Friendly Fire Notebook

Dweezil Dwarftosser wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote:

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
off, for the very first time.

Bull, John. LB I, the mining of the harbors, the stopping of their invasion with heavy
casualties did that. What on the LB II target list, other than Hanoi Radio, hadn't we
struck before?

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

They had already agreed to the same terms in October, but pulled out in November when the
US tried to reopen the talks and negotiate for new conditions which were asked for by
President Thieu, which they refused (as we expected they would). They then agreed in
January to essentially the same terms as in October, when we abandoned our attempts to
try and get the major changes Thieu wanted. What exactly were we going to bomb that we
hadn't already? How were we going to do so, since Nixon knew perfectly well that he
couldn't continue the bombing once Congress came back? See below.

For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
their continued survival.

You're sort of right, you've just got the timing wrong. Their attitude shifted after the
failure of the Spring offensive (due to LB I as well as ARVN resistance), not after LB
II. Here's the letter from Nixon to Thieu dated October 16, 1972 (from "The Palace
File"), describing the change in attitude:

The White House
Washington

"Dear President Thieu:

I have asked Dr. Henry Kissinger to convey to you this personal letter regarding our
current negotiations with North Vietnam which now appear to be reaching a final stage.

"As you know, throughout the four years of my Administration the United states has stood
firmly behind your Government and its people in our support for their valiant struggle to
resist aggression and preserve their right to determine their own political future.

"The military measures we have taken and the Vietnamization program, the dramatic steps
that we took in 1970 against the cambodian sanctuaries, the operations in Laos in 1971
and the measures against North Vietnam just this past May have fully attested to the
steadfastness of our support. I need no emphasize that many of these measures were as
unpopular in the U.S. as they were necessary.

"At the negotiating table we have always held firm to the principle that we would never
negotiate with North Vietnam a solution which predetermined the political outcome to the
conflict. We have consistently adhered to positions that would preserve the elected
government and assure the free people of Vietnam the opportunity to determine their
future.

"Until very recently the North Vietnamese negotiatiors have held firmly to their
long-establishedposition that anysettlementofthewarwouldhaveto include your resignation
and the dismantlement of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and its institutions.

"It now seems, however, that the combination of the perserverance and heroism of your
Government and its fighting forces, the measures taken by the United States on the 8th of
May, 1972, and our firmness at the conference table have caused a fundamental shift in
Hanoi. In the course of Dr. Kissinger's recent meetings with the North Vietnamese
negotiators in paris, it has become progressively more evident that Hanoi's leadership is
prepared to agree to a ceasefire prior to a resolution of the political problem in South
Vietnam. This is indeed an important reverse in doctrine and must represent a decision
by them which cannot have been taken lightly. They know the weakness of their own
political forces in the South and therefore the risks involved in reaching an agreement
that does not meet their poltical objectives must indeed for them be great.

"The consequence of this change in strategy has resulted in a situation wherein we and
Hanoi's negotiators have reached essential agreement on a text which provides for a
cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of remaining allied forces, the exchange of
prisoners of war, and the continued existence of your Government and its institutions
after the ceasefire takes effect. In addition to the document itself a number of private
assurances have been obtained designed to meet the security concerns of your country and
whose implementation we consider an essential part of this agreement.

"Dr. Kissinger will explain to you in the fullest detail the provisions of the proposed
agreement which he carries with him and I will therefore not provide further elaboration
in this message. I do, however, want you to know that I believe we have no reasonable
alternative but to accept this agreement. It represents major movement by the other
side, and it is my firm conviction that its implementation will leave you and your people
with the ability to defend yourselves and decide the political destiny of South Vietnam.

"As far as I am concerned, the most important provision of this agreement, aside from its
military features, is that your Government, its armed forces and political institutions,
will remain intact after the ceasefire has been observed. In the periodfollowing the
cessation of hostilities you can be completely assured that we will continue to provide
your Government with the fullest support, including continued economic aid and whatever
military assistance is consistent with the ceasefire provisions of this government.

"I recognise that after all these years of war a settlement will present an enormous
challenge to your leadership and your people. We all recognize that theconflict will now
move into a different form, a form of political struggle as opposed to open military
confrontation; but I am of the firm conviction that with wisdom and perserverance your
Government and the people of South Vietnam will meet this new challenge. You will have
my absolute support in this endeavor and I want you to know it is myfirm belief that in
this new phase your continued leadership of the destiny of South Vietnam is
indispensable.

"Finally, I must say that, just as we have taken risks in war, I believe we must take
risks for peace. Our intention is to abide faithfully by the terms of the agreements and
understandings reached with Hanoi, and I know this will be the attitude of your
government as well. We expect reciprocity and have made this unmistakably clearbothto
them and their major allies. I can assure you that we will view any breach of faith on
their part with the utmost gravity; and it would have the most serious consequences.

"Allow me to take this occasion to renew my sentiments of highest personal regard and
admiration for you and your comrades in arms.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon [Nixon then added the hand-written note below on the bottom of the letter]

"Dr. Kissinger, General Haig and I have discussed this proposal at great length. I am
personally convinced it is the best we will be able to get and that it meets my
_absolute_ [emphasis in original] condition that the GVN must survive as a free country.
Dr. Kissinger's comments have my total backing. RN"

Thieu then demanded major changes, but as Nixon clearly writes above he didn't think the
DRVN would agree to them, and they didn't. The letters Nixon sent to Thieu in October
and November describing this process, and reflecting Nixon's growing frustration with
Thieu's intransigence are also available, but you can read the book for yourself to fill
in the blanks.

Academics can revise history as much as they want, as can
bureaucrats and politicians write books glorifying their
own involvement and marginalizing the contributions of
others (best recent example: Richard Clarke's shameless
book-marketing 09/11 committee) - but they cannot change
the actual events that occurred.

Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

And what does the most powerful direct participant have to say? Nixon again, here's the
verbatim text (again, from "The Palace File") of his ultimatum to Thieu, telling him to
sign the Ceasefire Agreement (without the major changes Thieu demanded in October), or be
prepared for the U.S. to abandon the RVN completely:

The White House
Washington

January 20, 1973

"Dear President Thieu:

"Thank you for your January 20th letter, which I have carefully read.

"No point is served in reviewing the record of our exchanges, regarding the Agreement and
the protocols. While it may be true that the latest texts of the protocols did not reach
Saigon until January 11, it is also true that your representatives in Paris were
continually without instructions during the various negotiating sessions in November and
December. We were thus forced to proceed according to our own best judgement. During
this process we kept your representatives fully informed, while continually asking in
vain for your goverment's suggestions.

"In any event, all these considerations are now beside the point. The essential fact is
that the situation in the United States makes it imperative to put our relationship on a
new basis. It is obvious that we face a situation of most extreme gravity when long-time
friends of South Vietnam such as Senators Goldwater and Stennis, on whom we have relied
for four years to carry our programs of assistance through Congress, make public
declarations that a refusal by your Government of reasonable peace terms would make it
impossible to continue aid. It is in this situation which now threatens everything for
which our two countries have suffered so much.

"Let me now address the specific proposals you have made in your letter. We have made
innumerable attempts to achieve the very provisions you have proposed with respect to
North Vietnamese forces [Thieu's continiuing demand that they be specifically required to
withdraw from the RVN, which had caused the talks to fall apart in October, and which the
US had abandoned trying to get], both in the text of the Agreement and in formal
understandings. We have concluded that the course we have chosen is the best
obtainable. While there is no specific provision in the text, there are so many
collateral clauses with an impact on this question that the continued presence of North
Vietnamese troops could only be based on illegal acts and the introduction of new forces
could only be done in violation of the Agreement. It seems to me that the following
clauses in the Agreement achieve this objective:

-- The affirmation of the independence and sovereignty of South Vietnam in Articles 14,
18(e), and 20.

-- The provision for reunification only by peaceful means, through agreement and without
coercion or annexation, which establishes the illegitimacy of any use or threat of force
in the name of reunification (Article 15).

-- The U.S. and DRV, on an equal basis, pledging themselves to against any outside
interference in the exercise of the South Vietnamese pople's right to self-determination
(Article 9).

-- The legal prohibition of the introduction of of troops, advisers, and war material
into South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam (Article 7).

-- The principle of respect for the demilitarized zone and the provisional military
demarcation line (Article 15).

-- The prohibition of the use of Laotian and Cambodian territory to encroach upon the
sovereignty and security of South Vietnam (Article 20).

-- The fact that all Communist forces in south Vietnam are subject to the obligation
that their reduction and demobilization are to be negotiated as soon as possible (Article
13).

"In addition, we are prepared to give you a unilateral U.S. note which sums up our
understanding on this issue. Ambassador Bunker will show you a draft of a note which we
will deliver in Saigon on the day of signature of January 27.

"With respect to your concern about the protocols, it seems to us that Article 6 in the
ceasefire/joint commission protocol would permit your police forces to continue carrying
carbines and rifles since the continuedpresence of North vietnamese forces obviously
constitutes 'unusual circumstances'. Nevertheless, I shall instruct Dr. Kissinger to
seek a change in this Article in an attempt to remove its ambiguity. I cannot, however,
promise success.

"The key issue is different, however. We have now reached a decisive point. I can no
longer hold up my decision pending the outcome of further exchanges. When Dr. Kissinger
leaves Washington Monday morning, our basic course must be set. As I have told you, we
will initial the Agreement on January 23. I must know now whether you are prepared to
join us on this course, and I must have your answer by 1200 Washington time, January 21,
1973.

"I must meet with key Congressional leaders Sunday evening, January 21, to inform them in
general terms of our course. If you cannot give me a positive answer by then, I shall
inform Dr. Kissinger to initial the Agreement even without the concurrence of your
government. In that case, even if you should decide to join us later, the possibility of
continued Congressional assistance will be severely reduced. In that case I will not be
able to put into my January 23 speech the assurances I have indicated to you, because
they will not then seem to have been a voluntary act on my part. Needless to say, I
would be most reluctant to take this fateful step.

"Let me therefore sum up my position as follows: First, I welcome your decision to send
Foreign Minister Lam to Paris, and I will instruct Dr. Kissinger to to have the fullest
and frankest discussion with him. Dr. Kissinger will see him both before and after his
meeting with the North Vietnamese to make clear your Government's full particpation in in
our actions. Secondly, I have instructed Dr. Kissinger to seek the change in the
protocol regarding police forces. Thirdly, with respect to North Vietnamese forces, I
can go no further than the draft note that I am asking Ambassador Bunker to transmit to
you and which we will hand over to you officially on January 27, the day of signing.
Fourthly, if you join us we shall announce the Vice President's visit to Saigon before
the date of signing though he could not leave Washington until January 28.

"Finally, and most importantly, I must have your assurance now, on the most personal
basis, that when we initial the agreement on Tuesday we will be doing so in the knowledge
that you will proceed to sign the Agreement jointly with us.

"This agreement, I assure you again, will represent the beginning of a new period of
close collaboration and strong mutual support between the Republic of Vietnam and the
United States. You and I will work together in peacetime to protect the independence and
freedom of your country as we have done in war. If we close ranks now and proceed
together, we will prevail."


Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

You could say that. You could also say that the loss of their petroleum source
(Ploesti) to the Soviets on August 31st,1944, as well as the loss of the coke
supplies of France (Western allies, August-September; can't make steel without coke)
had more than a little to do with it. Oh, and the several million German military
casualties suffered on the Eastern Front might be due a little credit too, don't you
think? ;-)

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.

Precisely how much of this did they make themselves, so that we could target the
production facilities? Zero.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

They did build bicycles themselves, I'll give you that. All other road/rail
vehicles came in from outside the country.


Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

Ed, the only problem is that you ignore all that had gone before and was still going
on throughout, none of which you were aware of at the time. See my other post.



Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective.

Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

And hope like hell that the other side's definition of losing is the opposite of
your definition of winning, and that they will accept and conform to your exit
strategy. Neither may be the case, especially in limited wars.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.

Actually, LB II did have a clear strategy, but it wasn't the one you state. It was
more "By bombing NVN before Congress comes back into session and cuts off all funds,
I can convince Thieu that we will continue to back him should the DRVN violate the
accords, while also convincing the DRVN that it's not worth it for them to hold out
for the whole loaf but accept the same offer they'd previously agreed to before
Thieu queered the deal, so we can get our PoWs back and get the hell out of there
with as much dignity as we can muster."

Nixon was successful on the first three counts, and the fourth was arguable.
"Winning the war" was never his goal with LB II; he knew that the war could only be
won in South Vietnam, unless we were prepared to obliterate North Vietnam and risk a
direct confrontation with the PRC and/or the USSR. Politically (and morally), that
wasn't an option, unless you feel that Nixon was willing and able to order the
AF/Navy to destroy the Chinese and Soviet factories that were producing virtually
all the north's war needs, along with the Eastern Bloc cargo ships that brought much
of it there, and the north's own food supplies? Or how about just nuking Hanoi,
Haiphong, and the Red River Delta in general?

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote:

Dweezil Dwarftosser wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote:

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly
better terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
off, for the very first time.

Bull, John. LB I, the mining of the harbors, the stopping of their invasion with
heavy casualties did that. What on the LB II target list, other than Hanoi Radio,
hadn't we struck before?

Wrong question. (And my time near there was long over by then...)
The appropriate question is : "Did they think that LB I was an
anomaly (like the old Rolling Thunder program) that wouldn't be
resumed for years? If so, LB II convinced them we were serious
and would keep up - and increase - the pressure. Nixon was NOT
LBJ - though his motivation was likely just as political: do what
is necessary to END this thing ASAP, without it going down in the
history books as another Dien Bien Phu. If it meant the destruction
of all of NVN's capability to wage war, so be it. (Not a bad
objective during any war, eh?)

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

They had already agreed to the same terms in October, but pulled
out in November when the US tried to reopen the talks and negotiate
for new conditions [...]

I don't particularly care WHY they pulled out. LB II convinced
them to *change their ways* - which you conveniently would like
to ignore.

The fact that Nixon also had to "up the ante" with the SVN
government as well (Take the deal or we're outta here right
now...) does not diminish in any way the "motivation" which
was provided to the the N. Vietnamese to "coax" them back to
the bargaining table: LB II (and in general, the entire series).

Please refrain from confusing political goals and wartime
objectives - or attempting to dismiss military successes
as merely inconsequential "tools" of diplomacy. There is no
doubt they are tools - but unrivalled as a *enabler* of
diplomacy; without the will to use this tool effectively
(which Nixon possessed and LBJ did not) you get the Third
World Debating Society actions of the UN.

Subject: Friendly Fire Notebook
From: Dweezil Dwarftosser
Date: 4/18/04 2:19 AM Pacific

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -

We won the VN war??? Really?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

On Sun, 18 Apr 2004 07:48:39 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

You could say that. You could also say that the loss of their petroleum source
(Ploesti) to the Soviets on August 31st,1944, as well as the loss of the coke
supplies of France (Western allies, August-September; can't make steel without coke)
had more than a little to do with it. Oh, and the several million German military
casualties suffered on the Eastern Front might be due a little credit too, don't you
think? ;-)

Which, I think, makes my point. The victory comes from a complex
intermix of events. To discount the impact of the 8th AF on Germany's
capability to continue is to grossly over-simplify.

It may be a return to the cliches of AF vs Army dialog in which the
regular repitition of "boots on the ground" or "a tank on the front
lawn of their O'club" is refuted by anecdotes of the rapid termination
of hostilities after Aug 6 & 9, 1945, or Dec 29, 1972, or or Desert
Storm's 100 day air/100 hour ground war.

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.

Precisely how much of this did they make themselves, so that we could target the
production facilities? Zero.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

They did build bicycles themselves, I'll give you that. All other road/rail
vehicles came in from outside the country.

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?


Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

Ed, the only problem is that you ignore all that had gone before and was still going
on throughout, none of which you were aware of at the time. See my other post.

Ahh, what a cruel accusation after all these years. Do you really
consider that I ignore all the history or that my perspective is so
narrow?


Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective.

Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

And hope like hell that the other side's definition of losing is the opposite of
your definition of winning, and that they will accept and conform to your exit
strategy. Neither may be the case, especially in limited wars.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.

Actually, LB II did have a clear strategy, but it wasn't the one you state. It was
more "By bombing NVN before Congress comes back into session and cuts off all funds,
I can convince Thieu that we will continue to back him should the DRVN violate the
accords, while also convincing the DRVN that it's not worth it for them to hold out
for the whole loaf but accept the same offer they'd previously agreed to before
Thieu queered the deal, so we can get our PoWs back and get the hell out of there
with as much dignity as we can muster."

Nixon was successful on the first three counts, and the fourth was arguable.
"Winning the war" was never his goal with LB II; he knew that the war could only be
won in South Vietnam, unless we were prepared to obliterate North Vietnam and risk a
direct confrontation with the PRC and/or the USSR.

You've said a mouthful, but unfortunately even those of us with the
largest orifice sometimes can't get the whole thing in. You might also
put it into the context of presidential politics. The Nixon policy of
Vietnamization that started in '68 had already been nearly completely
implemented. It was acknowledged at all levels that all we wanted was
a "withdrawal with honor" and release of the POWs.

Let's also acknowledge that the Oct termination of LB was just prior
to election and that both the Nixon administration and the NV/VC were
using it to their advantage. Once elected, and prior to inauguration
for his second term, with four years ahead of him, Nixon felt free to
flex our muscle to wrap things up quickly. He did.

The final point you make is a good one. The clear differences in ROE
between Rolling Thunder when we were decidedly tentative without a
clear knowledge that it was possible to keep the nuclear genie in the
bottle and the wider latitude for action in LB and finally LB II is
evidence. After eight years we had developed a much better picture of
the relationship between Vietnam and China, as well as the split
between the Soviets and Chinese. And, we knew that the Viets were
Soviet clients rather than Sino-proxies. Neither of the big players
were going to get confrontational and both benefited from our
political unrest.


Politically (and morally), that
wasn't an option, unless you feel that Nixon was willing and able to order the
AF/Navy to destroy the Chinese and Soviet factories that were producing virtually
all the north's war needs, along with the Eastern Bloc cargo ships that brought much
of it there, and the north's own food supplies? Or how about just nuking Hanoi,
Haiphong, and the Red River Delta in general?

Ahh, now there's a picture to contemplate.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

On 18 Apr 2004 14:26:38 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

Subject: Friendly Fire Notebook
From: Dweezil Dwarftosser
Date: 4/18/04 2:19 AM Pacific

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -

We won the VN war??? Really?


Arthur Kramer

Well, Art, if you get the chance to visit the Wall, you'll find 58,325
names on the wall. If you check most historian estimates of losses to
the NVN and VC, you'll get numbers of dead ranging from a low of one
million to a high of three million. By numbers, we won.

If you measure the victorious side by who owns the land at the end of
hostilities, the fall of Saigon in 1975 says they won.

But, if you visit Hanoi today, you'll find a real "Hanoi Hilton" that
offers an "American breakfast" included in the room rate. If you visit
Ho Chi Minh City, you'll find a bustling, free-market entrepenurial
economy. And, you'll find tour packages available at any travel agent
in the country touting the scenery, history, and hospitality of a
visit to Vietnam. If you measure the success or failure thirty years
after, it looks more and more each day like capitalism and Western
values beat Communism every way.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Subject: Friendly Fire Notebook
From: Ed Rasimus
Date: 4/18/04 10:41 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

On 18 Apr 2004 14:26:38 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

Subject: Friendly Fire Notebook
From: Dweezil Dwarftosser
Date: 4/18/04 2:19 AM Pacific

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -

We won the VN war??? Really?


Arthur Kramer

Well, Art, if you get the chance to visit the Wall, you'll find 58,325
names on the wall. If you check most historian estimates of losses to
the NVN and VC, you'll get numbers of dead ranging from a low of one
million to a high of three million. By numbers, we won.

If you measure the victorious side by who owns the land at the end of
hostilities, the fall of Saigon in 1975 says they won.

But, if you visit Hanoi today, you'll find a real "Hanoi Hilton" that
offers an "American breakfast" included in the room rate. If you visit
Ho Chi Minh City, you'll find a bustling, free-market entrepenurial
economy. And, you'll find tour packages available at any travel agent
in the country touting the scenery, history, and hospitality of a
visit to Vietnam. If you measure the success or failure thirty years
after, it looks more and more each day like capitalism and Western
values beat Communism every way.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8


Geez Ed, I guess you are right. We did win the VN war.
((:-))



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve.

Hardly, my biggest concern today is that STRATCOM re-invents itself as "SAC
reborn", which may be in progress. No, my beef with Michel is in his first
chapter where he bashes SAC about its "ORI mentality" and then makes a mistake
by throwing spears at SAC, LeMay and their contribution in Korea during that
conflict(Michel makes a *completely* false statement about SAC's contribution
to 7th AF during 1951-1952). In my opinion, that entire chapter is of little
value to the rest of the book. I agree completely with Michel about the
horrible job SAC did in nearly every regard during LB II, but when read in the
context of the first chapter, it looks like he's got a gripe with SAC. In fact,
he admits he once had a "gripe" with SAC. In that first chapter Michel claims
(and since I lent my copy to someone I'm going to have to paraphrase) that all
fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE *hated* SAC and dreaded an assignment to
any SAC unit. What the book jacket tells us is that Michel was an F-4 pilot,
one that obviously had issues with SAC. Bottom line, I thought the book was
great, but the first chapter was not needed, contained historical innacuracies
and overall detracted from Michel's overall premis.

The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why? Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.

I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent.

So you can actually research facts from a library and produce a factually
correct writting?


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

If it meant the destruction
of all of NVN's capability to wage war, so be it. (Not a bad
objective during any war, eh?)

Except that, outside of the mining of Haiphong harbor, and the required strikes
against SAM sites, LB II attacks weren't designed to destroy their capability
to wage war. Our strikes that continued further south against their mechanized
ground units were designed to destroy as many fielded forces as we could, but
these were not part of LB II.

I don't particularly care WHY they pulled out. LB II convinced
them to *change their ways* - which you conveniently would like
to ignore.

I don't believe either one of us is ignoring the fact that the NVN returned to
Paris, what we're saying (or at least I am) was that had Nixon forced Thieu to
agree to the initial agreement, without the bombing, the end result would have
been the same. Neither one of us is arguing LB II was a waste of men and
equipment, but it's over stating its impact on the war in SE Asia to claim; "it
ended the war". If you mean it was the last large scale operation for US forces
in SE Asia, then yes, it ended the war. If you mean without it the war would
have gone on longer, you're wrong.

Please refrain from confusing political goals and wartime
objectives

In this case, they're inseperable. And that should be the lesson learned from
LB II, not that if you bomb a nations capital round the clock for 11 days with
enough aircraft, you'll win any war.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

Except that the only real shortage they had that you listed was
petroleum....and eventually land as the Army rolled into Germany. The 8th AF
bombing campaign depleted POL stores and forced Germany to use men and
equipment to defend from air strikes that otherwise would have been used with
front line units. Except, at SOS and even ACSC you'll "learn" the 8th AF
bombing campaign "won the war in Europe".

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.

Thanks to the Soviets and Chinese certain parts of their military were in the
20th Century, but most of their military (supplied via Schwinn bicycle) and the
infrastructure and population were not far removed from at least the Bronze
Age.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

Ed, that transportation network consisted of a hundred or so WW II era French
trucks and a few hundred bicycles. Hardly "hi-tech".

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

That's simply wrong. Yes, LB II was a *part* of making the above happen, but to
claim it was the single reason, or even the main reason is wrong. If Nixon and
Kissenger had not stiff armed Thieu into blessing the already agreed upon peace
plan, LB II would have lasted until congress returned from break and voted to
suspend all funding for the war in SE Asia. You're trying to make a simple
cause-effect relationship out of a situation with more than two "moving parts".
However, what you say is also being taught in Air Force PME, which IMHO is
tragic.

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective. Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.

I'd say your first statement is the lesson learned from the entire conflict.
The lesson learned from LB II is that air power can be as much a political
weapon as a military one and used in conjunction with political forces can
allow the U.S. to achieve limited political objectives. The lesson being
taught, and the wrong one IMHO is; If we had just done LB II in 1965, the war
would have ended in 1966.Or; LB II ended the war because of the tremendous
damage we caused to the North Vietnamese, forcing them to sue for peace
(without admitting they had already agreed to it).


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"