Greatest Strategic Air Missions

Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end result.
End of story.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end result.
End of story.


Gee, Art.

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.

Wouldn't a strategic air mission have to be something like the Dam Busters or
something?

Or wrecking that canal (I forget the name) with Tall Boys?

Seriously, something that caused a strategic effect for economical return, like
the Oil Campaign of 1944/45.

Walt

Subject: Greatest Strategic Air Missions
From: (WalterM140)
Date: 8/22/2004 5:05 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end result.
End of story.


Gee, Art.

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.

Wouldn't a strategic air mission have to be something like the Dam Busters or
something?

Or wrecking that canal (I forget the name) with Tall Boys?

Seriously, something that caused a strategic effect for economical return,
like
the Oil Campaign of 1944/45.

Walt

\

If that dam was never busted it wouldn't have made the slightest difference in
the war. In fact the results of the dam busting was disappointing. Why are we
discussing missions that may have been heroic but made zero difference in the
outcome of fhe war?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end
result.
End of story.


Gee, Art.

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.


Well no.

Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.
There were large numbers of troops based there. At
least 3 divisions IRC

It was also a major communications center, a storage point,
and the embarkation port for most of the troops who
were sent to the Philipines, Malaya, China etc.

To quote a Japanese newspaper report, "Probably more
than a thousand times since the beginning of the war did
the Hiroshima citizens see off with cries of 'Banzai' the
troops leaving from the harbor."

Wouldn't a strategic air mission have to be something like the Dam Busters
or
something?


Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
strategic as it gets.

Keith

In article , "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end
result.
End of story.


Gee, Art.

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.


Well no.

Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.

To avoid any confusion, it was 2nd _General_ army. A regular Japanese
"army" was more like an Allied corps, an "area army" was equivalent to a
field army (i.e., four-star command). General Army was somewhere
between Army Group and Theater Army.

There were large numbers of troops based there. At
least 3 divisions IRC

It was also a major communications center, a storage point,
and the embarkation port for most of the troops who
were sent to the Philipines, Malaya, China etc.

To quote a Japanese newspaper report, "Probably more
than a thousand times since the beginning of the war did
the Hiroshima citizens see off with cries of 'Banzai' the
troops leaving from the harbor."

Wouldn't a strategic air mission have to be something like the Dam
Busters
or
something?


Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
strategic as it gets.

Keith

Keith Willshaw wrote:

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.



Well no.

Are you saying that a large number of civilians was not killed in that
bombing?


Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.
There were large numbers of troops based there. At
least 3 divisions IRC

The bombing did not target any specific military facilities. According
to the Japanese figures, military casualties from the attack accounted
for less than 3% of the overall casualties. Thus, for every Japanese
soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.

Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
strategic as it gets.

The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
were even considering a surrender. They figured maybe Stalin won't stop
with the Kurils. Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
to the Americans and nobody nuked them.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse

Venik wrote:

Thus, for every Japanese
soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.

The judgement on whether a mission was a strategic success is not based on
collateral damage. In *most* circumstances high collateral damage will usually
translate to a strategic failure....but not in this case.

The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
were even considering a surrender.

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
to the Americans and nobody nuked them.

Uhh..the first successful nuclear bomb testing wasn't done until 16 July
1945....two months after Germany was defeated.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end
result.
End of story.


Gee, Art.

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.

Most of them Japanese Catholics who while loyal Japanese were often
conscientious objectors.

I am told by some Malaysian friends of Eurasian extraction that the
Nunneries, Catholic schools etc were treated with deference by the Japanese
because they had enough soldiers in their own forces concerned about this.



Wouldn't a strategic air mission have to be something like the Dam Busters
or
something?


Ploesti? Don't know if it worked but Germany's synthetic fuel industry was
only ever capable of meeting 30% of requirements. It seems that Germany's
heavy bomber program was scrapped in part due to this even after the He 177
had become reliable and it made the Whermacht more vulnerable to the
eventualy attacks on the syn fuel plants themselves.

Both the Germans and Japanese were looking for a way of surrendering
conditionaly (ie not an armistice but a surrender with occupying forces).

Because the allies wouldn't except anything but unconditional surrender the
war had to drag on and many more people on both sides had to die.

Harry Morgentau (US secreatary of state) had particularly horrendous plans
in stall for Germany that involved starving to death about 15 million of the
population that would have made the Ukranian genocides 4.5 million pall in
comparison. It was an inkling of these plans, the knowledge of the carve
up of Germany and also the fact that the Germans wanted to surrender to the
US/UK rather than the Russians (whose atrocities involved tearing women
apart by the legs in Kongisberg using trucks) as well as Hitlers no
surrender mentality that extended the war.





Or wrecking that canal (I forget the name) with Tall Boys?

Seriously, something that caused a strategic effect for economical return,
like
the Oil Campaign of 1944/45.

Walt

BUFDRVR wrote:

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

I am sure the answers would have been different if these interviews were
conducted by the Soviets. In addition to trying to appease their
conquerors, these Japanese leaders probably also felt more comfortable
with the idea that their surrender was precipitated by a super weapon
and not but by their desire to salvage as much as possible out of a
hopeless situation.

As you know, during the Yalta conference Stalin promised to attack Japan
ninety days from the surrender of Germany. In return the USSR got the
Allied blessing to grab some territory back from Japan. It's hard to
imagine that the Japanese were not aware of the details of this deal.
Even before the Germany's surrender, the Japanese sent a diplomatic
delegation to the USSR to work out some sort of a surrender deal that
would allow Japan to keep the Emperor. By that time the US diplomats
have already got themselves into a bottle by pronouncing the policy of
Unconditional Surrender. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no
particular problem with the Emperor.

Germans surrendered on May 8, which meant that Stalin was obligated to
attack Japan no later than August 8. US plans called for a limited
invasion of the Ryuku Islands in November and the invasion of the
mainland Japan was to take place in January of 1946 at the earliest. So
there definitely was a big gap between the timing of the Soviet invasion
of Japan and the US invasion. If the negotiations between Japan and the
USSR produced results (and there was no reason why they shouldn't have,
since both countries were not even at war with each other), the Soviet
"attack" on Japan could have been a very brief and victorious affair for
Stalin.

The US delayed the Potsdam conference for two weeks, during which the
first nuke was tested. And Truman authorized the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki just two days before the Soviet attack against Japan.
Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur. And the public
reaction in the US to the use of the A-bomb was split close to the
middle. At the time, the significance of timing of these events was
quite obvious to anyone reading newspapers.

Japanese negotiated with both the US and the USSR and in both cases
their primary and only real condition was to retain the Emperor. They
would have preferred to surrender to the Americans for obvious reasons:
USSR had territorial claims against Japan and nobody in Japan was
looking forward to living under Kremlin's control. On the other hand,
negotiating with the USSR was less problematic because the two countries
were not at war and because the Soviets, unlike the US, did not demand
unconditional surrender.

In the end, the US changed its policy of Unconditional Surrender and
that's what prompted the Japanese surrender. And the use of the nukes
allowed the US to obscure this rather embarrassing policy change from
public scrutiny, as well as to give Stalin something to think about.
It's also important to remember that Truman counted on a much bigger
impact of the A-bomb on the Soviets, because, of course, he had no idea
that the Soviets have already taken from Los Alamos everything they
needed for their own bomb. During the Potsdam conference Truman even
attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
his failure to grasp the significance of the event., since Truman,
obviously, expected some sort of an emotional response from uncle Joe.
If Truman knew how quickly the USSR would build its own A-bomb, perhaps
he would have listened to his military commanders on this matter.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse

"Venik" wrote in message
...
Keith Willshaw wrote:

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.



Well no.

Are you saying that a large number of civilians was not killed in that
bombing?


Nope and a large number of civilians died in the
Soviet capture of Berlin - war is hell.


Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.
There were large numbers of troops based there. At
least 3 divisions IRC

The bombing did not target any specific military facilities.

Hiroshima was a major army and naval centre, like
Kronstadt , Portsmouth or Konigsberg

According
to the Japanese figures, military casualties from the attack accounted
for less than 3% of the overall casualties. Thus, for every Japanese
soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.

Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
strategic as it gets.

The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
were even considering a surrender.

The Japanese cabinet stated otherwise. Indeed more than one
of those in that body publically stated that only the use of the bomb
allowed them to surrender.


They figured maybe Stalin won't stop
with the Kurils. Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
to the Americans

Hint the Americans refused to accept that surrender and
held out for uncoditional surrender - as with Japan.

The USSR lacked the amphibious capability to invade the
Japanese home islands. Even the combined carrier forces
of Britain and America were barely adequate at Okinawa.
Lots of luck trying to invade Honshu without air cover.


and nobody nuked them.


Except that the Japanese werent prepared to surrender until after
the second bomb and even the the Emperor had to intervene.

Keith




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