Friendly Fire Notebook

Damn! I had no idea that the hundreds of NVN trucks
we destroyed in Laos during 1970/71 had left them with
so few vehicles at home, just a year or so later.

First, the "hundred or so trucks" I referred to were the ones in use on the Ho
Chi Mihn trail, not delivering goods in downtown Hanoi. Secondly, throughout
the war, post-strike assesments of trucks destroyed was so overly inflated that
by late 1968, we had destroyed more trucks on the trail then North Vietnam had
in the entire country. The CIA doesn't have a very good reputation now, but
during Vietnam they were very accurate and routinely cut in half or even thirds
the reported destroyed vehicle reports. They also were very accurate in their
assesment of the effect we had on NVN POL stores.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.

They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
that amount. All in 11 days!

And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.

Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
F-111 targets in his book.

SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.

Well, not just me but several prominant authors..

I have read several prominent authors, too, and some of their "facts" were
point blank wrong. The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts. The coal fired
electrical plant we took out with LGBs in the daylight on Day #3 after the
bombers two nights in a row is one that stands out in my mind. The post strike
photos in the textbook clearly shows the damage we left behind. Don't believe
all you read unless the author was there himself.

Hereis an interesting read for you from aother author

http://www.sftt.org/303VINq.pdf



You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian
and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22

These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail?

Yes they were. We also used to escort Specter on the trails at night, in
F-4Ds. We usually carried CBU-58 and MK 82 with daisy cutters. Specter would
"mark" the lead and tail trucks and stop the convoys with 20 mm API then we
would drop in the line between the two truck fires. According to the Specter
guys the convoys were often in the miltiple hundreds of trucks. I seem to
recall that the record number of Specter truck kills in one night was 500+. I
got credit for a total of 400+ over a period of four months according to
Specter BDA for whatever that was worth. I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.



Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed? Must have made sense to somebady
and we all worked for the politicians. Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.



we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon

Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3.
Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing
in
a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor)
were
having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough,
18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and
Kuwait.

SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a crosswind
or wind shear in other words? We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
equipped
A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s. An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch steering
from his offset aimpoint to his target, similar to that incident where the
B-52 cell hit Neak Long in Cambodia.



My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Vietnamized.

Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch.

The NVN didn't recover until 1975.

True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that
than
LB I.

Maybe for the bombers but I would have to disagree for the fighters.

On Day 8 for example, Korat was fragged against a rail LOC, first daytime
strike for the AF A-7Ds. Unfortunately that one was a fiasco as the #2 -105
Weasel punched off his load on the runway on TO roll after an engine problem
and shut the runway down for 45 min. We finally did get off and over the
target but it was 100% unercast, the Pathfinder couldn't get a Loran lock and
so we all went home. It is described in the ACSC thesis that Karl Eschmann
wrote that became the book you refer to. I'd have to get it out to see exactly
what the target was but I am almost certain it was a rail yard. Karl and I are
friends and as I was a contributor and proofreader, he gave me a couple copies
of the manuscript. I loaned my book out and never got it back. The book
leaves out some information in places that is in the manuscript.

The accounts of LBII are a sore subject with me as there seems to have been an
element in the AF that was determined to show SAC in the best light possible.
That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental. Particularly when I
see BDA attributed to the bombers when I know for a fact that the fighters were
responsible. I am in no way tryng to downplay the bravery of the SAC crews - I
wouldn't have wanted their jobs for twice the pay - but I don't believe the
bombing was all that effective.. What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more effective.
They were running out of missiles and fuel as their supply lines had been
pretty well cut off as early as Day 3. I guess you could call that political
but I see it as more of a tactical solution. Had the supplie lines stayed open,
the bombong might have gone on a lot longer. I don't think it wold have
happened as it did if NVN had more missiles. I sat in an orbit over downtown
for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing - in fact I still have some
pictures I took with a little camera I carried with me.

Regards.

Steve Mellenthin






BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 19 Apr 2004 22:00:08 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.

They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
that amount. All in 11 days!

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down? Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.) Also note
that on 27 Dec. Maj. Carl Jeffcoat and 1/lt Jack Trimble were shot
down in daylight by a Mig-21 flying out of Kep. I engaged a pair of
MiG-21s on Dec 23rd, out of Phuc Yen. And, on Dec. 26th put four
CBU-52 on the N. end of the relatively unblemished runway of Yen Bai
during egress on a H/K mission near Hanoi.

And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.

Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
F-111 targets in his book.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable". Regular
locations for the highly mobile SA-2 units were listed as VN numbers,
but few of them were occupied during LB II. We often carried 8x10 BxW
glossies of known sites taken by recent RF-4 runs as a backup. The
priority was attack sites that fired on us or the strike package,
attack sites that we fired Shrikes at, and finally F-4s in the lead to
visual recce SAM possible sites.

Talking to Marshall in December last, he was in Hanoi researching his
next book. I asked him for a photo of the site on the downtown lake
(peninsula on the E. shore, still has a network of roads on it--now a
park). Marsh reported that there never was a site on that location. I
led the H/K element that killed the site on 12/21 in a scene that was
reminiscent of the SAM City finale of Flight of the Intruder. There
was most definitely a SAM site at that location.

SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....

Then you need to meet some Weasels. From the earliest days of F-100F
Weasels to the end of the war with third generation F-105Gs, we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up. While
early ('64-65) sites were classic Star-of-David bladed and surveyed
bases, in very short order they disappeared from view and became
heavily camouflaged and a "shell game" of which one is going to have
someone home.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts.

Which include "documented facts" on how 8th Air Force won WW in Europe. See my
earlier posts for my opinion of AF PME.

Don't believe
all you read unless the author was there himself.

That's ridiculous. Using that logic there is only one "believeable" book on the
Peloponnesian War. Conversely, according to you I could right a definitive work
on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which wouldn't be worth the cost of the paper
because I was so deeply buried in B-52 stuff (flying and mission planning),
that the "big picture" blew right by me.

I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.

Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.

Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed?

Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.

Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a
crosswind
or wind shear in other words?

Nope. The BUFF OAS calculates a release using the winds at altitude, should
those winds change drastically on the way down, it could have a significant
impact on accuracy. It happened in LB II, then again in DS. It was fixed after
DS.

We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
equipped
A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s.

Not sure about the F-4s, but neither the F-111 or A-6 was dropping from inside
or above the jet stream. If the F-4 has that capability great, its too bad they
didn't give it to the BUFF following Vietnam, we could have used over
Iraq/Kuwait.

An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch
steering
from his offset aimpoint to his target

A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
30,000+' AGL.

That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.

I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.

but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..

Depends what effect you were looking for...

What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
effective.

What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.

They were running out of missiles

Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting them
out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in Hanoi
decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
operators job much more difficult with varied routing.

and fuel

They had been low on fuel since May due to LB I. LBII had little to no impact
on NV POL stores.

I don't think it wold have
happened as it did if NVN had more missiles.

See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
includes very little about you fighter guys.

I sat in an orbit over downtown
for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing

The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down?

Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?

Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)

What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
College is wrong? I'm shocked Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
back of a library.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable".

Absolutely.

we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.

Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.

Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.

I don't disagree with you relative to overstating numbers . My body, truck,
and tonnage of enemy supplies destroyed counts were ridiculous at times. I am
trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect to
my own personal observations. I've enough pre/post strike recce photos of
truck parks and convoys to know that there were a lot of trucks, numbering int
he hundreds, certainly more than the hundred you mentioned unless you want to
tell me those photos wre faked.

I wasn't impressed one way or the other by the accounts of LB I and II when I
went through SOS and ACSC. The AWC readings were shown to me by an 0-4 and an
0-5 who were taking AWC by correspondence. I understand they upset a few folks
when they pointed out the errors in the photos to the staff.



Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed?

Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.

Possibly for some but not all the daytime targets that were struck. If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the first
place? You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they hit
anything or not, scaring the government back to the table and i don't quite
hold that view. My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the TAC
guys had learned the hard way, and then the collective actions of both forces
convinced the NVN there was no future in their current strategy once they
started losing assets..


Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.




A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
30,000+' AGL.

The pathfinders usually operated above 15,000' to stay out of small arms and
lighter AAA.like 23 and 37 mm.




That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.

I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.


Certainly did in the ACSC reading I referred to above.

You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity. Same
difference. Several who have challenged that viewpoint have become pariahs,
Dana Drenkowski for one.




but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?




What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
effective.

What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.

They were running out of missiles

Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting
them
out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in
Hanoi
decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
operators job much more difficult with varied routing.

and fuel

I read that too but I don't agree. The missile firings dropped off after Day
3.


They were low on everything which also explains why the daytime AAA was so
light. I was over Hanoi and saw the sky go from absolutelyclear to totally
undercast from AAA. I never saw that in the daytime sorties I flew in LBII.
You are making my point about why their follow-on warfighiing capability was
set back by the fighter strikes. Whether the changed B-52 tactics or lack of
operation missiles reduced bomber losses is almost a moot point but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II


See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
includes very little about you fighter guys.


I have the book and have read it a couple of times. I agree with nearly all he
has written. I guess we just see the accounts he describes differently. He
does quote a squadron mate, Rex Rivolo, in several places.but there isn't a
vast amount written about the daytime fighter sorties.




the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing

The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.


There must have been quite a few SAM shooters getting disciplined that night
then. . One crew in our squadron had one fired at them, dodged it, then took
it down again for another. The backseater saw the altimeter unwind to zero as
they bottomed out in the pullup, but the SAM missed. It was the backseater's
first mission in country.

The F-111s operated far too low to be targeted once they were out onto the Red
River delta and in SAM country.

On 20 Apr 2004 22:23:11 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.

You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
the big picture." Then you offered a "young NV Lt, armed with an AK-47
and a pistol" and no ammo.

Today you discount the intense fighting that was going on at Hue, An
Loc, and Khe Sanh during the period in question. Lots of ammo was
being expended by the bad guys---it must have come from somewhere and
I'll be willing to believe US troops on the scene that it was being
fired.

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down?

Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?

There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II.
As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable. And,
no, we weren't that bad. In fact, if you see the pix of Radio Hanoi
after the LGB guys from Ubon showed up, you'll see the level of
accuracy. You also might consider the Doumer Bridge, the Dragon Jaw at
Thanh Hoa, the Bac Giang and Bac Ninh bridges as examples of artistry
with manually delivered dive bombs. And, consider the difference
between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away, high in the menopause
and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a
hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal.

Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)

What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
College is wrong? I'm shocked Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
back of a library.

I don't think they shot at F-4s. An F-4 had no reason to get to the
altitudes of the B-52s (in fact in A/A configuration with three bags
it was almost impossible.) I suspect that they were shooting at
shadows--no airplanes at all. But, it was good for morale to award
some kills.

Maybe Guy Alcala knows if Toperczer reported any losses from the NVN
side related to the BUFF gunner claims.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable".

Absolutely.

we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.

Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.

A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
is it?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

I am
trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect
to
my own personal observations.

Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes
from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my
copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm
paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your
personal experience?

If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the
first
place?

Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes
ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a small
building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi
without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost.

You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they
hit
anything or not

As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian casulties
were kept to a minimum.

My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the
TAC
guys had learned the hard way

True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw
no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.

That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I.

You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity.

And you are making half of mine.

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?

No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get hits
tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN government
gets a personal, up close viewing.

but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II

Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the
accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping them
and you and I will be in agreement.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
the big picture."

Taken by itself, yes, personal observations are not adequate historical
sources. When backed up by other personal sources they get more credibility,
but when backed up by documents, they become factual. The munition, food and
POL shortages experienced by the NVA in the summer of '72 are well documented
by NV government records and by dozens of NV officers and enlisted who were
obsessive diary keepers. Ed, you're arguing against a very solid historic fact.

There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II.

And BUFFs.

As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable.

Not with 108 bombs its not! Come on Ed, I split the runways at Batajanica with
a B-52 two-ship with a grand total of 90 weapons. 2 more two-ships followed
until we quartered the runway making it useless for anything except a
Cessna-172. This was all done with unguided Mk-82s. Its not really that
difficult to cut runways, even with unguided weapons.

And, consider the difference
between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away

30 miles ? I wish it were possible....

and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a
hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal.

I have seen, up close and personal, SA-2s, SA-3's and SA-6s. Operating in the
"menopause" is not as safe as you seem to think.

I suspect that they were shooting at
shadows--no airplanes at all.

However, this whole issue gets at the heart of your argument. Here you have
reports from guys who were actually there and compared to studies done by guys
who weren't actually there (sitting in the back of a library as you put it) we
find the "library guys" more historically accurate. Why? Because the infameous
"fog and friction" tends to distort reality. There's no fog and little friction
from the back of a library. I'm not sure how familiar you are with the study
Checkmate did in the 80s of a supposed F-4 to F-4 blue on blue kill in Vietnam,
but several guys who were not old enough to drive when the incident occured,
accurately figured out that a supposed blue-on-blue kill in 1971 (I think?)
over NVN was, in fact, an enemy MiG-21 that shot down the F-4. As far as I'm
concerned personal eyewitness accounts are good historical sources, but like
all other sources, must be supported by other documentation.

A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
is it?

LOL...nope, not at all. I was trying to point out that had there been an SA-2
site located in those areas (which there wasn't), they would have certainly
been destroyed, so the fact that no SAMs were attacked by B-52s is a matter of
good NVN luck.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"