Why not use the F-22 to replace the F/A-18 and F-14?

(sid) wrote in message . com...
"Gord Beaman" ) wrote in message . ..
(WaltBJ) wrote:

Are there two of these 'fly into the trees' accidents? The one I am
There was another Airbus CFIT accident a little bit later than the one
discussed here. IIRR the aircraft mushed into the upslope of a
mountain at night in bad weather. And lack of familiarity with the
automation was a factor.

This was the accident...
http://aviation-safety.net/database/1992/920120-0.htm

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 18:03:00 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

snip old stuff

There were also known and documented defects with various A320 systems at that time -
including throttle response and height indication. Capt Assiline asserts that the a/c
showed 100 ft altitude when it was actually flying much lower.

Anyone who would rely on a pressure altimeter to operate a low, slow
aircraft 100 feet from the ground when a radar altimiter was fucntioning
(and apparently giving accurate aural information) and available is not
making a prudent decision. The pressure altimiter (servo, ADC or
otherwise) is only required to be accurate to app +/- 30 feet at sea level
to begin with (and the DFDR was only required to show pressure altitude
resolution to +/- 100 ft, but may have been more on this unit). A radar
altimiter is accurate (depending on a given antenna/plane configuration)
to within 5 feet (and quite likely less) between wheel height and terrain.

Read the CVR transcript again and tell me how the Captain could possibly
be surprised later when told/shown he was below 100 feet during the
fly-over.

With delight. Sorry about the lost formatting when text posting

(French text is translated into English)

Time: Source: Contents:

12.44:27 TOWER QNH Habsheim 1012 Fox Echo 9.8.4
Captain OK

12.44:31 Co-pilot Roger

12.44:32 Captain 9.8.4 put in 9.8.4

12.44:34 Co-pilot 9.8.4 QFE selected!

12.44:37 Good gear is down; flaps 2!

12.44:42 Captain Flaps 3

12.44:45 Co-pilot Flaps 3!
Captain That's the airfield, you confirm?

12.44:48 Co-pilot Affirmative

12.44:51 Co-pilot You see it LL 01, when we get there you're at 1 nautical mile, that's right.

12.44:55 [GONG!] - nosewheel valve

12.45:04.7 GPWS [Too Low Terrain!]
Co-pilot OK!

12.45:19.1 Radio altimeter [Forty]

12.45:04.7 [GONG!] - GPWS cut off

12.45:05.7 Radio altimeter [Two hundred]

12.45.11 Co-pilot P.....G.....! (name of flight safety officer)

12.45:11.4 Radio altimeter [Two hundred]

12.45.12 Co-pilot G.. is going to ...eh!

12.45:14 Co-pilot OK, you're at 100ft there, watch, watch

12.45:13 Radio altimeter [One hundred]

12.45:19.1 Radio altimeter [Forty]

12.45:23.6 Radio altimeter [Fifty]

12.45:26 Captain OK ,I'm OK there, disconnect autothrottle

12.45:27.5 Radio altimeter [Forty]

12.45:32 Co-pilot Watch out for those pylons ahaead, eh. See them?

12.45:33 Co-pilot Yeah, yeah, don't worry.

12.45:34.5 [Clack! Clack! Clack!] - power lever dentents

12.45:35.3 Radio altimeter [Thirty]

12.45:36.2 Radio altimeter [Thirty]

12.45:37 Co-pilot TOGA/SRS

12.45:38.3 Radio altimeter [Thirty]

12.45:39 Captain Go around track

12.45:39.9 Captain Sh...!

12.45:41.5 END OF TAPE



NOTE

12.45:11.4 Radio altimeter [Two hundred]
12.45:13 Radio altimeter [One hundred]

that's a sudden sink rate of 4000 fpm as reported by the 'radio altimeter' whilst at around
100ft !

I assume that the second time is actually incorrect since it's out of sequence but I found the
same on another copy of the transcript.

Let's assume say it should be 12.45:15 ( more in lline with other timings ) - still indicates a
sudden sink @ around 1800 fpm !

So the radio altimeter was accurate ? I think not. And that was known to be one of the weak
spots in the A320's systems at that time IIRC.

I'm guessing that Capt Asseline realised that the radar altimeter was malfunctioning and
reverted to baro readings.


Regds, Graham

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , "Doug \"Woody\" and
Erin Beal" writes
On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".

CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

And the equation for "time on station" includes time to and from home
base, and time to turn the aircraft around. For a given force size, the
nearer your bases for refuelling and rearming, the more aircraft in the
cabrank and the fewer in transit to and from. Tankers are useful
extenders, but only if fuel is the limiting factor: we're not yet able
to do air-to-air rearming.

Again, HMS Sheathbill in 1982 is instructive for the extension in cover
it allowed.

To be precise, prior to HMS Sheathbill (the Harrier FARP) going operational, on an
avg. 1 hour and 15 minute Sea Harrier sortie, 65 minutes was spent in transit to
and from the carriers, 10 minutes on CAP. After HMS Sheathbill was established,
33 minutes was spent in transit to CAP, 37 minutes on CAP, five minutes to HMS
Sheathbill for refueling/rearming. Reverse the above mission, or turn Sea
Harriers at Sheathbill all day, giving 65 minutes on CAP, 10 minutes in transit
to/from the FARP. And then there were the Harrier GR.3s sitting ground alert for
CAS (25-30nm away from their targets), instead of 200-250 nm away on the carriers.



I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

You could say the same about helicopters: IIRC helo crashes were the
biggest single killer of British troops in Telic / Iraqi Freedom.

US troops too, I suspect. Certainly the case in Afghanistan, along with those
disasters waiting to happen, the C/KC-130s. Subsequent to the major fighting in
Iraq helo accidents/shootdowns have made up a fair percentage as well, although
probably less than those from IEDs and ground vehicle accidents. Wait, we'd
better get rid of those latter too, especially those damned HMMWV deathtraps. And
then there were those tank and LAV crews that drove into rivers or canals and
drowned; away with them all, I say. They're obviously far too dangerous to be
used by military personnel.

Guy

In article ,
on Sun, 22 Feb 2004 23:18:39 GMT,
R. David Steele VE attempted to say .....


It is going to be interesting starting somewhere between 2008 and
2012.

That's when the PRC has the next Chinese Civil war and breaks apart..

--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

In article ,
on Mon, 23 Feb 2004 11:47:53 GMT,
R. David Steele VE attempted to say .....


| Not everyone keeps up with various policies and DoD planning.
| the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen Myers, was picked
| to plan for this potential war.
|
|Actually, you're the one who seems out of touch. The Joint Staff plans for
|all sorts of wars all the time. But Presidents don't pick Chairmen of the
|JCS to plan any particular wars. Indeed, the Chairman's job is mostly to
|supervise current ops; the Staff does long-term planning regardless of who
|is in charge.

There were several articles in the Washington Post here, when the
GWOT started (just after Sept 11th), on how Gen. Myers was
selected to plan for a possible war with China. And how he was
out of his element with the GWOT. It is common knowledge, at
here in DC, that we do have a war in the making with China. It
would be nice to avoid that war. But Gen Myers does have that
mission.


That is hardly a ringing endorsement for your sources.
And if such a thing is "common knowledge" then some folks need to be both
fired AND thrown in jail.




| China has let it be known, there
| are a number of papers coming out of their post graduate officers
| school, that they plan to challenge us for control of the far
| east. That means control over India, most of SE Asia (down to
| Australia), Japan, the Philippines and Siberia.
|
|China's policy appears to be primarily focussed on ensuring that no one else
|interfrres with their own territory.

And they define that "territory" as everything from India to
Australia to Siberia and Japan. The whole of the far East. This
has been China's "domain" for thousands of years. The question
is do you want to be shut out of that area?

They haven't ruled it in a thousand years. And couldn't if they tried.
In fact they seem to be having a hard time ruling the territories they
currently occupy.



| Also China has sent it agents off its soil as it never has in
| 5000 years. They now run the Panama Canal. Have bases all
| throughout the Caribbean. Now own a port (former naval base) in
| San Diego. And they have extensive operations all throughout
| North Africa.
|
|Oh, good grief. China has commercial intereasts worldwide, yes. But
|there's no evidence that running port operations in Panama (NOT running the
|Canal proper, BTW) translates into any sort of aggressive intent. INdeed,
|the company that runs those ops is a Hong Kong-based multinational, not
|controlled by the Chinese government as the fearmongers would have you
|believe.

Since much of "business" in China is owned by the People's
Republican Army (PRA), business is seen as an arm of the
military.

Where, did you say you worked ? A contractor doing Intel ?
It's the "People's Revolutionary Army"



Whether we like it or not, things change. China has been looking
for a chance to be player. With the USSR gone, and Russia weak,
they have their chance. Most of us have no problem if they play
fair and equal. But if they treat business much the way the
mafia does then we will have to learn to be equally aggressive.

The party elite like their MB limo's too much to cause problems.


Not everyone in the world sees appeasement as being fair minded.
Many see those who use appeasement as being weak thus prey.




--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

In article ,
on Tue, 24 Feb 2004 16:04:20 GMT,
Chad Irby attempted to say .....

In article ,
"Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal" wrote:

On 2/22/04 5:18 PM, in article ,
"R. David Steele" wrote:

China has let it be known, there
are a number of papers coming out of their post graduate officers
school, that they plan to challenge us for control of the far
east. That means control over India, most of SE Asia (down to
Australia), Japan, the Philippines and Siberia.

Papers out of PG schools and war colleges are strictly academic
exercises--on both sides. Contingency plans are, well... contingencies.

Yeah, but suddenly deciding to build up to four aircraft carriers on a
rush program is a bit, well, *interesting*...


They won't have operational CV's and airwings for 20 years. And the PRC
won't last that long so it wont matter.


Especially after they decided to buy some Su-30s. Kinda makes you
wonder if they really bought the naval variant, plan on doing the mods
themselves, or have a naval version of their own somewhere.





--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

In article t,
Tank Fixer wrote:

In article ,
on Tue, 24 Feb 2004 16:04:20 GMT,
Chad Irby attempted to say .....

In article ,
"Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal" wrote:

On 2/22/04 5:18 PM, in article ,
"R. David Steele" wrote:

China has let it be known, there
are a number of papers coming out of their post graduate officers
school, that they plan to challenge us for control of the far
east. That means control over India, most of SE Asia (down to
Australia), Japan, the Philippines and Siberia.

Papers out of PG schools and war colleges are strictly academic
exercises--on both sides. Contingency plans are, well... contingencies.

Yeah, but suddenly deciding to build up to four aircraft carriers on a
rush program is a bit, well, *interesting*...

They won't have operational CV's and airwings for 20 years.

Only if they're following the US model. You should know that they've
been having their pilots practice carrier landings on mockups on ground,
for example. If they're going up against anyone but the US, all they
have to do is be able to do fair-weather ops.

With a couple of wings of moderately-new knockoffs of some of the
Russian planes, they'd go from no real naval air to the second or third
biggest carrier-borne air capability in just a few years.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Frijoles wrote:

snip

On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s or
B-2s. (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover the
same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?) And
if tanking isn't an "issue," what's up with all the bragging about what a
great tanking capability the Navy's brand new STRIKE aircraft provides...?

Especially since they had to send four more F-18Es to the theater during the
war, to boost the navy's own tanker assets (and of course, taking away airbridge
tanker assets from other jobs, to get them there).

45% of Marine CAS sorties during OIF were flown by Harriers -- that's hardly
a trivial number, particularly if you're on the ground getting shot at, or
facing the prospect of having to deal with massed armor and indirect fires.
IIRC, about 1500 strike sorties were flown off L-class ships, principally
Bataan and BHR which each operated 20-25 jets. A couple hundred were flown
from a "recovered" airfield within 10 minutes of Baghdad.

snip

Would you happen to know which airfield? I've found one source that says it was
"60nm south" of Baghdad, but no other details. Looking at a map,

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middl...print_2003.jpg

Shayka Mazhar and Al Iskandariyah New appear to be too close to the city, Salman
Pak East is too close and too far east (although the Marines did go by there
IIRR). An Najaf New is due south of Baghdad and about the right distance, but
AFAIK the marines weren't near there in any strength, having crossed the
Euphrates at Nasiriya before heading up between the rivers towards Baghdad. The
Shaykh Hantush Highway Strip seems to be the closest match for distance and
direction, but the marines also went through al Kut, which puts An Numaniyah (I
know they took that) or Al Jarrah in the picture (although they're more SE than
S), and possibly the fields south and/or east of Al Kut, altough they're a bit
far and definitely southeast.

Guy

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 11:06 PM, in article
, "Guy Alcala"
wrote:

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient bed-down
SNIPPAGE... Lots of tanker stats
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around
al-Kut.

There's a shortage of USAF tankers in EVERY conflict--especially since the
demise of the A-6 and proliferation of the Hornet. Citing AV-8B ops in OIF
is only slightly relevant. Of course, if you have STOVL capability, use it
(OIF)--providing the threat will permit it. You've already sunk the blood
sweat and tears into it. My point is, the excessive risk in peace time and
the reduction in payload/range isn't worth the small war time advantage, and
the outcome of OIF would not have changed significantly had the Harriers not
been around to help out.

Yes, it's romantic to operate from austere bases in country... Leap-frogging
your way to Bagdad. No, it's not worth the risk/hassle.

Tell it to the attack helo guys, who leap-frogged their way to Baghdad. Is there
some reason why FARPS for helos to avoid the round trip to Kuwait make sense, but
doesn't for STOVL fixed-wing a/c? The benefits are the same, a mix of more time on
station/shorter cycle time/fewer hours on the airframe/less fuel wasted in transit.

SNIP
And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130 mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being able
to operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be a
good thing?

Given the timeline, I don¹t think that particular example is why there's a
STOVL F-35 being built.

That and the fact that (AFAIK) the A-10s have been the only (USAF) attack a/c based
in Afghanistan since OEF. Along with the Harriers.

Although I'm fairly certain this is why the USAF is
jumping on the STOVL bandwagon. Frankly, I think the A-10 (or some other
low/slow/straight-wing design) is a better platform for what we're talking
about.

If you've got at least 3-4,000 feet of usable runway, it might be. Anything less
and it's just as useless as all the other conventional fixed-wing strikers.



SNIP
What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's get
rid of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping
like flies.

Guy

Guy, that's just ridiculous. Helos actually have a bona fide mission--and
can auto-rotate. Why would you want to get rid of them?

Because they're more dangerous than pure fixed-wing a/c, of course. The same
justification you use for saying that STOVL isn't worthwhile. As to auto-rotation
ability, that doesn't seem to have kept the helo crew/pax casualty count down very
much in the current war. Damaging/destroying the tail rotor, its controls or the
drive shaft makes auto-rotations rather difficult.

Guy

"Scott M. Kozel" wrote:

Not surprising for Puke Bear.

Who the h**l rattled *your* cage Kozel ?

I once thought you were an intelligent person.

Your resort to schoolgirl hysterical abuse shows otherwise. Caught a
case of Berteimania ?


Graham