Guns on fighters?

On 8/10/03 9:55 AM, in article , "Mike
Kanze" wrote:

Woody,

Would have helped to have a gun on an Intruder

I agree that having a gun would have been a good thing during Preying Mantis
(taking out oil platforms). I can't agree that the Intruder would have been
the right bird for guns. During 1988 the A-7 was still lurking about, so
it's not as if we didn't have gun assets available. I presume the A-6E
COULD carry rockets (as its predecessor Intruder variants could), and so
augment the gunfire from the Thalidomide Crusader.

Then there's the old conundrum about what tradeoffs you'd need to make, to
retrofit a gun into any aircraft not already "gun-ready". With the
Intruder, this would most likely have meant a pod. The expression, "sailors
and pods don't mix very well", was already gaining currency during the early
1970s with the intro of the EA-6B to the fleet.

Since the A-6's primary mission was all-wx attack a gun - at best - would
only have been a "nice to have".

Owl sends.

Owl,

All very true. Oil platforms, Boghammers etc... They zig, you simply follow
them with bullets.

OBTW, never saw it except in TACMAN pictures, but the Intruder DID have a
gun pod designed for it. All the ordies and gunners I talked to had never
seen one either. Apparently, you dialed in a mil setting and fired it in
the manual mode with the pickle button--kinda goofy from a pilot/human
factors standpoint (my opinion only).

Of course as a former B/N, you already know that the A-6E did carry rockets.
In fact, I had the opportunity to employ every rocket delivery possible from
the Intruder... Straight Path, Manual, General, Loft (NOT High Loft
though)--both pilot and B/N designates--Zuni's and 2.75's. I'm not the ace
of the base, just happened to get scheduled for 3 rocket hops with 2 full
pods each and lots of range time. MAARP's were great in the old days.
Problem is WRT PREYING MANTIS: Rockets not allowed on ship. You wouldn't
believe how many of my Hornet contemporaries these days that have never even
SEEN a rocket pod (even though they should have during advanced strike in
A-4's).

There would have been some definite tradeoff to include a gun on the A-6
from its inception, but the design was a bit myopic from a mission
standpoint, so we got what we got. I was always a bit jealous of the A-7's
gun... Always seemed like it would have been a fun thing to strafe the wake
after mission tanking. Ah the reminiscing...

--Woody

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
While I agree in principle with what is stated here, I have to point
out some errors.

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote:

Viet Nam warfare proved to be a learning experience for the US aviation
community, which had come to believe, by the 1960's, that guided missiles
were all that would prove to be needed to prosecute aerial warfare.

Let's note that there was really only one tactical jet procurred by
the "US aviation community" which was missile only. The F-4. In the
mid-60's when the Vietnam War expanded, the USAF was operating the
F-100, F-105, F-104.

Did the F-100 routinely operate over N Viet Nam in either the fighter-bomber
or the CAP role? Did the F-104? Of the three you mention, only the F-105
had to requisite combination of bomb-load, range (with tanker supporta) and
high speed necesary for operations over the North; the F-104 hadn't either
the legs or the weight-carrying capacity and the F-100 might not have been
able to carry the needed load far enough. (The interesting thing, to me, is
that all three "Century Series" aircraft, whether originally intended for
(fighter-bomber type) interdiction, air-superiority or tactical nuclear
attack, all featured an integral gun-armament, not as a retrofit , but from
the drawing board onward. There never seems to have been any question over
whether these a/c "needed" an integral gun armament).

Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility of
the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well.


The USN was flying the A-4, F-8. All gun
equipped. Later (besides the F-4 B/C/D/J) there were the F-5, A-37,
A-1, A-7---all gun equipped.

Of the a/c mentioned above, only the F-8 had the internal guns, legs and
performance necessary for the CAP role over the North. However, what was
needed at the time was aircraft capable of performing primarily the
fighter-bomber role, with a secondary aia-to-air role. The F-105 had the
load-carrying capaility, the performance, and (with tanking) the legs to
accomplish the mission.


Alarming, if not distressing reports were received fairly early on that a
number of US a/c downed over N Viet Nam had been shot down in error by US
missiles fired from beyond range of positive visual identification by
other
US a/c.

ROE in MiG country until 1972--eight years into combat--always
required VID, except for a small number of Combat Tree,
close-controlled F-4s out of Udorn in '72. I can recall no
"distressing reports" of losses due to A/A fratricide. Simply didn't
happen.

I do recall such reports, with the caveat that the sources for the reports
were newspapers. It appears that under the stress of engagement and of
identifying a/c while under "g"-forces, some mis-identifications were made.
Allegedly, from certain aspects under the stress of maneuvering conditions,
an F-4 could appear to resemble a Mig-21. Occasionally, however, after hasty
identification, it proved necessary to open the range in order to employ,
say, an early Sidewinder or Sparrow. It allegedly was under such
circumstances that the friendly-on-friendly errors were committed.


That led to a belatedly-responded-to request, in which a redesign of the
F-4
(which took over from the F-105) to include a useable integral cannon
(F4E)
was accomplished.

While the F-4 was certainly deployed in-theater in '66, it didn't
"take over" for the F-105 which continued to carry most of the iron
into NVN until 1968 when it was finally attrited to the point of no
longer being combat effective.


Agreed, the F-4s didn't simply completely replace the F-105s all at once,
but were progressively introduced as the numbers became available.


The US aviation community learned that it had to be
especially careful in reaching the decision to fire a missile at another
a/c, if only because under the stress of "g"-forces, hurried
identifications
of fleetingly-sighted targets, occasional failures of IFF squawks, and
the
workload imposed on the friendly pilot team, enemy a/c were not so easy
to
distinguish from friendlies as it appeared to be in training.


If "under the stress of "g" forces" it would certainly mean visual
conditions and tail aspect in '66, '67. Certainly not a player for
AIM-7 shots and with the AIM-9B of the period, the firing limit was
max of 2.5 G.

IFF squawk was irrelevant to missile firing or fighter-to-fighter ID.
We didn't have that kind of equipment until a limited number of Combat
Tree birds showed up in '72.

In that case, I must be mistaken, as I had been told that US a/c of the day
were fitted with an IFF which offered approximaely 2048 discrete "squawk"
codes, which aided in distinguishing friend from foe. If these devices went
inop, a friendly could not reliably be distinguished from an enemy
electronically; the pilot would have to rely on his eyes.

Recall, however, that during the 1950's there was a prominent human factors
case involving an F-100 on a training mission which downed its target-towing
a/c, instead of the intended trailing target, under visual engagement
conditions, because under "g"-loading in a pursuit curve, the towing a/c
appeared to the F-100 pilot to be the target. The incident was dramatized in
a television program.


The solution was to close to ranges, before firing, at which a sound
visual
ID could be obtained. That measure not only tended to reduce
friendly-fire
losses, but also meant that rather often a US a/c would get so close to
an
enemy that the minimum firing distance for the missiles carried might be
reached before the positive ID could be made. Under such circumstances,
it
made sense to have an onboard cannon so as to deal with the situation.

It wasn't just tactically sound, it was ROE required. I agree
completely.

Missiles nowadays are far superior in reliability, and have much-improved
ranges.

I should have written "minimum engagement ranges".

Some radars carried aboard fighters have the capability of ID-ing an
enemy a/c simply from its radar-return. Hence it is considered safe to
fire
from beyond visual range, which allows the avoidance of close-in
WWI-WWII-Korea dogfighting. And that's good because it is hard enough to
maintain situational awareness even at a distance from an opponent with
the
aid of positive control via AWACS, much less than in a complicated
encounter
at close range.

Nonetheless, most pilots desire to have some sort of reserve punch, just
to
cover the odd case where missiles haven't done the job or have been
expended, and an opportunity to disengage successfully coud hinge on
being
able to shoot your way out.


More important than what you've said regard reserve punch is the
tactical practice of having a gun to threaten your opponent into
predictable action. Firing sequence wisely should be--BVR radar
missile, BVR/WVR all-aspect IR missile, then high angle gun shot as
you blow through the merge. Turn-n-burn should be avoided at all
costs.

I certainly agree with you. However, I am not sure that the immediately
above was generally understood or agreed upon until the advent of College
Dart, Top-Gun and Red Flag; air combat maneuvering at the speeds of Viet
Nam (and later) era a/c, in an environment of opposing SAMs threats and
enemy GCI-controlled interceptors, has proved to be a lot more complicated
and deadly than ever before. A dogfight can become unexpectedly hazardous in
a very short time.


If in a X-v-X engagement, your wingman maneuvers to insure the gun
threat on your adversary to allow for safe separation--i.e. keep him
turning as you break away to separate.

You're undoubtedly correct. At times, especially at close ranges, a "gun
threat" can be more imposing than a missile, because while missiles can
malfunction, a well-aimed burst of cannon fire can mean only one thing.

If we've got a man in the seat, we need a gun in the nose.

Agreed. A sentence worth a thousand images. How this truism was lost sight
of is beyond my ken.

"Eric Moore" wrote in message
om

Have they decided what kind of gun the F-35 will have?

Apparently the GAU-12/U 25mm Gatling, in place of the Bk27 27mm revolver
cannon originally planned. The Air Force gets an internal fitting; the
others have bolt-on versions of some sort or other. I've seen mention of
pods in one of the weapon bays or a conformal gun pack on a centerline
station. I really hope it's the latter.

BTW, the selection of GAU-12 is confirmed in this newsletter (pg 2).

http://www.lmaeronautics.com/product...-35JSFTeam03Su
m.pdf

Also, what's the status of the laser weapon that was to be
fitted in the F-35 weapon bay?
Just curious.

The proposal was for a laser that would fit in the lift-fan bay, not the
weapon bay. It's still pretty much a PowerPoint slide. It depends on
scaling solid-state lasers from their current 1-10kW output to at least
100kW and repackaging them from lab test beds to functional weapons. The
Air Force says first opportunity is sometime in 2012, but that looks pretty
optimistic to me.

http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new...w=story&id=new
s/masd0926.xml

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote in message
...
SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility of
the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well

What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is. The USAF was
the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara. The trials
were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory. It
was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance and
range that impressed the Air Force. The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

"Red" wrote in message
m...

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote in message
...
SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
of
the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well


What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.

Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.


The USAF was
the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.

I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
for among other things, the following:

1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.

I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service for
production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was unfamiliar
with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the USAF
usages and practices in mind.

The trials
were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
It
was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance and
range that impressed the Air Force.

It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials". The
version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of two
J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
F-105's engine), and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
between two crewmen. The F-4's design had been initiated during the
mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).

Once MacNamara made his decision, however, the USAF was faced eating that
decision with a spoon and pretending to like it, or having to soldier on
with fewer modern a/c than it believed it needed. Same thing happened with
the F-111. (The contortions the English language can withstand in making
night appear to be day, are truly amazing).

The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm but
addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not all
of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
egregious examples.

lynn- The Navy fixed their error on the F-4J/S. BRBR

Error in the B,N,J,S-think he meant by having a gun in the Turkey and
Hornet...corrected the error in the USN F-4...
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote:


"Lawrence Dillard" wrote in message
...
Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
of the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well

What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.

Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.

Well, although the message was prefaced with a bit of flame, it's
substantially correct.

The USAF was
the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.

I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
for among other things, the following:

1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.

The USAF liked the idea of twin-engine reliability. The USAF had lots
of experience with two-man crews in the F-101, F-89, etc. The USAF had
spent the previous decade and a half heavily involved in NORAD
concepts of fighting off the Soviet bomber threat, which tracked well
with a missile equipped airplane. The F-101 was a McDonnell-Douglas
airplane.

Additionally it should be noted that McNamara became SecDef under JFK
who took office in Jan '61 when the initial procurement contract for
the F-4C was already let. The first operational deliveries were taking
place in '62.

I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service for
production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was unfamiliar
with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the USAF
usages and practices in mind.

The airplane was aerodynamically superior to anything the AF had on
the drawing board, carried a bigger load of iron, had a better A/A
radar and with INS was a better strike platform. The USAF version from
the onset had nuke wiring and receptacle refueling. Most assuredly the
AF had a lot of input to the RFP..

The trials
were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
It
was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance and
range that impressed the Air Force.

It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials". The
version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of two
J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
F-105's engine),

The two -79s of the F-4 give it a much superior T/W ratio over the 105
which from '58 on had been suffering serious growing pains. The 105
was viewed as decidedly unreliable, expensive to operate, overly
complex and a poor excursion into advanced technology.

and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
between two crewmen.

The 105 was proving that the technology had reached a point of crew
saturation and a two-man crew was a darn good idea if all of those
complex missions were to be done by one aircraft.

The F-4's design had been initiated during the
mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).

Of course the design had started in the mid-50s, just as the 104 and
105 had been early fifties initiation. There wasn't anything else on
the boards (if we rule out the derivative of the F-100, the F-107), so
the Phantom was an advance.

The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

Here, you are right on.

In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm but
addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not all
of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
egregious examples.

Well, that's a leap of reason. Certainly the commonality of the F-111B
was a flawed idea, but the later variants of the F-111, the E and F
models were pretty darn good airplanes and the C-5 set a standard for
airlift and reliability. I don't do helicopters, so I'll let someone
else address Cheyenne.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Woody,

Thanks for filling in some gaps in my dated knowledge.

OBTW, never saw it except in TACMAN pictures, but the Intruder DID have a
gun pod designed for it.

Interesting. I can visualize the trenchant comments from the 1973 Green
Lizard Ordie Shop on THAT one.

Of course as a former B/N, you already know that the A-6E did carry
rockets.

I always assumed this to be the case, but since my Intruder career ended in
1974 - with only A, B (PAT ARM) and K time in my logbook - I wasn't sure.
At the time the E Standard was just beginning to appear at Oceana but none
had come yet to Whidbey. And of course the E Standard was soon superseded
by the E TRAM.

All that we had on the Rock in 1974 was an E Standard cockpit mockup in the
VA-128 Ready Room that was no more informative than the $.50 kiddie rides
outside the Oak Harbor food stores.

Rockets not allowed on ship.

What was the thinking behind that one - spurious ignition worries? Still
the case? Allowed ashore only?

To me, rockets are a great way of equipping a non-gun aircraft with a cheap
forward-firing air-to-surface weapon that consumes no internal space and
gives very good hitting power. Only question in my mind is - how often will
such a weapon be required in the future for air-to-surface work? (I know
our Marine Corps brethren have a ready answer to that question.)

Owl sends.
--
Mike Kanze

436 Greenbrier Road
Half Moon Bay, California 94019-2259
USA

650-726-7890

"Vegetarian (vej ' i târ ' ee en), n. Amerindian term meaning "lousy
hunter".


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
[rest snipped]

You would have to have a time machine and change real events. The AF had
ordered the F4 BEFORE MacNamra took office.


"Lawrence Dillard" wrote in message
...

"Red" wrote in message
m...

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote in message
...
SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
of
the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well


What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.

Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.


The USAF was
the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.

I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
for among other things, the following:

1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.

I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service
for
production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was
unfamiliar
with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the
USAF
usages and practices in mind.

The trials
were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
It
was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance
and
range that impressed the Air Force.

It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials".
The
version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of
two
J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
F-105's engine), and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
between two crewmen. The F-4's design had been initiated during the
mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).

Once MacNamara made his decision, however, the USAF was faced eating that
decision with a spoon and pretending to like it, or having to soldier on
with fewer modern a/c than it believed it needed. Same thing happened with
the F-111. (The contortions the English language can withstand in making
night appear to be day, are truly amazing).

The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm
but
addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not
all
of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
egregious examples.

I hate when I get cut off :-)

Continuation -

The original AF proposal was for F-4Bs which the AF designated the F-110A.
These were upgraded to F-4C with small changes to the B model. J79-GE-15,
APQ-100 RADAR, wider tires, an AF friendly refueling boom and if I recall, a
change in the inertial nav system.

This version, the F-4C 1st flew in May of 1963.

The AF had operational F-4Bs in March of 62. Testing and procurement
started and progressed before MacNamara took office.

JD


"Lawrence Dillard" wrote in message
...

"Red" wrote in message
m...

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote in message
...
SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP SNIP
Enter Mr Wonderful, SECDEV Mac Namara, who recognized the versatility
of
the (missile-only) F-4 and on the basis of alleged cost-savings due to
"commonality", ordered it to equip the USAF as well


What a bunch of revisionist history crap this statement is.

Thank you for this very kind and of course, wise, commentary.


The USAF was
the driving force behind the adoption of the F-4, not MacNamara.

I have never before heard this one. In fact, the USAF was yary of the F-4,
for among other things, the following:

1) The F-4 called for twin engines.
2) The F-4 called for two crew members.
3) The F-4 had no integral provision for a gun.
4) The F-4 was to be constructed by McDonald-Douglas.

I have never heard other than that the USAF wanted no part of a design in
which it had had no input from the output and certainly did not want to be
in a position in which it would have to compete with its sister service
for
production priorities, etc., on a "hand-me-down" product and was
unfamiliar
with McD as a supplier; altogether, the USAF wanted to define its air
mission and to accomplish it with a/c designed from the outset with the
USAF
usages and practices in mind.

The trials
were conducted in 1961, just as the F-4 was entering the Navy inventory.
It
was the performance of the aircraft in weapons load, radar performance
and
range that impressed the Air Force.

It was MacNamara who was impressed and who had called for the "trials".
The
version I heard was that the trials were "fixed" so as to minimize or
ignore USAF objections, including that the USAF looked upon the use of
two
J-79s as a step back (15,800-17,900 lbs thrust vs some 25,000 lbs for the
F-105's engine), and was yary of the idea of splitting cockpit duties
between two crewmen. The F-4's design had been initiated during the
mid-1950's, an attribute the USAF did not find attractive, and would need
substantial modifications to meet the USAF's established methods of
operation, including in-flight refueling. In despite of USAF objections,
the F-4 "won" (MacNamara's Rules).

Once MacNamara made his decision, however, the USAF was faced eating that
decision with a spoon and pretending to like it, or having to soldier on
with fewer modern a/c than it believed it needed. Same thing happened with
the F-111. (The contortions the English language can withstand in making
night appear to be day, are truly amazing).

The adoption of the F-4 by the Air Force
that became the arguement by MacMamra that if it could be done for one
aircraft it could be done for all of them. This lead to the TFX/F111 BS.

In fact, MacNamara, a bright man, came to his position with several firm
but
addle-pated convictions on weapons and systems acquisition, most if not
all
of which have been found to be fatally flawed and virtually
unworkable---F-111, C-5A, and IIRC, the Cheyenne helicopter, to name a few
egregious examples.