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Distribution of armor on a B-52



 
 
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  #2  
Old August 8th 04, 10:30 AM
Yeff
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On 08 Aug 2004 09:04:19 GMT, B2431 wrote:

You never get away from SAC, they know where you are and they are watching you.


SACumcised were you?

--

-Jeff B.
yeff at erols dot com
  #3  
Old August 8th 04, 11:03 AM
Guy Alcala
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Andrew Chaplin wrote:

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Distribution of armor on a B-52
From: Andrew Chaplin
Date: 8/7/2004 8:57 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Distribution of armor on a B-52
From: Bob

Date: 8/7/2004 8:46 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

None..


You mean it had no protective armor? None?

Yup, he means zilch, zippo, three fifths of five eighths of f*ck all.


Sheesh !


I gather the A-10, the Su-25 and a few attack helicopters are the only
a/c flying with armour these days. AC-130 may have some armour, but
I'm not sure.


Most tactical jets have some armor protecting at least the pilot, although
nothing like the titanium bathtub the A-10 pilot sits in. For the BUFF and
similar nuclear-tasked a/c of its era, armor was considered irrelevant and
counterproductive to the mission. If it's only going to be used once 'for
real', and even extremely high attrition rates still allow the mission to be
accomplished (75% losses? Moscow's still a smoking hole in the ground), then
armor just decreases the a/c's performance and takes up weight that can far
more usefully be dedicated to defensive electronics or other features that
provide greater protection.

Of course, when we found ourselves fighting a drawn-out conventional war in
Vietnam where the majority of losses were to AW, AAA and SAM warhead
fragments (as opposed to nuclear blast and radiation), where it wasn't one
strike and we hold the victory celebration (in the local deep mine where
we've ensconced ourselves to while away the years repopulating the human
race and listening to Vera Lynn, waiting for the radiation levels to die
down), the balance changed. Many of the a/c used in Vietnam were modified to
decrease their vulnerability to combat damage. Sometimes armor and
self-sealing and/or flame-retardant foam lined fuel tanks were retrofitted;
in many cases redundant, separated hydraulic systems were retrofitted to a/c
like the F-105s (designed as nuclear strike a/c) that Ed flew.

The F-105 had redundant hydraulic systems, but they weren't designed with
combat damage in mind. The two lines ran side by side inside the dorsal
fairing, so a hit that took out one usually took out the other, and once all
the fluid had run out of the system the horizpntal stabilizer went to the
max. nose up positions and it was time punch out.

Understandably, pilots took a dim view of ejecting over North Vietnam
because they had no control of their a/c, so Fairchild instituted a quick
fix which, when the hydraulic system had taken a hit, allowed the pilot to
lock the stabilizer in the position appropriate for 350KIAS (IIRR. Ed will
probably remember) before the fluid ran out. They could control their
height by increasing or decreasing the throttle. That at least gave them a
shot at getting out of North Vietnam and over the Gulf of Tonkin or Laos,
Cambodia or Thailand before ejecting, where the odds of being rescued were
far higher, but there was no way they had enough control to attempt a
landing.

The final fix involved installing a separate standpipe for emergency use.
IIRR this allowed some limited control of the ailerons/spoilers for lateral
control using the trim switch, and I forget how much if any limited control
was available for the stabilizer,also using the trim. In good conditions
this might allow the pilot to make a landing at an airfield, and certainly
gave him a lot more control of heading.

Since Vietnam, far more effort has gone in to designing survivability right
into the a/c, because for the first time someone (the USAF and USN, and
beyond them the aircraft design companies, Fairchild (F-105) and McAir (F-4
and A-4) having the most data) had bothered to gather a good-sized
statistical data base about the causes of a/c losses, and then quantified
the features which were most cost-effective for the role and threat the
particular a/c design is expected to meet. Everyone had always known that
some a/c were more survivable than others, but no one had every really done
a proper statistical analysis before of just how much certain features were
worth, and the trade-offs, although there'd been some movement in this
direction by Operational Research units of the US and British (at least) in
WW2. Survivability requirements are now part of the design spec, and all
the post-Vietnam generation of US combat a/c were designed with
survivability taken into account.

Guy

  #7  
Old August 8th 04, 03:59 PM
Ed Rasimus
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On Sun, 08 Aug 2004 10:03:33 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:


Most tactical jets have some armor protecting at least the pilot, although
nothing like the titanium bathtub the A-10 pilot sits in. For the BUFF and
similar nuclear-tasked a/c of its era, armor was considered irrelevant and
counterproductive to the mission. If it's only going to be used once 'for
real', and even extremely high attrition rates still allow the mission to be
accomplished (75% losses? Moscow's still a smoking hole in the ground), then
armor just decreases the a/c's performance and takes up weight that can far
more usefully be dedicated to defensive electronics or other features that
provide greater protection.


I don't recall any armor in the F-105 or F-4.

Of course, when we found ourselves fighting a drawn-out conventional war in
Vietnam where the majority of losses were to AW, AAA and SAM warhead
fragments (as opposed to nuclear blast and radiation), where it wasn't one
strike and we hold the victory celebration (in the local deep mine where
we've ensconced ourselves to while away the years repopulating the human
race and listening to Vera Lynn, waiting for the radiation levels to die
down), the balance changed. Many of the a/c used in Vietnam were modified to
decrease their vulnerability to combat damage. Sometimes armor and
self-sealing and/or flame-retardant foam lined fuel tanks were retrofitted;
in many cases redundant, separated hydraulic systems were retrofitted to a/c
like the F-105s (designed as nuclear strike a/c) that Ed flew.


The F-105 was "dry wing" so no threat there, but the tanks were not
foamed. The F-4 initially was not foamed, but after leading-edge slats
were installed and during later production runs of E-models, the tanks
were foam-filled. The F-4 was "wet wing".

The F-105 had redundant hydraulic systems, but they weren't designed with
combat damage in mind. The two lines ran side by side inside the dorsal
fairing, so a hit that took out one usually took out the other, and once all
the fluid had run out of the system the horizpntal stabilizer went to the
max. nose up positions and it was time punch out.


All the aircraft of the period (Century Series) had three hydraulic
systems--two for flight controls and one for utility. They were
usually inter-mingled so that one side of a control actuator was
powered by one FC system and the other by utility. Gear, flaps,
refueling door, gun drive, etc. were utility.

As you state, the 105 piping was adjacent and often two hydraulic
systems could be taken out by one hit.

Understandably, pilots took a dim view of ejecting over North Vietnam
because they had no control of their a/c, so Fairchild instituted a quick
fix which, when the hydraulic system had taken a hit, allowed the pilot to
lock the stabilizer in the position appropriate for 350KIAS (IIRR. Ed will
probably remember) before the fluid ran out. They could control their
height by increasing or decreasing the throttle. That at least gave them a
shot at getting out of North Vietnam and over the Gulf of Tonkin or Laos,
Cambodia or Thailand before ejecting, where the odds of being rescued were
far higher, but there was no way they had enough control to attempt a
landing.


I never flew with that mod. But you essentially describe it correctly.
When it was apparent you would lose hydraulics, you flipped switch
which sealed the system at several points and locked the slab at 350
KIAS trim position. Nose control was through throttle maneuver--more
gas, nose rises, pull power off, nose falls.

TE flaps on the 105 were electric and with the slab-lock engaged a
toggle switch was activated that let you control differential flaps
for roll.

Strictly a "get out of Indian country" system. Bailout was mandatory
after engagement.

First guy that I know of that tried it was a friend, Wayne Fullam who
rode the airplane in. His last radio call was "how do you get the
&^%$$ nose up?"



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org
  #8  
Old August 13th 04, 02:19 AM
Ed Rasimus
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Posts: n/a
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On Mon, 09 Aug 2004 01:39:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:


Beats not having the option, and it did save some pilots. The final system came
in afterwards, and IIRR had a separate reservoir that could be used for landing.
The details on both systems are in Jenkins book on the F-105, certainly the most
complete and informative book on the Thud I've ever read.

Guy


I got a mention in Dan Jenkins books as well as in Tony Thornborough's
excellent "Iron Hand: Smashing the Enemy's Air Defenses", which may be
the definitive work on Weaseling.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org
  #9  
Old August 16th 04, 06:22 AM
Bill Shatzer
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ArtKramr ) writes:

You mean it had no protective armor? None?


Yup, he means zilch, zippo, three fifths of five eighths of f*ck all.


Sheesh !


Why would you suppose otherwise?

Armor may be of some use against 13mm rounds but of little use against
SAMs and AAMs. And those were the principal weapons which concerned
its designers.

Cheers and all,




--


"Cave ab homine unius libri"
  #10  
Old August 16th 04, 08:40 AM
Guy Alcala
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Bill Shatzer wrote:

ArtKramr ) writes:

You mean it had no protective armor? None?


Yup, he means zilch, zippo, three fifths of five eighths of f*ck all.


Sheesh !


Why would you suppose otherwise?

Armor may be of some use against 13mm rounds but of little use against
SAMs and AAMs. And those were the principal weapons which concerned
its designers.


Armor can be of use against SAMs and AAMs as well, as they tend to use
proximity-fused warheads which do their damage with fragments if the target
is outside the radius of the blast zone. Most of them (especially in that
generation) weren't going to score direct hits. Again, it was a question
of the Buff's intended 'one combat sortie and "we'll meet again some sunny
day"' mission, combined with the high, fast and far design flight profile
that made armor not worth the weight. It's not as if the crews would be
bringing a damaged a/c back to anything, even assuming they weren't already
killed by blast or dying of radiation sickness.

Guy

 




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