Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944


We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.They
wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications

Keith


They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets, B-17's and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Krztalizer" wrote in message
...
The Lufwaffe Nachtjakgt

Well that looks interesting.

The
Luftwaffe for a time had to resort to wild boar tactics which involved
single engined fighters equipped with special navigation equipment but
with
no radar.

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
have
interviewed.

I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials. Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights. They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators: I believe mosquitoes were the main
target. The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again. I believe that great of squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.


Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it? I
have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.


Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal. I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.



The night fighter pilots maintained high morale and motivation to the
end.
In five years this arm of the Luftwaffe underwent greater technical and
tactical change than any other branch of the Armed Forces.

Probably true, although it should be weighed against the groud attack arm
of
the airforce, that started the war in some cases with Henschel biplanes
and
open cockpits and ended with Jets.





v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets, B-17's
and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.



Arthur Kramer

Art,

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

Steve

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin)
Date: 7/16/2004 8:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets, B-17's
and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.



Arthur Kramer

Art,

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

Steve


Massed bombers in tight formation drop large, tight bomb patterns on the gound
for maximum destruction against targets.
We did that quite effectively so we just kept doing it.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

smartace11 wrote:

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more reliable/efficient
than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to him
during WWII. Especially considering that, IIRC, the VN B-52 raids were night
missions, fewer airplanes. Weather and selection of IPs was not as critical as
in WWII.
Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way around.

Rick Clark

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: (OXMORON1)
Date: 7/16/2004 9:13 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

smartace11 wrote:

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more reliable/efficient
than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to
him
during WWII. Especially considering that, IIRC, the VN B-52 raids were night
missions, fewer airplanes. Weather and selection of IPs was not as critical
as
in WWII.
Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
around.

Rick Clark


We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
since we won that war. (sigh)




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

Steve


Massed bombers in tight formation drop large, tight bomb patterns on the
gound
for maximum destruction against targets.
We did that quite effectively so we just kept doing it.



Arthur Kramer

That is what I have read in the literature but my question is could losses been
reduced without compromising accuracy. I understand the principle of
concentration of force but I am wondering, from a hypothetical standpoint, if
there were possibly other tactics that could have been more effective that
weren't used. Mass formations of bombers was a signature formation for the
bomber trade, at least in our AF, but it has been demonstrated that it may not
be the best tactic. I am just wondering what you opinion was in that regard.

Art wrote:
We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
since we won that war. (sigh)

Nobody said you didn't.
However, and there is always a "however" in life, would you not agree that with
better equipment, a shared workload and a little more training you might have
been able to squeeze a little more out of the system?

Same objective, different methods, etc.

Rick Clark

smartace11 wrote:

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more reliable/efficient
than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to
him
during WWII. Especially considering that, IIRC, the VN B-52 raids were night
missions, fewer airplanes. Weather and selection of IPs was not as critical
as
in WWII.
Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
around.

Rick Clark


I don't disagree at all, I am just asking the question. The B/A-26 was used in
Vietnam as well and my question is whether using a medium bomber/attack
aircraft was appropriately used in a heavy bomber role. There is no doubt that
the heavies in War 2 were employed in what seems to have been the most logical
tactic. The -26 is a bit of a different beast and its main advantage seems to
have been speed and maneuverability, not payload.

in WWII.
Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
around.

Rick Clark


We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
since we won that war. (sigh)




Arthur Kramer

I am having a hard time getting my question across here (sigh). I will re-ask
the question. Was the B-26 more effective or appropriately used in a heavy
bomber or a medium tactical attack aircraft type role. Hypothetical question.
Just looking for an opinion not a service record.