russia vs. japan in 1941 [WAS: 50% of NAZI oil..]

"Snuffy Smith" wrote in message et...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
om...
"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" wrote in message
...
Stuart Wilkes wrote:

Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
campaign in the West.

What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
you are comparing. i.e:

Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.

Maybe he has better things to do than spend his whole life worrying about
ancient history like you?

He had a question, and he knew who to ask for an accurate answer: Me.

He knows better than to ask you, because he knows that all he would
get from you is some ill-tempered spleen-venting mixed up with
spiteful lies.

Stuart Wilkes

Seraphim wrote:

There are pros and cons on either side, the big difference
was doctrine. If the Germans had the French tanks and
vice versa the Germans would still have won.

Probably true, but it would have been much harder for the Germans. French
tanks were *slow*. Of the 3,473 French tanks, ~1,400 were only capable of
12mph on roads, and another 1,000 or so could only do 18mph. Compare that
to the 3,200+ German tanks that were all capable of 25+mph. The size of
your gun, and the thickness of your armor doesn't matter if you never get
to engage another tank.

Yes. Also, the fighting compartment of the German
tanks was much better, so they could fight on the
move. They had radios for fast coordination, which the
French tanks mostly lacked. Most importantly, there
was logistic support, air support from the Stukas, and
rapid coordination for them to move very rapidly - all
of which the French lacked, and which could not have
been at all quickly corrected.

Dennis

(The Black Monk) wrote in message . com...

snip

Had the Germans been statesmen they would not have had
to contend with resistence in eastern Europe,

See below.

indeed they would probably have had several 100,000 more allied troops

German troops in France in 1941 were equipped largely with captured
Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav, and French equipment. The troops of
Germany's sattelites were equipped with their own (generally poor)
equipment, and the Germans gave them very little to make up the
equipment deficiencies in the Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, and
Finnish armies.

So the Germans would have faced severe problems equipping any great
number of additional troops, at least before Speer's rationalization
of the German war economy starts to boost output.

snip

This alternative strategy is not as far-fetched as it seems.

Unfortunately, this strategy fails to take account of the logistical
and material constraints under which Nazi Germany waged Barbarossa.

German transportation assets, such as the captured Soviet rail
network, the German truck fleet, German draft animals, and fuel supply
proved insufficient for the transportation of ammunition and vehicle
and aircraft fuel only. And German draft horses died by the hundred
thousand during Barbarossa, because they couldn't survive the
conditions the East. For the Axis forces in the East therefore, their
food, warm clothing, shelter, survivable draft animals, and fuel for
heat had to come at the expense of the population in the areas they
occupied, who had little enough to begin with. The German Army
couldn't afford to trade for these things, since trade items from
Germany would tie up train capacity that was already insufficient for
the transportation of vehicle fuel and ammunition. So German Army
requirements for food, warm clothing, shelter, survivable draft
animals, and fuel for heat had to come by uncompensated requisition
from people who have little to begin with.

In no event will this be popular, no matter what the German policy
behind it is.

In every event this will provoke resistance, no matter what the German
policy behind it is.

It is likely that a German policy that is not explicitly genocidal
will provoke less resistance than the historical one, but the
occupation is still sufficiently harsh that resistance is manifested.

The impact of this on the course and outcome of the war in the East is
open to question.

Elements in the Wehrmacht were outraged at the Nazi mistreatment
of Eastern Europeans,

Indeed some were. But a look at the German logistics system shows
that there was no real alternative for them, apart from not waging war
in the East at all.

Stuart Wilkes

Christophe Chazot wrote:

"Keith Willshaw" a écrit dans le message
news: ...

"Christophe Chazot" wrote in message
...

John

My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.

What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
achieved
in 1917-18...


Actually I suspect it did. The horror of WW1 was so strong in the
generation
of 1940 that they were determined to avoid it happening again.

This is I think what lay behind the reluctance to take the offensive
against Germany in 1939 when their troops were busy in Poland.


Keith

I was talking about what happened to our army in a strictly military field.
The morale questions were important too, and the massacre of WW1 certainly
had a reverse effect on the will to fight again 20 years later, as you
quote. By the way, the reluctance to take offensive in 1939 was also due to
the lack of drive of general Gamelin, a peacetime chief of staff who had
been promoted for peacetime reasons but who seriously lacked the required
skills for such a job at such a time. It was also due to some technical and
logistical shortfalls, that resulted from the budget cuts all along the
1930s and that were not corrected until it was too late, but that's a bit
off-topic on naval newsgroup.
Regards,
Christophe

I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
them reluctant to do so in WWII.

Joe


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On 23 Oct 2003 12:39:28 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:

The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
Berlin of 24 July 1939:

"General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'


So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy

No. As I show below, they quite accurately report the content of the
discussions between Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson. The latter was
not, to my knowlege, assigned to the German embassy.

No, they quite accurately report what Wohlthat _reported_ were the
content of the discussions he had with Horace Wilson on 21st July
1939. Wilson not only denied that he had met Wohlthat on that date,
but denied offering Germany a non-aggression treaty during his
acknowledged contacts with Wohlthat at earlier and later meetings.

I suspect that where there are conflicting accounts of such contacts
on the Soviet side in regard to non-aggression pacts in the context of
German ambitions towards Poland in 1939, your reading will be a little
less convinced of the definative nature of the diplomatic feelers in
question.

about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.

How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
London, on British initiative...

Actually, my reading of the source you quote is that Wohlthat asked
permission from Goring to pursue economic contacts with the British in
June 1939. [page 88]

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation

A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred

Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
July, 21 July, and 31 July.

Not according to Wilson. Which account you believe (Wilson or
Wohlthat] is up to you. In most cases people seem to allow their
interpretation to be dictated by their prejudices, and I don't think
you're an exception.

Here's Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003,
pg 89, on these negotiations:

"Sir Horace presented a detailed plan for Anglo-German accord that
began with a proposal of a nonaggression pact. ... There would be a
recognition of spheres of influence. Eastern and southeastern Europe
were to be designated as Germany's sphere. Third, there would be
agreements on arms limitations for land, sea, and air power
(Chamberlain had long sought an air pact with Germany, as this was a
particular concern for British security.) Fourth, colonial issues
would be resolved, including how best to develope Africa. ... Sir
Horace Wilson said that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would
release Britain from her commitments to Poland; thus, the Danzig
question would lose much of its importance for Britain."

Wohlthat asked what authority lay behind these British proposals.

"When asked whether Chamberlain had approved these plans, Wilson
asserted that the Prime Minister had given his full consent." - Shore
pg 90.

Notice how, on page 89, Shore refers to this as "Sir Horace [Wilson]
then supposedly presented his interlocutor with a draft formula for
Anglo-German cooperation, but this memorandum has never been found."
Shore is quite careful to use terms like "allegedly" and "supposedly"
in this respect, qualifications which I note you drop when you present
these interpretations as unchallenged fact, which, in fact, they are
not.

therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy.

So you think these were discussions "...vis-a-vis Germany..." held
between the German themselves.

Who knows, given that all you have is one German civil servant's
opinion of what was discussed and what this meant?

Or, you're just trying to weasle out
of their uncomfortable implications.

The latter, I think.

I think you should be very careful when casting this sort of language
around, given that in fact the basic thrust of the source you quote,
at least in regard to secret Anglo-German contacts in June-July 1939
contradicts your basic assertion that Hitler was aware of them and
they informed his decision in regard to attacking Poland. Shore makes
it explictly clear that there was no evidence that Hitler was aware of
them, in contrast to Ribbentrop.

Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained,

One might think that the German Embassy might already have an idea of
Germany's willingness to negotiate. Or, you're just trying to weasle
out of their uncomfortable implications.

I think we can take the readiness of Germany to negotiate on the basis
of Wilson's efforts from the conclusion they reached (a conclusion, I
note in passing, that you don't seek to widely publicise in your
references to Shore):

"Just two weeks before the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German talks
reached their finale. Whether he had proposed them or not,
Chamberlain finally received a response to his or Sir Horace's secret
overtures. On August 20, Fritz Hesse, the German embassy advisor,
wrote to Sir Horace on Ribbentrop's instructions. The German
government, Wilson was told, had no interest whatsoever in
negotiations with Britain." [page 99]

So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong

They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid.

This is where I am convinced you are using references in bad faith.
In fact Shore makes it clear that the source *you* are utilising to
indicate underlying British policy in the form of Wohlstadt's and
Dirksen reports, explictly contradicts this:

"Unable to gain an audience with Ribbentrop, Dirksen decided to send
yet another report summarising his previous cables and stressing his
conviction that Britain would fight to defend Poland." [page 98]
Shore claims this report was sent to Weizsacker and Ribbentrop. Note
that phrase ".. stressing his conviction that Britain would fight to
defend Poland."

Now, either you didn't read that last sentence or you are seeking to
selectively distort the actual meaning of the references you quote to
support your position.

Anybody taking Dirksen's report's of his own and Wohlstadt's activity
seriously, as you do, should be able to account for the fact that they
stressed that the British _were_ in fact prepared to fight over Poland
in accordance with their guarantee. This appears to flatly contradict
what you believe on the matter, on the basis of what you have posted
in this thread so far.

...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."

Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
"Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
support Poland in resisting force by force

And what did HMG do in the interval to acquire the capability to
support Poland in resisting by force? Hitler saw no such actions or
preparations. Hence, he discounted the threat.

Hitler's wish-fulfillment isn't the issue at hand. What he was told
about British intentions and what the British had established as their
intentions are. Ribbentrop was claiming to Ciano that the British
wouldn't fight over Poland on 11 August, and Hitler similarly on 12
August. Clearly, Ribbentrop at least knew of Dirksen's report by
then, which contradicted this. [page 98 again] So much for the value
of that report to the decision-making process in the Nazi hierarchy.

I personally suspect, as usual, that the Nazis selectively chose to
believe whatever bits of that report which fit in with Hitler's
perceived plan and their exisiting prejudices, and discarded the rest.
That would seem to have some parallel in this thread, at least.

No he was a realist,

A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!

Unlike Stalin, who's sense of realism managed to believe with touching
faith in Hitler's "sincerity" after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and up
until the panzers rolled across his borders. Seems a very modified
form of 'realism' in regard to the "sincerity" of Hitler's treaty
undertakings to me. Are you rolling about laughing at _that_
ridiculous faith in Hitler's word, I wonder?

It shows that as long as the merest, threadbare shred of a hope of a
possibility of a chance that maybe, someday, in the course of time,
Hitler will join HMG in an anti-Soviet agreement, it is sufficient
reason to trust Hitler's sincerity and continue to judge him as better
than his actions.

Not what Chamberlain was saying to his sisters on 23rd July, was it?

And the British offered to end those talks.

Molotov ended those talks.

Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
anything.

And he gave them how long to alter their stance before initiating the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact which carved up Poland and the
rest of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest? I note this kind of
deal seems to excite your criticism when Chamberlain might be
interpreted as trying it, but not when Stalin actually _does_ it. To
refer to the source you quote once more, Shore makes it clear that
Stalin was soliciting a deal with Hitler in March 1939.

Gavin Bailey




--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.

"Joe Osman" wrote in message
...
Christophe Chazot wrote:



I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
them reluctant to do so in WWII.


Hardly

WW1 began with the Germans attacking through Belgium
following the Schlieffen plan. In subsequent offensives the
French did indeed suffer horrendous casualties.

Keith

"Nik Simpson" a écrit dans le message news:
...

If anybody wants a really good read on the subject I highly recommend
Ernest
R. May's "Strange Victory."

Or Marc Bloch's "Strange defeat" (L'étrange défaite), written by a medievist
who had fought the first war and who did not believed what he saw when he
volunteered for the second one, at age 53.

Yours,
Christophe

Christophe Chazot wrote:
"Nik Simpson" a écrit dans le message news:
...

If anybody wants a really good read on the subject I highly
recommend Ernest R. May's "Strange Victory."

Or Marc Bloch's "Strange defeat" (L'étrange défaite), written by a
medievist who had fought the first war and who did not believed what
he saw when he volunteered for the second one, at age 53.

Strange Victory is almost written as a companion piece to Strange Defeat and
makes frequent references to it.


--
Nik Simpson

Keith Willshaw wrote:
"Joe Osman" wrote in message
...

Christophe Chazot wrote:


I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
them reluctant to do so in WWII.



Hardly

WW1 began with the Germans attacking through Belgium
following the Schlieffen plan. In subsequent offensives the
French did indeed suffer horrendous casualties.


It's a mix of both On 3 August Germany attacked belgium.
They did not pass Charleroi until Until Aug 22. (althought they were
fighting the french in Belgium

On august 8 Joffre ordered the French offensive into Alsace Teh Germswn
wer suppsoed to withdraw and trap the French from behind but they made
the studid decison to contest the french advance.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/lorraine.htm

"Vince Brannigan" wrote in message
...


Keith Willshaw wrote:
"Joe Osman" wrote in message
...

Christophe Chazot wrote:


I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
them reluctant to do so in WWII.



Hardly

WW1 began with the Germans attacking through Belgium
following the Schlieffen plan. In subsequent offensives the
French did indeed suffer horrendous casualties.


It's a mix of both On 3 August Germany attacked belgium.
They did not pass Charleroi until Until Aug 22. (althought they were
fighting the french in Belgium


and the BEF

On august 8 Joffre ordered the French offensive into Alsace Teh Germswn
wer suppsoed to withdraw and trap the French from behind but they made
the studid decison to contest the french advance.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/lorraine.htm


The 3rd coming before the 8th it would seem that the
opening gambit was indeed a German attack and
the fact of the French offensive having occurred on the 8th
would appear to make it subsequent.

In any event French losses around Mulhouse were light,
the town itself having been taken without serious opposition
the French were subsequently on the defensive.

Keith