French block airlift of British troops to Basra

On 14 Oct 2003 22:17:37 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)
wrote:

Read more carefully. I never said that Howe had a plan for occupying
Boston. I wrote that Howe's alteration to the original Dartmouth/Gage
plan was to *remove* the army from Boston and have it operate from
Rhode Island instead.

In fact, Howe's plan outlined to Dartmouth on 9th October 1775 (echoed
by Gage on 1st October 1775) was to remove his forces from Boston, and
split them into 2 forces. The larger force was to take New York
(quoted as 20 battalions or 12,000 men), the smaller Rhode Island
(5,000 men or eight or nine battalions under Clinton) "from whence it
might possibly penetrate into the country". Only then, after "the
reduction of the rebels in New York" would he consider New England -
"these corps [i.e. Howe and New York and whatever Carleton/Burgoyne
might get down the Hudson from Canada] might take seperate routes into
the province of Massachusetts Bay as circumstances might arise". [page
140]

The tentative language adopted in regard to invading Massachusetts Bay
contrasts with the unchallenged immediate focus on New York and
reflects the actual priority for these tasks. This was further
emphasised by the order in which they were performed by Howe in
historical reality, i.e. the taking of New York coming first, Rhode
Island second, and the possibility of Clinton operating against
Massachusetts from Rhode Island a distant third which was abandoned in
favour of developing operations from New York into New Jersey and up
the Hudson.

Clearly, operating directly against New England was not a British
strategic obsession at the time in view of the other strategies
actually pursued. This was explictly recognised by Dartmouth in the
letter of 2nd August 1775 to which Howe and Gage were responding in
October, which offered three strategic alternatives for Howe's (and
Gage's) consideration:

1. "Whether we should push the war with our whole force in the next
campaign on the side of New England"

2. Make "Hudson's River the seat of the war" and take New York,
leaving a holding an diversion force in Boston.

3. Go to "other places".

The fact that Gage and Howe both ruled out 1, and opted for 2, with
the proviso that the Boston force actually went to Rhode Island, along
with the division of strength involved and the later discarding of
land-based offensive plans from Rhode Island indicates that the New
York policy was the prime strategic object. Davies is quite clear
that the Rhode Island force was a "supporting post", i.e. subsidiary
to New York.

Furthermore, in an echo of the reduction of the putative role for
Clinton's force at Rhode Island, nobody was particularly interested in
Burgoyne's attempts to broaden the scope of his advancdown the Hudson
to an ultimate objective of invading Connecticut [although by the same
token nobody seemed interested in reducing the fog of inchoerence
surrounding Burgoyne's ultimate objectives beyond opening up land
communications between New York and Canada]. By that stage, Howe was
more interested in Washington's army and Philadelphia than he was in
supporting Burgoyne in the Hudson valley. The only possible contender
for a 1777 invasion of New England was basically allowed to run into
defeat with no effort to even define it as such or get Howe to support
it properly.

That you prefer to give scope to unfounded speculation
on this point rather than adhere to the evidence of the historical
record is instructive.

William Howe to Lord Dartmouth, October 9th, 1775

"In answer to your lordship's first query [presumably of August 2nd]
vizt. 'Whether the ensuing campaign should open from hence with the
whole force,' I beg leave to say that the opening of the campaign from
this quarter would be attended with great hazard, as well from the
strength of the country as from the entrenched positions the rebels
have taken. . . and from the difficulty of access further into the
country they would have every advantage in the defence of it on their
side."

Clearly, Howe was less than thrilled with operating out of Boston.
Which is why he later adds,

"But I am humbly of the opinion that by the entire evacuation of this
town and taking hold of Rhode Island with the force propsed for this
place, the army would be better connected and the corps would act with
greater effect on that side, from whence it might possibly penetrate
into the country [i.e. New England]; whereas in this station [Boston]
it could only defend the post and perhaps make some few incursions for
fresh provisions without the power of reducing the inhabitants."

You'll note my points about Howe's priorities and aims for the New
York and Rhode Island forces come from the same letter. The "primary
object", as defined by Howe, was *not* the invasion of New England,
whether from Boston *or* Rhode Island.

It's not as if my reading of these sources is particularly
revolutionary: this is what Davies himself has to say in the
introduction to Volume XI Transcripts, July - December 1775:

"As to the deployment of this army [reinforcements promised to Howe
and Gage in August 1775], Dartmouth invited Gage to choose between New
England, New York and 'other places', leaving it entirely to the
judgement of the generals but himself coming out fairly strongly in
favour of New York."

"Both were flatly against carrying on the war in New England (by which
the meant the army's fighting it's way out of Boston), and for the
same reason: everything favoured the enemy. Both, predicatably,
opted for taking post at New York, with the qualification that the
British forces then in America were not sufficient to hold Boston as
well. Finally they agreed in selecting Rhode Island as the principle
supporting post for New York, a possibility Dartmouth had raised on 1
July but not in his letter of 2 August." [page 3]

Whoever was pushing this vision of British "misconceptions" about "all
that they had to do" being to "conquer New England" to "crush the
rebellion" and this being "the thinking that drove British strategic
planning for the first half of the war", it wasn't the British
commander-in-chief in America, his successor, nor the relevant
minister responsible for instructing them in accordance with
government policy.

This seems to cover British strategic planning in 1775-1777. What
other "first half of the war" did you have in mind?

On another note, when it comes to British "misconceptions", one of the
basic facts behind Howe's objections to operating out of Boston was
the strength of rebel forces and their ability to replace casualties
from the surrounding countryside. Compared to Burgoyne's initial
under-rating of the difficulties of getting to Albany and his
dismissal of the possibility of a large local force with sufficient
capacity to defeat his advance being gathered without withdrawing
support from Washington, this was a reasonable and accurate
appreciation.

Gavin Bailey

--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.

(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...

On 14 Oct 2003 22:17:37 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)
wrote:

Read more carefully. I never said that Howe had a plan for
occupying
Boston. I wrote that Howe's alteration to the original
Dartmouth/Gage
plan was to *remove* the army from Boston and have it operate from
Rhode Island instead.

In fact, Howe's plan outlined to Dartmouth on 9th October 1775 (echoed
by Gage on 1st October 1775) was to remove his forces from Boston, and
split them into 2 forces.

The larger force was to take New York
(quoted as 20 battalions or 12,000 men), the smaller Rhode Island
(5,000 men or eight or nine battalions under Clinton)

It's taken me awhile to figure out your "quotes" as they are coming
from different letters from different men at different times under
different iterations of different plans. However, I think I have it
figured out.

In answer to Dartmouth's interogatories of August 2nd, Gage gives no
figures. Howe (October 9th) gives the "20 battalions for New York" in
his letter of 9 October, but pares that number down to 16 in his of
November 26th. The "8 or 9 battalions" mentioned was the force
required *in addition to* those reinforcements already in the pipeline
in order to hold Boston "if my orders shall be to leave a force here
for the preservation of the town and to proceed with the remainder to
New York." In other words, Howe was telling Dartmouth, that there was
no way Boston could be held without another 5,000 men. He does,
however, later propose these for Rhode Island.

"from whence it
might possibly penetrate into the country". Only then, after "the
reduction of the rebels in New York" would he consider New England -
"these corps [i.e. Howe and New York and whatever Carleton/Burgoyne
might get down the Hudson from Canada] might take seperate routes into
the province of Massachusetts Bay as circumstances might arise". [page
140]

Page 140 of what source? Macksey? If so, it is a distortion of the
facts.

On August 2nd, Dartmouth asked the following questions

1. Whether or not to "push with our whole force. . .on the side of
New England" in 1776?

2. Whether or not the Hudson River was a better "seat of the war" and
so take New York City while holding Boston?

3. If New York was not safe, to make raids elswhere?

4. If neither were advisable, to abandon Boston for Halifax and await
circumstances?

Gage responded by answering

1. Attacking out of Boston would be a bad thing.

2. "It has always appeared to me most advisable to make Hudson's
River the seat of the war. Its situation between the eastern and
western colonies is advantageous, besides being commodious in
transporting the necessaries of an army. We are made to believe also
that many friends [i.e. loyalists] in that province would appear in
arms and the troops receive many supplies they are in want of. A
communications with Canada might be better secured from thence than
any other part and during winter, when the troops can't keep the
field, attempts might be made upon the southern provinces by embarking
in the transports." He then states that the force then in Boston was
inadequate for holding both Boston and New York.

3. Agrees.

4. Believes that Boston was teneble through the winter.

Now his answer to #3 would appear to validate, somewhat, your claim,
but further in the letter he added "[i]t appears to me most necessary
for the prosecution of the war to be in possession of some province
where you can be secured and from whence you can draw supplies of
provision and forage, and that New York seems to be the most proper to
answer those purposes.
"The possession of Boston occasions a considerable diversion of the
enemy's force and so far of use, but is at the same time so open to
attacks on many sides that it reuires a large body to defend it."
He then suggests that if enough troops were made available "to
multiply our attacks" [i.e. if he is reinforced], he would occupy
Rhode Island, where he conceives "it tobe easily defended with the aid
of a frigate or two and a few smaller vessels of war, and is so
situated as to have an easy communication with New York, and from
thence the whole coast of Connecticut, the north side of Long Island,
and the western parts of Massachusetts Bay, may be attacked."

In other words, New York was not meant to be a strategic objective,
but merely a secure *base of operations*. He does suggest operations
against Southern colonies, but only in the winter, and any seasoned
campaigner knew to be damned difficult to ship troops from one theater
to the next, and back again. So, any thought of a campaign agains the
southern colonies must be construed as an after thought, or a "selling
point," but one made with little consideration of seriousness. That
notion is further inhanced by his desire to operate from Rhode Island
*against* Connecticut and Massachusetts-i.e. New England. Overall, it
sets the stage, but his outline lacks depth of ultimate motive.
Probably because he had already sent his resignation, and was mainly
just "going through the motions." It was not the final word on what
was ultimately the ultimate British purpose.

On October 9th, Howe answered that same set of questions from
Dartmouth (as he knew he was to take command upon Gage's stepping
down) and answered them thusly.

1. Ditto Gage

2. Partly answered above. He would take 20 battalions to New York,
leaving five for the defense of that city, and first to open
communications with Canada (which would have 3,000 men for its defense
and 3 or 4,000 Canadians [who never would show up]). However, once
this was accomplished, "these corps might take seperate routes into
the province of Massachusetts Bay as circumstances may arise." He
then brings up the notion of removing the Boston force from that city
to operate in Rhode Island so that the "army would be better connected
and the corps would act with greater effect on that side, from whence
it might possibly penetrate into the country." IOW, the taking of New
York was the stepping stone for the invasion of New England. No
where does Howe mention operations south of New York.

The tentative language adopted in regard to invading Massachusetts Bay
contrasts with the unchallenged immediate focus on New York and
reflects the actual priority for these tasks.

But not the ultimate objective.

This was further
emphasised by the order in which they were performed by Howe in
historical reality, i.e. the taking of New York coming first, Rhode
Island second, and the possibility of Clinton operating against
Massachusetts from Rhode Island a distant third which was abandoned in
favour of developing operations from New York into New Jersey and up
the Hudson.

Again, inductive reasoning suggesting that Howe was following a part
of a concerted plan, when in fact he was doing nothing but reacting to
events.

Clearly, operating directly against New England was not a British
strategic obsession at the time in view of the other strategies
actually pursued. This was explictly recognised by Dartmouth in the
letter of 2nd August 1775 to which Howe and Gage were responding in
October, which offered three strategic alternatives for Howe's (and
Gage's) consideration:

Snip Dartmouth's points raised above

The fact that Gage and Howe both ruled out 1, and opted for 2, with
the proviso that the Boston force actually went to Rhode Island, along
with the division of strength involved and the later discarding of
land-based offensive plans from Rhode Island indicates that the New
York policy was the prime strategic object.

Wrong. As I enumerated above. New York was meant to be a secure base
for subsequent operations against New England.

Davies is quite clear
that the Rhode Island force was a "supporting post", i.e. subsidiary
to New York.

How does the occupation of New York win the war for the British? That
is what is at discussion here. Both Gage and Howe make it clear what
they wanted in going to New York was not a war winning strategy but
only a change of base, because Boston was such a poor one.


Furthermore, in an echo of the reduction of the putative role for
Clinton's force at Rhode Island, nobody was particularly interested in
Burgoyne's attempts to broaden the scope of his advancdown the Hudson
to an ultimate objective of invading Connecticut [although by the same
token nobody seemed interested in reducing the fog of inchoerence
surrounding Burgoyne's ultimate objectives beyond opening up land
communications between New York and Canada]. By that stage, Howe was
more interested in Washington's army and Philadelphia than he was in
supporting Burgoyne in the Hudson valley. The only possible contender
for a 1777 invasion of New England was basically allowed to run into
defeat with no effort to even define it as such or get Howe to support
it properly.

Again, this is entirely inductive, and is not even correct on the
facts of it. Firstly, Howe's initial plan for 1777, dispatched on
November 30th of 1776, had the armies operating up the Hudson and out
of Rhode Island. The New Jersey army was only to make faints.
Burgoyne would not have mentioned operations against western
Massachusetts if that was not connected in any ways with prevailing
sentiment. That notion was shot down more for reasons of command and
control and logistical than any thing else. Burgoyne was ordered to
Albany as the easiest way to get him out from under Carleton and
placed under Howe's command. There was never supposed to be much
opposition to that movement at all as, like in '75, everyone assumed
the Hudson valley was dominated by loyalists, and that the American
army there was weak. Other than that, Burgoyne had no purpose.
Germain never provided any input, then or at any other time. Not in
'76 and not '78 save to suggest the obvious choices Clinton would be
forced to act on. It is one of the primary reasons that both Carleton
and Howe (and IIRC Clinton) all came to despise Germain. He provided
no strategic direction. Knowing that, British strategy has to be
discussed with the primary focus given to the theater commanders
perspectives, and for 1777, both came to the conclusion, seperately,
that New England was the primary objective. That is why it is
included in Howe's first, and why it was included in Burgoyne's
proposal. Remember, he left for London some time before Cornwallis
landed at Fort Lee. If Howe had not had other objectives in mind, he
would not have ordered Cornwallis to halt at Brunswick and so allow
Washington to make his escape. It was only after circumstances
changed that Howe made his drastic departure from previous strategy,
whereas Burgoyne merely continued it (if somewhat aimlessly).

You'll note my points about Howe's priorities and aims for the New
York and Rhode Island forces come from the same letter. The "primary
object", as defined by Howe, was *not* the invasion of New England,
whether from Boston *or* Rhode Island.

Tactically, no, but strategically, yes.

In his letter of November 30th, 1777, he proposed an army of 10,000
men to act offensively from Rhode Island against Boston, another
10,000 to act up the Hudson, and an army of 8,000 "to cover Jersey and
to keep the southern army in check by giving a jealously to
Philadelphia."

It's not as if my reading of these sources is particularly
revolutionary:

Not it is not. It is in fact quite conventional.

this is what Davies himself has to say
in the
introduction to Volume XI Transcripts, July - December 1775:
"As to the deployment of this army [reinforcements promised to Howe
and Gage in August 1775], Dartmouth invited Gage to choose between New
England, New York and 'other places', leaving it entirely to the
judgement of the generals but himself coming out fairly strongly in
favour of New York."

Which, of course, was answering the question of basing.

"Both were flatly against carrying on the war in New England (by which
the meant the army's fighting it's way out of Boston),

Which of course is silly. Boston was NOT the only avenue of approach
into New England. I mean, really, just where do you think an army
operating from Rhode Island was going to operate against? Georgia?

and for the
same reason: everything favoured the enemy. Both, predicatably,
opted for taking post at New York, with the qualification that the
British forces then in America were not sufficient to hold Boston as
well. Finally they agreed in selecting Rhode Island as the principle
supporting post for New York, a possibility Dartmouth had raised on 1
July but not in his letter of 2 August." [page 3]

Whoever was pushing this vision of British "misconceptions" about "all
that they had to do" being to "conquer New England" to "crush the
rebellion" and this being "the thinking that drove British strategic
planning for the first half of the war", it wasn't the British
commander-in-chief in America, his successor, nor the relevant
minister responsible for instructing them in accordance with
government policy.

Little trouble was expected in New York as it was full of the King's
"Friends." They weren't going to New York to pacify it. It was
already considered pacified!


On another note, when it comes to British "misconceptions", one of the
basic facts behind Howe's objections to operating out of Boston was
the strength of rebel forces and their ability to replace casualties
from the surrounding countryside.

Of course Howe was referring to New England, and not all of America in
general. He, and Gage et al, wanted New York because it was
considered friendly territory. Howe even persisted in that mistake
through the first half of 1777. Burgoyne too. Germain's papers make
it clear that he also thought New York was mostly loyalist. Howe
occupied New Jersey in full because he was under the impression that
most Jersians were loyal (and he quoted the numbers of "loyalists" who
took loyalty oaths as proof). Read where he talked of the Canadian
army being composed of 3000 British troops and 3 or 4,000 Canadians!
It is probable that more Canadians enlisted in the American army than
the British. Not one single Canadian regiment was ever raised (though
a number of loyalist regiments were raised in Canada, but from
loyalist expats from other colonies-chiefly New York). One of the
reasons Howe gave for going to Philadelphia was to raise troops from
the "mostly" loyal population. After 1778, the British went to the
South in hopes of garning all those loyalists to be found there. That
was one of the great delusions of the war for the British, but I never
included New England in that estimate.


Compared to Burgoyne's initial
under-rating of the difficulties of getting to Albany and his
dismissal of the possibility of a large local force with sufficient
capacity to defeat his advance being gathered without withdrawing
support from Washington, this was a reasonable and accurate
appreciation.

Everyone underestimated the difficulties in getting to Albany. The
British constantly under-estimated Washington (who was quite a good
strategist-he never thought, until it actually occured, that the
British would be so stupid as to march south down the Lakes and
Hudson) who they always planned on him doing what they wanted him to
do, and not what he might actually be capable. His withdrawal into
New Jersey was one overlooked possibility, as was his willingness to
sacrafice the New England coast so as not to violate the priniciple of
mass was another, and his strategic plan for 1777 was a brilliant
study in its simplicity.

--
Regards,

Michael P. Reed

On 21 Oct 2003 13:02:43 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)
wrote:

In fact, Howe's plan outlined to Dartmouth on 9th October 1775 (echoed
by Gage on 1st October 1775) was to remove his forces from Boston, and
split them into 2 forces.

The larger force was to take New York
(quoted as 20 battalions or 12,000 men), the smaller Rhode Island
(5,000 men or eight or nine battalions under Clinton)

It's taken me awhile to figure out your "quotes" as they are coming
from different letters from different men at different times under
different iterations of different plans. However, I think I have it
figured out.

I've specified the dates involved.

In answer to Dartmouth's interogatories of August 2nd, Gage gives no
figures.

Which is why I quoted Howe, not Gage, although the latter agreed with
Howe on the matter of abandoning Boston in favour of Rhode Island and
centering operations on New York. Given that Howe was about to
supersede Gage, his intentions are material to the discussion.

Howe (October 9th) gives the "20 battalions for New York" in
his letter of 9 October, but pares that number down to 16 in his of
November 26th.

Note the relative proportions of the force in both cases, as I said:
the main concentration of force for the coming campaign was to be
against New York.

The "8 or 9 battalions" mentioned was the force
required *in addition to* those reinforcements already in the pipeline
in order to hold Boston "if my orders shall be to leave a force here
for the preservation of the town and to proceed with the remainder to
New York." In other words, Howe was telling Dartmouth, that there was
no way Boston could be held without another 5,000 men.

...if the main object was to be, as all agreed, New York.

He does,
however, later propose these for Rhode Island.

"from whence it
might possibly penetrate into the country". Only then, after "the
reduction of the rebels in New York" would he consider New England -
"these corps [i.e. Howe and New York and whatever Carleton/Burgoyne
might get down the Hudson from Canada] might take seperate routes into
the province of Massachusetts Bay as circumstances might arise". [page
140]

Page 140 of what source?

The only one I've referred to, Davies, Vol XI with passing reference
to Vol XII. If I quoted Macksey I would say so, and I would admit it
if I had omitted to provide a relevant reference.

Macksey? If so, it is a distortion of the
facts.

I'd appreciate it if you didn't seek to attribute bad faith or
dishonesty without some compelling evidence of such. If I'm quoting a
reference, I try to do so accurately and without distorting the
meaning with selective editing of statement or of context, as I've
indicated below. In this case Howe's letter to Dartmouth of 9th
October 1775 is reproduced on page 140 of Volume XI.

In other words, New York was not meant to be a strategic objective,
but merely a secure *base of operations*.

For one who criticises inductive reasoning, can you spot a flaw in
that statement at all?

2. Partly answered above. He would take 20 battalions to New York,
leaving five for the defense of that city, and first to open
communications with Canada (which would have 3,000 men for its defense
and 3 or 4,000 Canadians [who never would show up]). However, once
this was accomplished, "these corps might take seperate routes into
the province of Massachusetts Bay as circumstances may arise."

The full quote being something like:

"The accomplishment of the primary object for opening the
communication being obtained by the two armies and secured by proper
posts, in which operation the reduction of the rebels in the province
of New York must in some measure ne included, these corps might take
seperate routes into the province of Massachusetts Bay as
circumstances arise."

This gives Howe's clear strategic priorities ("the primary object")
taking New York and "crushing rebel resistance" in New York before a
tentative and qualified ambition to move into New England. I'd be
interested to see if you could refer to any statement of Howe's
identifying an offensive in New England as a "primary object" or
immediate "object" of his intentions in the same manner as he uses
such phrases to refer to New York in 1775 or concentrating on
Washington's army in 1776. The language used seems clear enough to
me. Which is impressive, given the customary obscurity of Howe's
prognostications,

He
then brings up the notion of removing the Boston force from that city
to operate in Rhode Island so that the "army would be better connected
and the corps would act with greater effect on that side, from whence
it might possibly penetrate into the country." IOW, the taking of New
York was the stepping stone for the invasion of New England. No
where does Howe mention operations south of New York.

The tentative language adopted in regard to invading Massachusetts Bay
contrasts with the unchallenged immediate focus on New York and
reflects the actual priority for these tasks.

But not the ultimate objective.

The ultimate objective was to end the rebellion. My contention is
that this was not restricted to an erroneous obsession with crushing
New England in particular as you assert. This is reflected in the
actual British decision-making process in 1775 which subordinated the
military conquest of New England to the holding of bases to open up
seaborne communication. New England was one possible object, but New
York, Rhode Island and even detatched operations in the south were to
be considered and employed first. It was one object among many, all
of which ended up as a higher priority.

This was further
emphasised by the order in which they were performed by Howe in
historical reality, i.e. the taking of New York coming first, Rhode
Island second, and the possibility of Clinton operating against
Massachusetts from Rhode Island a distant third which was abandoned in
favour of developing operations from New York into New Jersey and up
the Hudson.

Again, inductive reasoning suggesting that Howe was following a part
of a concerted plan, when in fact he was doing nothing but reacting to
events.

I'm at a loss to consider what you think British planning actually was
then: all plans, even the rebel's ones, revolved around achieving
pre-selected aims while simultaneously trying to react to external
events as they developed. The rebellion itself can be dismissed as
"doing nothing but reacting" to British colonial policy or the British
response as a whole as "doing nothing but reacting" to the rising in
New England, or the French, Dutch and Spanish interventions, etc, etc
ad infinitum.

What the correspondance in question here illustrates is that the
British were not obsessed with New England when considering offensive
operations designed to end the rebellion. In fact, the correspondance
makes clear that British strategy was malleable and was evolved with
full consideration to the operational difficulties on the spot. The
relevant commander-in-chief was given wide lattitude to implement
government policy, which itself was not laid down in a dictatorial
fashion. If this itself is "inductive" and thus beneath your
consideration, then tough: this is actually how British strategic
policy evolved and what it actually was historically.

What remains is that the reconquest of New England did not enjoy the
primacy you assert for it in British strategy.

Clearly, operating directly against New England was not a British
strategic obsession at the time in view of the other strategies
actually pursued. This was explictly recognised by Dartmouth in the
letter of 2nd August 1775 to which Howe and Gage were responding in
October, which offered three strategic alternatives for Howe's (and
Gage's) consideration:

Snip Dartmouth's points raised above

The fact that Gage and Howe both ruled out 1, and opted for 2, with
the proviso that the Boston force actually went to Rhode Island, along
with the division of strength involved and the later discarding of
land-based offensive plans from Rhode Island indicates that the New
York policy was the prime strategic object.

Wrong. As I enumerated above. New York was meant to be a secure base
for subsequent operations against New England.

Taking New York was designed to fulfil several objectives, the least
and most tentative of which in the relevant correspondance was as a
possible platform for invading New England. I'm not asserting that
operations against New England were totally rejected in some binary
mirror-image of your original assertions. I am asserting, based
clearly on the sources that I originally referred to and which support
this, that the British had a much broader strategic appreciation than
you claim, reflected in the fact that other objectives were given a
higher priority than the mistaken excessive focus on New England which
you originally asserted.

Davies is quite clear
that the Rhode Island force was a "supporting post", i.e. subsidiary
to New York.

How does the occupation of New York win the war for the British?

How does the evacutation of Boston win the war for the British? How
does abandoning any landward offensive by the Rhode Island force win
the war? How does omitting to specify Burgoyne's ultimate objective
and even ignore his requests to clarify any putative offensive role
for his forces in Connecticut win the war? Now, if the British really
were obsessed with re-conquering New England to the extent that you
originally asserted, such decisions are inexplicable.

If you actually want to know what I think the default British
assumptions about the best means for subjugating New England were, I
would suggest it involved detatching other colonies (which were also
in rebellion and also needed to be dealt with if the government was to
achieve it's policy of defeating the rebellion) by developing
operations in more sympathetic areas first, which might then culminate
in limited military operations relying on seaborne communication on
the New England coast (i.e. as Germain was suggesting in March 1777).
These operations were to be subsidiary to the blockade, while a
combination of blockade and military operations at selected locations
to restore colonial government would provide the political pressure to
force a compromise peace by individual colonies. In other words,
something like what they did in 1812-14 although with a much larger
military component to deal with the Continental Army.

That
is what is at discussion here. Both Gage and Howe make it clear what
they wanted in going to New York was not a war winning strategy but
only a change of base, because Boston was such a poor one.

Both Gage and Howe turned down operations in New England, not just
with the evacuation of Boston, but in Howe's case for the two years
that followed in which he had the force sufficient for major offensive
operations that he had been asking for in 1775. The direction of
British forces in 1776-1777 and throughout the rest of the war
indicate what their strategic objectives were at the time, and the
secondary basis of any direct offensive against New England is
immediately obvious. What I suggest is a more cogent explanation for
the their strategic motives was a more realistic appreciation of the
size of the task involved in subduing the rebellion on a
continental-wide basis, which explains their willingness to develop
operations in New York, the Hudson, Philadelphia, Charleston and the
Carolinas (not to mention their anti-invasion measures and operations
in the Carribean and India) in a manner that your posited obsession
with New England on their behalf does not.

Furthermore, in an echo of the reduction of the putative role for
Clinton's force at Rhode Island, nobody was particularly interested in
Burgoyne's attempts to broaden the scope of his advancdown the Hudson
to an ultimate objective of invading Connecticut [although by the same
token nobody seemed interested in reducing the fog of inchoerence
surrounding Burgoyne's ultimate objectives beyond opening up land
communications between New York and Canada]. By that stage, Howe was
more interested in Washington's army and Philadelphia than he was in
supporting Burgoyne in the Hudson valley. The only possible contender
for a 1777 invasion of New England was basically allowed to run into
defeat with no effort to even define it as such or get Howe to support
it properly.

Again, this is entirely inductive, and is not even correct on the
facts of it. Firstly, Howe's initial plan for 1777, dispatched on
November 30th of 1776, had the armies operating up the Hudson and out
of Rhode Island. The New Jersey army was only to make faints.

Operations on the Hudson had parity, but even then this was quickly
displaced by his plans detailed in his letter to Germain on 20th
December, which explictly gave priority for operations in Pennsylvania
and the taking of Philadelphia. This was followed up by the deferral
of operations against Boston and the rejection of even *diversionary*
amphibious activity in New England when Germain suggested it in March
1777 in favour of "..more important operations of the campaign...",
i.e. Howe's offensive in Pennsylvania.

Burgoyne would not have mentioned operations against western
Massachusetts if that was not connected in any ways with prevailing
sentiment.

Why did Burgoyne solicit a ruling on this if it was the self-evident
ultimate strategic obsession? Why didn't Germain respond with
something along the lines of "Yes, New England is the priority, move
on it immediately after linking up with Howe at Albany" while telling
Howe to concentrate on New England and ignore Washington and
Philadelphia? Clearly, concentrating on an offensive against New
England was _not_ their main priority.

That notion was shot down more for reasons of command and
control and logistical than any thing else.

Howe seemed happy enough to know Carleton, who had seniority on him,
wasn't going to be coming down from Canada. Meanwhile, Burgoyne was
clearly going to be his subordinate once any linkup was achieved.

Burgoyne was ordered to
Albany as the easiest way to get him out from under Carleton and
placed under Howe's command. There was never supposed to be much
opposition to that movement at all as, like in '75, everyone assumed
the Hudson valley was dominated by loyalists, and that the American
army there was weak. Other than that, Burgoyne had no purpose.

I think mission creep crept in. Opening up communications with Canada
and protecting it from further invasion mutated into something more
incoherent which allowed Burgoyne the scope he wanted. There's no
doubt he underestimated both the quantity and quality of the
opposition he faced. The plan makes no sense at all without taking
that into account. However, even after getting to Albany, there was
no clear plan and again Davies seems to believe his force was
"diversionary" - an adjective that always seems to come into play when
the British were discussing future operational strategy.

Germain never provided any input, then or at any other time.

I don't really know if he should: the primary issue was integrating
Burgoyne and Howe and getting Howe to act in Burgoyne's support. The
person with the first responsibility there was Howe, but Germain can
be blamed for letting him do his own thing with insufficient
communication and co-ordination.

Not in
'76 and not '78 save to suggest the obvious choices Clinton would be
forced to act on. It is one of the primary reasons that both Carleton
and Howe (and IIRC Clinton) all came to despise Germain. He provided
no strategic direction. Knowing that, British strategy has to be
discussed with the primary focus given to the theater commanders
perspectives, and for 1777, both came to the conclusion, seperately,
that New England was the primary objective.

It was never Germain's job to provide that kind of direction. Howe
was the commander-in-chief, with wide military and civil
administrative latitude to secure the return of the disaffected.
Co-ordinating via Germain was idiotic, given the distance and time-lag
involved in communicating to London and awaiting a response. Howe
should have been communicating to Burgoyne direct or via Carleton.
That left plenty of scope for mutual recrimination as it was, but the
only messages going back to Germain should have been Carleton's rants.
Military co-ordination had to take place under the aegis of the
commander-in-chief. That put the ball in Howe's court.

That is why it is
included in Howe's first, and why it was included in Burgoyne's
proposal. Remember, he left for London some time before Cornwallis
landed at Fort Lee. If Howe had not had other objectives in mind, he
would not have ordered Cornwallis to halt at Brunswick and so allow
Washington to make his escape.

The rationale for Howe's dilatory approach in New York can be
disputed. One objective that had currency then and now hinged upon
Howe attempting to avoid inflicting a bloody defeat on Washington
which would polarise resistance towards a political settlement
further. I've never read that it had any relevance to any obsession
with returning to New England.

It was only after circumstances
changed that Howe made his drastic departure from previous strategy,
whereas Burgoyne merely continued it (if somewhat aimlessly).

Howe was the one who decided to keep the main force of the army
against Washington and cancel the intended operations against Boston
from Rhode Island. Meanwhile, his operations udner Clinton in upper
New York fulfilled the letter if not the spirit of his undetakings
about how far he would support Burgoyne. In both cases, two options
(operations in the Hudson valley and the offensive to Philadelphia)
overrode the whatever priority was given to returning to the offensive
in New England.

You'll note my points about Howe's priorities and aims for the New
York and Rhode Island forces come from the same letter. The "primary
object", as defined by Howe, was *not* the invasion of New England,
whether from Boston *or* Rhode Island.

Tactically, no, but strategically, yes.

Strategically, by 1777 Howe was in Philadelphia and nobody was
following Burgoyne down the Hudson. As usual, resuming the offensive
in New England was on the back burner.

In his letter of November 30th, 1777, he proposed an army of 10,000
men to act offensively from Rhode Island against Boston, another
10,000 to act up the Hudson, and an army of 8,000 "to cover Jersey and
to keep the southern army in check by giving a jealously to
Philadelphia."

On 30th November 1776 (at least that's the date in my notes), he
proposed an army of 10,000 to operate from Rhode Island towards Boston
under Clinton, another 10,000 to operate out of New York towards
Albany, 8,000 to hold Washington in New Jersey with another 5,000 to
hold New York. In the event, he went after Washington, and guess
which priority got axed? That's right, the idea of land operations
against Boston by Clinton, who instead performs a limited offensive in
upper New York while Howe goes after Washington with the main balance
of his army, as announced on 20th December.

What emerges from all this is that New England was a strategic
objective of the British. But that it did not have the priority you
assert for it. Other and more important objectives constantly
eliminated what low-priority plans were made for operations in New
England. I'll leave it up to any spectators of this thread (if any
can overcome the terminal boredom involved) to decide which of our
characterisations of British strategic policy and their underlying
assumptions best fits the facts.

It's not as if my reading of these sources is particularly
revolutionary:

Not it is not. It is in fact quite conventional.

Saratogan, then?

this is what Davies himself has to say
in the
introduction to Volume XI Transcripts, July - December 1775:
"As to the deployment of this army [reinforcements promised to Howe
and Gage in August 1775], Dartmouth invited Gage to choose between New
England, New York and 'other places', leaving it entirely to the
judgement of the generals but himself coming out fairly strongly in
favour of New York."

Which, of course, was answering the question of basing.

"Both were flatly against carrying on the war in New England..." The
question of basing was fundamentally relevant to the issue of where
the army was actually to _operate_. Obviously, this wasn't in New
England for the first half of the war. Nor the second, in the event.

"Both were flatly against carrying on the war in New England (by which
the meant the army's fighting it's way out of Boston),

Which of course is silly.

That's Davies's interpretation, not mine. In that case I wanted to
reproduce the whole quote rather than truncate the parenthesis and
lose his qualification (even if doing so would superficially support
my argument better).

Boston was NOT the only avenue of approach
into New England. I mean, really, just where do you think an army
operating from Rhode Island was going to operate against? Georgia?

The critical issue in both cases is what the army was actually to
achieve. My own disagreement with Davies is that he refers to
continuing operations from Boston by characterising them as "...the
army's fighting its way out of Boston..". To which I respond - where?
To do what? The British force in Boston was besieged by a larger
local force with a hostile hinterland all around. Simply refighting
Bunker Hill ad infinitum might have dispersed the relevant militia
levies, but with the countryside behind them they would always have
the opportunity to reform and replace losses. Gage and Howe both had
an understanding of how the attritional balance was against them in
that context, particularly after Bunker Hill. Only an imbecile would
have advocated plunging an army deep into New England in those
circumstances without any concept of how it was to re-establish
British administration where colonial government had been almost
entirely subverted and the rebel forces were seen as the legitimate
armed force of broad mass of the population.

One of the factors governing the choice of New York as an alternative
to Boston was an appreciation of the differing balance of power
between rebels and loyalists there. As I've just read you to agree
with further on. This differential was crucial, and helps explain why
the British developed operations elsewhere but apart from holding
Rhode Island as a naval base did next to nothing to reconquer New
England directly.

Whoever was pushing this vision of British "misconceptions" about "all
that they had to do" being to "conquer New England" to "crush the
rebellion" and this being "the thinking that drove British strategic
planning for the first half of the war", it wasn't the British
commander-in-chief in America, his successor, nor the relevant
minister responsible for instructing them in accordance with
government policy.

Little trouble was expected in New York as it was full of the King's
"Friends." They weren't going to New York to pacify it. It was
already considered pacified!

Not when Howe first turned up. It was clear that taking New York was
to be a major amphibious operation against substantive resistance.
Which it was. That resulted in the British actually operating from a
base with better communications with a large military force on hand to
disperse rebel militias and allow a loyalist regime to establish
itself in the shadow of that.

On another note, when it comes to British "misconceptions", one of the
basic facts behind Howe's objections to operating out of Boston was
the strength of rebel forces and their ability to replace casualties
from the surrounding countryside.

Of course Howe was referring to New England, and not all of America in
general. He, and Gage et al, wanted New York because it was
considered friendly territory. Howe even persisted in that mistake
through the first half of 1777. Burgoyne too. Germain's papers make
it clear that he also thought New York was mostly loyalist.

Almost everybody in the British administration thought that _every_
colony had this illusiary mass of oppressed loyalists willing to
spring to the side of the legitimate government at the first sign of a
sizeable British force appearing locally. Howe was explict that there
would be a requirement for militarily eliminating rebel forces in New
York in his letter of 9th October 1775, long before he turned up there
in person and decided he needed more reinforcements to do the job.
You can certainly argue that this was optimistic, but it wasn't an
unfounded belief and indicates why the British weren't interested in
continuing active operations in New England after the siege of Boston.

Howe
occupied New Jersey in full because he was under the impression that
most Jersians were loyal (and he quoted the numbers of "loyalists" who
took loyalty oaths as proof). Read where he talked of the Canadian
army being composed of 3000 British troops and 3 or 4,000 Canadians!

Everybody had problems getting the local militia to operate away from
home: the Americans not the least.

It is probable that more Canadians enlisted in the American army than
the British. Not one single Canadian regiment was ever raised (though
a number of loyalist regiments were raised in Canada, but from
loyalist expats from other colonies-chiefly New York).

Canadian anitpathy or neutrality was sufficient to doom the premature
American attempt to conquer Canada as well. In that respect American
operations in Canada faced much of the same dynamic that the British
did further south.

One of the
reasons Howe gave for going to Philadelphia was to raise troops from
the "mostly" loyal population. After 1778, the British went to the
South in hopes of garning all those loyalists to be found there. That
was one of the great delusions of the war for the British, but I never
included New England in that estimate.

The perception of the geography of loyalist sympathy was fundamental
to British strategy: an army was only going to operate where it could
assist and be assisted by local American loyalists who were the people
who would actually operate a loyal regime and return the colonies to
"normal relations". This works both ways - it enticed the British to
New York and elsewhere, but it also made them reject Boston and New
England as a potential theatre of operations even before Burgoyne got
bogged down in the Hudson against unexpected local resistance. By
1775 Gage had plenty of experience of the problems of attempting to
excercise British administration in a hostile countryside in New
England, and pastures new seemed more promising to everybody. What
counts above all is that fact that what had been a New England crisis
at the time of the powder alarms had, by the time of the siege of
Boston, become a continent-wide crisis.

Compared to Burgoyne's initial
under-rating of the difficulties of getting to Albany and his
dismissal of the possibility of a large local force with sufficient
capacity to defeat his advance being gathered without withdrawing
support from Washington, this was a reasonable and accurate
appreciation.

Everyone underestimated the difficulties in getting to Albany.

Yes. However, I feel Howe was a little more alive to the
potentialities than Burgoyne was. Having said that, the most
boneheaded actor in one of Burgoyne's plays might have been a little
more alive to the reality than Burgoyne, even if he wasn't quite the
buffoon he is sometimes made out to be.

The
British constantly under-estimated Washington (who was quite a good
strategist-he never thought, until it actually occured, that the
British would be so stupid as to march south down the Lakes and
Hudson) who they always planned on him doing what they wanted him to
do, and not what he might actually be capable. His withdrawal into
New Jersey was one overlooked possibility, as was his willingness to
sacrafice the New England coast so as not to violate the priniciple of
mass was another, and his strategic plan for 1777 was a brilliant
study in its simplicity.

I'm not disputing this hagiography, even if I don't have much patience
with it (pace his battlefield defeats and failure to defend New York
and Philadelphia: he was never able to stop Howe doing what he wanted
to do, and the biggest obstruction to Howe's activities was probably
internal). Washington's greatest achievement was keeping an army -
however ill-equipped and bedraggled - in the field, and improving it
over time. British policy, at least under Howe, sought to exploit the
underestimated difficulty of just doing that. Even so, the existance
of a continental army was just one of a large number of factors the
British had to deal with in 1777-82; the most important were the
European allies the Americans gained, which imposed inescapable
constraints on British seaborne communications and military resources
in other theatres as well as providing the Americans with an allied
expeditionary force.

After 1777 the British were in a major conflict with several European
powers, and America was just one theatre of operations. In those
circumstances re-conquering New England vanished off the radar of
British immediate strategic ambitions.

Gavin Bailey
--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.