Best dogfight gun?

Chad Irby wrote in message m...
(Tony Williams) wrote:

Chad Irby wrote:

Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
structure that fell through on closer examination.

Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
work on hard info rather than forum gossip.

This talks about the cost issue:

http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1

"We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
"Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
supplier on a best-value case."

Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin'

A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
"they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."

The usual response in that case is to tell the supplier to keep the
price down or lose the contract. With a potentially huge market for
the F-35, Mauser would have to have been mad to throw it away. There
is no inherent reason that I am aware of that the BK 27 should have
been more expensive to make than the GAU-12/U, particularly since both
would have been made in the USA (unless they're planning to save money
on the initial batch by re-using guns from the AV8-B). I remain
suspicious that GD was both the gun integrator and the supplier of the
GAU-12/U; they weren't exactly innocent bystanders.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Tony Williams" wrote:
| Chad Irby wrote in message
m...
| (Tony Williams) wrote:
|
| Chad Irby wrote:
|
| Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball
pricing
| structure that fell through on closer examination.
|
| Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like
to
| work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
|
| This talks about the cost issue:
|
| http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1
|
| "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
| "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we
were
| forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
| supplier on a best-value case."
|
| Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
| GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
| proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
| the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin'

The comment in the article was "Lockheed Martin originally selected the
BK 27 27mm cannon offered by Boeing [BA] and Mauser in July 2000" which
would have been 5 months after GD had withdrawn its proposal in February
of that year. If that comment is true Lockheed Martin, by default,
selected the only weapon left in the competition.

"Tony Williams" wrote in message
m...
Chad Irby wrote in message
m...
(Tony Williams) wrote:

Chad Irby wrote:

Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
structure that fell through on closer examination.

Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
work on hard info rather than forum gossip.

This talks about the cost issue:

http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1

"We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
"Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
supplier on a best-value case."

Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin'

A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
"they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."

The usual response in that case is to tell the supplier to keep the
price down or lose the contract. With a potentially huge market for
the F-35, Mauser would have to have been mad to throw it away. There
is no inherent reason that I am aware of that the BK 27 should have
been more expensive to make than the GAU-12/U, particularly since both
would have been made in the USA (unless they're planning to save money
on the initial batch by re-using guns from the AV8-B). I remain
suspicious that GD was both the gun integrator and the supplier of the
GAU-12/U; they weren't exactly innocent bystanders.

Do you remember the American production of Roland? Each and every drawing
had to be reproduced with SAE equivalents of all the metric dimensions. That
kind of "Americanization" ran the price up to the point that the AF choked.

Ed Rasimus wrote in message

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

Ed,

I take issue with your last statement, unless you're limiting the
scope of your answer to tacair only. My wing flew 300 sorties during
Anaconda and dropped 845 JDAM's and 24 Mk84's providing excellent on
call air power. Granted we're a heavy bomber and could fly 1000 miles
and then loiter for a few hours, which the fighter guys couldn't do.
I'm sure BUFDRVR can chime in with the BUFF's contribution to CAS in
Afghanistan. It only goes to back up what you've been saying, methods
of delivering CAS are changing.

Cheers,
Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there!

What do you think my day job is? _Someone_ has to try to work out the
best way to use what we've got, and while the Services take the lead
they also hire some civilian help.


Ed raises some valid criticism of the data as raw numbers, but he agrees
with the main thrust: guns on or off fighters were a trivial factor in
air-to-air combat effectiveness; at least when compared to training,
tactics, doctrine, personnel deployments, maintenance, technology...

Trouble is, the "we did badly because we didn't have guns" mantra is
attractive, seductive... and wrong.


It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
was...

Too little analysis is as bad as too much.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message . ..
"Tony Williams" wrote in message
m...
Chad Irby wrote in message
m...
(Tony Williams) wrote:

Chad Irby wrote:

Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
structure that fell through on closer examination.

Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
work on hard info rather than forum gossip.

This talks about the cost issue:

http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1

"We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
"Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
supplier on a best-value case."

Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin'

A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
"they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."

The usual response in that case is to tell the supplier to keep the
price down or lose the contract. With a potentially huge market for
the F-35, Mauser would have to have been mad to throw it away. There
is no inherent reason that I am aware of that the BK 27 should have
been more expensive to make than the GAU-12/U, particularly since both
would have been made in the USA (unless they're planning to save money
on the initial batch by re-using guns from the AV8-B). I remain
suspicious that GD was both the gun integrator and the supplier of the
GAU-12/U; they weren't exactly innocent bystanders.

Do you remember the American production of Roland? Each and every drawing
had to be reproduced with SAE equivalents of all the metric dimensions. That
kind of "Americanization" ran the price up to the point that the AF choked.

Yes, something like that is what I assumed in the first place.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Brett" wrote in message ...
"Tony Williams" wrote:
| Chad Irby wrote in message
m...
| (Tony Williams) wrote:
|
| Chad Irby wrote:

| Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball
pricing
| structure that fell through on closer examination.
|
| Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like
to
| work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
|
| This talks about the cost issue:
|
| http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1
|
| "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
| "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we
were
| forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
| supplier on a best-value case."
|
| Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
| GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
| proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
| the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin'

The comment in the article was "Lockheed Martin originally selected the
BK 27 27mm cannon offered by Boeing [BA] and Mauser in July 2000" which
would have been 5 months after GD had withdrawn its proposal in February
of that year. If that comment is true Lockheed Martin, by default,
selected the only weapon left in the competition.

Sorry, I was mixing it up with Boeing. I have a print-off of an item
from 'Defence Systems Daily' dated April 29th, 1999, which says: "The
Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for its
next-generation JSF combat aircraft...The gun is also a candidate for
the Lockheed-Martin version of the JSF."

Presumably GD saw the writing on the wall. Why else would they
withdraw their gun, which they seem more than happy to provide now?

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
training burden)

The training burden? For gosh sakes, you already have to have armorers,

Trained gun-fitters and repair teams, and the logistic pipeline to
support them, cost money.

and
I doubt that including a periodic requirement for the pilots to do some
range work would be that great a burden--it is after all what they do during
peacetime.

Try costing up the aircraft, the range, the targets (whether air-to-air
or air-to-ground), the equipment to provide useful feedback and training
(because 'pulled trigger, gun made loud noise, came home, landed' is not
useful training) and it adds up with alarming rapidity.

How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?

Apparently a pretty decent one including F-15E's, F-16's, and A-10's as
well, from what I have read of the reports on Anaconda.

I'd heard the A-10s got pulled early due to hot/high problems, and given
the frequent sniping at the F-16's range I'm surprised to hear it doing
significant long-range loiter.

How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
little result.

Actually, one senior US Army commander *did* sort of hammer the CAS effort
after-the-fact, though not specifically directed at the strafe operations.
Some of his comments were valid, and some were likely as not an attempt to
shovel off blame that he should have borne on his own shoulders. As to
effect, the reports I read varied, with some indicating that in some
instances they ended up having to resort to using PGM's a lot closer than
they originally cared to in order to finally destroy the target (and in at
least one case that almost literally "blew up in their face", so to speak,
yielding a quick, "you almost got us with that last bomb" from the CCT). I
recall two reports indicated that the strafes were on target and at least
suppressed the bad guys (and sometimes suppression is the best you can hope
for).

According to

http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports...irwar_exec.pdf

the US flew 17,500 combat sorties over Afghanistan, of which you've
heard of several failed strafes ('danger close' sorties where the gun
passes failed to stop the enemy, leading to 'even more dangerously
close' use of other munitions) and two cases where the enemy was
'suppressed'. Guesstimate two aircraft in each case for eight sorties
with a 50% success rate.

It's not an enormously convincing argument that the existing gun
armament is a potent and essential CAS tool, is it? Either the gun needs
to be made significantly more effective in order to increase its
lethality and utilisation... or it needs replacing with something better
able to provide _effective_ close fire to troops in combat.

Burdening most of your tactical air fleet with a thousand pounds of
ballast that's used on 0.05% of combat sorties is

As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)

Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is
it?

And you describe above how in at least one case, strafing failed to
deter the enemy and heavier weapons had to be resorted to.

Similarly, one drag on developing a weapon for danger-close CAS is the
airy claim that "that's what the gun is for" when its effectiveness is
patchy (some reports of 'suppression' when it was used, but others where
the enemy declined to be deterred)

Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda
participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. Imagine a scenario
where the bad guy has a better MANPADS capability and you are stuck in a
similar (daytime) situation--which would you rather commit to making
strafing runs to suppress the bad guys, fast-movers or that AC-130? If you
are as concerned about risk as you claim, you know what the answer to that
one is.

Sounds like there's a need for a similar weight and accuracy of fire as
the AC-130 can deliver, but with the survivability of a fast jet.

In your scenario, neither aircraft is particularly suitable: if the
AC-130 can't survive the SAM threat, repeated passes by fast movers will
also get them speared by those improved MANPADS (especially since
they're delivering a lot less firepower and so *need* to make multiple
passes through the weapon envelope of an alerted enemy... this is what
is technically known as a Really Bad Idea).

Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
necessary" is a shaky proposition.

Better than, "This was not available, so it could not be used, and we lost a
lot of guys", IMO.

So where's the evidence for that?

Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
"really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
is now and forever a fixture.

OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a
participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to
*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide
available to be tried first? I wouldn't.

And the only options are 20mm cannon or 2000lb bombs? Think again. If
this is a genuine and frequent need, neither weapon is appropriate.

What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?

For gosh sakes, Paul, we are talking a real world example where the M61 was
their best hope, at least initially.

No, we're talking about current and future procurement.

Unless you plan your only combat to be action replays, then you need to
learn what worked and what didn't; decide what lessons are valid and
which were special cases; and then plan for the future so you do more of
what worked, less of what didn't work and learn from the Lessons
Identified.

Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
procure in the future.

So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well
as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that
will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find
itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and
STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?

About as acceptable as declaring that there's no particular problem that
a few strafing passes won't completely solve.

What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
unless someone's willing to take some risks.

Taking risks is inherent to military operations. METT-T rules, and the
commanders get paid to weigh those risks versus gains. If you are claiming
otherwise, then thank goodness our fathers who fought in WWII did not take
that view.

I'm not the one claiming four situations in 17,500 sorties demonstrates
a completely untouchable situation, Kevin.

Taking out an aircraft's gun is a risk (that somewhere in the future,
horrible things will happen for the lack of a strafing pass) but also an
opportunity (that's a thousand pounds more disposable load to use, and
training time freed up - now how to best use it?)

If there's a marginal capability (like danger-close CAS), does the gun
actually add much to it? Does it happen often enough to justify the very
real costs? Is there a better solution available or capable of
development?

Is it an unacceptable risk? Well, according to some... but then you get
into the mutual contradictions of "guns are essential weapons" and "it's
not worth developing anything better".


And it was my grandfather who fought in WW2, only his war started even
earlier than usual: he got a two-day head start on British and French
troops.

The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
straight-line path... like a strafing run.

No, they are even more lethal to that guy flying the AC-130,

Who has the option of operating above the light AAA, though MANPADS are
a problem there too.

or to those
guys flying the cargo helos in to haul all those mortar and arty rounds that
you would prefer we use exclusively.

Given that the mortars should be one to two miles back at least (for
81mm tubes, more for 120s) and artillery five to ten miles, that is one
_hell_ of a light AA gun or man-portable SAM that can detect and hit a
cargo flight at that distance while in contact with friendly troops and
under artillery fire. It's a *lot* easier to acquire and shoot at the
Big Loud Plane that just flew overhead.

If the enemy air defences are _that_ good, you're definitely not wanting
to fly strafing passes.

Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
not the best solution to the problem.

I'd imagine had you been with those guys from the 10th LID who were so happy
to get those strafing runs you'd have a slightly different view of the value
of retaining that capability, as distasteful as having to resort to its use
may be.

But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
of their main armament?

Not if their main armamnet was incapable of handling the situation that
arose. That is the differnce, when viewed against the Anaconda model.

In at least one case the main armament had to be used anyway,
danger-close be damned.

Had
you taken up that M61 space and crammed a few new radios, or another few
pounds of fuel onboard, it would still not have allowed those CAS aircraft
to do what they were *there* to do, which was support the troops engaged, no
matter how close the separation of the two combatants. With the M61's they
did that.

In four cases, with patchy results at best.

How about improving ground-to-air comms to shorten the targeting cycle?
More fuel, meaning more loiter time per aircraft, for more responsive
support? Both reduce the time needed from call-for-fire to delivery;
meaning instead of 'suppressing' the enemy with strafing passes, they
can be engaged with destructive weapons because they've had less time to
close. Or more payload, for a new munition that's got both short
danger-close and high lethality on target?

Again, you're not talking "a few pounds", you're talking about half a
ton: some wags would have you believe you could double an F-16's payload
that way. ("Wall-to-wall bombs today, boys, I'm carrying BOTH Mark
82s!")

The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
hot-and-high conditions.

Those AH-64's were indeed getting hammered--but because they hung around and
continued to press home repeated gun runs against the critical targets. How
many AH-64 crews were lost? None.

How many missions did they fly the next day? None. How much ordnance did
they deliver? None.

How many lives did they save on the
ground? We'll never know.

And how many helicopters were available to fly sorties the next day, and
the day after, and how many men could have died as a result? Or, what
was cancelled because the air support they needed for backup suddenly
wasn't there?

Losing a half-squadron of AH-64s in a single incident suggests that
there's a serious capability gap, not that the existing systems are just
fine.

Similarly, 88% attrition is _not_ sustainable.

The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.

They wanted fire that would not also kill them in the bargain, which is why
they repeatedly *requested* strafe, again and again. In some cases they
later resorted to using LGB's, with the curious methos of walking them in as
if they were conventional rounds, from what I could decypher. And yet they
still continued to request gun runs...wonder why?

Because those were the only two options available to them, and neither
sound satisfactory: the LGBs worryingly lethal over too large an area,
the gun runs inadequately lethal.

I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..

Yep, and what was available that day (or days, as IIRC this lasted well into
the next day) was CAS, and what those soldiers kept asking for from the CAS
was guns, at least in the early stages. Tells me they liked the guns.

Tells me they need another option available to them.

Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?

It is not that important an issue. The fact is that all of the incoming
aircraft we will be fighting with in the foreseeable future, minus the STOVL
version of the F-35, have guns included in their armament suites. I say
great, keep 'em and keep that flexibility they give us.

It must be wonderful having that much budget.

Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.

From what I gather that was dictated by the addition of the STOVL
capability, which necessitates making room for the lift fan, etc.

But the STOVL version is more, not less, likely to be performing CAS.
How then can the gun be optional, if it's so effective and essential?

If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.

And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
more time between those absences.

Those absences are kind of meaningless if the alternative is another couple
of circuits with an arament suite that does not allow you to serve the
customers down below, aren't they?

Yet again, armament suites are not fixed forever.

I doubt the groundpounder down below who
is in a situation where his options are such that he wants a strafe/can't
risk even a PGM is going to be very relieved by the knowledge that his CAS
stack can do a few more circles without being able to actually handle his
request.

Having the enemy "suppressed" for a pass or two is not a great return on
investment either.

Neither is having to use those PGMs even closer than the original "too
close" because the gun runs didn't do the job.

How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
stack'?

It does NOT matter if that CAS asset can't conduct the kind of attack you
need!

So you don't have the right weapons for the job? (20mm lacks
effectiveness, current PGMs too generous in their danger zones)

Bear in mind you're making force-wide assertions on the basis of 0.05%
of the offensive air sorties here.

I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
you've also got something badly wrong.

You just don't get it, do you? "**** happens" in combat, and flexibility is
what allows you to adjust. having that aerial gun option is a tool for
flexibility.

http://www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml
+++++
Combat controller recalls Operation Anaconda
by Tech. Sgt. Ginger Schreitmueller
Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking
our lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and
strafe the area with guns," said the sergeant.

The aircraft made a low and hard sweep over the entrenched area, popping
off rounds at the enemy troops.

"You could see the snow flying off the ground near the bunker and I knew
he was hitting it," said Brown.

The aircraft made several more passes at the enemy before indicating he
was out of ammo.

Despite the thousands of rounds pitting the area, the al-Qaida forces
kept firing.

"I kept yelling across the area at the platoon leader about our options
to eliminate the bunker,� said Brown. “We coordinated on what we
needed to do to 'frag' out the enemy and blow the bunker. We knew the
bad guys were still hiding in the bunker. We were already two hours into
the fight and it was only going to get worse if we couldn't take down
their position."

Using his close air support training and skills, Brown targeted the spot
using precision bombs. The need was urgent as additional al-Qaida troops
were pulling up the mountaintop toward the U.S. team.

"If we couldn't kill the bunker, we were going to be surrounded,� said
Brown. “We knew that we had enemy soldiers hiding in the terrain to
our (right). Effectively, they were moving in on us and we had nowhere
to go."

The danger-close call proved effective, as the bombs skidded across the
side of the mountain just in time and collapsed the bunker.

"The noise was just like it sounds in the movies," said Brown. "You
could smell the burning pine off the trees and see the snow kicking off
the ground."

snip

But with the bunker out of action and the enemy forces moving up toward
the Americans, Brown turned his attention to the rock and tree cluster
on the other side of the landing zone.

"Since I couldn't use target designators, I needed some marking to be
able to talk the bombs onto target," said Brown. "I used a small tree I
referred to as the bonsai tree as a reference point."

Brown cleared a fighter pilot to drop bombs. When the smoke cleared the
tree was now just a stick in the ground, he said.

Enemy resistance waned and Brown took a breath."
+++++

Doesn't sound like the 'flexibility' of having a gun helped much, except
to waste time; and they lost seven men in that firefight. There's an
identified need for a more effective danger-close weapon, but the gun
doesn't seem to be it.


Another account of that battle from SSgt Vance at

http://globalspecops.com/sts.html

includes the following two excerpts:

+++++
"I told the combat controller to have the F-15s to strafe the bunker and
have them come in from our right to our left. The CCT repeated what I
said. He was smart enough that I did not have to tell him too much
detail of what to say on the radio. We used the position of the
helicopter to give clock directions. He had basic knowledge of CAS so I
could tell him to have the fighters do gun runs on an area from which
direction and he would get on the radio and make it happen. The first
F-15 pass was really close and I was uncomfortable because I could not
tell if the guns were pointing at my team or the enemy bunker so I told
the CCT to abort it. I told him to have them come in more from behind
us, so I could tell they were not pointing at us. I told him to clear
them and the rounds hit right by the bunker. I told him to have them do
that over and over again. I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s
and F-16s. For the first 10-15 minutes, the CCT thought I was the team
leader. He yelled to me 'team leader' when the team leader was sitting
next to him. At this point, the team member who was injured in the leg
and could not move easily was facing one way. Another Sgt. and I were
pulling security on the bunker. The Platoon Leader and I tried to
determine where would be a good landing zone. The fighters did some more
gun runs and the enemy was still jumping up shooting at us."

snip

"I asked the medic 'if we hang out here, how many guys are going to
die?" The medic said at least two, maybe three. I reported to
Controller 'it is a cold PZ and we are going to lose three if we wait.
Just as I said it was a cold PZ, we were shot at. However, we could have
made it cold by the time they got the helicopters in there. It was just
every once and while the enemy would take pop shots at us. If we had CAS
on station dropping bombs, we could have gotten out of there at that
time. I told CCT to drop bombs down in the valley and on the small hill
every now and again. Every time the plane showed up and you could hear
them, we weren't being
shot at. Just having the planes nearby kept the enemy away. Continuously
dropping bombs discouraged them from coming after us. So every now and
again, we would drop bombs on them with B52s, B-1s, those were the last
aircraft we had. I cannot remember which one."
+++++

Again, not a ringing endorsement of the strafing runs...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Jake McGuire" wrote in message
. com...
It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
passes before he's out of ammunition.

Well, you kind of snipped away the related bit about the scenario where you
are well within danger-close and under a significant MANPADS threat during
daytime, which sort of eliminates the AC-130 from the running. The point
was that the groundpounders found the guns a better starting point for CAS
during that operation than PGM's. Are you claiming that the 10th LID and
101st AASLT DIV folks did not like getting that 20mm strafe support they
received from the F-15E's and F-16's that day?

It didn't do them much good, compared to the numerous bombs they called
in. Read SSgt Vance's testimony: where the al-Qaeda troops kept firing
despite the strafing, their position was destroyed with bombs, and lack
of bombs (not guns) was cited as a significant delay in their
extraction, which contributed to at least one death (SrA Jason D.
Cunningham, who was badly wounded and died before being evacuated)

Your mistake is to assume
that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
then it's always possible to develop something better.

Your mistake is drawing the wrong conclusions based upon different platform
requirements, for starters. APKWS is a Hydra-based (or Hellfire based)
solution (neither is scheduled for USAF use)

Is it forever impossible for the USAF to use those weapons, or are they
just not in the current plan?

, and just like the option of
using a gun pod, requires specific load out.

You can carry plenty of APKWS with the weight freed up by deleting a
gun: so an aircraft tasked for CAS gains capability without losing
weapons or fuel.

In other words if your existing
CAS support package does not have it onboard when they show up, or are
routed in based upon urgent need, and the separation between forces
precludes use of larger PGM's, the ground guys are out of luck.

So where CAS is a likely diversion, then standard loadout includes a
seven-round APKWS launcher (just as sorties over parts of the FRY used
to require an anti-radar missile either per aircraft or per flight,
IIRC). When you've freed up a thousand pounds, using a quarter of that
for contingency CAS isn't a large problem.

OTOH, if
they have their trusty internal cannon the ground guys will get at least
some form of support.

With very marginal effect, however.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Magnus Redin
writes
Hi!

"Paul F Austin" writes:
So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than
"it might be useful and you never know"..

A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets
like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers
forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles.

UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
to need so many rounds per target.

It is of course possible to develop a fairly cheap and small low
performance AA-missile but it is hard to get it as cheap as a gun
system.

"a gun", or "a gun system"? Be careful about actually costing everything
you need for a gun system, including the total cost of the training
sorties needed for pilots to reliably hit Predator-size or smaller
targets.

This gun competitor might be developed if someone decides to
arm small UAV:s with AA-missiles for killing other UAV:s and
helicopters.

See the armed variant of Predator already for the air-to-ground
version...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk