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Pearl Harbor Defense



 
 
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  #51  
Old September 19th 04, 12:47 AM
Mike Dargan
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John Carrier wrote:
The Pearl Harbor debacle is often blamed on lack of resources caused by
inadequate support from the politicians. Wrong. Short and Kimmel had
both quantitative and qualitative superiority but were hopelessly inept.


While agreeing on the ineptitiude its clear that the IJN had a clear
superiority in terms of modern fighter aircraft.


Dig out Gordon Prange's book and do the numbers. P40s were adequate
against the Japanese in China, thousands of miles from their supply
depots. Why wouldn't they bave been adequate over Oahu?



I doubt USAAC training addressed the vastly superior Zero turning
performance.


No kidding.

Flying Tigers were successful because of tactics developed
(quickly) given the P40's few advantages versus the Zero.


P40s with a height advantage would have been a serious problem for Vals
and Kates. The few that did get off the ground, including some P36s,
more than held their own with the Zeros.


Also, why wasn't Kimmel running patrols? He didn't have resources to
cover 360 degrees, but he certainly could have covered the NW quadrant for
a couple of hundred miles. Washington had been bombing him with warnings
for weeks. Geez. Couldn't he have just read the newspapers?



Nobody dreamed Pearl would have been the target.


Nonsense. Ever hear of Billy Mitchell? What kind of military mind
would assume that his major base would not be a target?

Given that he had
insufficient resources to mount a real patrol effort, he elected to do
(virtually) nothing instead.


I'll agree that sitting on their butt's doing nothing was the best that
Kimmel and Short could do. Certainly better than their pathetic
conspiracy mongering.

Cheers

--mike

R / John\


  #52  
Old September 19th 04, 02:18 AM
Peter Stickney
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In article ,
"John Carrier" writes:
The Pearl Harbor debacle is often blamed on lack of resources caused by
inadequate support from the politicians. Wrong. Short and Kimmel had
both quantitative and qualitative superiority but were hopelessly inept.


While agreeing on the ineptitiude its clear that the IJN had a clear
superiority in terms of modern fighter aircraft.


Dig out Gordon Prange's book and do the numbers. P40s were adequate
against the Japanese in China, thousands of miles from their supply
depots. Why wouldn't they bave been adequate over Oahu?


I doubt USAAC training addressed the vastly superior Zero turning
performance. Flying Tigers were successful because of tactics developed
(quickly) given the P40's few advantages versus the Zero.


The FLying Tigers rarely, if ever, met up with Zeros. The Japanese
air effort in Western China was performed by the Army, not the Navy.
Be that as it may, I don't think it would have mattered. The Energy
Maneuverability "Blow through disengage, climb back, repeat as needed"
tactic goes back to the First World War. While dogfighting is fun
when nobody's shooting at you, it's like hand-to-hand combat. You
only engage in it if you have no other choice. (As in weaponless,
naked, and with at least one foot nailed to the floor.)
It does, however, require foreknowledge of an incoming raid, so that
the interceptors can take off, form up, and climb to their height
advantage. Once they've got that, they can blow through the escorts
and hit the bombers before the escorts can counter them.
That certainly wasn't something being newly re-learned - It was the
main thrust of Fighter COmmand during the Battle of Britain, after
all.
Chennault went to a great effort to build an early warning net, which,
even though it didn't have radar, allowed the Tigers to be ready when
the attacks came. That sort of warning/command and control network
didnt' exist in Hawaii, the, Philippines, Malaysia, or the Dutch East
Indies. The first warning that they got was when the Japanese came
over the horizon, and by then it was too late.

It still works, even in modern contexts. During Rolling Thunder,
F-105s shot down something over 20 MiG-17s, while losing 4. While teh
MiG-17 has astonishing maneuverability, it wasn't an actual advantage
in combat. Close to 20 105s were shot down by MiG-21s, using hich
speed pop up tactics to blow through the formation, fire their
missiles, and get gone before the Thuds could react.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
  #53  
Old September 19th 04, 05:05 AM
William Wright
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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"William Wright" wrote in message
news:VVP2d.210921$Fg5.133498@attbi_s53...



At Pearl Harbor? I don't think so.


I do, as did the congressional board of inquiry

The most they got over the target at one
time was about 45.


According to the joint congressiional committee findings
the Japanese had 81 fighter aircraft in the attack wave


43 in the first wave (+2 aborts), 35 in the second wave (+1 abort) and the
rest (27) for CAP over Kido Butai (108 total). Maximum number over the
target at one time was 43.


Just about any time P-40s or F4Fs took on Type 0 Kansen
on equal terms they did reasonably well with losses being pretty close

to
one-to-one. When the Americans really got wacked they were usually out
numbered 2 or 3 to one. The Hawaiian Air Force had 64 P-40s and 20 P-36s
in
commission that morning.


The had exactly 108 fighters of all type on strength but a full
59 of those were not available for flight leaving only 49
airworthy fighters.


According to the Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, aircraft in
commission were 9 P-40C, 55 P-40B, 20 P-36A, 7 P-26A and 3 P-26B (94 total)
and aircraft out of commission were 4 P-40C, 32 P-40B, 19 P-36A, 1 P-26A and
3 P-26B (59 total) for a total of 153.

Destroyed were 5 P-40C, 37 P-40B, 4 P-36A, 5 P-26A, 1 P-26B (52 total) and
in comission after the attack were 2 P-40C, 25 P-40B, 16 P-36A, 2 P-26A and
2 P-26B (47 total).

I think you might have misremembered.


Even the Far East Air Force only suffered about
one-to-one loss ratio in air combat on December 8th. The problem was

they
were only able to get about 12 of their 72 P-40s into combat against

about
100 Type 0s.


You just said the IJN only had 45


This last paragraph refers to the attack on the Far East Air Force
(Philippines). That attack force got some thing like 100 fighters over the
target at one time.


Keith





  #54  
Old September 19th 04, 05:30 AM
William Wright
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Default


"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"William Wright" wrote in message
news:2LP2d.62556$MQ5.42514@attbi_s52...

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"Tom Cervo" wrote in message
...
The Pearl Harbor debacle is often blamed on lack of resources caused
by
inadequate support from the politicians. Wrong. Short and Kimmel

had
both quantitative and qualitative superiority but were hopelessly
inept.


Actually, they were probably quite able. They were simply expecting

an
attack
in the Far East, and that PH might face sabotage or submarine attack

as
the
base for the response for that attack. That remark (from Frank Knox?)
about no,
they must mean the Phillippines, shows that it didn't stop with them.

Nope

Not a single Army AA unit was able to engage the first wave
of attackers and only 10% were able to engage the second wave.

Not only were the mobile guns not deployed the fixed
guns had no ready use ammunition as the quartermaster
thought it got too dirty in the field.


I believe they had just returned to depot after the war warning the week
earlier.


They never left the depot.


This is what I had remembered:

3. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND COAST DEFENSES.--General Burgin commanded the
Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all
antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd
Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and
the 98th Regiment.

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary
basis saying:



We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular
thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to interceptor
Command . . . For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we
had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA
would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know
that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would
simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the
roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this
simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to
December 7 . . . On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on
December 7. The fleet was in the harbor.


On the other hand:
The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burgin as
follows:



[178] They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception
that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries
along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the
ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and
had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into
the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft
guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out.
The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater,
which you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the
old volcano. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from
the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field
positions. (R. 2604- 2605)



Keith




  #55  
Old September 19th 04, 11:45 AM
John Carrier
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Posts: n/a
Default

SNIP

Also, why wasn't Kimmel running patrols? He didn't have resources to
cover 360 degrees, but he certainly could have covered the NW quadrant
for a couple of hundred miles. Washington had been bombing him with
warnings for weeks. Geez. Couldn't he have just read the newspapers?



Nobody dreamed Pearl would have been the target.


Nonsense. Ever hear of Billy Mitchell? What kind of military mind
would assume that his major base would not be a target?


We all venerate Billy Mitchell now, he was considered a loose cannon back
when. A more appropriate example was the successful (training) raid on
Pearl by USN carrier forces in the mid-30's. I correct my statement.
Nobody in a position to influence the decision process in December 1941
dreamed Pearl would be the target.

R / John


  #56  
Old September 19th 04, 12:20 PM
John Carrier
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Default

SNIP

The FLying Tigers rarely, if ever, met up with Zeros. The Japanese
air effort in Western China was performed by the Army, not the Navy.
Be that as it may, I don't think it would have mattered. The Energy
Maneuverability "Blow through disengage, climb back, repeat as needed"
tactic goes back to the First World War. While dogfighting is fun
when nobody's shooting at you, it's like hand-to-hand combat. You
only engage in it if you have no other choice. (As in weaponless,
naked, and with at least one foot nailed to the floor.)
It does, however, require foreknowledge of an incoming raid, so that
the interceptors can take off, form up, and climb to their height
advantage. Once they've got that, they can blow through the escorts
and hit the bombers before the escorts can counter them.
That certainly wasn't something being newly re-learned - It was the
main thrust of Fighter COmmand during the Battle of Britain, after
all.
Chennault went to a great effort to build an early warning net, which,
even though it didn't have radar, allowed the Tigers to be ready when
the attacks came. That sort of warning/command and control network
didnt' exist in Hawaii, the, Philippines, Malaysia, or the Dutch East
Indies. The first warning that they got was when the Japanese came
over the horizon, and by then it was too late.

It still works, even in modern contexts. During Rolling Thunder,
F-105s shot down something over 20 MiG-17s, while losing 4. While teh
MiG-17 has astonishing maneuverability, it wasn't an actual advantage
in combat. Close to 20 105s were shot down by MiG-21s, using hich
speed pop up tactics to blow through the formation, fire their
missiles, and get gone before the Thuds could react.


The Mig-17's maneuverability was only useful in a turning engagement. The
105's, once they delivered their ordnance were intent on DISengagement (at
very high speed). The guns-only (1500' range in rear quarter),
speed-limited (very limited G above 450KIAS) Mig-17 couldn't hunt in that
environment. You are correct, the missile carrying Mig-21 was far more
suited to the environment. But tactics had little to do with it.

It's always great to discuss the concept of blowing through an engagement,
extending out and then choosing whether or not to re-engage. But, if a
particularly bogey decides you're "It" that can quickly deteriorate into the
engagement you don't want. Been there, done that countless times on both
sides of the arena ... as adversary and as fighter.

R / John


  #57  
Old September 19th 04, 04:34 PM
Leanne
external usenet poster
 
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" [178] They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the
exception
that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed

batteries
along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the
ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person

and
had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it

into
the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft
guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out.
The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater,
which you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in

the
old volcano. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out

from
the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field
positions. (R. 2604- 2605)


This is interesting as I knew an old gentleman, who has since passed, that
was a Pearl Harbor survivor that talked about that morning. He was assigned
to one of the truck mounted .50 cal guns and went over the road from Ft
Shafter to Hickam Field to take up a position on the perimeter of the field.
I had thought he had said that they were firing their guns when moving into
position. His unit spent some time on the perimeter of Hickam Field and then
moved on to the South Pacific.


Leanne



  #58  
Old September 19th 04, 04:40 PM
Mike Dargan
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

John Carrier wrote:
SNIP


Also, why wasn't Kimmel running patrols? He didn't have resources to
cover 360 degrees, but he certainly could have covered the NW quadrant
for a couple of hundred miles. Washington had been bombing him with
warnings for weeks. Geez. Couldn't he have just read the newspapers?


Nobody dreamed Pearl would have been the target.


Nonsense. Ever hear of Billy Mitchell? What kind of military mind
would assume that his major base would not be a target?



We all venerate Billy Mitchell now, he was considered a loose cannon back
when.


He contradicted navy battleship dogma. Just like Yamamoto did.

Cheers

--mike

A more appropriate example was the successful (training) raid on
Pearl by USN carrier forces in the mid-30's. I correct my statement.
Nobody in a position to influence the decision process in December 1941
dreamed Pearl would be the target.

R / John


  #59  
Old September 19th 04, 05:00 PM
Peter Stickney
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In article ,
"John Carrier" writes:
SNIP

The FLying Tigers rarely, if ever, met up with Zeros. The Japanese
air effort in Western China was performed by the Army, not the Navy.
Be that as it may, I don't think it would have mattered. The Energy
Maneuverability "Blow through disengage, climb back, repeat as needed"
tactic goes back to the First World War. While dogfighting is fun
when nobody's shooting at you, it's like hand-to-hand combat. You
only engage in it if you have no other choice. (As in weaponless,
naked, and with at least one foot nailed to the floor.)
It does, however, require foreknowledge of an incoming raid, so that
the interceptors can take off, form up, and climb to their height
advantage. Once they've got that, they can blow through the escorts
and hit the bombers before the escorts can counter them.
That certainly wasn't something being newly re-learned - It was the
main thrust of Fighter COmmand during the Battle of Britain, after
all.
Chennault went to a great effort to build an early warning net, which,
even though it didn't have radar, allowed the Tigers to be ready when
the attacks came. That sort of warning/command and control network
didnt' exist in Hawaii, the, Philippines, Malaysia, or the Dutch East
Indies. The first warning that they got was when the Japanese came
over the horizon, and by then it was too late.

It still works, even in modern contexts. During Rolling Thunder,
F-105s shot down something over 20 MiG-17s, while losing 4. While teh
MiG-17 has astonishing maneuverability, it wasn't an actual advantage
in combat. Close to 20 105s were shot down by MiG-21s, using hich
speed pop up tactics to blow through the formation, fire their
missiles, and get gone before the Thuds could react.


The Mig-17's maneuverability was only useful in a turning engagement. The
105's, once they delivered their ordnance were intent on DISengagement (at
very high speed). The guns-only (1500' range in rear quarter),
speed-limited (very limited G above 450KIAS) Mig-17 couldn't hunt in that
environment. You are correct, the missile carrying Mig-21 was far more
suited to the environment. But tactics had little to do with it.


Just so. Maneuverabulity, in the turning adn burning sense, isn't an
offensive tool, unless you can sucker somebody in. And, yes, nobody
expected an F-105 to turn with a MiG-17 at low EAS, so I don't think
anybody tried. What I found interesting was that despite the
relatively high number of engagements, (Indicated by the number and
spread-out nature of the F-105's kills, and, as you say, the F-105's
interest in getting gone after dropping their bombs, so most shots on
MiG-17s occurred in passing, as it were) The Frescoe had a fairly poor
record.

I'd say that tactics, although not at the ACM level had a lot to do
with the relative success of the MiG-21. They knew that at that
stage, their pilots were, in general, rather weak, in terms of
experience and training, and used their GCI system and preplanning
cleverness to load the dice in their favor. Using their GCI system to
place them low and behind (out off the view of the radar cover from
either Red Crown or the RC-121s - they'd only get 3 or 4 radar paints
as the MiG climbed out of the clutter - not enough to build a track or
issue a coherent warning) with a pop up into a slashing attack
and blow through was a tactic that minimized the difference in pilot
and airplane capabilities. Somebody on the PAVN staff had their
thinking cap on.


It's always great to discuss the concept of blowing through an engagement,
extending out and then choosing whether or not to re-engage. But, if a
particularly bogey decides you're "It" that can quickly deteriorate into the
engagement you don't want. Been there, done that countless times on both
sides of the arena ... as adversary and as fighter.


If you can disengage and reattack, it's a better move. If you can't -
it's like a street fight - you run what you brung.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
  #60  
Old September 19th 04, 06:44 PM
Keith Willshaw
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Leanne" wrote in message
...


This is interesting as I knew an old gentleman, who has since passed, that
was a Pearl Harbor survivor that talked about that morning. He was

assigned
to one of the truck mounted .50 cal guns and went over the road from Ft
Shafter to Hickam Field to take up a position on the perimeter of the

field.
I had thought he had said that they were firing their guns when moving

into
position. His unit spent some time on the perimeter of Hickam Field and

then
moved on to the South Pacific.


Leanne


There was dobtless some small arms fire but the heavy and
light guns of the AA command didng get into action.

Keith


 




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