Two MOH Winners say Bush Didn't Serve

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm

What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you
not understand?

... before repeating that bit of revisionism.


The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield
opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or
Korea, for that matter)


Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with
Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the
main reason the East Bloc collapsed.


--Mike

On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 17:37:13 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm

What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you
not understand?

What part of "in place" doesn't equate with "real-time"?

... before repeating that bit of revisionism.


The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield
opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or
Korea, for that matter)

At the start of Desert Storm, the military of Iraq was ranked as fifth
largest in the world. Battlefield opposition at the start of Vietnam
was strictly small-arms, guerilla forces. Ia Drang was an
enlightenment. But, there was no armor, little artillery, zero modern
logistics possessed by the VC at the start in '64-'65. The Air Order
of Battle possessed by NVN was never more than 120 aircraft and
usually closer to 75 throughout the war.


Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with
Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the
main reason the East Bloc collapsed.

Gorbachev's policies can also be attributed to the generational shift
from the leadership of the Stalinist cronies to the thirty year
younger generation that he represented. His glasnost (what a
concept--free exchange of information with the non-communist world)
and perestroika (participating in a free-trade global economy rather
than continuing the failures of central planning) were little more
than acknowledgement of the shortcomings recognized by George F.
Kennan in 1947.



--Mike

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

One interesting thing I've noted is that Vietnam vets who fought
hand-to-hand combat seem to overwhelmingly be far less retroactively
gung-ho on the war than those who flew fixed wing far above. Why do you
suppose that is?


There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim
"hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated
by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See
Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales.

I doubt any of us who are or have been on active duty have much trouble
spotting a poseur. I'm speaking based on conversations I had with people
who most definitely fought hand-to-hand, like the people I served with
who flew CSAR, some of the people I worked with at the VA, and more than
a handful of disabled vets who I assisted in getting their benefits.

Why is it that most of those people are far less gung-ho about that
conflict than people such as yourself who flew high above the ground?
I'm not trying to denigrate any type of combat experience, but 24/7
dangers faced on the ground apparently fostered different impressions.


Of those who served on the ground, the proportion of career to draftee
and officer to lower-rank enlisted could change the perception of
events. Of ground vets from Vietnam, I have seldom encountered any
that went so far as John Kerry in their condemnation of their fellow
warriors.

Are you speak of encounters with them while the war was still going...or
years later?


As for those who flew "far above", you might want to consider the
sustained loss rates of the Rolling Thunder participants in comparison
to those "hand-to-hand" combats. Or, maybe check the proportion of
POWs between the ground and air combatants.


Nobody questions the dangers faced by aircrews who flew missions in
Vietnam. However, in a fast-mover your odds of getting back to base
outside the country for a cold beer and a hot meal are much better than
the grunt in the jungles with an M-16 even surviving. I don't see how
that can be denied. It's one of the reasons I wasn't a grunt...even
though I knew the chances of surviving any more than a handful of
potential CSAR missions was not good.



--Mike

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm

What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you
not understand?

What part of "in place" doesn't equate with "real-time"?

"In place at the start" is static. It means at point A, this, this, and
that were there. Real-time means that not only were this, this, and that
there at point A, but they were sustained and augmented throughout the
conflict.

So to answer your question of "What part of "in place" doesn't equate
with 'real-time'"?: none of it equates to real-time.


... before repeating that bit of revisionism.


The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield
opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or
Korea, for that matter)

At the start of Desert Storm, the military of Iraq was ranked as fifth
largest in the world.

Great, and I hear Spiderbreath, Kansas has the 3rd largest ball of yarn
in the world.

A gazillion trained bodies with a dirty AK's in one hand and white
flags in the other does not constitute a major force.




Battlefield opposition at the start of Vietnam
was strictly small-arms, guerilla forces. Ia Drang was an
enlightenment. But, there was no armor, little artillery, zero modern
logistics possessed by the VC at the start in '64-'65. The Air Order
of Battle possessed by NVN was never more than 120 aircraft and
usually closer to 75 throughout the war.


So we have established that Iraq was better prepared at the onset of
battle than was Vietnam. I imagine a decade of high-intensity fighting
with Iran probably had something to do with that. In any case, I didn't
refer to what may or may not have existed at a single static moment; I'm
referring to outside help from a major super-power throughout the entire
conflict. Did Iraq have that for even a day of Operation Re-elect Bush
or the latest war?


Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with
Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the
main reason the East Bloc collapsed.

Gorbachev's policies can also be attributed to the generational shift
from the leadership of the Stalinist cronies to the thirty year
younger generation that he represented. His glasnost (what a
concept--free exchange of information with the non-communist world)
and perestroika (participating in a free-trade global economy rather
than continuing the failures of central planning) were little more
than acknowledgement of the shortcomings recognized by George F.
Kennan in 1947.

They were also 99% of the reason why the East Bloc fell.


--Mike

Subject: Two MOH Winners say Bush Didn't Serve
From: Ed Rasimus
Date: 6/13/2004 9:52 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 05:27:27 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:

One interesting thing I've noted is that Vietnam vets who fought
hand-to-hand combat seem to overwhelmingly be far less retroactively
gung-ho on the war than those who flew fixed wing far above. Why do you
suppose that is?


There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim
"hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated
by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See
Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales.

Of those who served on the ground, the proportion of career to draftee
and officer to lower-rank enlisted could change the perception of
events. Of ground vets from Vietnam, I have seldom encountered any
that went so far as John Kerry in their condemnation of their fellow
warriors. I know of none that have called their service traitorous,
their actions and those of their comrades criminal, or their service
dishonorable. Maybe I don't travel in the right circles.

As for those who flew "far above", you might want to consider the
sustained loss rates of the Rolling Thunder participants in comparison
to those "hand-to-hand" combats. Or, maybe check the proportion of
POWs between the ground and air combatants.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Only the infantry stole stole valor, never the airmen?

On 13 Jun 2004 18:30:24 GMT, (Lisakbernacchia)
wrote:

Subject: Two MOH Winners say Bush Didn't Serve
From: Ed Rasimus

There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim
"hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated
by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See
Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales.

Only the infantry stole stole valor, never the airmen?

You seem intent on becoming a regular contributor here. If that is so,
then might I suggest that you read just a bit more slowly and try to
detach a bit from your agenda.

I did not say that only "the infantry stole valor..." Nor does
Burkitt. There have been a rash of poseurs claiming to be SEALs,
Special Ops, CIA operatives, POWs, MOH recipients, and pilots.

Recently at a ceremony in Colorado a man in the uniform of an AF
colonel, wearing wings and the AF Cross, told stories of having been a
POW, escaping captivity, evading capture, heroic flights, etc. His
problem was that he never rose above the rank of A/1C, that he was
never a pilot, never a POW and never left the US when he was on active
duty. His biggest problem was that also on the podium was the National
Commander of the Nam-POWs who proceeded to blow the whistle on him.

The reality is that while there were hundreds of thousands who saw
ground combat in SEA, there were millions who served in support
functions both in country and elsewhere. Many have made claims of
combat experience that are untrue. Many, of course are very true.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 18:09:46 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

One interesting thing I've noted is that Vietnam vets who fought
hand-to-hand combat seem to overwhelmingly be far less retroactively
gung-ho on the war than those who flew fixed wing far above. Why do you
suppose that is?


There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim
"hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated
by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See
Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales.

I doubt any of us who are or have been on active duty have much trouble
spotting a poseur. I'm speaking based on conversations I had with people
who most definitely fought hand-to-hand, like the people I served with
who flew CSAR, some of the people I worked with at the VA, and more than
a handful of disabled vets who I assisted in getting their benefits.

Burkitt reserves a lot of space in his book to discuss the VA.

Why is it that most of those people are far less gung-ho about that
conflict than people such as yourself who flew high above the ground?
I'm not trying to denigrate any type of combat experience, but 24/7
dangers faced on the ground apparently fostered different impressions.

Indeed they do. The sustained combat experience on the ground is
decidedly different than an hour or two "across the fence." But there
is also the difference between several days of intense ground combat
(and let's acknowledge that SEA was considerably less intense than the
incredible duration of battle in WW II), and months of daily rising to
face the mission of the day. Consider the Luftwaffe who had no end of
tour, but simply flew until the war would be over or they would be
dead.

During Rolling Thunder, I got up each day and went to a briefing with
25 other guys. On average, each and every day for six months, one of
those 25 would be lost. Some days, none. Some days three or four.
Average, one a day. Keep going to the briefing and one day you will be
the one.


Of those who served on the ground, the proportion of career to draftee
and officer to lower-rank enlisted could change the perception of
events. Of ground vets from Vietnam, I have seldom encountered any
that went so far as John Kerry in their condemnation of their fellow
warriors.

Are you speak of encounters with them while the war was still going...or
years later?

I continue to encounter veterans from all services.

As for those who flew "far above", you might want to consider the
sustained loss rates of the Rolling Thunder participants in comparison
to those "hand-to-hand" combats. Or, maybe check the proportion of
POWs between the ground and air combatants.


Nobody questions the dangers faced by aircrews who flew missions in
Vietnam. However, in a fast-mover your odds of getting back to base
outside the country for a cold beer and a hot meal are much better than
the grunt in the jungles with an M-16 even surviving. I don't see how
that can be denied. It's one of the reasons I wasn't a grunt...even
though I knew the chances of surviving any more than a handful of
potential CSAR missions was not good.

The odds of completing a 100 mission NVN tour were poor. In '66 an
F-105 was lost every 65 missions over NVN. For every five that started
a tour, three of the five would be lost. 40% survival rate.

There are definitely ground units from the war that suffered similar
rates, but that is the exception.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Subject: Two MOH Winners say Bush Didn't Serve
From: Ed Rasimus
Date: 6/13/2004 12:22 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

You seem intent on becoming a regular contributor here. If that is so,
then might I suggest that you read just a bit more slowly and try to
detach a bit from your agenda.


Only I have an agenda and you have none?. 'Id say that your claim that we won
in VN is clearly an agenda..And one lacking in merit on any basis.

"Ed Rasimus" wrote

Recently at a ceremony in Colorado a man in the uniform of an AF
colonel, wearing wings and the AF Cross, told stories of having been a
POW, escaping captivity, evading capture, heroic flights, etc. His
problem was that he never rose above the rank of A/1C, that he was
never a pilot, never a POW and never left the US when he was on active
duty. His biggest problem was that also on the podium was the National
Commander of the Nam-POWs who proceeded to blow the whistle on him.

The reality is that while there were hundreds of thousands who saw
ground combat in SEA, there were millions who served in support
functions both in country and elsewhere. Many have made claims of
combat experience that are untrue. Many, of course are very true.

During Desert Storm, there was a USAF guy from Lakenheath, I believe. Went
home on leave just after (or during) operations, and was interviewed, on TV,
as to his experiences in Iraq.

"Pilot, almost got shot down, blowing stuff up, me and my wingman, blah blah
blah"

Turns out he was also an A1C.

Pete

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

One interesting thing I've noted is that Vietnam vets who fought
hand-to-hand combat seem to overwhelmingly be far less retroactively
gung-ho on the war than those who flew fixed wing far above. Why do you
suppose that is?


There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim
"hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated
by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See
Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales.

I doubt any of us who are or have been on active duty have much trouble
spotting a poseur. I'm speaking based on conversations I had with people
who most definitely fought hand-to-hand, like the people I served with
who flew CSAR, some of the people I worked with at the VA, and more than
a handful of disabled vets who I assisted in getting their benefits.

Burkitt reserves a lot of space in his book to discuss the VA.


Meaning what? Does he claim combat vets and/or disabled vets working for
the VA are less than honest?


During Rolling Thunder, I got up each day and went to a briefing with
25 other guys. On average, each and every day for six months, one of
those 25 would be lost. Some days, none. Some days three or four.
Average, one a day. Keep going to the briefing and one day you will be
the one.

Well my hat goes off to you and to all those who paid in blood or risked
that blood doing what their country told them to do. I find it next to
impossible to understand how any vet (especially a combat vet) would
make statements about not "****ing on somebody if they were one fire"
when that somebody also risked their all and shed blood for their
country.

Partisanship should never trump honor and respect. It's sad that
uber-partisans of both major political parties in the U.S. have lost
sight of that (if they ever had it in the first place).



As for those who flew "far above", you might want to consider the
sustained loss rates of the Rolling Thunder participants in comparison
to those "hand-to-hand" combats. Or, maybe check the proportion of
POWs between the ground and air combatants.


Nobody questions the dangers faced by aircrews who flew missions in
Vietnam. However, in a fast-mover your odds of getting back to base
outside the country for a cold beer and a hot meal are much better than
the grunt in the jungles with an M-16 even surviving. I don't see how
that can be denied. It's one of the reasons I wasn't a grunt...even
though I knew the chances of surviving any more than a handful of
potential CSAR missions was not good.

The odds of completing a 100 mission NVN tour were poor. In '66 an
F-105 was lost every 65 missions over NVN. For every five that started
a tour, three of the five would be lost. 40% survival rate.

There are definitely ground units from the war that suffered similar
rates, but that is the exception.


I don't doubt what you're saying for a minute. Never having been in
combat, I can't speak from experience, but numbers on paper be
damned...I'll take fighting from above over eyeball to eyeball at close
quarters any day.


--Mike