the bureaucrats deciding that the requirements should be minimal since he's not doing anything "important" (although I bet that if it was that way, it changed after this loss!). Anybody know how this typically works? -- Mike Ash Radio Free Earth Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon |
#16
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RTFM
On 29 Apr, 04:28, Dudley Henriques wrote:
On Apr 28, 9:31*pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" wrote: Dudley Henriques wrote: On Apr 28, 7:41 pm, "Steven P. McNicoll" wrote: Private wrote: RTFM http://www.rense.com/general85/Airbus340.pdf Funny, but not quite true. http://www.snopes.com/photos/airplane/etihad.asp Actually it's pretty close to the truth. Actually, "pretty close to the truth" and "not quite true" are pretty much the same thing. True. This accident came in to our safety group via one of our airline guys as a "note of interest" rather than something we would be working on. After reading the report, the only opinion I formed was that the tail should have been tied down for any test at max thrust and that whoever was in charge of the test (presumably the left seat) should have been familiar with the test procedures AND checked out enough on power lever use to know completely the emergency shutdown procedure if something went wrong. Not bringing the power back prior to and coincident with brake application seemed to me an inexcusable error. Task overload shouldn't have been an issue as far as power reduction. That was a normal procedure failure. As to the Arab question; I didn't even consider nationality in my rationale; simply the body in charge :-) -DH The guy in charge in one of the front seats was apparently an Airbus employee with another in the jump seat. Maintenance guy from the airline in other pilot seat. All three could well have been blond and blue eyed, and almost certainly were not all arab - if that makes any difference to anything. It certainly doesn't from here. Something similar - and even scarier - but cheaper. I happened to listen again to this audio earlier today. Similar situation, full power run up, with non-aircrew at the controls, gone wrong. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iKFY...e=channel_page Lightning XM135 inadvertant flight by Wing Commander "Taffy" Holden This time it was a taxi test, the aircraft was an English Electric Lightening and it got airborne. Pins in seat so no escape that way, no canopy. Driver was senior RAF Engineering Officer who was pilot trained but only to a low standard as part of his Engineering training, and had never flown anything bigger than a Harvard trainer. Was probably not current but I don't know. Got it down without significant damage and lived too. Amazing. Cause reported as getting throttles caught in re-heat gate and not being familiar enough with it to get them out, and steer too, before running out of runway. The only clear path remaining was *UP*. Don't suppose that would take too long in one of those. Whooooosh - oh NO!!!! Quite why you need a gate to keep throttles *in* re-heat I have no idea. |
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