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start making the ST21, AST21, ASF-14 and A-12 Flying Dorito!



 
 
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  #21  
Old January 4th 07, 12:27 AM posted to rec.aviation.military.naval
DDAY
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 43
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that goFAR - FAST -

----------
In article , Jim Carriere
wrote:

Another term for that is "sunk costs" (or writeoff), which is not a good
analytical justification for continuing with any project. Political
justification, certainly, but it is similar psychology to holding on to
a bad investment (hoping it will eventually turn around). If a project
is a dud, there really is no sense going on with it no matter how much
money has been spent or how close it is to being complete.


That's not always true. Sunk costs can be an important consideration if the
replacement is going to cost more to develop than the existing program will
cost to fix. Put it this way--suppose you've sunk $8 billion into a program
that will require $4 billion more to fix. But if you determine that any
replacement is going to cost you at least $8 billion, then you are better
off continuing with the existing program--assuming that you have a
reasonable chance of succeeding.

Sunk costs can also represent assets, because they bought _something._ Most
of that might be blown on salaries, but at least some of it bought hardware.
Starting from scratch means junking those assets.

Yeah, it's not precise, but sunk costs serve as a crude benchmark for
comparison to the costs of starting over.




D

Ads
  #22  
Old January 4th 07, 01:14 AM posted to rec.aviation.military.naval
Jim Carriere
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 57
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that goFAR - FAST -

DDAY wrote:
----------
In article , Jim Carriere
wrote:

Another term for that is "sunk costs" (or writeoff), which is not a good
analytical justification for continuing with any project. Political
justification, certainly, but it is similar psychology to holding on to
a bad investment (hoping it will eventually turn around). If a project
is a dud, there really is no sense going on with it no matter how much
money has been spent or how close it is to being complete.


That's not always true. Sunk costs can be an important consideration if the
replacement is going to cost more to develop than the existing program will
cost to fix. Put it this way--suppose you've sunk $8 billion into a program
that will require $4 billion more to fix. But if you determine that any

snip

Which all depends on whether the original solution is still partly valid
or no longer valid.

I think we're both expressing the same thing in different ways, and that
we agree with each other.

And OBTW my opinion is that the JSF is still a valid solution. Not for
the current conflict, but for future conflicts or (best of all) for
future conflicts that it may help deter.
  #23  
Old January 4th 07, 03:00 AM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military.naval,us.military.navy
Ski
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 29
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that go FAR - FAST - and HIGH

Paul has good comments and I would just add a few remarks....



"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message [email protected], Ski
writes
You all seemd to me to have hit the main issues with the USN right now -
somehow the Navy has thrown away its good sense and started chasing courses
of action that will reduce its ability to deal with the world threats in
only from a defensive nature.


(2) The F/A-18E/F/G has re-written the maintainability and sortie generation
books but it is no more then a more capable A-7 and not even an A-6 and
surely not an F-14 despite the maintenance nightmares.


Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or
A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair
or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been
doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the
Navy needs at the moment.


In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing but adjustments. At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and faster and more numerous. So now the air wing can't do the outer battle despite higher sortie generation and the support ships can't cover the real estate, so in the end ther are vulnerabilities and we have endemic "soft" ships still way too vulnerable to hits, especially from cruise missiles - so lacking the manned high-far-fast fighter at the outer air battle means that the battlegroups remain vulnerable and must stay deep and surface fast.


(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning a
super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
Tomcat.


The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.


Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not facts. We still have a growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles (sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it only got worse. The slow demise of the Tomcat was as much forced by Navy policy as it was due to use and age - that is it also can parallel many strategies to remove the old and bring in the new (could be shared by the A-7 and A-6 also, definately the F-111 in Australia). The budget for spares was cut, the depots were diverted in effort, the Pheonix missile was pronounced "dead", little mod things here and there were stopped, and even though the Tomcat evolved to a multi-role 'Bombcat" totally outclass'ing the Hornet in range, payload and precision strike systems (F-14D) that given new engines and a digital refit could have been the right mix machine for the F/A-18E/F - but to do that would have been to hard to justify and would have added cost to the Hornet. Decisions had to be made - but were they the right ones. I contend that there was and remains an urgent need for a modern Tomcat to combat cruise missiles and platfoirms at the outer ring of the fleet and it would fill the gap in reduced numbers of support ships and the overall vulnerability of the force. Adding submarines to this outer defense ring is the necessary next step.

(4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and then
slide the whole program to include a decade or so development


In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was
added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others
bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales,
who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.


The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain. The small participants simply want to share in what's there, there is no co-production potential and at best a group of coutries will buy a few aircraft and share them which is a good idea - but given how things are stretching now anyway - a decade is a breather for everyone.

(5) Now like it or not, the move from battle ship to carrier will have
another shift down the road and that may be sub-surface so the Navy may
really find that under-sea ops will be its big hitters and the whole surface
world may have to look again at what it is and should be.


Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless
for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of
Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?


Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future. Believe me the sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when. If you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship then you are there are you not; the sub can be anywhere but the invisible support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat could. And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is superior or inferior. We are dealing with a profound debate over just what war is and what it is not. The time of counting chips and comparing force structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend. We elude to it think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all hierachies of power to issues of national will and values. Clauswitz is stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict.

The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk

  #24  
Old January 4th 07, 06:13 PM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military.naval,us.military.navy
Paul J. Adam
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 60
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that go FAR - FAST - and HIGH

In message [email protected], Ski
writes

Happy to jump back in, but aware that some F-14 drivers are reading

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or
A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair
or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been
doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the
Navy needs at the moment.

*
In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but
had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the
modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing
but adjustments.* At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to
escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the
enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and
faster and more numerous.


Add "and launched from a lot closer in". We're not fighting blue-water
warfare any more, and aren't likely to in the near future. The cruise
missile threat remains real, but it's exemplified by incidents like the
attack on HMS Glamorgan in 1982, the Gloucester shootex of 1991, or the
Hanit attack last year: ships not too far from shore getting attacked by
a late-unmasking threat, often in conditions of air superiority or even
air supremacy.

So now the air wing can't do the outer battle
despite higher sortie generation


Who are fighting the outer air battle against? The Bad Guys aren't going
to form up alpha strikes and come at us over a couple of hundred miles
of open ocean for us to work on: and if they do, Hornet plus AIM-120
remains an effective counter. (Arguably, since we're more likely to be
talking fighters than Backfires, more effective than Tomcat plus
Phoenix).

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

*
Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it
trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not
facts.* We still have a*growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles
(sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical
aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it
only got worse.*


Very true, but again the danger is - and for the near future remains -
inshore and in confined or busy conditions. When you've got forty-plus
surface contacts within five miles and are within spitting distance of
Iranian territorial waters, with "IRGCN incursion!" being piped several
times a day, your priority and the primary threat is *not* the outer air
battle: current and near-future Bad Guys who make their intentions known
at 250 miles are well within the ambit of current capabilities.

Hezbollah don't have an air force or any significant over-the-horizon
targeting, but that didn't stop them putting a C802 into an Israeli
warship despite the skies being black with the Heyl Ha'Avir.

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant

was
added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others
bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales,
who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

*
The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas
that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is
clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other
critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain.*


Okay, but the UK won't: we need the JSF to replace the Harriers and to
fly from the new carriers, and we can't wait a decade. I doubt we'd be
unique in having problems with "just keep flying what you've got for a
decade".

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless
for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of
Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

*
Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future.* Believe me the
sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when.*


That being the point - we're not ready to do this now, nor in the
immediate future.

If
you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship
then you are there are you not;


The problem being that communication, which requires the submarine to be
slow with a mast up.

the sub can be anywhere but the invisible
support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat
could.*


You still need someone to be there with a sensor, meaning a decent-sized
hull with a radar at useful height, plus all the datalinks or whatever
black magic is getting you comms with the submarines: lose that and your
submersible forces have lost the Recognised Air Picture..

So, perhaps that unit needs weapons to protect itself, and crew to
operate them... and it's become a warship and we're back to where we
were.

And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a
large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.*


Which all get you back to the same vulnerabilities as surface warships,
but more so.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the
actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is
superior or inferior.* We are dealing with a profound debate over just what
war is and what it is not.*


Actually, I'd say rather that we're moving away from an aberrant period
where "war" with equivalent powers could be clearly and obviously
defined, planned and prepared for; lesser conflicts were sideshows to be
managed discreetly while preparations for the Next Great Conflict were
made. Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, were all heavily influenced and
overshadowed by the ongoing Cold War.

The time of counting chips and comparing force
structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend.* We elude to it
think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all
hierachies of power to issues of national will and values.* Clauswitz is
stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict. ***


This assumes that your opponent is an identifiable nation, of course.

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk
  #25  
Old January 4th 07, 09:40 PM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military.naval,us.military.navy
Ski
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 29
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that go FAR - FAST - and HIGH

Paul - good points but let me continue...


"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... In message [email protected], Ski writes

Happy to jump back in, but aware that some F-14 drivers are reading

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the Navy needs at the moment.

Agree for the moment

In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing but adjustments. At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and faster and more numerous.

Add "and launched from a lot closer in". We're not fighting blue-water warfare any more, and aren't likely to in the near future. The cruise missile threat remains real, but it's exemplified by incidents like the attack on HMS Glamorgan in 1982, the Gloucester shootex of 1991, or the Hanit attack last year: ships not too far from shore getting attacked by a late-unmasking threat, often in conditions of air superiority or even air supremacy.

"We are not fighting Blue Water any more" - that is the "wish" but not the reality - the ships are moving away from the coast lines as the threats from anti-ship cruise missiles, aircraft, ballistic missiles, small suicide craft, and bombers increases. The Naval build up now in the Persian Gulf will "show" many things but the "teeth" are gone and even with AMRAAM's and the latest F-14's theer is not enough of either to make a difference. We have one or two cycles then beat feet for open water.

So now the air wing can't do the outer battle despite higher sortie generation

Who are fighting the outer air battle against? The Bad Guys aren't going to form up alpha strikes and come at us over a couple of hundred miles of open ocean for us to work on: and if they do, Hornet plus AIM-120 remains an effective counter. (Arguably, since we're more likely to be talking fighters than Backfires, more effective than Tomcat plus Phoenix).

The "outer" air battle can form very fast and one does not need regiments to do it, just four, six or ten platforms with cruise missiles. Note that this week Malaysia takes delivery of its first Su-30's, Indonesia has them and the Chinese are converting their Air Force to them and evaluating still better versions as the Russian come out of the cold and have started to deliver new models to the Russian Air Force. The Su-34 will replace the Su-24 Fencer, a far more capable platform and as we look to the Carribean Venezuela and Mexico will have these machines - all capable of employing several families of anti-ship cruise and precision stand-off weapons. The Navy will need to move wide, deep and fast and the only things that will keep up with them will be aircraft and submarines and a small number of specialized auxiliary boats.

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

And hence the big "mis-information" to modernize the decks, simplify the Navy's aviation types and support trail and in the end a smaller more capable Navy to fight an enemy that has already check-mated that capability and can do so min an un-organized way of failed-states and irregular actors.

Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not facts. We still have a growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles
(sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it only got worse.

Very true, but again the danger is - and for the near future remains - inshore and in confined or busy conditions. When you've got forty-plus surface contacts within five miles and are within spitting distance of Iranian territorial waters, with "IRGCN incursion!" being piped several times a day, your priority and the primary threat is *not* the outer air battle: current and near-future Bad Guys who make their intentions known at 250 miles are well within the ambit of current capabilities.

You are not wrong that the "core" threat for irregular ops remains littoral, but the present fleet can not operate there safely and the ships they have programmed for that cost 5 times too much, hence a step back may be necessary.
We need a littoral carrier but not a $3 billion LHA(R) - more LHA's and LHD's with more MV-22's and a Blitz-fighter would make the case much better. The best and most cost effective aviation littoral ship for the Marines and SOF would be a refurbished JFK (CVA-67) revamped to include two less boilers and screws, reduced cats, a trauma hospital, SOF troop quarters, a wing of Marine F/A-18E/F/G's, more CH-53E and the Blitz fighter. Now with the JFK operating close and the swarm of ships and aircraft from the amphibious expeditionary battle group it all fits better. The Kitty Hawk would round off the 2 x fleet 2 x ExBG idea

Hezbollah don't have an air force or any significant over-the-horizon targeting, but that didn't stop them putting a C802 into an Israeli warship despite the skies being black with the Heyl Ha'Avir.

Terrible proof that not much is really working with all the IT and ISR hype - we need numbers and strength. Note that I speak the same as you in the littoral context but all i did was to move the nuclear fleet out into the open ocean and brought in more of the present classes of chips that you can still procure for two or three to the new model. And the $600+ million for the JFK refurbishment that once was considered such an enormous figure is putts against the near $10 billion projected for the CVN-21 - yikes!!!

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales, who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain.

Okay, but the UK won't: we need the JSF to replace the Harriers and to fly from the new carriers, and we can't wait a decade. I doubt we'd be unique in having problems with "just keep flying what you've got for a decade".

Your UK will not leave but it will drag its feet and what really needs to be done is what is being done slowly - a merging of the US and UK defense industry - slowly - slowly. What the UK needs is to do what the Marines would be forced to do - give up on JSF STOVL (F-35B), drop it, the move to accept the Kitty Hawk and refurbish it to a UK-US standard, then as quid-pro-quo (as the Marines will do screaming but loving it) accelerate an enormous buy of F/A-18E/F/G's (drops the price some 20%) to fill these two carriers (actually provides the Marines and the UK with an additional fighter squadron to fill out the ship airwings). Organize the JFK and Hawk to be the aviation lead ships in two major Atlantic (NATO) Expeditionary Battle Groups (EBG) for all the warfare scenarios you describe and this frees the main six USN nuclear battlegroups to be strategic, nuclear and open ocean. The JFK would have one USN squadron and one RN squadron, the Hawk one USN squadron and one Marine Squadron. This would free up one air wing for the USN filling the shortfall.
The EBG's would join with other aviation assualt ships now loaded to the hilt with V-22's, in fact the demise of the JSF would double the space available for V-22 and that is what is needed more. The Blitz fighter would come with the V-22 because attack helicopters can not fly fast enough to escort it and the fighters from the lead ships would do that initially. The dropped necessary hospital ship will show up again organic to the JFK and Hawk as well as all the many multi-agency groups and kit for stability operations. Additional assault ships would then be abvle to fill in the EBG.

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future. Believe me the sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when.

That being the point - we're not ready to do this now, nor in the immediate future.

If you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship then you are there are you not;

The problem being that communication, which requires the submarine to be slow with a mast up.

the sub can be anywhere but the invisible support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat could.

You still need someone to be there with a sensor, meaning a decent-sized hull with a radar at useful height, plus all the datalinks or whatever black magic is getting you comms with the submarines: lose that and your submersible forces have lost the Recognised Air Picture..

Agree but don't underestimate how the submarine could overcome the technical issues you present. Just as an F-22 could guide another aircraft's AMRAAM, X-Craft like high-speed cargo ships could be loaded to accompany the formations and the targeting for many weapons loaded on board could come from various other locations and much more stealthy then anything we have now on the surface

So, perhaps that unit needs weapons to protect itself, and crew to operate them... and it's become a warship and we're back to where we were.

And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.

Which all get you back to the same vulnerabilities as surface warships, but more so.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is superior or inferior. We are dealing with a profound debate over just what war is and what it is not.

Actually, I'd say rather that we're moving away from an aberrant period where "war" with equivalent powers could be clearly and obviously defined, planned and prepared for; lesser conflicts were sideshows to be managed discreetly while preparations for the Next Great Conflict were made. Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, were all heavily influenced and overshadowed by the ongoing Cold War.

The time of counting chips and comparing force structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend. We elude to it think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all hierachies of power to issues of national will and values. Clauswitz is stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict.

This assumes that your opponent is an identifiable nation, of course.

We are saying the same thing in different ways

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools. -Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk

This email was cleaned by emailStripper, available for free from http://www.papercut.biz/emailStripper.htm
  #26  
Old January 5th 07, 02:19 AM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military.naval,us.military.navy
Mike Kanze
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 114
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that go FAR - FAST - and HIGH


Ski & Paul,

Excellent thread, and a very welcome counterpoint to much of the trash appearing in rec.aviation.military.naval recently.

Keep it coming.

--
Mike Kanze

"I would love to change the world but they won't give me the source code."

http://www.sfgate.com/blogs/tech

"Ski" wrote in message news:[email protected]
Paul - good points but let me continue...


"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... In message [email protected], Ski writes

Happy to jump back in, but aware that some F-14 drivers are reading

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the Navy needs at the moment.

Agree for the moment

In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing but adjustments. At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and faster and more numerous.

Add "and launched from a lot closer in". We're not fighting blue-water warfare any more, and aren't likely to in the near future. The cruise missile threat remains real, but it's exemplified by incidents like the attack on HMS Glamorgan in 1982, the Gloucester shootex of 1991, or the Hanit attack last year: ships not too far from shore getting attacked by a late-unmasking threat, often in conditions of air superiority or even air supremacy.

"We are not fighting Blue Water any more" - that is the "wish" but not the reality - the ships are moving away from the coast lines as the threats from anti-ship cruise missiles, aircraft, ballistic missiles, small suicide craft, and bombers increases. The Naval build up now in the Persian Gulf will "show" many things but the "teeth" are gone and even with AMRAAM's and the latest F-14's theer is not enough of either to make a difference. We have one or two cycles then beat feet for open water.

So now the air wing can't do the outer battle despite higher sortie generation

Who are fighting the outer air battle against? The Bad Guys aren't going to form up alpha strikes and come at us over a couple of hundred miles of open ocean for us to work on: and if they do, Hornet plus AIM-120 remains an effective counter. (Arguably, since we're more likely to be talking fighters than Backfires, more effective than Tomcat plus Phoenix).

The "outer" air battle can form very fast and one does not need regiments to do it, just four, six or ten platforms with cruise missiles. Note that this week Malaysia takes delivery of its first Su-30's, Indonesia has them and the Chinese are converting their Air Force to them and evaluating still better versions as the Russian come out of the cold and have started to deliver new models to the Russian Air Force. The Su-34 will replace the Su-24 Fencer, a far more capable platform and as we look to the Carribean Venezuela and Mexico will have these machines - all capable of employing several families of anti-ship cruise and precision stand-off weapons. The Navy will need to move wide, deep and fast and the only things that will keep up with them will be aircraft and submarines and a small number of specialized auxiliary boats.

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question, that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

And hence the big "mis-information" to modernize the decks, simplify the Navy's aviation types and support trail and in the end a smaller more capable Navy to fight an enemy that has already check-mated that capability and can do so min an un-organized way of failed-states and irregular actors.

Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not facts. We still have a growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles
(sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it only got worse.

Very true, but again the danger is - and for the near future remains - inshore and in confined or busy conditions. When you've got forty-plus surface contacts within five miles and are within spitting distance of Iranian territorial waters, with "IRGCN incursion!" being piped several times a day, your priority and the primary threat is *not* the outer air battle: current and near-future Bad Guys who make their intentions known at 250 miles are well within the ambit of current capabilities.

You are not wrong that the "core" threat for irregular ops remains littoral, but the present fleet can not operate there safely and the ships they have programmed for that cost 5 times too much, hence a step back may be necessary.
We need a littoral carrier but not a $3 billion LHA(R) - more LHA's and LHD's with more MV-22's and a Blitz-fighter would make the case much better. The best and most cost effective aviation littoral ship for the Marines and SOF would be a refurbished JFK (CVA-67) revamped to include two less boilers and screws, reduced cats, a trauma hospital, SOF troop quarters, a wing of Marine F/A-18E/F/G's, more CH-53E and the Blitz fighter. Now with the JFK operating close and the swarm of ships and aircraft from the amphibious expeditionary battle group it all fits better. The Kitty Hawk would round off the 2 x fleet 2 x ExBG idea

Hezbollah don't have an air force or any significant over-the-horizon targeting, but that didn't stop them putting a C802 into an Israeli warship despite the skies being black with the Heyl Ha'Avir.

Terrible proof that not much is really working with all the IT and ISR hype - we need numbers and strength. Note that I speak the same as you in the littoral context but all i did was to move the nuclear fleet out into the open ocean and brought in more of the present classes of chips that you can still procure for two or three to the new model. And the $600+ million for the JFK refurbishment that once was considered such an enormous figure is putts against the near $10 billion projected for the CVN-21 - yikes!!!

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales, who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain.

Okay, but the UK won't: we need the JSF to replace the Harriers and to fly from the new carriers, and we can't wait a decade. I doubt we'd be unique in having problems with "just keep flying what you've got for a decade".

Your UK will not leave but it will drag its feet and what really needs to be done is what is being done slowly - a merging of the US and UK defense industry - slowly - slowly. What the UK needs is to do what the Marines would be forced to do - give up on JSF STOVL (F-35B), drop it, the move to accept the Kitty Hawk and refurbish it to a UK-US standard, then as quid-pro-quo (as the Marines will do screaming but loving it) accelerate an enormous buy of F/A-18E/F/G's (drops the price some 20%) to fill these two carriers (actually provides the Marines and the UK with an additional fighter squadron to fill out the ship airwings). Organize the JFK and Hawk to be the aviation lead ships in two major Atlantic (NATO) Expeditionary Battle Groups (EBG) for all the warfare scenarios you describe and this frees the main six USN nuclear battlegroups to be strategic, nuclear and open ocean. The JFK would have one USN squadron and one RN squadron, the Hawk one USN squadron and one Marine Squadron. This would free up one air wing for the USN filling the shortfall.
The EBG's would join with other aviation assualt ships now loaded to the hilt with V-22's, in fact the demise of the JSF would double the space available for V-22 and that is what is needed more. The Blitz fighter would come with the V-22 because attack helicopters can not fly fast enough to escort it and the fighters from the lead ships would do that initially. The dropped necessary hospital ship will show up again organic to the JFK and Hawk as well as all the many multi-agency groups and kit for stability operations. Additional assault ships would then be abvle to fill in the EBG.

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future. Believe me the sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when.

That being the point - we're not ready to do this now, nor in the immediate future.

If you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship then you are there are you not;

The problem being that communication, which requires the submarine to be slow with a mast up.

the sub can be anywhere but the invisible support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat could.

You still need someone to be there with a sensor, meaning a decent-sized hull with a radar at useful height, plus all the datalinks or whatever black magic is getting you comms with the submarines: lose that and your submersible forces have lost the Recognised Air Picture..

Agree but don't underestimate how the submarine could overcome the technical issues you present. Just as an F-22 could guide another aircraft's AMRAAM, X-Craft like high-speed cargo ships could be loaded to accompany the formations and the targeting for many weapons loaded on board could come from various other locations and much more stealthy then anything we have now on the surface

So, perhaps that unit needs weapons to protect itself, and crew to operate them... and it's become a warship and we're back to where we were.

And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.

Which all get you back to the same vulnerabilities as surface warships, but more so.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is superior or inferior. We are dealing with a profound debate over just what war is and what it is not.

Actually, I'd say rather that we're moving away from an aberrant period where "war" with equivalent powers could be clearly and obviously defined, planned and prepared for; lesser conflicts were sideshows to be managed discreetly while preparations for the Next Great Conflict were made. Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, were all heavily influenced and overshadowed by the ongoing Cold War.

The time of counting chips and comparing force structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend. We elude to it think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all hierachies of power to issues of national will and values. Clauswitz is stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict.

This assumes that your opponent is an identifiable nation, of course.

We are saying the same thing in different ways

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools. -Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk

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  #27  
Old January 5th 07, 02:32 AM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military.naval,us.military.navy
BlackBeard
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 79
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that go FAR - FAST - and HIGH


Mike Kanze wrote:
Ski & Paul,

Excellent thread, and a very welcome counterpoint to much of the trash appearing in rec.aviation.military.naval recently.

Keep it coming.


Agreed. With my experience working with the Hornet's various systems
(targeting, OFP's, etc.) for ten years and then the last seven years
working with survivability aspects of both the Hornet and JSF, it's
nice to see reasoned discussion regarding other aspects of these
platforms.

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb,
it's just fate whether you live in Tibet or Kansas...

  #28  
Old January 5th 07, 05:32 AM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military.naval,us.military.navy
Ski
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 29
Default New Carriers - Old refurbishments - New Navy Fighters that go FAR - FAST - and HIGH

I think we must think sensibly especially since this enemy has backed us into a real bad situation. We do not need the JSF now but we do not want to loose all the good that went into it - and since we could tailor it a little better for a more complex time down the road why not put it into a generous (say $4 billion/yr) development slide and keep it getting better and staying warm for that time we need to penetrate into North Korea looking for mobile missiles or the Iranian command sites in the eastern frontier and stay around for a few hours a lot of support add-ons.

For the war on terror - we need more ships and more assault forces with many more V-22's and a replacement for the A-10 that can also replace the Apache and Cobra and escort the V-22. Then we need a air-land doctrine that explains how to use this.


"BlackBeard" wrote in message ups.com...

Mike Kanze wrote:
Ski & Paul,

Excellent thread, and a very welcome counterpoint to much of the trash appearing in rec.aviation.military.naval recently.

Keep it coming.


Agreed. With my experience working with the Hornet's various systems
(targeting, OFP's, etc.) for ten years and then the last seven years
working with survivability aspects of both the Hornet and JSF, it's
nice to see reasoned discussion regarding other aspects of these
platforms.

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb,
it's just fate whether you live in Tibet or Kansas...

 




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