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#11
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"Giz" wrote in message
snipped for brevity Hey Bill, are you an A-dub? Ayup!g I'm one of the active duty types that has seen behind the curtain. I left active duty after my first 4 and joined the reserves (SAU VP0545), but came back to active duty after 4.5 there. I don't view the reserves as wasteful, but I do view them as somewhat of a luxury. We shouldn't have reserve squadrons instead of active squadrons. Well, maybe so and maybe not. A lot depends on your definition of "luxury" and and missions that need to be accomplished. One of the hardest lessons of WWII was that the virtual elimination of ASW assets in the RN and USN after WWI damn near caused a catastrophe. If the Japanese had followed German practice with their subs it probably would have. Again, the WWII analogy is not directly on point as no potential adversary CURRENTLY possesses a significant subsurface threat. There are lots of subs out there in the hands of possible "bad guys" but so far they have not choosen to use them. If they do then long range maritime patrol may not be of too much help and the S3 series might be sorely missed. A choice that the VP community would be facing in the near future if we didn't make use of the aircraft in the reserve units. I do believe that the SAU concept will be making a return to the Naval Air Reserve, and hopefully we can reform some of the units when MMA is online. I doubt that budget pressures in the future will be less than they are now. The idea that we will buy enough MMA airframes to outfit non-existant RESFORON/SAUs smacks of a GREAT DEAL of optomism!g And that still does not address the other hardware units. If the air assets go how long before the FFGs follow? It seems to me that if the Reserve Forces are to survive being anything but "knife and fork" units spending their time watching "Victory at Sea" reruns then they had better look to their "hole card" and crack up some Congressional support for at least maintenace of the status quo. Bill Kambic If, by any act, error, or omission, I have, intentionally or unintentionally, displayed any breedist, disciplinist, sexist, racist, culturalist, nationalist, regionalist, localist, ageist, lookist, ableist, sizeist, speciesist, intellectualist, socioeconomicist, ethnocentrist, phallocentrist, heteropatriarchalist, or other violation of the rules of political correctness, known or unknown, I am not sorry and I encourage you to get over it. |
#12
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Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long before. What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a face card in the back pocket of the leadership. I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at work. Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin. One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of "augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to them. Of course, as with any plan, the one that started this whole thread could change by next week. In the end we shall see what we shall see. Just my 2 cents. Eric Scheie "Bill Kambic" wrote in message ... More to the point, loss of an internal Reserve hardware capability is unlikely to EVER return. The RESFORONS have always been "poor relations" but made do with what they had and sometimes embarassed Active Duty types in head to head competition. The Active Duty types have, in my personal presence, often noted the vast "wastage" of funds on the Reserve hardware units. (To be completely fair, a fair number have also "looked behind the curtain" and seen the reasons why hardware units are a Very Good Thing.) The likelyhood of facing the hords of the Red Army (or the late, unlamented Soviet Navy) is very small. But there are still places where you can lose a bunch of aircraft and people in a hurry and have to replace them the same way (a "dust up" in North Korea comes to mind). The complexity of modern aircraft means that the "WWII Approach" of 90 day wonder to Fleet Fighter Pilot in a year (or so) is unlikely to EVER be seen again. This means that you have to have a "well" of trained people to draw on in time of crisis. The REFORON/SRU hardware units filled that need. When they "go away" so will a cheap solution to an expensive problem. Bill Kambic Formerly of VS-73 (the SRU part whose numbers escape me) and VP-93 (ditto), NAF Detroit, 1974-1978 |
#13
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"Bill Kambic" wrote in message ... "Giz" wrote in message snipped for brevity Hey Bill, are you an A-dub? Ayup!g I'm one of the active duty types that has seen behind the curtain. I left active duty after my first 4 and joined the reserves (SAU VP0545), but came back to active duty after 4.5 there. I don't view the reserves as wasteful, but I do view them as somewhat of a luxury. We shouldn't have reserve squadrons instead of active squadrons. Well, maybe so and maybe not. A lot depends on your definition of "luxury" and and missions that need to be accomplished. Substantial numbers of birds will be parked this summer. By luxury I mean we are facing a this or that choice. The day when we could have both has passed us by. To keep all the Reserve Squadrons would cost us Active Squadrons. While I believe in the value of the Reserves, I don't think that would be a wise choice. Bottom line, we can't have both. One of the hardest lessons of WWII was that the virtual elimination of ASW assets in the RN and USN after WWI damn near caused a catastrophe. If the Japanese had followed German practice with their subs it probably would have. Again, the WWII analogy is not directly on point as no potential adversary CURRENTLY possesses a significant subsurface threat. There are lots of subs out there in the hands of possible "bad guys" but so far they have not choosen to use them. If they do then long range maritime patrol may not be of too much help and the S3 series might be sorely missed. A choice that the VP community would be facing in the near future if we didn't make use of the aircraft in the reserve units. I do believe that the SAU concept will be making a return to the Naval Air Reserve, and hopefully we can reform some of the units when MMA is online. I doubt that budget pressures in the future will be less than they are now. The idea that we will buy enough MMA airframes to outfit non-existant RESFORON/SAUs smacks of a GREAT DEAL of optomism!g I doubt that too, but a shuffle of P-3 airframes that are left may reconstitute several Reserve Squadrons. And that still does not address the other hardware units. If the air assets go how long before the FFGs follow? It seems to me that if the Reserve Forces are to survive being anything but "knife and fork" units spending their time watching "Victory at Sea" reruns then they had better look to their "hole card" and crack up some Congressional support for at least maintenace of the status quo. Hopefully, the SAU concept will keep that from happening. Bill Kambic Giz AW1(NAC/AW) CPW-11, CV-59, VP-0545, CV-66, VP-45, VP-30 WTU |
#14
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"Michael Wise" wrote in message ... In article , "Giz" wrote: It will be a sad day when the all these squadrons are gone. It was fun while it lasted. John Larson LCDR(Ret) VP-90 1984-1994, NAS Glenview IL. Big surprise. I thought Clinton was bad, Bush is even worse. He already cut Veterans Benefits by millions of dollars while telling our troops what a good job they are doing. Talk about 2-faced. At ther rate he's going I won't be surprised I've been a republican all my life, but I have to look at this adminustration and ask "What has he done for the country?" Walt CPO, UNS, Ret. He can't fix 8 years of abuse overnight. How does slashing veterans benefits come anything close to approaching a fix for what you call "8 years of abuse"? Face it, Bush Jr., like his pappy, doesn't give two ****s about vets. He talks the armchair "Rah rah military" talk from the safety and comfort of somebody from a family wealthy and connected enough to ensure never being sent in harms way...but at the end of the day, he's like the rest of those do-nothing privileged stooges at the top and given the choice of protecting his the already obscene profits of his lackey friends and contributors or funding programs to benefit those who served their country and even shed blood for it...will always side with his cronies. Republican or Democrat, it makes no difference...servicemen are just their pawns....although Republicans are pretty good about lying to deny that. Whatever, believe it or not there are issues that we are more interested in than on base housing, larger pay raises, ect. These are active duty issues; not veterans ones. Veterans are more interested in keeping benfits or benefit eligibility for something like a service-connected disability (maybe taking a bullet or their country or permanent disability from any number of combatant or peacetime functions). I'd like parts to keep my bird in the air and FMC. The issues you speak of don't mean **** if we don't come back. I'm certainly not overpaid, but at the same time I'm not on foodstamps or know any who are. I know that they are out there, Great, but we're talking about veterans here. Do you undertand the difference between active duty and veteran? Veterans have already done there time. It is they who Bush Jr., like his pappy before him, are slashing benefits for, You brought the veteran's issues into a thread that was discussing the current and future state of Navy Air. Not exactly a "veteran's issue". Thank you for your service and have a happy 4th, but if you can't accept that this thread will follow along on the issues it is concerned with, then find somewhere else to grind your axe or start a new thread. False, Walt brought veterans issues into the thread and I responded to that. Thank you for your service as well, but if you're reading comprehension skills are that off, perhaps you should avoid participating in any thread. --Mike No Mike, I responded to Walt. Your first post on this thread was a response to that post of mine. You have noted that Walt hasn't kept the veteran's issues a part of this thread? Once again, this thread is about the current state of Naval Air. Hardly a veteran's issue, although it may be (and should be) a concern of veterans. As far as not participating in any thread, with the exception of responding to your trolls I have remained on topic. The issue is money, and we don't have enough to fix everything at once. A little patience and flexibility will be needed. Semper Gumby. Giz |
#15
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"Eric Scheie" wrote in message . net... Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long before. What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a face card in the back pocket of the leadership. I doubt any here question their value. I don't. I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at work. At one time this was true. Currently, many of the Reserve's airframes have less hours on them. Will getting these airframes fix the problem? No, but it may keep us alive until the fix (new airframes) reaches us. The fact is that in the next few years squadrons will be decommissioned. What we're discussing is who should lose those squadrons. Navair or Navairres. Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin. One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of "augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to them. It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU, VP-0545. I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's. Giz |
#16
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On 7/4/03 3:52 PM, in article ,
"Giz" wrote: Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin. One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of "augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to them. It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU, VP-0545. I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's. Giz SAU is a program that works in FRS's and deployed VP units but not in reserve VF's or VFA's. A single-seat pilot especially would have some major trouble working up for, traveling to, and flying his ACDUTRA in a deployed CVW for two weeks for a variety of reasons. Likewise, the VFA's are not having the airframe problems that the VP's are having. What I'm saying is keep the reserve VFA status quo. Consider SAU-ing reserves into the active duty VP's. --Woody |
#17
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Well done. Very well written post.
The loss of Naval Air Reserve hardware units would be a tragedy. It is a short-sighted move initiated not by the politicians (like GWB as has been suggested) but by the active duty Flag Officers. Unfortunately, the casualty will be the cost-effective "insurance policy" and professional adversary elements of Naval Aviation. Don't think for a moment that the VFC's can handle all of the commitments. VFC's cover SFARP's, but the FRS's have relied heavily on the reserve VFA's to be their bogies. By the way, this is no surprise to those of us in the reserves. Ever since the separate appropriation line for the Naval Reserves was melded into the active duty's line, this has only been a matter of time. For the last two years, they've been trying to write VFA-203 out of the budget and in the short term, this year, it looks as if they've succeeded. The only thing that will keep USNR air alive will be heavy congressional involvement. --Woody On 7/4/03 3:07 PM, in article , "Eric Scheie" wrote: Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long before. What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a face card in the back pocket of the leadership. I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at work. Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin. One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of "augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to them. Of course, as with any plan, the one that started this whole thread could change by next week. In the end we shall see what we shall see. Just my 2 cents. Eric Scheie "Bill Kambic" wrote in message ... More to the point, loss of an internal Reserve hardware capability is unlikely to EVER return. The RESFORONS have always been "poor relations" but made do with what they had and sometimes embarassed Active Duty types in head to head competition. The Active Duty types have, in my personal presence, often noted the vast "wastage" of funds on the Reserve hardware units. (To be completely fair, a fair number have also "looked behind the curtain" and seen the reasons why hardware units are a Very Good Thing.) The likelyhood of facing the hords of the Red Army (or the late, unlamented Soviet Navy) is very small. But there are still places where you can lose a bunch of aircraft and people in a hurry and have to replace them the same way (a "dust up" in North Korea comes to mind). The complexity of modern aircraft means that the "WWII Approach" of 90 day wonder to Fleet Fighter Pilot in a year (or so) is unlikely to EVER be seen again. This means that you have to have a "well" of trained people to draw on in time of crisis. The REFORON/SRU hardware units filled that need. When they "go away" so will a cheap solution to an expensive problem. Bill Kambic Formerly of VS-73 (the SRU part whose numbers escape me) and VP-93 (ditto), NAF Detroit, 1974-1978 |
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"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message ... On 7/4/03 3:52 PM, in article , "Giz" wrote: Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin. One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of "augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to them. It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU, VP-0545. I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's. Giz SAU is a program that works in FRS's and deployed VP units but not in reserve VF's or VFA's. A single-seat pilot especially would have some major trouble working up for, traveling to, and flying his ACDUTRA in a deployed CVW for two weeks for a variety of reasons. It would be difficult. There are FRS's for the VF/VFA communities. That may be one answer. It would definitely be far from ideal. Likewise, the VFA's are not having the airframe problems that the VP's are having. No? The airframe transfer shellgame between deploying squadrons and those just returning has ended? No sarcasm there. If that has ended, then the VFA's are doing well, but the last I heard was that returning squadrons were being picked apart to bring the deployers up to full strength. What I'm saying is keep the reserve VFA status quo. Consider SAU-ing reserves into the active duty VP's. I agree that we should SAU all communities that need it. If that allows VFA and/or VF to remain as Reserve Squadrons great, but we do need to end the cycle of aircraft transfers. Giz |
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On 7/4/03 8:43 PM, in article ,
"Giz" wrote: No? The airframe transfer shellgame between deploying squadrons and those just returning has ended? No sarcasm there. If that has ended, then the VFA's are doing well, but the last I heard was that returning squadrons were being picked apart to bring the deployers up to full strength. I agree that we should SAU all communities that need it. If that allows VFA and/or VF to remain as Reserve Squadrons great, but we do need to end the cycle of aircraft transfers. Giz From an idealist's standpoint, I agree with you... but after 17 years of experience in Naval Air, I've observed that post-deployment airframe transfers are the norm. More commonly, a squadron would put their jets into preservation for 1-2 months after coming back from deployment and lose parts support. In Hornet squadrons (because each squadron typically flies only 1 or 2 lots of jets (e.g. mine flies 8's and 9's) preservation is more common than transfers. What I'm saying is that in the TACAIR communities, airframe transfers are not necessarily a gauge of health because Naval Air has been unhealthy from a parts and airframes standpoint ever since I was an Ensign. A better indicator might be the number of airplanes air wings deploy with. On my first cruise, an air wing had 90 aircraft. My most recent cruise: 70. That's all funding-driven. Sure we still have 46-50 bomb-droppers, but we could have more (i.e. an even better tooth-to-tail) if the budget would allow it. The leadership has allowed (even promoted) the decrease to keep aircraft carrier decks filled and because it looks more efficient. So we're agreed that Naval Aviation could be healthier--just not what the indicators of health are. What's the cure? Certainly not shutting down the reserve hardware units. The defense budget has been decreasing as a percentage of the total federal budget for a long time and there's no reason to suspect that it won't continue to decrease. Even if the money from the reserves is absorbed into the active duty coffers, it will only serve as a band aid fix. And without extra capability to fund, congress will continue to shave off dollars in the years ahead because they will have no reason not to. The net result will be (a) "Termination" of the Navy's "insurance policy" (such as VFA-201 provided for CVW-8 this year) and (b) Loss of 60% of the Navy's adversary players (all reserve squadrons right now). Because of the lack of adversary units, (and the fact that in the last 3 "wars" that there was no credible air-to-air threat) the case will be made that air-to-air training syllabi can be decreased and/or civilian units flying CAT III aircraft will be brought in to augment the VFC's. This "cart before the horse" mentality will certainly work in the short term, but will leave Naval aviators ill-prepared for conflicts involving better equipped and more serious forces. Sounds a lot like "the sky is falling." It's not, but it's getting a whole lot darker. --Woody |
#20
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"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message ... On 7/4/03 8:43 PM, in article , "Giz" wrote: No? The airframe transfer shellgame between deploying squadrons and those just returning has ended? No sarcasm there. If that has ended, then the VFA's are doing well, but the last I heard was that returning squadrons were being picked apart to bring the deployers up to full strength. I agree that we should SAU all communities that need it. If that allows VFA and/or VF to remain as Reserve Squadrons great, but we do need to end the cycle of aircraft transfers. Giz From an idealist's standpoint, I agree with you... but after 17 years of experience in Naval Air, I've observed that post-deployment airframe transfers are the norm. More commonly, a squadron would put their jets into preservation for 1-2 months after coming back from deployment and lose parts support. In Hornet squadrons (because each squadron typically flies only 1 or 2 lots of jets (e.g. mine flies 8's and 9's) preservation is more common than transfers. What I'm saying is that in the TACAIR communities, airframe transfers are not necessarily a gauge of health because Naval Air has been unhealthy from a parts and airframes standpoint ever since I was an Ensign. It may not mean as much as it did in my community. At one time each squadron "pretty much" owned their planes. Transfers were infrequent. The upkeep these planes got was great. As we lost airframes to hours or mods the transfer game began. Rarely did you get another squadron's gem. A lot of maint hours went into bringing those planes up to a true FMC status. They were transferred up, but you know, kind of up. As I look back, that time was the first signal that we were headed for trouble. That I believe is the cause of my prejudice against a policy of transfers. There's nothing like ownership to encourage upkeep. That's more of a motivator than any CO could come up with. I know that this thread is about the possibility of losing that ownership in Navairres. I guess each side will be arguing that they should be the "haves" and not the "have nots". I hope the right choice is made, and I'm glad I don't have to make it. Giz A better indicator might be the number of airplanes air wings deploy with. On my first cruise, an air wing had 90 aircraft. My most recent cruise: 70. That's all funding-driven. Sure we still have 46-50 bomb-droppers, but we could have more (i.e. an even better tooth-to-tail) if the budget would allow it. The leadership has allowed (even promoted) the decrease to keep aircraft carrier decks filled and because it looks more efficient. So we're agreed that Naval Aviation could be healthier--just not what the indicators of health are. What's the cure? Certainly not shutting down the reserve hardware units. The defense budget has been decreasing as a percentage of the total federal budget for a long time and there's no reason to suspect that it won't continue to decrease. Even if the money from the reserves is absorbed into the active duty coffers, it will only serve as a band aid fix. And without extra capability to fund, congress will continue to shave off dollars in the years ahead because they will have no reason not to. The net result will be (a) "Termination" of the Navy's "insurance policy" (such as VFA-201 provided for CVW-8 this year) and (b) Loss of 60% of the Navy's adversary players (all reserve squadrons right now). Because of the lack of adversary units, (and the fact that in the last 3 "wars" that there was no credible air-to-air threat) the case will be made that air-to-air training syllabi can be decreased and/or civilian units flying CAT III aircraft will be brought in to augment the VFC's. This "ca rt before the horse" mentality will certainly work in the short term, but will leave Naval aviators ill-prepared for conflicts involving better equipped and more serious forces. Sounds a lot like "the sky is falling." It's not, but it's getting a whole lot darker. --Woody |
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