Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

ArtKramr wrote:

ubject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala

As Chris points out, both the B-25 and B-26 were so used, in the PTO, MTO,
and ETO
(not the B-25), in the early stages. High loss rates led to the move to
medium

The B-26's were used on the deck with terrible results and were almost
instantly pulled up to 10,000 feet.

That "instantly" took several months in the MTO and the PTO. It took two
missions, both to Ijmuiden, in the ETO, with the second mission suffering 100%
losses (1 a/c aborted and was the only one to return).

After that the B-26 were the only mediums
used in the ETO replacing the slower, shorter range, smaller bombload B-25's.

As I stated, the B-25s were never used in the ETO; the B-26s didn't replace
them. The only time that one replaced the other in any theater was in the PTO,
where the B-25 replaced the B-26. As to speed and range, we've been through this
before. Speeds of the B-25 and B-26 models used in the MTO and ETO were
comparable, a couple of mph either way, with the difference so small as to be
lost in individual a/c variations. The B-26 and B-26As used in the PTO and the
early B-26Bs used in the MTO were faster than the contemporary B-25s, but that
changed once the long wing came in on the B-26B-10 and subsequent models.

As to range, the B-25C and later models were longer-ranged than the B-26,
although the B-26 and B-26A were longer-ranged than the B-25 up through the 'B'
model. Hardly surprising, as the B-26 (all models) had normal max. internal fuel
of 962 gallons, while the early B-25s only had 670 gallons. But from the B-25C
and D models on, the B-25 carried 974 gallons internally, vice the B-26's 962.
Combined with its smaller, less thirsty engines, the B-25 (C and later) range was
better than the B-26. The B-26's normal max bombload was greater, by 1,000 lb.
(4,000 vs. 3,000).

The B-26 rendered the B-25's obsolescent.

Tey were both ordered out of the same design competition, and the B-26 was
removed from production before the B-25 was, which says a lot about about which
was considered more valuable to the war effort. If that's being rendered
obsolescent in your book, then most a/c would be happy to be obsolescent. Of
course, with the coming of jets they were both obsolescent, as were all
piston-engined a/c, but that's a different matter entirely.

Guy

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/17/2004 1:23 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Chris Mark wrote:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as
the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss
rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The
B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had
difficulty in
tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.

Guy


Remember that the B-25's were in the MTO.

Art, read Chris's post. Both were in the MTO and PTO, which is why I asked where
he got the info. I'm going to repost Chris' data to refresh your memory:
-----------------------------------------------------------------

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

snip

During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25 one
per 43 sorties.
----------------------------------------------------------------

Please note that the above data provides info for those theaters where both the
B-25 and B-26 were flying the same missions at the same time, the only way to make
a valid comparision of the two a/c. To summarize the loss data:

Overall MTO loss rate:

B-25: 1/164 sorties, or .61%.
B-26: 1/148 sorties, or .68%.

Conclusion: B-25 loss rate is about 11.5% better than the B-26, flying the same
missions at the same time.

North Africa-only loss rate, Nov. '42 - June '43:

B-25: 1/43 sorties, or 2.33%.
B-26: 1/20 sorties, or 5.00%.

Conclusion: B-26 loss rate is over double B-25 loss rate.

And finally, you claimed that the MTO was :

A less hazardous theatre [than the ETO].

Does that claim hold up? Nope.

B-26 loss rate, North Africa only: 5.00%
B-26 loss rate, overall MTO: .68%
B-26 loss rate, Overall ETO: .48%

Conclusion, B-26 loss rate in the MTO was 42% higher than it was in the ETO, and
just taking the North African theater (where there was a high percentage of
low-level missions), loss rates were 7.4 TIMES what they were in the ETO. Still
insist that the MTO was a less hazardous theater?

Guy






B-25 loss rate

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ost (Chris Mark)
Date: 7/17/2004 5:16 PM Pacific Standard Time

All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in
the
Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.


Chris Mark



Phased out is the wrong term. They were yanked out and rushed up to the ETO
where the demands were much higher and targets much tougher. Only the best were
used in the ETO. The only reason a piece of equipment was taken out of the ETO
is because it couldn't cut.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Chris Mark wrote:

From: Guy Alcala g_alcala@junkpostoffic

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures?

Part of a project I'm working on. I've been plugging away at a history of the
air war in the MTO off and on for some years and got curious about operations
in other theaters and how they compared.

Can you break out B-25 and B-26 losses in the MTO excluding North Africa? Those
are the onesI'm really interested in. BTW, I take it theseare all combatlosses and
don't include operational losses?

Whether B-25 or B-26, losses track pretty closely with mission profile. For
example, the 319th, a B-26 group sent to the MTO, was trained in low-level
attacks. But after less than three months, losses were so severe that it was
withdrawn from combat and retrained in medium altitude bombardment, after which
losses plummeted. The 310th, a B-25 outfit, was somewhat similar, although it
kept a specialized low-level squadron for sea sweeps for a long time.
Whether B-25 or B-26, used as medium altitude bombers, losses were in the
roughly one per 150-200 sortie range and 3-4 times higher when they went down
on the deck.
B-26 losses were higher than B-25 losses in the MTO. I suspect the biggest
reason was better single-engine performance by the B-25.

I'd agree, although engine maintenance would have also fed into the problem. Given
the maintenance problems, losing _an_ engine might well lead to loss of the
airplane just from failure of the other one due to overstrain, even if it was
otherwise controllable on a single. the other thing I wonder about is if the B-25
had better air filters at the time. I know many of the early B-26 groups in North
Africa retrofit the larger intakes (for air filters) on the nacelles of their early
B models, but I don't know how the B-25 setup compared at the time.

B-26s also had much higher abort figures than the B-25, several times higher,
in fact. I suspect better reliability and easier maintenance of the B-25s
Wright engines, played some role in this, but more important likely was the
problems the B-26 had with its electrically operated props, so that a generator
failure would lead to a mission abort.

No doubt about it. There was also an issue, in the PTO at least, with prop tip
clearance while taxying on soft ground/runways. The difference between the B-25
and B-26 was only 3 inches, but that was apparently enough to cause problems. The
B-26B-4 and subsequent were given an extended nosewheel partly to compensate for
this (and also to improve the wing aspect angle on takeoff), and later the B-26F
and G models (Art flew a G) also had the wing angle of incidence increased to 3
degrees, providing similar benefits to takeoff performance and proptip clearance.

It also seems that it was far easier to make repairs on the B-25's fuselage skin,
given that it was mostly flat panels instead of the B-26's double curvature. And
as Art will tell you the B-26's nose gear was rather weak, which didn't help its
mission capable rate when operating from rough strips.

Conversely, in the Pacific, with the B-25 groups flying low-level missions, the
hydraulicly operated props caused losses. Typically, a plane would take a hit
in the oil cooler and start losing oil. Had the plane been at 10,000 feet,
that engine's prop would have been feathered and the engine shut down. Good
chance the old bird would make it home or to an emergency field. But on the
deck shutting down the engine was not an option. The plane had to maintain
power on both engines until it got clear of the target. Unfortunately, by that
time, oil pressure might well have dropped so low that the prop couldn't be
feathered.

The B-25 had good short field performance compared to the B-26. That made it
more desirable in the rougher theaters of operation. Turnaround time on the
B-25 was quicker as well, so that it was possible when needed, say as during
the Anzio invasion, for a single plane to fly multiple sorties in a single day.
Maximum lifting capability was around two-thirds greater (depending somewhat
on models compared) for the B-25 compared to the B-26, basically meaning that
B-25s could stagger into the air with seemingly impossible loads. Thus, in the
Pacific, you would have B-25s staging out of Palawan flying missions to bomb
shipping in Saigon, staying in the air 10 or 11 hours.
All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in the
Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.

I know one US MTO B-26 Group was briefly converted to B-25s before relocating to
the states for transition to the A-26 and the PTO, but I thought the other 2? (3?)
remained in the theater. ISTR the various allied air forces flying the B-26
continued flying it in the MTO, although at least a couple of the French groups
moved to France after Anvil/Dragoon. I remember seeing a photo of one US B-26 base
on either Corsica or Sardinia, which had six parallel packed and oiled dirt
runways, giving some idea of the dust problems in theater.

Guy

WalterM140 wrote:

Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
in height to minimise flak damage.



That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type could
fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.

That's a question of stability and control forces. The B-17 was easier to fly in
formation than the B-24, but I have no idea how the British heavies stacked up.

I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I shouldn't
think as at high an altitude as the B-17.

Not even close, owing to the engine supercharging.

B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the altitude
at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.

Again, due to the superchargers. Both US mediums and the British heavies used
single-stage two-speed superchargers while the B-17 and B-24 used turbochargers
(feeding superchargers). That generally gave them max. power and top speeds ain
the range of 13,500 - 15,000 feet. A couple of years ago a few of us decided to
find out what it would take to boost RAF heavies to B-17 or B-24 formation cruise
heights. Given the available British engines, they could only have used two-stage
two-speed Merlins, 60, 70 or 80 series. Those were all being used by Spit 8/9/16s,
late model Mossie bomber/recon a/c, and of course Merlin P-51s. Major changes in
production lines (and the a/c) would have been required to provide enough for the
heavies as well.

Our conclusion was that the simplest and quickest method for the Brits to go over
to US style daylight bombing against well-defended targets in the fall of 1943 was
to use B-24s diverted from US groups in training (the 8th preferred the B-17), at
least until they could produce a high altitude bomber engine (preferably a Bristol
Hercules air-cooled radial, either turbocharged or with a two-speed supercharger)
in adequate numbers. By night most of them were able to cruise individually in
the 19 - 23,000 foot range, but formation flying limits the performance to the
worst a/c, and also requires some power in hand for throttle jockeying and
formation turns. So we figured they were likely restricted to tight formation
flying at altitudes of around 18,000 or at most 20,000 feet for Lancs or Halifax
IIIs, although we knew we'd have to lighten the bombloads to get them that high
(owing to the need to increase the defensive armament, armor, crew, and fuel
loads).

Guy

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 7/17/2004 11:21 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944


We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly
turret.They
wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications

Keith


They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
B-17's and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.


It was since they Germans needed those electronic aids to
find them. Bottom line Art is that most hight bombers
never saw what killed them and no radar guided turrets
were then available.

The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
you need to find the target.

Keith

How about take off a few pounds of bombs and do both?

Many of the crews were "taking off a few pounds of bombs" to improve
performance, albeit unofficially over the North Sea or as soon as they crossed
into German airspace. A B-17 or B-24 ball turret weighed about 1,500 pounds
loaded - now you want to add the weight and drag of a radome and radar to that,
and unlike the case with US pathfinders, you're doing so on every a/c instead
of just the lead. That's a lot more than "a few pounds" of bombs, and you've
made every a/c far more vulnerable to fighters and flak, because you're slower
and can't fly as high.

As an example of just how major the drag was, in 1944 and 1945 the 8th AF
allowed various units to experiment with removing guns and turrets to see what
effect it had on performance. Most of the experiments involved only a single
position, but one group removed the chin, top and ball turrets (this was 1945,
when fighter opposition was minimal), and found that it improved the cruise IAS
by about 25 mph, as well as increasing the altitude, climb rate, and ease of
formation flying. That kind of speed increase by the night heavies (compared
to a normal cruise of 155-165IAS several thousand feet lower) would have made
interception by the radar-equipped Me-110s that made up the bulk of the
NachtJagd far more difficult if not impossible, and was worth far more for
safety than the gun turrets were. Which is why US jet nuke bombers were only
given tail guns. Daytime is another matter, at least when there's serious
fighter opposition, but we're talking about night.

Guy

WalterM140 wrote:

The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And
yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why?

If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the
Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew
that help wasn't coming.. Right?

If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well
then he was wrong.

You don't become a great captain by being wrong.

Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if
not criminally incompetent.

I'd say the evidence shows he was wrong, but you can be wrong without being
incompetent. Harris believed what he was doing was more effective than it was, but
unfortunately for him the Germans weren't providing BDA for him, and he couldn't
consult the USSBS. That others disagreed with him as to area bombing's
effectiveness is also true, but just because we know they were correct on that
issue NOW doesn't mean that it was obvious at the time. We can say that Harris
stuck with it long after he should of in the face of the evidence, but how many
commanders have been condemned for changing horses in midstream just when they were
on the verge of success? No one can accuse Harris of not adhering to maintenance
of aim. Of course, the same can be said of Haig; there's no one right answer.

Besides, Harris has an out; if you wish to throw around accusations of
incompetence, or rather negligence, you have to look no further than Portal. If he
disagreed with Harris' strategy and tactics and he didn't think that Harris would
properly support new ones if ordered to, it was his responsibility to replace him
with someone else; Harris said as much, in so many words. Portal punted, not
requiring him to change, and not replacing him.

Guy

WalterM140 wrote:

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
factor.

Gee, that is -my- point.

And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
it.

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.

Was it beyond normal human kin in 1942 to devine the fact that the self
defending bomber was not going to work, even with the heavy armament, high
altitudes, tight formations and toughness of the B-17's and their crews?

We're not interested in 'divining' anything, what was needed was empirical
evidence, and early British unescorted raids by far more lightly armed, slower
twin-engined Wellingtons flying in looser formations at much lower altitudes
weren't necessarily indicative of US efforts. As it turns out, they _were_
indicative, but we didn't know that at the time.

Maybe so. I am not necessarily blaming Eaker and Hunter, just pointing out the
fact that a strong force of P-38's (provided that the technical problems were
addressed aggressively) could have been available a year before the pioneer
Mustang group arrived.

3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC in the
ETO.

It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was what
it was. I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace any
more than it was.

Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine on
t/o.

snip

The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively
could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available
in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long,

Thats all I am saying, my friend.

So far we agree.

the
need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
shallow penetrations we were making at the time.

It wasn't obvious perhaps. That's why kudos go to those who see beyond the
obvious.

Arnold ordered Giles to
increase
the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the
reference,
"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months
to
achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months
before
they were all sent to the Med.

Yes, Eaker could have been screaming bloody murder -- "hey, don't take my long
range escorts!" But he didn't, for whatever reason.

It wouldn't have made the slightest bit of difference if he had. With our focus on
the ETO air war and D-Day et. seq., we forget that in 1942 and 1943, the ETO wasn't
the highest priority theater - the Med was. the P-38 was consuidered absolutely
vital there, so that's where they went. Eaker screamed repeatedly to Arnold about
diversions to the MTO reducing the rate of the 8th's buildup throughout 1943; a fat
lot of good it did him prior to October or so.

And as others have mentioned, the P-38 wasn't all that much more long-ranged than
the P-47 at the time. P-38 internal fuel prior to the J with leading edge tanks,
was 300 gallons. A P-47D-23 or earlier with somewhat less total power had 305
gallons internal (the D-25 through M had 370 gal.). The P-38 would outclimb it,
but the P-47 was faster, so range was fairly close. The P-38's big advantage was
that it had large external tanks early, but the 165 gallon tanks weren't
pressurized (and never were), so couldn't have been used above 20,000 feet or so in
any case, which is where the escorts needed to be.

Let's instead postulate that the P-47 got big pressurized external tanks, either a
150 (actual cap. 165 gal.) or 200 gallon for the C/L, or a pair of 108 gallons
underwing, in August or September 1943 rather than February/April 1944.
Historically, note that despite high priority and the best efforts of Cass Hough
and Co. at Bovingdon, the first P-47 mission using drop tanks, the 200 gallon,
unpressurized and very draggy ferry tank only half loaded, was only in July 1943,
with the 75 gallon (actual cap. 84 gal.) metal pressurized tank becoming available
in August 1943, and the 108 gallon paper tank in October IIRR.

According to Zemke the 150 gal.C/L tank allowed the 56th to get to the Hanover
region, while the twin 108 gallon tanks only increased the radius a bit further
(limited by internal fuel for combat and return), but did increase the endurance.
Sure, they still can't go all the way to Berlin, but they can sure as hell take the
heavies a lot further in and meet them further in as well, decreasing the time the
Luftwaffe has to attack them. And the P-47 is a better high altitude escort
fighter than the P-38 anddoesnt suffer from all its problems, it just needs bigger
fuel tanks (external and then internal, in that order).

Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Guy

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala

hat's a lot more than "a few pounds" of bombs, and you've
made every a/c far more vulnerable to fighters and flak, because you're
slower

A B-17 would do about 140 IAS and an ME 109 would do about 350 IAS. And you are
worried about slowing the B-17 down so it can't outrun an ME 109???? I sat in
a B-26 doing 180 IAS and the FW-190's could pass us like we were sitting still.
You think if we were a bit slower it would cause a problem? Not as far as the
FW was concerned.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ost (Chris Mark)
Date: 7/17/2004 5:16 PM Pacific Standard Time

All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in
the
Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.


Chris Mark



Phased out is the wrong term. They were yanked out and rushed up to the ETO
where the demands were much higher and targets much tougher. Only the best were
used in the ETO. The only reason a piece of equipment was taken out of the ETO
is because it couldn't cut.

Art, no US B-26 Groups (17th, 319th, 320th) that had been assigned to the MTO were
"yanked out' and redeployed to the ETO. None, zero, zilch, nada. One of these
groups was redeployed to the US after having its B-26s replaced by B-25s (this only
lasted a month or so), for conversion to the A-26 and then movement to the Pacific.
Chris can probably correct my memory, but IIRR the other two groups were eventually
re-equipped with A-26s and stayed in the MTO, or were folded up.

Meanwhile, the RAF continued to operate 2 Squadrons of B-26s in the MTO, the South
African Air Force continued to operate 5 squadrons in the MTO, and the French
continued to operate six "Groupes" (equivalent to US squadrons) in the MTO. The
French units were later part of the 1st Tactical Air Force, operating against
targets in southern France until the end of the war.

All 8 US B-26 Groups in the ETO were originally deployed there - no B-26 Groups
arrived from any other theater.

Guy