US Army Cancels Comanche Helo

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 15:36:51 -0500, Howard Berkowitz
wrote:

In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?


Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

John Hairell )

"M" *@*.* wrote in message ...
Kevin Brooks
I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.

Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
(iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
missions.

Actually, from what little I understand, that scenario is one where LO tech
would be of the least usefulness. Early warning radars work on the longer
end of the wavelength, and LO is least effective against EW systems; ISTR
reading that stealthy platforms can rather often pop up on such systems. But
the LO is better oriented towards the shorter wavelength acquisition and
tracking systems. If I have that all wrong, sombody else can feel free to
correct that view.


So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

I don't think LO in the radar spectrum is nearly as important for a helo
that is able to use terrain masking as would be reducing the IR and sound
signatures. As to going deep, the aviators were quite enamored with that
philosophy ever since the Apache arrived on the scene; when we played mixed
force simulations, where our division had both Cobras and Apaches in hand,
we invariably dedicated the Apaches to going deep (where they often took
heavier losses) while we retained the Cobras for over-the-shoulder shooting
and as our last-ditch AT reserve. The experience during OIF with the 11th
AVN BDE deep attack does point out the dangers inherent in trying to use
rotary assets in that role, but beware drawing to great a conclusion, as
that mission may have had some planning problems, and it was executed
knowingly at greater risk without SEAD support.


without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
arty assets is extremely risky."

More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
of enemy short-range airdefences?

In my expereince at the DIV level, and watching the corps planning cycle
up-close, yes it usually is included in the deep strike plan.

If so, what about operating
out of arty range?

Unlikely--MLRS is now reaching out to a bit over 70 klicks, and when firing
ATACMS it can go as deep as some 300 klicks. During exercises V Corps
usually kept a significant part of the ATACMS supply under its thumb for use
in both SEAD and against OPFOR deep attack (i.e., rocket) systems.

Or without having arty on theatre in the
first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)?

Which is why we are now fielding HIMARS, the HEMTT truck based "light MLRS",
with a six pack in the rack versus the two six packs available in the
tracked version. You can also do the JAAT routine, where the attack helos
work with fixed wing CAS.

And, finally,
if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
effective against the targets of the attack helos?

Nope. You are using the arty deep in the SEAD role against area targets. The
attack helos are going there because they can pick out and kill the specific
systems you are going after. If they are MBT's, then the current crop of
arty systems (other than Copperhead, which needs a designator and rather
good battlefield conditions) can't reliably kill them.

Couldn't
smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
of the AH's, and more safely?

How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None, other
than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and gotten
to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk about
fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.


Moreover, while MLRS can saturate fairly large areas with
submunitions, and will probably ruin the day of any
manpad operator in the target area, one can't possibly
use arty to saturate all the potential locations of
air-defences. At least not with low-level ingress/eggress.
A guy with a manpad can hide easily - in the worst
case he'll be lurking just next to your base, like has
been the case in some Russian helo losses in Chechenya.

So you do a good mission analysis using the currently available planning
software. Plot the ingress and egress in and check it against line-of-sight
and AD weapons ranges; a good GIS can then shde in the areas where your path
intersects the LOS from what terrain. You then either adjust your route, or
plan for SEAD fires on that terrain.


And what if the enemy has useful counter battery capability
that limits arty SEAD support? Use AH's to take it out, but...

I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our counterbattery, and
the ever important firefinder radars, capabilities.

Brooks

g

In article , John Hairell
wrote:

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 15:36:51 -0500, Howard Berkowitz
wrote:

In article , "Paul F
Austin" wrote:

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message



Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?


Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

I want to say 1947, but it would probably have to been a little after
that (or maybe late in the year) since the Air Force was represented as
a full service.

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

I want to say 1947, but it would probably have to been a little
after
that (or maybe late in the year) since the Air Force was represented
as
a full service.

If you google on "Key West Agreement", you will be overwhelmed with
information. It wuz 1948. ;-)

In article .net,
"Felger Carbon" wrote:

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

I want to say 1947, but it would probably have to been a little
after
that (or maybe late in the year) since the Air Force was represented
as
a full service.

If you google on "Key West Agreement", you will be overwhelmed with
information. It wuz 1948. ;-)



Hey, I was busy being a fetus most of that year! Talk about information
overload when you get born!

Thanks.

Kevin Brooks
How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None, other
than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and gotten
to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk about
fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

But there are non-US systems, like the Swedish Strix, which
is a 120mm mortar fired guided AT round. At least on paper,
it seems very formidable with autonomous guidance, target
search and prioritization, and a decent-sized top-attack
warhead. The Brittish 80mm Merlin was rather similar, although
mm-wave radar rather than IR, but I recall that it was cancelled.

I find it surprizing that the US hasn't adopted any smart
artillery rounds, except the Copperhead, which really isn't
all that smart (non-autonomous). Especially considering the
hype that was there already in the 80's about cargo rockets
with autonomous AT-munitions that would render massed MBT usage
obsolete (again ... Eg plans of Lance carrying dozens of
such munitions.

Perhaps the fact that none was fielded has something to do
with the end of the cold war. Speculatively, if it was seen
that the AH's (etc) that they already had were sufficient to
deal with any armour threat out there? Otoh, it's interesting
that Sweden would come up with such a round. Do they perhaps
see it the other way around, as a substitute for the attack
helos they don't have?

I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our
counterbattery, and the ever important firefinder radars,
capabilities.

Unlikely yes, but I could think of rapidly deployed
light 'speed-bump' infantry getting into trouble lacking
sufficient arty. Mogadishu perhaps illustrates in a
small scale that even US troops can find themselves on the
ground without sufficient support.

The matter of using MLRS for SEAD for AH's brings up
the question of whether it's sufficient for saturating
the defences. While anti-personnel bomblets, like
those used in MLRS, cluster bombs and such, typically
are very effective, there are situations where this
isn't the case. Soft terrain, like snow covered ground,
or boggy ground, greatly reduces the effect of any impact
fuzed arty, and small muntions in particular.

Firstly, the submunitions may fail to detonate, as the
decelearition when hitting the soft terrain may be
insufficient to trigger them. Secondly, the effect of
those that do detonate, is greatly reduced by the snow
or bog absorbing the blast and sharpnel. And finally,
there'll be no bouncing, which otherwise could give
bomblets a kind of low-level airburst capability.

Airburst by proximity fuzing is the obvious solution, but
I think it'd be prohibitavely expensive with bomblets. In
forested terrain, 'trigger-hair' impact fuzing may give
canopy-level airbursts, but I guess that wouldn't be practical
with bomblets either.

Are there bomblets (anti-personnel submunitions) that
actually work well in soft terrain? And if so, how
do they accomplish it?

Kevin Brooks wrote:
"M" *@*.* wrote in message
...
Kevin Brooks
I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.

Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
(iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
missions.

Actually, from what little I understand, that scenario is one where
LO tech would be of the least usefulness. Early warning radars work
on the longer end of the wavelength, and LO is least effective
against EW systems; ISTR reading that stealthy platforms can rather
often pop up on such systems. But the LO is better oriented towards
the shorter wavelength acquisition and tracking systems. If I have
that all wrong, sombody else can feel free to correct that view.


So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

I don't think LO in the radar spectrum is nearly as important for a
helo that is able to use terrain masking as would be reducing the IR
and sound signatures. As to going deep, the aviators were quite
enamored with that philosophy ever since the Apache arrived on the
scene; when we played mixed force simulations, where our division had
both Cobras and Apaches in hand, we invariably dedicated the Apaches
to going deep (where they often took heavier losses) while we
retained the Cobras for over-the-shoulder shooting and as our
last-ditch AT reserve. The experience during OIF with the 11th AVN
BDE deep attack does point out the dangers inherent in trying to use
rotary assets in that role, but beware drawing to great a conclusion,
as that mission may have had some planning problems, and it was
executed knowingly at greater risk without SEAD support.


without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
arty assets is extremely risky."

More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
of enemy short-range airdefences?

In my expereince at the DIV level, and watching the corps planning
cycle up-close, yes it usually is included in the deep strike plan.

If so, what about operating
out of arty range?

Unlikely--MLRS is now reaching out to a bit over 70 klicks, and when
firing ATACMS it can go as deep as some 300 klicks. During exercises
V Corps usually kept a significant part of the ATACMS supply under
its thumb for use in both SEAD and against OPFOR deep attack (i.e.,
rocket) systems.

Or without having arty on theatre in the
first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)?

Which is why we are now fielding HIMARS, the HEMTT truck based "light
MLRS", with a six pack in the rack versus the two six packs available
in the tracked version. You can also do the JAAT routine, where the
attack helos work with fixed wing CAS.

And, finally,
if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
effective against the targets of the attack helos?

Nope. You are using the arty deep in the SEAD role against area
targets. The attack helos are going there because they can pick out
and kill the specific systems you are going after. If they are MBT's,
then the current crop of arty systems (other than Copperhead, which
needs a designator and rather good battlefield conditions) can't
reliably kill them.

Couldn't
smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
of the AH's, and more safely?

How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems?
None, other than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested
some, and gotten to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually
fielded them.

Not true. The Army fielded and used the SADARM artillery-fired AT
submunitions in Iraq last year. The 3ID(M) After Action report says they
fired over 120 rounds with 48 targets killed.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...-aar-jul03.pdf

(You'll have to search in the report)

That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk
about fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

I think GMLRS is headed toward a unitary round more than smart subs. ATACSM
BAT may still show up, though.

The Army has also just issued a contract (now under protest) for manufacture
of a 120mm Precision-Guided Mortar Projectile, and is soliciting for an
off-the-shelf round to complement the depleted SADARM stocks.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

"M" *@*.* wrote in message ...
Kevin Brooks
How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None,
other
than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and
gotten
to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk
about
fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

But there are non-US systems, like the Swedish Strix, which
is a 120mm mortar fired guided AT round. At least on paper,
it seems very formidable with autonomous guidance, target
search and prioritization, and a decent-sized top-attack
warhead. The Brittish 80mm Merlin was rather similar, although
mm-wave radar rather than IR, but I recall that it was cancelled.

If Strix were such a great system it would have been picked up by more
nations than just Sweden and Switzerland (not sure that having two of the
biggest neutrals buy it is much of an endorsement!). Despite claims
otherwise, it will be subject to decoying with properly set up IR emitters.
And it only has a 7 klick range, which is not going to do much in the
interdiction role. If you try to fire it while your forces are in the close
fight, there is a significant fratricide risk.


I find it surprizing that the US hasn't adopted any smart
artillery rounds, except the Copperhead, which really isn't
all that smart (non-autonomous). Especially considering the
hype that was there already in the 80's about cargo rockets
with autonomous AT-munitions that would render massed MBT usage
obsolete (again ... Eg plans of Lance carrying dozens of
such munitions.

That was "Assault Breaker", father of ATACMS. The plans to develop smart
submunitions dispensers for the MLRS family, along with FASCAM versions,
died when the threat of a major conflict with the USSR winked out.


Perhaps the fact that none was fielded has something to do
with the end of the cold war.

Yep. But have no fear--the Excalibur GPS guided 155mm projectile is about
ready to enter service, IIRC. We also have GMLRS, with guided accuracy out
to around 74 km, according to released test results. And remember that
ATACMS is guided, out to 300 km.

Speculatively, if it was seen
that the AH's (etc) that they already had were sufficient to
deal with any armour threat out there? Otoh, it's interesting
that Sweden would come up with such a round. Do they perhaps
see it the other way around, as a substitute for the attack
helos they don't have?

Given its short range, I doubt it.


I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our
counterbattery, and the ever important firefinder radars,
capabilities.

Unlikely yes, but I could think of rapidly deployed
light 'speed-bump' infantry getting into trouble lacking
sufficient arty. Mogadishu perhaps illustrates in a
small scale that even US troops can find themselves on the
ground without sufficient support.

One of the lessons (re)learned from Anaconda was *always* have your arty
assets available. We are fielding the M777 light 155mm gun now, and HIMARS
is also pending fielding. We already have the M119 light 105mm guns. There
is no need for *any* significant US troop deployment to go in without arty
accompanying it.

Brooks

"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message
link.net...
Kevin Brooks wrote:
snip


How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems?
None, other than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested
some, and gotten to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually
fielded them.

Not true. The Army fielded and used the SADARM artillery-fired AT
submunitions in Iraq last year. The 3ID(M) After Action report says they
fired over 120 rounds with 48 targets killed.

Thanks; I had thought that program was axed a couple of years back.



http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...-aar-jul03.pdf

(You'll have to search in the report)

That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk
about fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

I think GMLRS is headed toward a unitary round more than smart subs.
ATACSM
BAT may still show up, though.

I believe you are correct, but I am not sure that the use of a a smart
submunition warhead is dead yet. The interest in being able to engage
transient targets and reduce the sensor-to-shooter cycle time would seem to
point to a place for such a system.


The Army has also just issued a contract (now under protest) for
manufacture
of a 120mm Precision-Guided Mortar Projectile, and is soliciting for an
off-the-shelf round to complement the depleted SADARM stocks.

The 120mm projectile is not going to be of much use in the deep attack--not
enough leg on it. In the close battle, the danger close range would have to
be a concern; lobbing autonomous IR or MMWR guided munitions over the FLOT
whre your own Brads and Abrams are operating could be problematic. Is the
new system going to use autonomous targeting, or laser designation?

Brooks


--
Tom Schoene