Friendly Fire Notebook

On 18 Apr 2004 21:18:55 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve.

Hardly, my biggest concern today is that STRATCOM re-invents itself as "SAC
reborn", which may be in progress.

No one will accuse you of paranoia for that apprehension. Be afraid,
be very afraid.

No, my beef with Michel is in his first
chapter where he bashes SAC about its "ORI mentality" and then makes a mistake
by throwing spears at SAC, LeMay and their contribution in Korea during that
conflict(Michel makes a *completely* false statement about SAC's contribution
to 7th AF during 1951-1952). In my opinion, that entire chapter is of little
value to the rest of the book.

You forced me to pull it off the shelf and do a quick skim. I think
you must be referring to the Prologue rather than the first chapter.
Titled "Peace is Our Profession" it seems to be a fairly accurate
brief history of the period of the '50s. LeMay and other WW II bomber
generals were in control of a large chunk of the AF. The real
questions of doctrine in an emerging Cold War were driving decisions
and strategic nuclear forces were a major player. Even the tactical
inventory was being developed around bomber intercept for defense and
low-level nuke strike for offense.

I agree completely with Michel about the
horrible job SAC did in nearly every regard during LB II, but when read in the
context of the first chapter, it looks like he's got a gripe with SAC. In fact,
he admits he once had a "gripe" with SAC. In that first chapter Michel claims
(and since I lent my copy to someone I'm going to have to paraphrase) that all
fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE *hated* SAC and dreaded an assignment to
any SAC unit.

Well, duh! I don't want to be a shatterer of your illusions, but that
is a fact. All fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE most assuredly
hated the thought of possibly being assigned to SAC. (Can you recall
the vinyl square top baseball caps and polyester dickies of SAC
crews?)

When personnel requirements and the bad personnel policy decision of
"no involuntary second tours" drove the cross-training of loads of
SAC, MAC and ATC crews into fighters, the hatred was reinforced. While
a lot of guys did a great job (and some are described in When Thunder
Rolled), there were some who brought SAC attitudes and lack of
flexibility with them. It wasn't a "team-building" exercise.

What the book jacket tells us is that Michel was an F-4 pilot,
one that obviously had issues with SAC. Bottom line, I thought the book was
great, but the first chapter was not needed, contained historical innacuracies
and overall detracted from Michel's overall premis.

Marshall flew a combat tour in RF-4s, then another in F-4s during
Linebacker and finally wound up as an F-15 driver.

The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why? Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.

So, you're telling me that the prep order that specified three-day max
effort that I read in the Korat Command Post on the morning of
December 18, 1972 was a fake?

If damage inflicted was a secondary concern, then why didn't we just
resume tactical operations and pick up where Linebacker had ended.
Inflicting maximum damage was the whole raison d'etre for scheduling
150 BUFF sorties on night one. (Have you ever seen 150 BUFFs airborne
in the same month let alone one night?)

I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent.

So you can actually research facts from a library and produce a factually
correct writting?

I think Pliny the Elder did some of that. (And, after ten years
service on the seven-member Board of Trustees of the Pikes Peak
Library District I've got a soft spot in my heart/head for libraries.)


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I think
you must be referring to the Prologue rather than the first chapter.

I'm sorry, I lent my book to someone, but yes the prologue is what I'm
referring to.

it seems to be a fairly accurate
brief history of the period of the '50s.

Not where it claims LeMay sent 7th AF its "least combat capable B-29 units"
(paraphrased). SAC sent 2 *radar* equipped B-29 units to Japan. These B-29
units were hardly the least capable in SACs inventory, in fact quite the
opposite.

Well, duh! I don't want to be a shatterer of your illusions, but that
is a fact.

Which is fine, but don't expect readers not to question your main premis when
its reflected in the light of; "I always hated SAC anyway..."

So, you're telling me that the prep order that specified three-day max
effort that I read in the Korat Command Post on the morning of
December 18, 1972 was a fake?

No, the three day maximum effort was also followed in the JCS order with the
caveat that operations could be extended. Nixon's memoirs shed even further
light, indicating he was going to bomb them until they returned to Paris....or
congress removed funding. Are you trying to say Nixon wouldn't have been the
ultimate authority on the legth of LB II?

If damage inflicted was a secondary concern, then why didn't we just
resume tactical operations and pick up where Linebacker had ended.
Inflicting maximum damage was the whole raison d'etre for scheduling
150 BUFF sorties on night one.

Because Nixon himself ordered the use of BUFFs over Hanoi! He was making a
statement!

Have you ever seen 150 BUFFs airborne
in the same month let alone one night?

No, but that would be awsome!


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

(BUFDRVR) wrote in
:

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

[snip]

T'other thing is the idiotic rules of engagement that prevented
attacks on Haiphong if there was "neutral" shipping in the port.
This policy worked very well for the North Vietnamese until the
day somebody screwed up and there were no neutrals. An acquaintance
of mine was on the ensuing raid and has some lovely pictures of the
port in flames.

IBM

__________________________________________________ _____________________________
Posted Via Uncensored-News.Com - Accounts Starting At $6.95 - http://www.uncensored-news.com
The Worlds Uncensored News Source

You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.
You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22 out ot Takhli with F-4s out the othe 48th
TFW. Or did I misunderstand?.

Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern. The F-4s went up in
the daytime to hit targets that the bombers missed. Two of which I flew escort
on were Radio Hanoi and the Hanoi thermal power production plant. Given that
we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon, I'd say that damage was
a concern. My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Viernamized. The NVN didn't recover until 1975.

Steve
Korat RTAFB 72-74
F-4E







The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why?
Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.

Geez Ed, I guess you are right. We did win the VN war.
((:-))

Lost the battle but won the war. The Soviet Union is gone and Chine looks more
and more like a bunch of filthy capitalists.

The Coke and IBM signs that you see on final to hanoi International kind of
explain it all don't they!

BUFDRVR wrote:

Thanks to the Soviets and Chinese certain parts of their military were in the
20th Century, but most of their military (supplied via Schwinn bicycle) and the
infrastructure and population were not far removed from at least the Bronze
Age.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

Ed, that transportation network consisted of a hundred or so WW II era French
trucks and a few hundred bicycles. Hardly "hi-tech".

Damn! I had no idea that the hundreds of NVN trucks
we destroyed in Laos during 1970/71 had left them with
so few vehicles at home, just a year or so later.

On 18 Apr 2004 22:07:46 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

While Linebacker was ongoing throughout the summer of '72 we were also
operating round-the-clock against the trail with Spectre and F-4s with
M-36 and with USAF/USN/Marine tacair in those beseiged hot spots.

In March of '73 we were about to muster a full scale roll-back on Khe
Sanh because in addition to the three SA-2 sites we had confirmed
there we also had intel on a pair of SA-3 sites being on the verge of
operational. That's after we "moved the rubble around" and there was
no infrastructure to move such stone age equipment three hundred miles
south.

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.

----Ed: Hunter/Killer specialist and WW #2488.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Ed Rasimus

Ed,

When I was assigned to one of the "summer help"Takhli F-4D units, namely the
48th out of Holloman, we hit Yen Bai in Aug 72 as our Pack 6 training flight,
and then Phuc Yen in Sept 72. Mixed loads of Mk 82 slicks and daisy cutters,
ffour flights of fours IIRC.

The F-4E Hunter-Killers were far more interesting. Didn't care much for that
1500' line abreast dumb bomber stuff.



Steve

You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.

Well, not just me but several prominant authors....

You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian
and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22

These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail?

Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon

Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3.
Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing in
a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor) were
having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough,
18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and
Kuwait.

My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Vietnamized.

Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch.

The NVN didn't recover until 1975.

True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that than
LB I.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"