Friendly Fire Notebook

SteveM8597 wrote:


Relative to the "experts" I guess people like Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw and Peter
Jennings are experts with the true facts because they have interviewed people
like Saddam Hussain.


I'm not sure that I would give an interview with 'people like Saddam
Hussein' much more credibility than an interview with Michael Jackson.
If his offical spokesman is anything to judge by a large amount of
offical information from his government was outrageous fiction.

Remember the widely reported "Jenin massacre' which the media fell for
and reported around the world? Later turned out to be a hoax despite the
'facts' quoted by the media.

Dave

On 21 Apr 2004 23:08:03 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Sounds like a great show, I can't wait. Although I am concerned that Michel
left over a disagreement. Out of him and Eschmann, I find Michel's book much
better documented and supported. Eschmann's book contains both the myth about
the BUFF-MiG shoot downs and the "hybrid" FAN SONG-LOW BLOW radar. Michel gets
the word right from the horses mouth on both those issues.


I agree. I read Eschmann many years ago and wasn't particularly
impressed with the conclusions he drew. He did his numbers, call-signs
and names well, but the recounting of the story didn't set well.
Seemed to be some hear-say and poor conclusions drawn.

Marshall Michel, OTOH, did a better job on "Eleven Days". He also did
a good job on "Clashes" although I still haven't forgiven him for
taking the easy way out and using only call-signs and not names.
That's unforgiveable for a historian.

I'm surprised to hear that Sullivan and Marsh had a disagreement. I
interviewed with Sullivan a couple of years ago through the auspices
of Michel who brought the whole film crew to the River Rat reunion in
Atlanta. It was just before "Eleven Days" was released and I thought
the whole project was in support of the book, not a separate effort.

Will be eager to see the video when it finally airs, as they have
definitely talked to a lot of the right people from both the big and
little airplane forces.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

On 21 Apr 2004 23:03:01 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:


Ahhh, Checkmate..."John Warden? I knew John Warden. John Warden was a
friend of mine. And, frankly, Senator, you're no John Warden...."

Nothing personal to your friend Ed, but I take that as a compliment.

Poetic license. John Warden was not a particular friend of mine. He
was stationed at Torrejon when I arrived there in '73. He had a combat
tour in the R/C/P and then moved to the front seat. No NVN experience.
He was a pompous ass.

Read about Chuck Horner's dismissal of John Warden when setting up the
offensive team for Desert Storm in Clancy's collaboration, "Every Man
a Tiger."

I have, great stuff, go Chuck!

Good! Note for your background that Chuck was an F-105 driver and
participated in the first disasterous SAM site raid along with Roger
Myhrum and Dick Pearson, two old friends of mine and IPs when I qual'd
in the 105.


The
positions in the illustrations are wrong. The sequence of events is
wrong. The ranges between aircraft are wrong. Even the location
relative to the target and other flights is wrong.

Now define; "wrong"...is it possible Ed, that you recalled it incorrectly. I'm
not choosing sides in this one, just pointing out, as in the case of our
fameous B-52 tail gunners, sometimes the participant is wrong.

Since you haven't yet read When Thunder Rolled, I'll excuse you for
not acknowledging the details of the situation, but suffice to say
that when you wind up in a five-ship with a MiG-17 in the middle of
your flight and the conclusion is the MiG trapped at six hosing your
brains out with his 37MM the memories are very explicit.

The only interview
conducted to establish the definitive historic account was done eight
months after the event with the flight lead in Wichita KS.

Than I would conclude that unless one of you wrote it down immediately after
the fact and verified it with other potential witnesses, that there is no way
of knowing for sure what happened. You may be right...or he may be right, but
as someone who was 4 years old at the time I can not accept either account as
fact.

Since it was me engaged with the MiG and not the flight lead, I'll
lean heavily toward my perceptions as correct.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

On 21 Apr 2004 23:08:03 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Sounds like a great show, I can't wait. Although I am concerned that Michel
left over a disagreement. Out of him and Eschmann, I find Michel's book much
better documented and supported. Eschmann's book contains both the myth about
the BUFF-MiG shoot downs and the "hybrid" FAN SONG-LOW BLOW radar. Michel gets
the word right from the horses mouth on both those issues.


I agree. I read Eschmann many years ago and wasn't particularly
impressed with the conclusions he drew. He did his numbers, call-signs
and names well, but the recounting of the story didn't set well.
Seemed to be some hear-say and poor conclusions drawn.

Marshall Michel, OTOH, did a better job on "Eleven Days". He also did
a good job on "Clashes" although I still haven't forgiven him for
taking the easy way out and using only call-signs and not names.
That's unforgiveable for a historian.

I'm surprised to hear that Sullivan and Marsh had a disagreement. I
interviewed with Sullivan a couple of years ago through the auspices
of Michel who brought the whole film crew to the River Rat reunion in
Atlanta. It was just before "Eleven Days" was released and I thought
the whole project was in support of the book, not a separate effort.

Will be eager to see the video when it finally airs, as they have
definitely talked to a lot of the right people from both the big and
little airplane forces.


Ed Rasimus


I loaned my copy of Eschmann's book to Al Falcione when we worked together on
the B-2 but never got it back. It and the ACSC manuscript differsomewhat in
their conclusions as I recall. I remember Karl telling me that there was some
pressure to keep the conclusions PC as SAC/ACC were hard pressed to defend
program funding for their B-1B and B-2 acquisitions . The AF wanted to keep
the heavy bomber critics at arms during that and I have always felt that is why
PC history doesn't quite seem to parallel reality with regards to LBII. I
worked both programs in that period and even under Reagan with the Cold war
winding down, bombers were a tough sell. Both programs were $$ capped and
there was tremendous pressure to keep them under budget.

Sullivan acknowledged that Michael was a key player in getting the project off
the ground and getting him into the fighter "circle". The book and the
documentary apparently were indeed one and the same effort initially, . As I
said earlier. it seems to be more of a difference of opinion over whether the
documentary was to be more of historical effort or an intro to LBII for the
masses so to speak. He indicated that his purpose was to make LBII more known
to the public as a whole as most people are totally unaware that it ever
happened. Somewhat long the lines of the ever increasing popular awareness of
WWII and Korea we have been witnessing. The same seems to be just starting for
the Vietnam era as evidenced by release of a movie like We Were Soldiers that
show VN vets in a more human and positive light as opposed to Platoon,
Apocolypse Now, and Full Metal Jacket.

I have known Karl for a long time. .We were stationed at Tinker and Korat
together. I have always known him to be a man of high integrity.

Please don't get me wrong, I enjoyed both Eschmann's and Michel's book and I
don't believe Eschmann intentionally mislead anyone in his book, he conducted
very detailed interviews of participants and used official USAF documents.
Michel went a step further. He confirmed through both Soviet and Vietnamese
sources that they had no LOW BLOWs in country before 1975, thus dispelling the
"hybrid radar" myth. As far as dispelling the MiG shootdown, Michel again went
one step further and inteviewed Vietnamese Air Force officers and was allowed
access to their official documents. Michel concluded there were no MiG-21s in
the area of the BUFFs on either night. Michel also concluded they were probably
shooting at F-4s who dived away, but Ed questions that aspect. I believe the
exact circumstances of those two incidents will never be known.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I agree. I read Eschmann many years ago and wasn't particularly
impressed with the conclusions he drew. He did his numbers, call-signs
and names well, but the recounting of the story didn't set well.
Seemed to be some hear-say and poor conclusions drawn.

What makes this more interesting Ed is that you and Steve have exact opposite
views on the accuracy of two books on the same subject. Steve feels Eschmann's
book is spot on and Michel's fails the accuracy test. What's that you were
saying about eyewitness accounts


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location
within the country criteria.

From my original post I had explained the "hundred or so trucks" were dealing
with vehicles stationed and operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. I have never
wavered on that criteria and have know reiterated it once more.

A truck delivering war material in the
PRC buffer isn't a truck?

No, it's a truck.

Or it isn't war material?

I'm sure it was hauling war material, most likely to Hanoi.

Or they had to
unload it and then put it on a different truck for the rest of the
trip?

BINGO. The trucks that operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail were stationed,
maintained and operated on the trail. Many had major modifications to increase
their clearence capability and nearly all had suffered some kind of battle
damage. Were some trucks brought down from Hanoi to work the trail? I'm sure on
occasion they were, but the Ho Chi Mihn trail didn't operate like the US
Highway system where a truck loads up at point A and delivers goods to point B.
In the case of supplies moving into SVN, typically the final destination was
point AA and delivered via bicycle. When you made the initial comment Ed about
the NVN supply system, I thought you were specifically talking about the Ho Chi
Mihn trail. Didn't you refer to supplies into SVN?

If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail,
there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment
points.

Define "massive". There were trans-shipment points and troop rest areas every 9
miles. According to Lt. Gen. Harold Moore; "Each camp, which could shelter a
company of troops, consisted of a series of crude bamboo huts dispersed along a
half-mile of trail to make a smaller target for warplanes."

So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC

Yes. And their NVA cohorts operating south of the DMZ.

and the three
division offensive had thousands of other trucks?

Yes.

Or, they three
divisions carried their logistic goodies in their rice bags?

They did a lot of that as well, but not nearly as much as the guys/gals moving
down the Ho Chi Mihn trail.

And, I just Googled Freedom Porch, since I'd never heard of it. No
hits. I then checked Hobson's "Vietnam Air Losses" where he has a list
of names of operations. No hit. Then I pulled Thompson's "To Hanoi and
Back". No hit.Got Freedom Train, but no Porch.

There were actually two Freedom Porch Operations, with Freedom Porch Bravo
being the bigger one. Bravo was the first time B-52s struck targets in NVN.

Check out this web site: http://www.hdart.com/powmia.html

It gives a very good synopsis, here's just one part; "During the North
Vietnamese spring offensive in 1972, Allied air power was called on to turn the
tide. The U.S. Air Force response to the invasion was immediate as B-52 Arc
Light missions and tactical air attacks intensified during brief respites in
the weather. The invasion was checked, but the lessons learned lead to
Operation Freedom Train against targets south of the 20th Parallel, and later
to Freedom Porch Bravo against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.
The first wave of Freedom Porch Bravo strikes began on April 16,1972, and
achieved respectable success over the highest threat areas within North
Vietnam. The first wave consisted of B-52 strikes supported by Navy and Air
Force tactical air."

What was that you were saying about us guys from the "back of the library"?

I believe Clodfelter also discusses, in pretty good detail, Freedom Porch Alpha
and Bravo in his book.


They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea
that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a
military operation as they could."

Uhh, the Joint Chiefs of Staff *are* military or am I misunderstanding you
here?

Since SAC wasn't chopped to 7th AF,
where below the JCS did this selection of critical targets get done?

Both SAC and 7th AF nominated targets to the JCS targeting board, the JCS put
them through the "White House filter" during the Johnson years and pretty much
rubber stamped them during Nixon's years.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left
and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars

On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over
a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed.

Both the standing order on SAM engagements and the undercast made that
possible. I'm confused are you trying to say that we had destroyed *all*
"critical" targets after night #5? If so, you would be helping make my point.

Ahh, at last, grounds for agreement. All military operations have
political strategic objectives. They also have military tactical
objectives.

They sure do, and sometimes the two don't depend on each other. That was true
for LBII and at least two raids I flew during OAF.

It was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with
remarkably little visibility.

Not according to Chuck Horner who points out several times in "Every Man a
Tiger" that the construction of SAM sites was nearly always detected, but off
limits to bombing till it was complete. I've heard that dozens of times from
F-105 crews on nearly every documentary on the Vietnam War.

SAM battalions relocated regularly and
were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with
missiles throughout.

I'd imagine resupplying Guideline Missiles in the middle of the jungle is much
easier than in more suburban areas. In Michel's book the SA-2 commander spelled
it out pretty clearly. I guess you don't believe him. What reason would he have
to lie?

If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was
constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the
destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc.

Not according to the guys commanding and operating the SAM sites.

Michel's account of the night 11 attack on Trai Ca is different than
you list here. He mentions the target and states that the A/C reported
eight SAMs fired, but doesn't indicate damage.

I got that from my thesis, unfortunately, it was not a direct quote and not
"foot noteable" (at least to my prof it wasn't, he didn't "ding" me for failing
to document sourcing for that paragraph) so I'm not sure which one of my
sources I used. Sorry, but I'll have to take your word on it about Michel, I
lent my copy out.

And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical
varients (sic)"?

Guideline would be a Strategic SAM, so would a Goa or a Gammon. A Gainful or
Gecco would be tactical SAMs. Was this not common lexicon in the 70s and 80s?

Let's keep in mind that the tactical crews (and after the first three
nights with 9 BUFFs lost the SAC crews as well) had several hundred
associates on the ground in captivity. Locations of damage wasn't
random

I have never said it was, that's Steve putting words in my mouth.

and precise targeting was essential if we weren't going to kill
the POWs as well.

As well as civilians, Nixon was adamant that we not supply congress a reason to
cut short their holiday break. This concern for collateral damage was the
reason the B-52s (at least the Guam based B-52s) had the ridiculous, "no
maneuvering on the bomb run" order.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

You are
putting a lot of energy into trying to convince me of something and I am not
sure of exactly what.

That Linebacker II didn't "win the war".

You made earlier statements that I challenged that NVN
only had 100 old French trucks left over from WW II.

No, I said they only had a hundred or so old French trucks being used to supply
forces in SVN, working the Ho Chi Mihn trail. I specifically stated I was not
refering to trucks operating in NVN.

You also stated that the
BUFFS were sent north for political reasons.

When the President directs it without knowing details about specific targets,
what would you call it?

You have contradicted yourself
several times on that 100 truck statement including below.

No, you have confused the issue. If you care (which I'm not sure I do anymore)
read through my original posts on the truck subject. I have reiterated several
times that I was *not* saying NVN had "a hundred or so old French trucks" *in
total*.

Most of the rest of
what you wrote is telling me about how the BUFFS went after military targets,
not politcal targets

The fact that BUFFs were going "down town" was political, the guys at 13th AF
and the JCS targeting board took a purely political objective and developed a
sound military campaign. The only thing lost in that conversion is the fact
that it really didn't matter for Nixon's ultimate objective if the Kihn No
vehicle repair yard was destoyed or not, just that bombs went off close enough
and didn't cause any large collateral damage issues. I've asked you twice and
now I'll try a third time. If the NVN returned to Paris because of the damage
inflicted from the bombing, what was hit and how was the damage effecting them?

Dikes and dams are legit military targets

Not always.

Hospitals are not

Not true, put a AAA piece on the roof or store arms there and its a legal
military target.

just to differentiate between what is legit and what is not.

You can't really do that with absolutes, the specific situation dictates
legality. If it were a case of absolutes, we wouldn't need lawyers in the Air
Operations Centers.

We certainly did enough dam busting in WWII and Korea.

We also bombed city centers for very small military gains, doesn't mean it
would pass the legality test. In the case of WWII the allies could claim
reciprocity since the Luftwaffe began striking city area targets first. The dam
busting in Korea was only legal because we claimed we were not targeting food
production but using the water to flood airfields and destroy bridges. In
Vietnam the dikes and dams would have been debateable legal military targets.

I am trying not to be emotional here but it seems to me that under your
logic,
every flight in VN was ultimately for political reasons starting long before
Rolling Thunder.

On several occasions Johnson attempted to let the military develop a bombing
campaign to achieve specific military objectives (with restrictions on bombing
targets in Hanoi or even NVN itself), during one period Johnson gave the JCS
the go to try to interdict supplies on the Ho Chi Mihn trail. Lots of luck,
like I stated earlier, until the Easter offensive the VC and NVA forces in SVN
required a mere 35 tons of supplies a day. This could be hauled in seven 2 1/2
trucks. How in the world are you going to shutdown over 80% of the trucking
along a route like the Ho Chi Mihn trail? During Johnson's years the military
attempted to go after NVN POL. The problem was it was so dispersed as to make
targeting it nearly impossible. Johnson grew frustrated with failure and went
back to his "target luncheons" and political bombing.



BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Poetic license. John Warden was not a particular friend of mine.

Wheeew..

He was a pompous ass.

Can I get an AMEN?

Note for your background that Chuck was an F-105 driver

Yep, he had bomb load envy as well when I met him for the second time at KBAD
in '96

MiG trapped at six hosing your
brains out with his 37MM the memories are very explicit.

The more emotional the situation, the less likely for memory accuracy....at
least according to psychologists.

Since it was me engaged with the MiG and not the flight lead, I'll
lean heavily toward my perceptions as correct.

Unless coroborated by other eyewitnesses, you may have the edge in accuracy,
but not good enough to be used as a factual reference.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Buying your book this weekend.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR wrote:


I'd imagine resupplying Guideline Missiles in the middle of the jungle is much
easier than in more suburban areas. In Michel's book the SA-2 commander spelled
it out pretty clearly. I guess you don't believe him. What reason would he have
to lie?

You must be referring to SAM sites within SVN - because
the trail through Laos was a friggin' moonscape (complete
with overlapping craters-upon-craters) years before either
LineBacker.