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#11
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Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message ink.net... Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option. That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission? That's a bit much. As I've said in another post, it's not just one mission. Afghanistan (especially Op ANACONDA) certainly cast some doubt on current attack helo doctrine. But I did sort of misdirect my comments here. I really should have said that these ops suggested that Comanche wasn't going to offer enough improvement in Army aviation's capability to perform these missions. As a fairly large helo (smaller than Apache, but not that much smaller), Comanche wasn't going to be dramatically less vulnerable to the sort of threats that were actually being encountered. But it was going to be a lot more expensive. Its main improvement for the performance of these missions seems to have been in sensors, which surely can be retrofitted to Apache for less money. It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for, You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to independently screen and guard at the division level; Granted. But why do they need a unique helo for this? Can't a cavalry aviation formation have attack helos the same way a cavalry ground formation has tanks? or why you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance radars like Longbow. So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard, reconnoiter, etc.). In which case, the scouts don't need heavy armament. If you were going to have a heavily armed scout, it seems like the Apache could have done that job, too with the main differences being in crew training and doctrine rather than the airframe. Given the shortcomings of the Kiowa Warrior, I get the impression that Apache units have been pretty much self-scouting in many cases anyway. -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
#12
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"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message news Kevin Brooks wrote: "Thomas Schoene" wrote in message ink.net... Granted they may not have done as badly as press reports suggest, but these wars showed that the idea odf the deep penetration striek by helicopters independant of ground forces was probably not a viable option. That is one hell of a leap based upon the results encountered during a single mission where the SEAD support was intentionally withheld. A lot of green suiters (outside the aviation community) thought that the emphasis on the deep attack mission was bit overdone, but to condemn the entire concept as "not viable" based upon one mission? That's a bit much. As I've said in another post, it's not just one mission. Afghanistan (especially Op ANACONDA) certainly cast some doubt on current attack helo doctrine. How did Anaconda do that? There they used the attack helos as CAS platforms in a rather demanding environment (helos don't like really high altitude operations that much). They performed their mission and took ground fire; one helo was lost after it had to set down during the transit back home (another Apache took an RPG round and stayed in the fight). So what universal conclusion can you reach based upon Anaconda results? Or for that matter based upon any other attack helo usage in Afghanistan? But I did sort of misdirect my comments here. I really should have said that these ops suggested that Comanche wasn't going to offer enough improvement in Army aviation's capability to perform these missions. As a fairly large helo (smaller than Apache, but not that much smaller), Comanche wasn't going to be dramatically less vulnerable to the sort of threats that were actually being encountered. But it was going to be a lot more expensive. Its main improvement for the performance of these missions seems to have been in sensors, which surely can be retrofitted to Apache for less money. I'd agree with the conclusion that Commanche did not offer enough gain to be worth its increasingly ridiculous cost. As to retrofitting sensors on Apache, another poster has already addressed the concerns that will have to be overcome if that route is followed. That would be sort of a reverse move for the Army, though-- IIRC they just finished pulling the AH-64's from the Cav units a few years ago in favor of the AH-58D. It's also hard to understand why a scout needs an armament that's only slightly lighter than the attack helo it's supposedly scouting for, You think the cavalry scout helos are there only to operate in support of the attack helos? Nope. Cavalry units can be tasked to independently screen and guard at the division level; Granted. But why do they need a unique helo for this? Can't a cavalry aviation formation have attack helos the same way a cavalry ground formation has tanks? The AH-58D became the standard Cav scout/light attack aircraft for the DIV Cav squadrons years ago, and the Apaches reside in the attack battalions at both DIV and Corps level, except for the airborne and light divisions, which have AH-58D's in their *attack* units (the 101st AASLT DIV retained the Apache). You are somewhat mixing your unit definitions a bit, too--cavalry units, be they corps or division level, are combined arms teams that already include *both* ground and air components (at DIV level the mix is three ground troops and two air troops, while at the corps level the regiment is made up of three ground squadrons and an air squadron). Yes, you can *augment* the cavalry unit's firepower by attaching some number of Apaches to it (if, for example, you wanted your DIV Cav unit to conduct a cover mission, which is normally beyond its capabilities). The current "unique helo", the AH-58D, is quite capable of performing the normal range of cavalry duties, and can perfrm adequately in the light attack role--why would you want to pull Apaches away from their normal attack duties and try and turn them into cavalry platforms? or why you need a scout at all when the attack helos have potent surveillance radars like Longbow. So the attack helos can concentrate on their mission (killing bad guys), while the cavalry scouts perform their mission (screen, guard, reconnoiter, etc.). In which case, the scouts don't need heavy armament. Uhmmm...look up what is involved with both screen and guard missions. Both involve the potential of direct combat (guard moreso than screening). Then there is that pesky fact that we have *only* AH-58D's assigned to the light and airborne divisions... If you were going to have a heavily armed scout, it seems like the Apache could have done that job, too with the main differences being in crew training and doctrine rather than the airframe. Again, you are going to be pulling them away from their primary role of being killing platforms. The 58D is a little smaller (a good thing for the sneak and peek role) and is easier to get into theater via airlift. It apparently performs quite well in the scout role, so why remove attack assets from the force structure to replace them? Given the shortcomings of the Kiowa Warrior, I get the impression that Apache units have been pretty much self-scouting in many cases anyway. Not sure what "shortcomings" you would be referring to in the case of the D model. And you have sort of made a point that goes against your earlier claim that the scouts are there "only" to support the attack helos. In actuality they support the entire force; they *can* and often *do* support the Apaches, but not always, and not exclusively. Brooks -- Tom Schoene |
#13
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"Hobo" wrote in message ... In article , "George Z. Bush" wrote: Why do I feel that they'd rather spend the money on some other project, like Star Wars, that they'd like rather than this one that the Army has said all along that it needs? I think unmanned vehicles can serve the reconaissance function much better than an ultra-expensive helo. The whole concept of a stealthy helo which can fly unnoticed and collect information has problems. Helos are noisy and produce a lot of heat and it is hard to make them radar stealthy. The fact that the whole thing got so expensive pushed it over the edge. Now the Army has plenty of money to do that. |
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