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GAO: Electronic Warfa Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy



 
 
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Default GAO: Electronic Warfa Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy

2001

Electronic Warfa Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy

Air Defenses (Letter Report, 01/03/2001, GAO/GAO-01-28).

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0128.pdf

To suppress enemy air defenses, U.S. armed forces use specialized
aircraft designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy
air defense systems through either physical attack or electronic
warfare. Concerns have been raised that the Air Force's decision to
retire EF-111 and F-4G suppression aircraft, combined with a growing
threat from increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses, has created
a
gap between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs. GAO

(1) examined the steps that the military has taken since 1996 to
improve
its ability to suppress enemy air defenses and (2) evaluated the
services' plans to eliminate any gap between their suppression
capabilities and needs. GAO found that the services have improved their

suppression capabilities, such as increasing the size of their fleets
of
F-16CJ and EA-6B suppression aircraft, improving the electronic warfare

and missile systems on these aircrafts, studying cost-effective
alternatives for suppression in the future, and reviewing electronic
warfare programs to determine if these programs are adequately managed,

prioritized, and funded. However, GAO also found that current
suppression capabilities are not adequate and that no comprehensive,
cross-service strategy exists for achieving the suppression mission.


--------------------------- Indexing Terms
-----------------------------


REPORTNUM: GAO-01-28
TITLE: Electronic Warfa Comprehensive Strategy Needed for
Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses
DATE: 01/03/2001
SUBJECT: Electronic warfare
Military aircraft
Weapons systems
Defense capabilities
Air defense systems
Surface to air missiles
IDENTIFIER: F-4G Aircraft
EF-111 Aircraft
F-16C/J Aircraft
EA-6B Aircraft
F-117 Aircraft


************************************************** ****************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Testimony. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
************************************************** ****************


GAO-01-28


A Report to Congressional Requesters


January 2001 ELECTRONIC WARFARE


Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses


GAO- 01- 28


Lett er


January 3, 2001 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman, Subcommittee on
Military
Research and Development Committee on Armed Services


House of Representatives The Honorable Bob Smith United States Senate


The U. S. armed services must suppress enemy air defenses to be able to

accomplish their war fighting objectives and survive. 1 To achieve this

suppression, the services use specialized aircraft designed to
neutralize,
destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems through
either
physical attack or electronic warfare. Specialized aircraft use
electronic
warfare devices, called jammers, to temporarily suppress enemy air
defenses
by transmitting electronic signals that disrupt enemy radar and
communications. Other specialized aircraft use anti- radiation missiles
that
home in on radar used by surface- to- air missile or anti- aircraft
artillery systems to physically degrade or destroy them. Because
suppression
aircraft are charged with protecting all of the services' aviation
assets in
hostile airspace, the suppression mission necessarily crosses
individual


service lines. You have expressed concern that a 1996 decision to
retire the
Air Force's EF- 111 and F- 4G suppression aircraft, combined with a
growing
threat from increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses, has created
a gap
between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs. 2 This
report


responds to your request that we (1) describe the actions the services
have
taken since 1996 to improve their capabilities for suppressing enemy
air
defenses and (2) evaluate the services' plans for eliminating any gap
between their suppression capabilities and needs.


1 The suppression of enemy air defenses mission increases U. S. air
forces'
ability to accomplish other missions by reducing their vulnerability to
air
defense missiles or guns. 2 By May 1998, all of the Air Force's EF- 111
and
F- 4G suppression aircraft had been retired.


Results in Brief Since 1996, the services have taken some actions to
restore
suppression capabilities lost through the retirement of the EF- 111 and
F-
4G aircraft,


mainly by increasing the number of Air Force F- 16CJ and Navy/ Marine
Corps
EA- 6B suppression aircraft. These aircraft, together with their
electronic
warfare equipment and high- speed anti- radiation missiles, provide
limited
capability against sophisticated enemy air defenses. To enhance this
capability, the Air Force is improving the performance of the


F- 16CJ's targeting system. In addition, the Navy is upgrading the
electronic warfare equipment on the EA- 6B to improve its radar jammer
performance and is working on improvements to increase the
effectiveness of
the high- speed anti- radiation missile. Also, the Navy is conducting a

study- scheduled for completion in late 2001- to determine the most
cost-
effective alternatives for the future. Alternatives being considered
include
modifications to manned and unmanned aircraft for replacement of the
EA- 6B
by 2015.


According to a 1998 study conducted for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 the services have not adapted
to
the evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand- alone radar
systems
that could be easily suppressed to integrated air defenses
incorporating
modern telecommunications links, passive sensors, and other
sophisticated
means


of avoiding suppression. 4 In a follow- on 1999 study, also conducted
for
the Joint Chiefs, the services were found not to have the quality or
quantity of systems necessary to protect their aircraft across the full

range of military


operations. 5 Successfully addressing the evolving threat, according to

these studies, will require innovative suppression solutions utilizing
multiple technologies and cutting across individual service lines. We
found
that the


Air Force's and the Navy's efforts, while beneficial, do not reflect a
comprehensive, cross- service approach. Despite their interdependence
in
carrying out the suppression mission, the services act on an individual
3
Coleman Research Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, conducted this study
for
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Science and
Technology)
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff between June 1996 and March 1998.


4 Integrated air defense systems use modern telecommunications
equipment and
computers to create networks of early warning radar, targeting radar
and
passive detection equipment that pick up aircraft communications or
engine
heat or other means to track and target aircraft. 5 The Department
convened
a special Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Integrated Product
Team,
sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct this assessment.


basis to define and prioritize suppression requirements and to develop,

manage, and fund solutions to those requirements. Within the Department
of
Defense, no comprehensive, cross- service strategy for closing the gap


between the services' suppression capabilities and needs exists- and no

coordinating entity has been tasked with preparing such a strategy- to
identify, among other things, suppression mission objectives, needed
solutions, funding, timelines, and mechanisms to track progress.
Consequently, service- level decisions are, in our view, much less
likely to
reflect the needed priority for closing the gap and to be the most
cost-
effective solutions for the Department overall. We are recommending
that the
Secretary of Defense designate a coordinating entity, including
officials
from each of the services, to develop a comprehensive cross- service
strategy to close the gap between the U. S. armed services' suppression

capabilities and their needs and to evaluate progress toward achieving
the
suppression objectives. In comments on a draft of this report, the
Department agreed with our findings but disagreed with our
recommendation.
It maintained that it is already addressing some shortfalls, citing as
evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrade efforts described in this
report.
Furthermore, the Department stated that it is performing a study- the
ongoing analysis of alternatives- to underlie a


Department- wide strategy for the suppression mission and that it will
ensure the outcome of the study leads to a balanced set of acquisition
programs between the services. We remain convinced that the Department
is
not likely to close the gap between suppression capabilities and needs
without developing a comprehensive, cross- service strategy for doing
so and
assigning responsibility for this task to a coordinating entity. The
ongoing
analysis of alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a
strategy.
In disagreeing with our recommendation to designate a coordinating
entity,
the Department also expressed concern that such an entity may lead to
the
neglect of unique service requirements but added that any such
authority
should be staffed in a manner that allowed coordination of planning and

explanation of those unique requirements. To address the Department's
concern about the need for representation from


the services, we revised our recommendation to include such
representation.
Background The United States experienced heavy aircraft and aircrew
losses
to enemy air defenses during the Vietnam War. Since then, the services
have


recognized air defense suppression as a critical component of air
operations. Consequently, when a crisis arises, suppression aircraft
are


among the first to be called in and the last to leave. Suppression
aircraft
such as the now retired EF- 111 and F- 4G played a vital role in
protecting
other U. S. aircraft from radar- guided missile systems during
Operation
Desert Storm in Iraq. In fact, Air Force strike aircraft were normally
not
permitted to conduct air operations unless protected by these
suppression
aircraft. The EF- 111 was equipped with transmitters to disrupt or
“jam” radar equipment used by enemy surface- to- air
missile or
anti- aircraft artillery systems. The F- 4G used anti- radiation
missiles
that homed in on enemy radar systems to destroy them (see fig. 1).


Figure 1: AGM- 88 High- Speed Anti- Radiation Missile


Source: U. S. Air Force.


Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, U. S. suppression aircraft have
been
continuously deployed in support of Operations Northern and Southern
Watch
protecting fighter aircraft maintaining the no- fly zones over Iraq. In

1999, during Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, EA- 6B


suppression aircraft (see fig. 2) carrying electronic jamming equipment
and
anti- radiation missiles were extremely important for protecting strike

aircraft from enemy radar- guided missiles.


Figure 2: EA- 6B Prowler


Source: U. S. Navy.


Radar is the primary means used by enemy forces to detect, track, and
target
U. S. aircraft. Hence, U. S. suppression aircraft focus on trying to
neutralize, degrade, or destroy the radar equipment of an enemy's air
defense system. Enemy radars in the past were often fixed in position,
operated in a stand- alone mode, and turned on for lengthy periods of
time-
all of which made them relatively easy to find and suppress through


electronic warfare or physical attack. U. S. suppression aircraft,
using
missiles and jammers, begin suppressing enemy air defenses after they
begin
emitting radio- frequency signals. At some risk to the aircraft and
aircrew,
the suppression aircraft must also be in the vicinity of the enemy air
defenses to complete their mission. In response to this suppression
capability, according to the Department, countries have been seeking to
make
their air defenses more resistant to suppression. These efforts include

increasing the mobility of their surface- to- air missiles and radar
equipment (see fig. 3), connecting radars


together into networks, and adding sophisticated capabilities so that
the
radar can detect aircraft while turned on for shorter periods of time.


Figure 3: Mobile SA- 6 Surface- to- Air Missile System Source:
Federation of
American Scientists.


Additionally, many nations, including some hostile to U. S. interests
such
as Iraq and North Korea, operate what is referred to as integrated air
defense systems. These systems use various means to track and target
aircraft, including modern telecommunications equipment and computers
to
create networks of early warning radar, missile system radar, and
passive
detection systems that pick up aircraft communications or heat from


aircraft engines. 6 Integrated networks provide air defense operators
with
the ability to track and target aircraft even if individual radar
elements
of the network are jammed or destroyed. During Operation Allied Force
in
1999, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, U. S. suppression
aircraft faced Yugoslavia's integrated air defense system and
experienced
significant difficulty trying to destroy


it, as Yugoslav forces often engaged in elaborate efforts to protect
their
air defense assets. These protective efforts allowed Yugoslav forces to

thwart many attacks, but they also reduced Yugoslav opportunities to
track
and 6 Alternatives to radar for tracking aircraft include electro-
optical,
infrared, laser, and passive means.


engage U. S. and coalition aircraft because their air defense assets
could
not be utilized and protected simultaneously. Nevertheless, Yugoslav
forces
managed to shoot down an F- 117 stealth fighter (referred to as stealth

because it is harder to detect with radar) (see fig. 4) and an F- 16CJ
on a
suppression mission. (Specific details about the two aircraft losses
and
tactics used by Yugoslav forces to avoid destruction are considered


classified by the Department.) In addition to the two losses, the
inability
of the U. S. to destroy the Yugoslav air defense network forced the U.
S. to
(1) fly its strike missions at higher altitudes to reduce risk; (2) fly



thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing its EA- 6B force
in
Europe to its limits; and (3) keep many low- flying aircraft, such as
the
Army's Apache attack helicopters, out of combat.


Figure 4: F- 117 Stealth Fighter


Source: U. S. Air Force.


At one point in time, advocates of acquiring more stealth aircraft
believed
that the Air Force's successful fielding of F- 117 fighters and B- 2
bombers
would allow the services to reduce their suppression aircraft
requirements.
However, the loss of the F- 117 over Yugoslavia in 1999 demonstrated
that
stealth aircraft could also benefit from improved suppression
capabilities.


Moreover, even if stealth aircraft required no suppression support, and
even
if the services do introduce more of them in the future, the majority
of


the aircraft in the U. S. fleet will not have stealth capabilities for
many
years and will still require suppression support. The Services Have


In 1996, we expressed concern about the decision to retire the Air
Force's
F- 4G and EF- 111 without comparable replacements. 7 Subsequently, the
Taken
Some Actions to services realized that the decrease in their
suppression
capabilities had Improve Their


increased U. S. aircraft vulnerability and could potentially frustrate
Suppression achievement of U. S. military objectives and prolong future

conflicts. Capabilities


Therefore, since 1996, the services have taken a number of actions to
improve their suppression capabilities. First, the Air Force is
increasing
the size of its fleet of F- 16CJ suppression aircraft (see fig. 5), and
the
Navy and the Marine Corps are adding EA- 6B suppression aircraft to
help
reverse the quantitative impact of the retirement of the EF- 111s and
F-
4Gs.


Figure 5: F- 16CJ Aircraft


Source: U. S. Air Force.


7 See Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses May Be Too Low (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 128, Apr. 10, 1996).


Although not comparable in capability to the F- 4G it replaced, the Air

Force F- 16CJ has an electronic targeting system and is equipped with
high-
speed anti- radiation missiles to attack enemy radar. The Air Force is
acquiring 30 additional F- 16CJ aircraft to bring its total to 210. The
Navy
and the Marine


Corps EA- 6B is a modified A- 6 strike aircraft outfitted with special
electronic transmitters for disrupting radar and communications. The
EA- 6B
can also fire anti- radiation missiles. The Navy has brought back from
retirement 20 EA- 6Bs to increase the total to 123 aircraft, of which
104
are available for combat operations. Recent operations in Yugoslavia,
Kosovo, and no- fly zones in Iraq have required extensive use of Air
Force
F- 16CJs and Navy and Marine Corps EA- 6B suppression aircraft.


Second, the services are improving the electronic warfare and missile
systems on these aircraft to enhance their limited capability against
sophisticated enemy air defenses. The Air Force is upgrading the
targeting
system on the F- 16CJ. The Navy is upgrading the radar jamming
equipment on
the EA- 6B to improve its performance. The upgraded EA- 6B equipment is

scheduled to be fielded beginning in 2004 and to reach Initial
Operational
Capability 8 in 2005. The Navy and the Air Force are also working
together
on improvements to increase the effectiveness of the high- speed anti-
radiation missile. (Further details about these upgrades are
classified.)


Third, the Navy is conducting a study to determine the most cost-
effective
alternatives for suppression in the future. According to the
Department, it
is the most important electronic warfare study presently ongoing and
has


considerable resources being applied to it. Numerous options for
augmenting
the EA- 6B starting in 2010 and replacing it by 2015 are being
considered,
including using a modified version of the Navy's new F/ A- 18 E/ F
aircraft
equipped with electronic warfare systems, or making modifications to
other
manned or unmanned aircraft. According to the Department, the study
will
also identify deficiencies and/ or limitations and seek corrective
actions.
It is scheduled for completion in late 2001.


Fourth, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics is conducting a Department- wide review of electronic warfare

programs, which include suppression programs. The purpose of this
internal
review is to determine whether these programs are adequately


managed, prioritized, and funded. 8 Initial Operational Capability will
be
reached when the first EA- 6B squadron equipped with the upgraded
systems is
ready to be deployed.


No Comprehensive Despite actions taken by the services since 1996, a
gap
remains between Strategy Exists to


the services' current suppression capabilities and their aircraft's
need for
protection from sophisticated enemy air defenses. Without a Address
Evolving
comprehensive, cross- service strategy for addressing that gap and a
Threats


coordinating entity charged with developing such a strategy and
evaluating
progress, it is unlikely that the actions needed to close the gap will
be
taken.


Current Suppression In the mid- 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found
in
its Joint Tactical Aircraft Capabilities Are Not


Electronic Warfare Study that the services' suppression capabilities
were
Adequate diminishing while the proliferation and modernization of enemy
air
defenses were increasing. Recognizing this, in 1996 the Deputy
Secretary of
Defense directed that a Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses mission



area architecture study be conducted. The purpose of the study was to
develop well- grounded bases for decisions regarding platform, weapon,
and
support system modernization and to explore new ways and means for
conducting suppression operations.


The study, completed in 1998, found that the services had not
adequately
adapted to the evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand- alone

radar systems that could be easily suppressed to integrated air
defenses
incorporating modern telecommunications links, passive sensors, and
other
sophisticated means of avoiding suppression. It also found that
maintaining
an effective suppression capability will require the development of
innovative and nontraditional solutions cutting across


individual service and functional (e. g., suppression, reconnaissance,
and
command and control) lines.


The willingness to adopt innovative approaches has provided the armed
services with large suppression dividends in the past. For instance,
during
Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, the U. S. launched
unmanned
aircraft as decoys from beyond the reach of enemy air defenses to cause
the
Iraqis to turn on their radar and/ or fire, thereby revealing their
positions


to suppression aircraft so they could be attacked. These attacks were
highly
successful when the Iraqi air defense forces remained fixed in position
with
their radar sites emitting signals that could be tracked by anti-
radiation
missiles fired from U. S. suppression aircraft such as the F- 4G and
EA- 6B.
As demonstrated in Yugoslavia in 1999, however, these tactics cannot
succeed
if enemy air defense forces choose not to reveal


themselves or move quickly after firing.


To address these shortcomings, the 1998 study envisioned the leveraging
of
advances in sensor and data link technologies to build a
multifunctional U.
S. suppression mission “network” in which loitering decoys
and
other unmanned aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft,
suppression aircraft, command and control aircraft, and strike aircraft
are
all interconnected by high- speed data links. Military commanders could
then


use this network to locate targets and launch coordinated Army, Navy,
and
Air Force attacks on the enemy air defense forces' positions.


According to the study, suppression weapon development is also ripe for

innovation. Future weapons could include, for instance, unmanned
loitering
drones with high- explosive warheads waiting silently high above to
dive on
enemy air defense forces before they can fire, or precisionguided
munitions
or anti- radiation missiles fired from unmanned aircraft that track
enemy
air defense forces as they move. By using unmanned


aircraft, the suppression mission controller could take risks that
would be
unacceptable using manned aircraft. The potential loss of the unmanned
aircraft or decoys in these scenarios is far preferable to the risk the

services face today of losing manned EA- 6B and F- 16CJ aircraft
conducting
suppression missions (such as the F- 16CJ lost over Yugoslavia in
1999).


The results of the mission area architecture study also led to a
follow- on
mission needs assessment to identify suppression mission deficiencies
and
technological opportunities to address them. According to the mission
needs
assessment completed in 1999, the services' overriding suppression
mission
deficiency is that they do not have the quality or quantity of systems
necessary to protect U. S., allied, and coalition air forces across the



full range of military operations. In terms of technological
opportunities
to address these shortcomings, the assessment concluded that a mix of
manned
and unmanned aircraft and lethal and nonlethal weapons (e. g., anti-
radiation missiles and jammers) will be required to meet current and
future
operational objectives. 9 To provide near- term relief until these new
systems can be acquired, the mission needs assessment proposed the
appointment of a single entity to conduct joint suppression mission
experiments involving assets from air, land, sea, information, and
space-
based forces. The objective of these experiments would be to try to
develop
joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to aid in the


suppression mission. 9 The Department today has no lethal or nonlethal
weapons- equipped unmanned aircraft with which to conduct suppression
missions.


No Comprehensive, CrossService Although Air Force and Navy suppression
aircraft are charged with


Strategy Exists for protecting all of the services' aviation assets in
hostile airspace,


Achieving Suppression suppression mission requirements are defined and
prioritized by the


Mission individual services. Also, the material and nonmaterial
solutions
that address these requirements are developed, managed, and funded by
the
individual services. The services' ongoing decisions to add F- 16CJ and



EA- 6B aircraft and to improve the EA- 6B aircraft and the high- speed
anti-
radiation missile, while beneficial, do not reflect a comprehensive,
cross-
service approach to improving their suppression capabilities. Within
the
Department, no comprehensive, cross- service suppression mission
strategy
exists that identifies, specifically,


the suppression objectives, preferably measurable, to be achieved; the
actions, including material and nonmaterial solutions, needed to


achieve those objectives; special technologies to be developed;
funding,
timelines, and responsibilities; and evaluation mechanisms to track
progress
or signal the need for


adjustments. Also, while it tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff with
conducting
the mission area architecture study and mission needs assessment, the
Department did not give responsibility to the Joint Chiefs or any other

entity for


(1) developing a comprehensive strategy and (2) evaluating to what
extent
suppression mission objectives are being achieved.


Without such a strategy or coordinating entity, service- level
decisions
are, in our view, much less likely to reflect the needed priority or
the
most cost- effective solutions for the services overall. For instance,
in
July 1999, the Commanding General of the Army's 101st Airborne Division

wrote to Army headquarters that, due to the retirement of the Air
Force's
EF- 111 and the shortage of Navy EA- 6B suppression aircraft, there
were
insufficient suppression assets to meet the Army's needs. He expressed
concern that the lack of required suppression support and failure to
degrade
enemy air


defenses could result in catastrophic losses of his soldiers and
equipment.
The Commanding General's proposed solution to this shortfall was for
the
Army to develop its own suppression mission aircraft.


Conclusions Since retiring the EF- 111 and F- 4G, the Air Force and the
Navy
have been acquiring additional suppression aircraft to restore some
lost
suppression


capabilities and have begun improving their existing suppression
systems.
However, recent studies have pointed to a number of suppression mission
area
deficiencies. In our view, the development of a comprehensive, cross-
service strategy for suppressing enemy air defenses is the best- and,
perhaps, the only- way to really know whether the services are


successfully closing the gap between suppression capabilities and
needs. And
the designation of a coordinating entity would provide the necessary
institutionalized leadership to develop a strategy and evaluate its
implementation. Until the gap is closed, U. S. aircraft will remain
vulnerable in future conflicts, possibly resulting in the loss of lives
and
expensive assets and forcing U. S. aircraft to continue modifying their

tactics (as they had to do in Yugoslavia in 1999) to reduce their
exposure
to increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses.


Recommendation to To significantly increase the likelihood that needed
actions are taken to the Executive Agency improve the ability of U. S.
aircraft to suppress enemy air defenses, we


recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate a coordinating
entity,
including officials from each of the services, to develop a
comprehensive,
cross- service strategy for closing the gap between the services'
suppression


capabilities and their needs and to evaluate progress toward achieving
suppression objectives.


Agency Comments and In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense


Our Review agreed with our findings regarding shortcomings in
suppression


capabilities but did not concur with our recommendation. The Department

maintained that the services are already addressing some shortfalls,
citing
as evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrades of F- 16CJ and EA- 6B
aircraft and the high- speed anti- radiation missile as described in
this
report. Furthermore, the Department stated that the ongoing analysis of

alternatives will underlie a Department- wide strategy and that it will

ensure the outcome of this study will lead to balanced, joint
suppression of
enemy air defense acquisition programs between the services. In
disagreeing
with our recommendation to appoint a coordinating entity, the
Department
expressed concern that such an entity may neglect unique service
requirements, but it also added that any such entity should be staffed
in a
manner that allows coordination of planning and explanation of those
unique
requirements.


Although the Department asserted that it would ensure that the outcome
of
the ongoing alternatives analysis would lead to a balanced program for
addressing the shortfalls, it did not explain how it would do so. We
remain
convinced that the Department is not likely to eliminate the gap
between
suppression capabilities and needs without assigning responsibility to
a
coordinating entity to develop a comprehensive strategy and evaluate
progress toward achieving suppression objectives. The ongoing analysis
of
alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a strategy. As
emphasized in this report, a comprehensive, cross- service strategy
would
increase the likelihood that actions would be taken. Among other
things, it
would identify objectives, material and nonmaterial solutions, funding,

timelines, and mechanisms to track progress in closing the gap.
Regarding
the


Department's concern that the coordinating entity would neglect unique
service requirements, we revised our recommendation to include
representation from the services.


The Department's written comments are reprinted in appendix II. Scope
and To
describe the actions taken to improve the U. S. armed services'
Methodology


capabilities for suppressing enemy air defenses, we interviewed Office
of
the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force, and Navy
officials responsible for electronic warfare requirements, EA- 6B
aircraft
requirements, and F- 16CJ aircraft requirements. We interviewed
officials


from the EA- 6B, F- 16CJ, and high- speed anti- radiation missile
programs.
We interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency officials and reviewed
performance data related to the Department's current suppression
capabilities and the capabilities of enemy air defense systems. To
evaluate
the services' plans for eliminating the gap between U. S. suppression


capabilities and needs, we reviewed the results of the Department's
Joint
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Mission Area Architecture Study and
follow- on Mission Needs Assessment and compared them to the actions
taken
by the Department to improve its suppression capabilities since 1996.
To
determine whether successful fielding of stealth aircraft has affected
overall suppression requirements, we interviewed Air Force officials
knowledgeable about stealth aircraft and stealth operations.


We conducted our work at Office of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force,

Army, Marine Corps, and Navy locations. We visited requirements,
acquisition, logistics, and testing offices of the military services;
field
commands and operating units; various program offices; government


organizations involved in developmental efforts or military studies;
and
contractor facilities. Specific locations we visited are listed in
appendix
I.


We performed our review from December 1998 through November 2000 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We
are
sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner, Chairman, and
Senator
Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed
Services, and
Representative Floyd Spence, Chairman, and Representative Ike Skelton,
Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services. We are also

sending copies to the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army;
the
Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F.
Whitten
Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew,
Director,
Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to
others upon request. We are also sending copies of this report to other

interested congressional committees. The report will also be available
on
our home page at http:// www. gao. gov.


If you have questions, please contact me on (202) 512- 4841. Major
contributors to this report were Michael Aiken, Terry Parker, Charles
Ward,
and Neil Wickliffe.


R. E. Levin Director, Acquisition and


Sourcing Management


Appendi Appendi xes x I


Locations Visited During This Review Office of the Secretary of
Defense,
Washington, D. C. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C. Headquarters

Elements, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, Washington, D. C.


Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C. Defense Advanced
Research
Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia Institute for Defense Analyses,
Alexandria, Virginia


Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia Naval Research
Laboratory,
Washington, D. C. U. S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida U.
S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia Air Combat Command, Langley
Air
Force Base, Virginia U. S. 9th Air Force and 20th Tactical Fighter
Wing,
Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina


Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland Marine Corps
Warfighting
and Development Division, Quantico, Virginia U. S. Air Force
Aeronautical
Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio


U. S. Air Force Air Armament Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida U.
S. Air
Force Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada Naval Strike
and Air
Warfare Center, Fallon, Nevada Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville,
Florida
Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center, Robbins Air Force Base, Georgia


Electronic Attack Wing, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station Whidbey
Island, Washington


38th Marine Air Control Group, Miramar, California 355th Operations
Group,
Davis- Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing, 53rd
Test
Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 169th Air National Guard, McEntire
Air
Force Base, South Carolina RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Coleman Research Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia


Appendi x II Comments From the Department of Defense


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Appendix I


Appendix I Locations Visited During This Review


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Appendix II


Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense


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Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense


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