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More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, with added nationalistic abuse (was: #1 Jet of World War II)
On Mon, 18 Aug 2003 20:56:13 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: [snip agreed points... err, I mean customary imperialistic Yankee insults and abuse] They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a major issue. Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't. Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in 1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather operational effectiveness, but in this case 3 Group has a larger allocation of asphalt runways. They can have some of 5 Group's more southerly ones as well, if neccessary. In this case we don't have Harris fulminating about the USAAF getting a disproportionate allocation of the all-weather base construction program. Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no expert. Slightly (but not significant in a tactical sense) better range, but only 3,000 lb. vs. 4,000 lb. bombload. Going into the Ruhr by day in 1943/early '44 at 10-15,000 feet (vs. the 20,000 feet plus of the heavies) would be a 'really bad idea' (tm). Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances. I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point. The mediums were doing what you say, but at shorter ranges, and there was never much doubt by the Luftwaffe who they were owing to the very different cruise and bombing altitudes. I still think hitting Schipol and Alkmaar with regular medium strikes and sequential fighter sweeps before and during B-17/B24 raids being routed over them is a good idea, and better than trying to do the same over the Pas de Calais. Put enough B-25 raids below the higher heavies, with enough fighter support, and the fighters with the best opportunity for bouncing the heavies escort and forcing them to drop external tanks will get sucked into their own private war and divert attention from the main force. The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and decent planning. In 1945, when much of the defense was in a state approaching collapse, and where our airpower was overwhelming. And when the Flak threat, which is the main issue we both have with them in 1943-44, was much higher. If they were usable in 1945, their main threat in regard to operational altitude was less capable in 1943. Obviously, the fighter threat is the real issue in 1943, but the Luftwaffe could not afford to treat them like a Circus over the Pas De Calais, and so their ability to concentrate on them and inflict heavy attrition at their own leisure would be constrained. And many of the tactical targets they did hit had substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as a deep-penetration strategic force. Seems we agree on that, then. I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them. Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs and replacement aircraft..... Ha! And if we could eliminate all the manhours lost/opportunites missed to morning and afternoon tea/brewing up, we could have won the war in 1944 at the latest;-) I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me, time for a large wet. [* Notice the British war effort defeding tea-production against the encroaching Japanese prove this: note the tea-producing areas marked with a * 1941: Malaya - Have it. 1942: Singapore - Can't be bothered 1942: Burma - Knock yourselves out. 1943: Arakan - Yawn. 1944: Imphal & Kohima en route to Assam*: Fight to the death! also in terms of naval history: 1941: Force Z - You've got working torpedos? Rats. 1942: Java Sea - You've still got those torpedos? Ah well. 1942: Ceylon* - Back, you slant-eyed fiends!] Next: the impact of Dougout Doug's massive personal consumption on the coffee supply and the consequent fall of the Phillipines, 1942. Gavin Bailey -- Another user rings. "I need more space" he says. "Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell |
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The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote in message ...
And when the Flak threat, which is the main issue we both have with them in 1943-44, was much higher. If they were usable in 1945, their main threat in regard to operational altitude was less capable in 1943. Obviously, the fighter threat is the real issue in 1943, but the Luftwaffe could not afford to treat them like a Circus over the Pas De Calais, and so their ability to concentrate on them and inflict heavy attrition at their own leisure would be constrained. While the amount of flak guns went up it appears the standard "window" was an effective jammer until the end of the war, so flak effectiveness seems to have gone down on a per gun basis from mid 1943. Hence the USAAF's use of it. I will drop this in since I have not seen it elsewhere, From the British history Design and Development of Weapons, M M Postan, D Hay, J D Scott. It claims there were 4 basic Spitfire airframes which it labels A, B, C and D D was the mark 21 onwards, C was the mark VII, VIII and most griffon marks up to XIX A was the original which served for the marks I, II, IV. It was stretched to do the Va, Vb, VI, PR VII and XIII and the Seafire I. B was the airframe developed from the abortive mark III fighter, it was used for the Vc, IX and XII, and presumably XVI. The main change appears to be the "universal" wing. I doubt this makes a major difference to CoG calculations in the mark V though. It seems the fighter had quite a tight margin, the report that for AB186 noting handling was worse with a Rotol propeller, rather than the standard de Havilland propeller, they were testing a modified elevator balance. BR202 (tropical Vc) was tried with a 29 gallon rear fuselage tank, requiring repositioning of the water tank, oxygen bottle and the R3002 radio, the certificate of design was issued on 7th July 1942 along with official approval. Some Spitfire Vs were flown from England to Gibraltar in early 1942, January I think, 5.5 hour flight. Seen Morgan and Shacklady, page 150 in my copy, map of Spitfire V range with extra fuel arrangements? Ferry, full overload tanks, 5 minutes take off, cruise at 240 mph with 20% fuel reserve, reinforcing radius 1140 miles. Escort, 5 minute take off, 10 minute climb, 15 minutes maximum power, remainder cruise at 240 mph, radius 540 miles. Given the need for higher cruise and problems of slower bombers this still should have meant around the German border at least. Note the extra range required a bigger oil tank, from 7.5 or 8.5 to 14.4 gallons. Note the deeper noses on the PR versions. The book does not state what fuel tankage is being used. In early 1942 Sholto-Douglas was asking for tanks of up to 30 gallons in the wings. Fighter Command had realised it needed more range to fight over France, it does not seem to have come up with the idea it should try for Germany. Apparently with drop tanks the Typhoon could make the German border. The RAF in Ceylon recognised the need for longer range as well, noting the Japanese capabilities. Fuel tankage according to Morgan and Shacklady, VIII 47 (upper) + 49 (lower) in front fuselage + 2 x14 (1 in each wing) IX 48 (upper) + 37 (lower) in front fuselage (same as V) later 2x18 (1 in each wing) and 33 or 41 in rear fuselage. XIV 36 (upper) + 48 (lower) in front fuselage + 2x12.75 (1 in each wing) XVIII 36 (upper) +48 (lower) in front fuselage + 2x12.75 (1 in each wing) +2x33 in rear fuselage. By the looks of it the FR version a camera replaced one of the rear fuselage tanks. The PR X, 47 (upper) + 48.5 (lower) in front fuselage + 2x66 (1 in each wing) the cameras were in the rear fuselage. The text mentions the mark IXe weights with 66 gallon rear tank. As far as I can tell the idea of major Spitfire modifications keeps running into the problem that until the P-47 was proven the allies did not have another fighter that could be considered a match for the Fw190A and Bf109G, hence the rush for the IX instead of awaiting the mark VIII. The middle east had to do without Spitfires until early/mid 1942 (Malta then Egypt), the major withdrawal of mark IXs from fighter command to the squadrons in Tunisia in early 1943. As far as I can see the long range Spitfire requires a Merlin 60 series to be competitive, and for the forward CG, wing fuel tanks, preferably a cut down rear fuselage for weight reasons, a bigger tail (at least XIV size) and the rear fuselage tanks, taking the best from the above you end up with 47 + 49 in the front fuselage 2 x 18 (1 in each wing) and 66 gallons in the rear fuselage, total 198 gallons. Then add external tanks, and remembering these are imperial gallons. Vickers apparently had a proposal for 197 gallons of internal fuel, in the above configuration. This would give a still air range of around 1,400 miles. The mark IX ML186 was apparently trialed in January 1945 with a 66 gallon rear tank and maybe some of the other tanks, take of speed was 78 mph, longitudinal stability started at 140 mph, flaps and undercarriage down tended to make the aircraft stable again. The pilot had to have his hand on the control stick at all times, cruising at 245 mph at 12,000 feet meant the aircraft could not be trimmed. After 35 gallons of fuel from the rear tank had been burnt the aircraft "stabilised". Spitfire output by Supermarine works, (from a graph in Design and Development of Weapons, which goes from January 1941 to December 1943, with a small quota of error when adding the totals up) columns are date / total for month / IV / VII / VIII / IX / XI / XII / XIV / Seafire. There was 1 mark VI in November 1942. Nov-42 112 / 3 / 3 / 6 / 58 / 3 / 1 / 0 / 37 Dec-42 106 / 5 / 2 / 8 / 54 / 8 / 2 / 0 / 27 Jan-43 130 / 4 / 4 / 10 / 63 / 10 / 3 / 0 / 36 Feb-43 114 / 2 / 1 / 20 / 48 / 11 / 6 / 0 / 26 Mar-43 117 / 0 / 4 / 40 / 24 / 12 / 20 / 0 / 17 Apr-43 98 / 0 / 4 / 46 / 10 / 8 / 17 / 0 / 13 May-43 126 / 0 / 10 / 43 / 18 / 27 / 0 / 28 / 0 Jun-43 110 / 0 / 7 / 76 / 6 / 14 / 7 / 0 / 0 Jul-43 105 / 0 / 5 / 81 / 0 / 12 / 7 / 0 / 0 Aug-43 124 / 0 / 5 / 96 / 0 / 19 / 4 / 0 / 0 Sep-43 133 / 0 / 5 / 104 / 0 / 20 / 4 / 0 / 0 Oct-43 133 / 0 / 3 / 108 / 0 / 19 / 0 / 3 / 0 Nov-43 125 / 0 / 8 / 88 / 0 / 19 / 0 / 10 / 0 Dec-43 124 / 0 / 16 / 76 / 0 / 22 / 0 / 10 / 0 Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
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On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 00:27:07 +1000, "Geoffrey Sinclair"
wrote: [snip yet more tiresome rationality and logical discourse] I will drop this in since I have not seen it elsewhere, From the British history Design and Development of Weapons, M M Postan, D Hay, J D Scott. [snipadoodledo] B was the airframe developed from the abortive mark III fighter, it was used for the Vc, IX and XII, and presumably XVI. The main change appears to be the "universal" wing. I doubt this makes a major difference to CoG calculations in the mark V though. Actually, I think it does for the Vb vs Vc. The longitudinal stability problems were worse in the Vb, while the Vc had some useful things to factor into consideration like re-raked undercarriage and bomb/drop-tank plumbing, not to mention a different internal wing structure which might have allowed small wing tanks. I don't think the Vb wing had that capacity due to strength issues. It seems the fighter had quite a tight margin, the report that for AB186 noting handling was worse with a Rotol propeller, rather than the standard de Havilland propeller, they were testing a modified elevator balance. Yes, but also note the constant buggering about with different ballast displacements for the different props, CSUs and fuselage equipment fitting. The Vb Trops are the worst, I think, as they carried more weight in the rear fuselage behind the existing CoG and more weight overall. BR202 (tropical Vc) was tried with a 29 gallon rear fuselage tank, requiring repositioning of the water tank, oxygen bottle and the R3002 radio, the certificate of design was issued on 7th July 1942 along with official approval. Some Spitfire Vs were flown from England to Gibraltar in early 1942, January I think, 5.5 hour flight. October 1942 was the date I have for ferry flights from Gibraltar to Malta, using the 170 gallon Boulton Paul tank and 29 gallon rear fuselage tank tested in the summer of '42. So far as I know they were all shipped to Gibraltar beforehand though, just like they were shipped to Takoradi, Egypt and later on Casablanca. The ferry Spits weren't in combat trim. Seen Morgan and Shacklady, page 150 in my copy, map of Spitfire V range with extra fuel arrangements? Yes, but this seems to be related to the October 1942 Gib-Malta ferry range, and doesn't reflect a realistic combat radius with operational load and operational fuel reserves (the escort range given would need a 5 hour endurance on external fuel and a 270 mile range on internal fuel excluding 15 mins combat allowance). I honestly have difficulties seeing any LR Spit, especially a V, getting back from Berlin on internal fuel only as that chart seems to indicate. Relying on external tankage to get into combat and return to base is a non-starter, and that's how I see that chart personally. Escort, 5 minute take off, 10 minute climb, 15 minutes maximum power, remainder cruise at 240 mph, radius 540 miles. Given the need for higher cruise and problems of slower bombers this still should have meant around the German border at least. Note the extra range required a bigger oil tank, from 7.5 or 8.5 to 14.4 gallons. Note the deeper noses on the PR versions. The book does not state what fuel tankage is being used. The extra oil was less of a problem with later single-piece engine blocks (Merlin 50 and 60 upwards). 540 miles is a problematic figure for a Mk V escort range on existing fuel, the deciding factor of which would be the range on internal fuel to get home, not just the tankage available in external stores. That's why I've been ranting about rear-fuselage tanks in the Mk V. We're still not approaching the ranges and endurance required for PR Spits, but even so the fitting of a PR XI oil tank and nose profile is entirely possible. In early 1942 Sholto-Douglas was asking for tanks of up to 30 gallons in the wings. Fighter Command had realised it needed more range to fight over France, it does not seem to have come up with the idea it should try for Germany. If BC were wedded to a daylight campaign against Germany, this would follow, pushed along by a torrent of invective in memos from Harris and the CAS. The text mentions the mark IXe weights with 66 gallon rear tank. As far as I can tell the idea of major Spitfire modifications keeps running into the problem that until the P-47 was proven the allies did not have another fighter that could be considered a match for the Fw190A and Bf109G, hence the rush for the IX instead of awaiting the mark VIII. The middle east had to do without Spitfires until early/mid 1942 (Malta then Egypt), the major withdrawal of mark IXs from fighter command to the squadrons in Tunisia in early 1943. The RAF in the MTO were still, even after Eisenhower had pushed for Mk IXs to supplement promised deliveries of Mk VIIIs in December 1942, on the short end of the stick for Mk IX allocations. What we need in this TL is a senior RAF staff constituency able to take on Fighter Command and win, in terms of dictating fighter operations, development and production. [snip basically agreed spec of LR Mk IX] [Mk VIII production figures from Postan] That gives ACM Kramer about 550 Mk VIIIs in the second half of 1943, or about 90 per month as I suspected. Gavin Bailey -- Another user rings. "I need more space" he says. "Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell |
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Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
snip Spit production data, fuel capacities Thanks for all this, Geoffrey. Guy |
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On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 20:56:37 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't. Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in 1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather operational effectiveness, I know they did, and they seem to have abandoned the idea at the first opportunity. I know, but I was working with an earlier conversion-to-daylight frame in mind, namely the summer of 1943, ideally before Hamburg gives Harris some unchallengeable success to rentrench his preferred night/area bombing strategy. but in this case 3 Group has a larger allocation of asphalt runways. They can have some of 5 Group's more southerly ones as well, if neccessary. In this case we don't have Harris fulminating about the USAAF getting a disproportionate allocation of the all-weather base construction program. I just don't see the point of converting 2 Gp. to heavies with all the disruption that would cause, when you still want a day medium bomber force. Yes, I was talking about 3 Group re-equipping with Liberators there. Some of their ex-Wellington bases (like Feltwell, Methwold, etc) weren't concreted by the summer of 1943, and they need bases with concrete runways for the Libs. 3 Gp. needs to convert from Stirlings in any case, which are no longer participating in the main offensive, and thus (from Butch's point of view) are almost completely ineffective. Again, I think you're working with a later point of departure from the existing historical timeline than me. In the summer of 1943 the Stirling force was actually scheduled to expand by another couple of new squadrons. Now that you've brought them to mind, they might be useful in shallow-penetration heavily-escorted daylight raids with their bombload. [B-25 ops] Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances. Not internally, it didn't. The B-25 bomb bay was smaller than the B-26's. Allowable loads were 1 x 2,000 lb., or 2 x 1,000/1,600 lb., or 6 x 500 lb. or some larger number (8/10/12? I forget) of 250 lbers. The figures I have are 15,000ft loaded cruise and a 4,000lb bombload which 2 Group were using from 1943 into 1944 from the references I've seen. Obviously, this was for targets in France, so deeper penetration might reduce the bombload, but it seemed to have the best range/bombload/defensive armament characteristics of the available bombers in 2 Group: frankly, intermediate-level penetration raids with Bostons or Venturas (the alternatives) are a non-starter. At some point around 1944 they realized that the 2,000 lb. station was essentially never used, so it was removed and that made enough room for them to carry 1 extra 1,000 lb. bomb. Bowyer claims the very first Mitchell raid in 2 Group in January 1943 (escorted by Mustang Is, interestingly enough) featured a bombload of 2 x 1,000lb and 4 x 500lb per aircraft. If this is correct, I think you're underestimating the possible bombload, or I'm underestimating the impact of increased fuel loading for more distant targets. The B-26 bomb bay could carry 2 x 2,000 lb. (and occasionally did), or 4 x 1,000 lb., or 8 x 500 lb., etc. Early models (B-26, B-26A and I think some early B-26Bs) had an additional aft bomb bay usable for small bombs, but this had first been sealed shut as being of more use for other purposes, and then deleted from production altogether. The British only got one allocation, initially of about 50 Marauders in 1942, which were used in the MTO, so we'd need to come up with come convincing operational justifications to grab those USAAF production allocations. I'm not sure, if my figures are correct, there's any need to replace the B-25 which after all is being operated by 2 Group already with a very low wastage rate. Easier to expand an existing resource than demand a new one entirely. [2 Group ops] I still think hitting Schipol and Alkmaar with regular medium strikes and sequential fighter sweeps before and during B-17/B24 raids being routed over them is a good idea, and better than trying to do the same over the Pas de Calais. Put enough B-25 raids below the higher heavies, with enough fighter support, and the fighters with the best opportunity for bouncing the heavies escort and forcing them to drop external tanks will get sucked into their own private war and divert attention from the main force. Pretty much what they were doing, although perhaps not that deep. Indeed, that's the point. The whole effort would have to be reoriented from northern France/western Belgium to focus on Holland and nothern Belgium. With the occasional trip to industrial targets like Knapsack, except not with unescorted Blenheims this time. Hitting the closer industrial targets should help diffuse the flak deployment beyond the targets hit by the 8th. Woensdrecht (along with Lille, Poix, Conches etc.) was a common target for B-26s in 1943, escorted by Spits. If the Spits could get them or B-25s to Eindhoven, Gilze-Rijn, Florennes etc., it would certainly be helpful, although the Luftwaffe was already pulling back to bases beyond medium bomber (and P-47) range in late '43. The real battle would soon displace beyond Spitfire range, then beyond LR Spit and Thunderbolt range, and then the Lightnings and Mustangs would have to carry the brunt. But this is a complementary approach. Extending the range of the shorter-ranged fighters is an essential force-multiplier, and will still do valuable work even when the main Luftwaffe fighter resistance has been pushed back from the coastal and inland belts into Germany itself. I'm not sure that the flak threat in '45 _was_ higher. Even the heavies average bombing altitude decreased considerably in 1945, down to the mid teens. Not over the big targets, though. Hitting smaller towns with rail junctions as part of the transport plan, or smaller factories in semi-rural areas wasn't the same as tackling the Ruhr or Leipzig. Some of that is likely due to a shift to more tactical (and thus less well-defended) targets, but not all of it. I imagine the disruption in production and more especially transport was affecting ammo supply, C2 was failing/being seriously degraded, and morale was undoubtedly collapsing as well. While the percentage of damage to flak compared to fighters was increasing, I haven't seen any evidence that it was due to increased effectiveness of the former; rather, it seems to be due to the ever-decreasing effectiveness of the latter. My impression is that the overall flak threat on major target complexes increased. I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them. Fine by me. The B-26s were hitting targets there (not the Bight or the Ruhr); weren't the Mitchells? Not often enough accordng to me, but then you're the man in charge of Fighter ops administration. I know they were bombing the same targets in France (and presumably coastal Belgium) as the B-26s were. As you can see, my knowledge of 2 Gp. ops is limited. They and the 9th hit the same kind of targets: mostly western Holland, western Belgium and northern France, going deeper as time progressed and the invasion period began. I want them bombing airfields like Jever and Rheine, attempting to hit the fighter force which will come up to dispute the path of the 8th AF. Even if the Luftwaffe response concentrates on the tactical raids, the potential bombing damage they can inflict will be too significant for the experten to amble around, only looking to engage with the tactical advantage and avoiding combat if they can't get up-sun and above in time, like they did over the Pas de Calais. This time there will be irate Luftwaffe brass demanding that the bombers be short down, and never mind their attritional exchange with the enemy fighters meanwhile. And while they were knocking down those Spitfire Vs from the close escort, the airfield was bombed by thirty Mitchells and another two hundred B-17s passed overhead unmolested. Hitting more significant targets than the Circus ops will compell a less attritionally-advantageous (for the Germans) Luftwaffe response, and thus increase the effectiveness of the supporting raids beyond what a couple of Typhoon squadrons bombing Poix could do. I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me, time for a large wet. That will give me just enough time to slip out and get an ice cream cone then, and drink a couple of bottles of coke on the way back. This silk underwear certainly does keep the thighs from chafing -- What, you thought we wanted the stuff for some vicarious sexual thrill? ;-) J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out. I have to add that the critical importance of tea to the British war effort was well-understood at the time. ****** "We're out of tea - you know what that means - the men won't put up with it and we'll come to a grinding halt." I sent a suitably worded signal to the Commanding General of 12th TAC: "Out of tea period the war is about to stop period". Within six hours a Dakota landed with enough tea on board to satisfy us for months. Attached to one of the chests was a personal message to me: "Keep the war going we are right behind you period." ********* From "Spitfire into Battle" by Wilfred Duncan-Smith. Interestingly, he also claimed a Tiger by strafing in the same campaign (south of France, 1944): "Continuing past Vienne, and on the open road, I spotted a Tiger tank going as hard as it could towards Lyons. More in hope than anger I gave it all my remaining ammunition. To my utter amazement it belched smoke and caught fire. When I gave my report to Tim Lucas, the senior Army Liaison Officer, he did not believe me, shaking his head and muttering that a Tiger was too tough for the shells of a Spitfire. I got my own back when I took him to the spot in my jeep, after we got to Lyons on 7 September, and showed him the tank. I was there, I am pleased to say, burnt out, with 'Bravo RAF' painted on its blackened hull. To me the sight was worth a couple of Me109s. Apparently some armour-piercing incendiary shells had ricohetted off the tarmac road into the oil tank and engine - pure luck, but very satisfying." Gavin Bailey -- Another user rings. "I need more space" he says. "Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell |
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The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:
On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 20:56:37 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote: Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't. Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in 1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather operational effectiveness, I know they did, and they seem to have abandoned the idea at the first opportunity. I know, but I was working with an earlier conversion-to-daylight frame in mind, namely the summer of 1943, ideally before Hamburg gives Harris some unchallengeable success to rentrench his preferred night/area bombing strategy. Okay, I was working on ACM Kramer's timeline, where the decision to switch was definitely fall '43. Note that this wasn't based on the actual situation, more an "if we decided to to make this change, what would such a decision entail? snip I just don't see the point of converting 2 Gp. to heavies with all the disruption that would cause, when you still want a day medium bomber force. Yes, I was talking about 3 Group re-equipping with Liberators there. Some of their ex-Wellington bases (like Feltwell, Methwold, etc) weren't concreted by the summer of 1943, and they need bases with concrete runways for the Libs. Okay, that clears up the confusion. 3 Gp. needs to convert from Stirlings in any case, which are no longer participating in the main offensive, and thus (from Butch's point of view) are almost completely ineffective. Again, I think you're working with a later point of departure from the existing historical timeline than me. Yes. In the summer of 1943 the Stirling force was actually scheduled to expand by another couple of new squadrons. Now that you've brought them to mind, they might be useful in shallow-penetration heavily-escorted daylight raids with their bombload. Only for targets with light flak defenses, similar to those the mediums would go after. At least they have dual controls, but they'd already been taken off day ops over France back in 1941?, and I don't think the defenses had gotten any lighter since. BTW, do you have any idea why they didn't put some extended tips on the Stirlings, as they did for the Halifax? Maybe it just would have taken too much of a change to get them up to reasonable heights. [B-25 ops] Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances. Not internally, it didn't. The B-25 bomb bay was smaller than the B-26's. Allowable loads were 1 x 2,000 lb., or 2 x 1,000/1,600 lb., or 6 x 500 lb. or some larger number (8/10/12? I forget) of 250 lbers. The figures I have are 15,000ft loaded cruise and a 4,000lb bombload which 2 Group were using from 1943 into 1944 from the references I've seen. Obviously, this was for targets in France, so deeper penetration might reduce the bombload, but it seemed to have the best range/bombload/defensive armament characteristics of the available bombers in 2 Group: frankly, intermediate-level penetration raids with Bostons or Venturas (the alternatives) are a non-starter. Absolutely, which is why Embry wanted to go all B-25/Mosquito. At some point around 1944 they realized that the 2,000 lb. station was essentially never used, so it was removed and that made enough room for them to carry 1 extra 1,000 lb. bomb. Bowyer claims the very first Mitchell raid in 2 Group in January 1943 (escorted by Mustang Is, interestingly enough) featured a bombload of 2 x 1,000lb and 4 x 500lb per aircraft. If this is correct, I think you're underestimating the possible bombload, or I'm underestimating the impact of increased fuel loading for more distant targets. I suppose that load just might be possible, depending on the arrangement of the bomb racks. I don't have a diagram of the B-25 bomb rack arrangement, and it's been awhile since I saw one up close. Plays hell with accuracy though, carrying a mixed load like that. Max. load, internal and external, is quoted as 5,200 lb. It's never been clear from the sources available to me whether you could carry 500 lbers externally on the wing racks the heaviest bombs specifically mentioned as carried there are 325 lb. depth charges. And a torpedo on the centerline, but I think we can ignore that. BTW, what was the target of that first attack? Are we talking a "just nip across the channel to Calais and back" sort of thing? The B-26 bomb bay could carry 2 x 2,000 lb. (and occasionally did), or 4 x 1,000 lb., or 8 x 500 lb., etc. Early models (B-26, B-26A and I think some early B-26Bs) had an additional aft bomb bay usable for small bombs, but this had first been sealed shut as being of more use for other purposes, and then deleted from production altogether. The British only got one allocation, initially of about 50 Marauders in 1942, which were used in the MTO, so we'd need to come up with come convincing operational justifications to grab those USAAF production allocations. I'm not sure, if my figures are correct, there's any need to replace the B-25 which after all is being operated by 2 Group already with a very low wastage rate. Easier to expand an existing resource than demand a new one entirely. Oh, I wasn't implying that we switch 2 Gp. to B-26s, as the production capacity isn't there in any case (what with Omaha switching over to B-29s). The B-25 is fine. It's odd that the USAAF and RAF wound up using different a/c exclusively in the ETO, when you'd think it would have been far simpler to concentrate on a single type. Both forces uses both of them in the MTO, but the B-26 benefited most from the shorter supply lines and better infrastructure in the ETO, as the B-25 required less maintenance and could be flown from worse airfields. snip 2 Gp. ops areas of agreement I'm not sure that the flak threat in '45 _was_ higher. Even the heavies average bombing altitude decreased considerably in 1945, down to the mid teens. Not over the big targets, though. Hitting smaller towns with rail junctions as part of the transport plan, or smaller factories in semi-rural areas wasn't the same as tackling the Ruhr or Leipzig. Some of that is likely due to a shift to more tactical (and thus less well-defended) targets, but not all of it. I imagine the disruption in production and more especially transport was affecting ammo supply, C2 was failing/being seriously degraded, and morale was undoubtedly collapsing as well. While the percentage of damage to flak compared to fighters was increasing, I haven't seen any evidence that it was due to increased effectiveness of the former; rather, it seems to be due to the ever-decreasing effectiveness of the latter. My impression is that the overall flak threat on major target complexes increased. In number of guns often true, but the C2 was worse. I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them. Fine by me. The B-26s were hitting targets there (not the Bight or the Ruhr); weren't the Mitchells? Not often enough accordng to me, but then you're the man in charge of Fighter ops administration. I know they were bombing the same targets in France (and presumably coastal Belgium) as the B-26s were. As you can see, my knowledge of 2 Gp. ops is limited. They and the 9th hit the same kind of targets: mostly western Holland, western Belgium and northern France, going deeper as time progressed and the invasion period began. I want them bombing airfields like Jever and Rheine, attempting to hit the fighter force which will come up to dispute the path of the 8th AF. Yes, those, Deelen and Twente etc. would all be useful. snip more noxious agreement I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me, time for a large wet. That will give me just enough time to slip out and get an ice cream cone then, and drink a couple of bottles of coke on the way back. This silk underwear certainly does keep the thighs from chafing -- What, you thought we wanted the stuff for some vicarious sexual thrill? ;-) J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out. We draw the line at accessorizing with earrings and pearl necklaces; supposedly he didn't. snip story confirming tea as vital to the British war effort Guy |
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On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 03:20:19 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: [Stirlings doing daylight tactical bombing in support of B-17s] Only for targets with light flak defenses, similar to those the mediums would go after. At least they have dual controls, but they'd already been taken off day ops over France back in 1941?, and I don't think the defenses had gotten any lighter since. They weren't taken off due to heavy losses per se [3-6 Stirlings from 7 and 15 Sqns in 3 Group were used in July 1941 for Circus ops], just that BC wanted them for the main strategic offensive and any bomber lost in daytime or even allocated to FC was seen as a disproportionate waste of resources from painfully small and slowly-expanding four-engined bomber production. We're reversing that perspective here, particularly after October 1943 when the Stirling force is baked by sufficient production output, but by the same token is looking for a mission as they are about to get dropped from deep-penetration missions. BTW, do you have any idea why they didn't put some extended tips on the Stirlings, as they did for the Halifax? Maybe it just would have taken too much of a change to get them up to reasonable heights. The only effort to do this that I can see came with the "super-Stirling" using Centaurus engines mooted by Shorts in 1941. The Centaurus wasn't going to appear in adequate numbers in time to have an impact on Stirling usage in the real world, meanwhile in 1941-42 the MAP and AM were unhappy with Short's chronic failure to meet existing Sitrling production targets. Any new type or equipment change which would further hinder production seems to have been dismissed out of hand, although that's conjecture on my part in the absence of hard evidence. The ceiling of the Stirling I was regarded as a problem, but it was hoped better engines would fix the problem, rather than changing the airframe, i.e. by the Hercules XIs used in the Stirling III. [2 Group B-25s using 4,000lb bombloads in January 1943] BTW, what was the target of that first attack? Are we talking a "just nip across the channel to Calais and back" sort of thing? Yes, the targets were on the Ghent-Terneuzen canal in Belgium; but on the other hand they also carried 4,000lbs on deeper penetrations to Brest and Normandy that I'm aware of. I was hoping you might have some evidence of 12th AF range and bombloads to compare, or even from ops in the SWP. [cowardly and snivelling agreement by the colonialist Yanqui running-dogs snipped] J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out. We draw the line at accessorizing with earrings and pearl necklaces; supposedly he didn't. snip story confirming tea as vital to the British war effort Well, it would help if you were aiming to contribute some badly-needed inaccurate, nationally chauvanistic-abuse to this thread, if you could actually manage some substantive inaccuracy. I note that so far I have been the only contributor to succeed in adding unsupported personal abuse to the thread so far. My victory in traditional usenet terms is, frankly, unassailable. Gavin Bailey -- Another user rings. "I need more space" he says. "Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell |
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ubject: More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, with
added nationalistic abuse (was: From: (Guy alcala) Date: 9/2/03 9:09 PM Pacific Daylight Time Message-id: ." Here's the sortie count and bomb tonnage for the B-25 and B-26: We never flew "sorties" We flew missions. Fighters flew sorties. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
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Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was: #1 Jet of World War II) | The Revolution Will Not Be Televised | Military Aviation | 20 | August 27th 03 09:14 AM |