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On this day in 1944..
On this day in 1944 the Germans began shelling theWirtz-Bastogne crossroad in
an attempt to push the 101st Airborne out of the defense of Bastogne. They failed. .Temperature went down to below freezing in the bitter cold of that Belgian winter and the 101st was down to eating K rations. Those that had them. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
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Subject: On this day in 1944..
From: Ed Rasimus Date: 12/20/03 7:45 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion. IMNSHO! And tactical bombing helped too. IMNSHO ! (grin) Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
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(ArtKramr) wrote in
: On this day in 1944 the Germans began shelling theWirtz-Bastogne crossroad in an attempt to push the 101st Airborne out of the defense of Bastogne. They failed. .Temperature went down to below freezing in the bitter cold of that Belgian winter and the 101st was down to eating K rations. Those that had them. Here's a good front-line story I came by: http://www.skylighters.org/xmas/ Regards... |
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Subject: On this day in 1944..
From: "Bjørnar Bolsøy" am Date: 12/20/03 11:40 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: (ArtKramr) wrote in : On this day in 1944 the Germans began shelling theWirtz-Bastogne crossroad in an attempt to push the 101st Airborne out of the defense of Bastogne. They failed. .Temperature went down to below freezing in the bitter cold of that Belgian winter and the 101st was down to eating K rations. Those that had them. Here's a good front-line story I came by: http://www.skylighters.org/xmas/ Regards... Outstanding. Thank you. Yup, the 101st held on to St. Vith for 5 days delaying the German advance and contributing io the German final defeat. Let's always remember "The Battered *******s of Bastogne". The sky cleared on the 23rd and we took to the air to relieve and resupply Bastogne Regards, .. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
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"ArtKramr" wrote in message ... Subject: On this day in 1944.. From: "Bjørnar Bolsøy" am Date: 12/20/03 11:40 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: (ArtKramr) wrote in : On this day in 1944 the Germans began shelling theWirtz-Bastogne crossroad in an attempt to push the 101st Airborne out of the defense of Bastogne. They failed. .Temperature went down to below freezing in the bitter cold of that Belgian winter and the 101st was down to eating K rations. Those that had them. Here's a good front-line story I came by: http://www.skylighters.org/xmas/ Regards... Outstanding. Thank you. Yup, the 101st held on to St. Vith for 5 days delaying the German advance and contributing io the German final defeat. Let's always remember "The Battered *******s of Bastogne". The sky cleared on the 23rd and we took to the air to relieve and resupply Bastogne A much apreciated Christmas blessing. |
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And, on this day in 1972, the Linebacker II operation experienced the
worst losses of the campaign with six B-52s downed over Hanoi. The Eleven Days of Christmas, however, drove the recalcitrant North Vietnamese back to the bargaining table and resulted in the release of our POWs by March of '73. And, arguably proved once and for all the Douhet principle that strategic bombing can be decisive politically without ground invasion. IMNSHO! You know Ed, I believed (past tense) this too, its what the Air Force teaches at every step of PME, but after completing a masters course about the air war in Vietnam, I'm not so convinced anymore. I may get drubbed out of the B-52 community, but I think the BUFFs could have sat the whole thing out and by early January 1973, Le Duc Tho would have still signed the Paris Peace Accord. Most of the targets hit by the BUFFs, had already been hit the previous Spring and Fall during Linebacker I. This is where people usually say; "the bombing demoralized the population and the politicians of North Vietnam". There are stories, most from former POWs being held in Hanoi, about the psychological effect the bombing had on the North Vietnamese, but no proof or any evidence that the communist party leadership was aware, or if they were, even cared about the psychological effect on their people. Marshall L. Michel (heck Ed, you may even know this guy?) wrote an outstanding book titled; "The Eleven Days of Christmas" where he interviewed NV SA-2 commanders and crews. One SA-2 commander said the politicians who visited his battalian, located close to the party headquarters, up until the last day, were confident and supportive, hardly the actions of a demoralized population. Additionally, the government ordered residence of Hanoi to evacuate, if they were non-essential, and to send their children to the camps in the country side, both orders were violated en mass, most Hanoi residents stayed put. Another great book addressing this issue is Mark Clodfelter's "The Limits of Air Power". Anyway, just a few opinions to counter current day "common logic". Regardless of their effect on North Vietnamese politicans, the BUFFs provided moral support to POWs (fact) and the crews layed the ground work for every BUFF mission flown today (fact). BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
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You hit upon one good reason for guys writing memoirs. Too quickly we
wind up with the participants and on-scene observers passing away and only the historians interpreting stacks of OPREP-4s and cryptic correspondence then interpreting the runes in the politically correct light of the day. Well, it goes both ways Ed. Michel absolutely destroys some of the material published by actual participants, whose "facts" were quite questionable. Hell Ed, I can pick up a book called "The View From the Rock" where I can read about how great the SAC-13th Air Force relationship was. This book was written by either the Group or Wing Commander at Andersen during LB II. As a participant in LB I and II, I would have to debate the conclusions of the course you took. Don't blame the course, these were my own conclusions. My final paper was on B-52 targeting effectiveness during LB II. Just a bit of what I discovered; "They dropped over 4,000 bombs on the Kinh No rail yard and vehicle repair facility. Impressive, however the Kinh No rail yard had already been disabled during Linebacker I". 4000 750 pound bombs on an already damaged (and certainly by the 2000th M-117, destroyed) railyard! I won't even go in to the targeting of Hanoi Radio, ok...yes I will. Four B-52s were shot down the first week trying to knock it off the air permanently, over 36 sorties and 2000 bombs to hit a small building and an antenna. On day number 9 two F-4s dropped three GBU-10s and knocked it off the air permenantly. If it wasn't the damage being inflicted by the BUFFs, how can we credit them with forcing the NV back to the table in Paris? Linebacker started to get the NVN and VC back to the table. Because their conventional offensive had stalled and ARVN units had actually begun to re-take some of the lost ground. As it progressed they observed the typical gradualism that had characterized each previous bombing cycle. Linebacker I didn't suffer from any of Johnson's "graduated response". The only mistake Nixon made was to restrict bombing below 20-North when the communists agreed to resume peace talks. By October, Kissinger announced the "light at the end of the tunnel" and we paused again, only to see the resolve of the NVN and VC return. The "pause" was not Nixon's fault, or Kissenger's. The agreement reached in October was reached between the US and North Vietnam, with no input from South Vietnam. Nixon demanded that Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnam's President approve the deal. The North Vietnamese never admitted its forces were involved inside the border of South Vietnam, as such, there was nothing in the agreement about removing them. Thieu refused to "ok" the deal because of this issue. So...the US and NVN had an agreement in principle, but needed to convince *our ally South Vietnam* to approve the deal. Bombing never halted, but interdiction sorties south of the DMZ were reduced to show NVN we were serious about the deal. When they didn't follow through, Nixon unleased LB II, which raised the stakes considerably. Nixon unleashed LB II after several political catastrophies had occured. First, in late November several democrats from both the House and Senate *publically* called for a vote on the suspension of funding for the military operation in SE Asia. These idiots made this request public on every national TV and newspaper media outlet and said the issue would be brought for a vote following the Christmas holiday break. As this was happening, Kissenger was attempting to add verbage to the Paris agreement stating regular NVN military forces would be withdrawn from South Vietnamese territory (Thieu wanted the statement to include all NVN supported forces such as the VC). Kissenger presented this to Le Duc Tho. The NVN were pretty savy on US internal political issues, they were well aware of the threat to withdraw funding and they seized this opportunity to claim we were changing an agreement already agreed upon (we were!) and left the conferance on 13 December 1972. The NVN were gambling that the House and Senates resolve to end the war would "hamstring" Nixon who would be unable to take any bold action, additionally if US funds were withdrawn, this would allow NVN to get *everything* and a cost of *nothing*. What ended up happening was; Nixon took strong action, and few members of congress spoke out against it. The bombing continued for 9 days (Le Duc Tho agreed to return to Paris and sign the *orginal* agreement on the 27th, bombing continued for two more days.) without a huge public or congressional outcry. The NVN decided that those in congress opposed to the war were such a minority that it would be highly doubtful they would vote to suspend funding. Kissenger literally told South Vietnamese President Thieu that he was signing the Paris Peace Accord, with or without Thieu's blessing, so reluctantly Thieu agreed and nothing in the final Paris Peace Accord mentions the withdrawl of NVN military forces. Basically a long way of saying that the NVN didn't sign anything more or less than they had already agreed upon in late October. What they didn't get was the "whole enchillada" with the complete withdrawl of US forces *and* the suspension of aid to South Vietnam that they thought they may get should congress vote to suspend funding. The overall silence from American politicians during LB II was every bit as powerful as the 750-pound bombs raining down on Hanoi and Haiphong. The intensity of night one where the original frag was for 150 BUFF sorties. Do the math, even if all of them weren't "big belly" D's. That's a lot of bombs falling in an area the size of Connecticutt. The 24 hour a day campaign of LB II was unprecedented. Yet most residents refused to leave or even send thier children away. I know Marshall quite well. You'll find my name mentioned on page 82 of his book. I finished it in September, but don't recall seeing your name. I've lent the book to someone, I'll have to check it out when I get it back. While I have great respect for Marshall's efforts in gaining the NVN perspective of LB II, let us not forget that he was interviewing functionaries of a Communist government and their statements "might" reflect typical revisionism. Possibly, but this is true for any person. You might also look at Wayne Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back" Not only have I read it, but I've discussed this issue with Dr. Thompson who attends our staff meetings every Tuesday and Thursday mornings. While I think I can catagorize his opinion accurately I won't try in case I am misunderstanding his position. What I can say is; Dr. Thompson did not flat out disagree with me. or Karl Eschmann's "Linebacker." I've read that as well. Probably most critical (and the major contribution of Marshall's "Eleven Days" is the acknowledgement that the LeMay elitism of the strategic bomber force as a "specified" command and not eligible to be CHOPped to the theater operational commanders is gone. While I agree whole heartedly with Michel's position (dysfunctional command chain with bombers), he loses some credibility to make an unbiased judgement in this area. In the opening chapter he states that for a fighter pilot, a tour in SAC was like a tour in hell (paraphrasing). If you then read the book cover jacket, you find Michel was a TAC-born F-4 guy during the 60s and 70s, one of those guys who though SAC was hell on earth. Bottom line; Michel was correct, but his position looks awful biased instead of factual based. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
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