CSAR: Nobody's First Choice: Another Air Force deal that doesn't pass the

Nobody's First Choice: Another Air Force deal that doesn't pass the
smell test.

The Weekly Standard

Nobody's First Choice
Another Air Force deal that doesn't pass the smell test.
by Michael Goldfarb
04/19/2007 12:00:00 AM

PERHAPS THE AMERICAN public can only digest only one helicopter-
related story at a time, but the Marine Corps's recent announcement
that the controversial V-22 Osprey will soon be deployed to Iraq--
which captured national headlines--is overshadowing a simmering
scandal in the Air Force's
CSAR-X competition.

CSAR stands for Combat Search and Rescue. The Air Force currently
operates 102 Sikorsky HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters to perform that
mission. The HH-60s average 25 years old, and the service is desperate
to replace them. Last November, the Air Force announced a winner in
the competition to select a
replacement: the Boeing HH-47, a new variant of the venerable Chinook.

Almost immediately, concerns arose about how the twin-rotor Chinook
had beaten out the Lockheed Martin/AgustaWestland-built US101 and
Sikorsky's H-92. Protests from Lockheed and Sikorsky ultimately led
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to side with the losing
companies. The GAO
reported that "upon our review of the record, including a hearing
conducted by our Office, we find that the Air Force's evaluation of
O&S [Operations and Support] costs was inconsistent with the RFP
[Request for Proposal]."

The GAO finds the total cost for the Boeing proposal to be $38.9
billion, including production, operations, and support, while US101
would cost closer to $35.9 billion. The cost breakdown is redacted in
the publicly released report, but sources familiar with the program
say that the $3 billion
difference in cost is a factor of production alone, not operations and
support. O&S costs were estimated at $23 billion across the board,
though the Lexington Institute's Loren Thompson (who has consulted for
Lockheed) says he is "incredulous that operating a helicopter with two
separate rotors can be as efficient" as the single rotor aircraft from
Lockheed and
Sikorsky--apparently the GAO was as well. Regardless, out of the box
the Lockheed helicopter is 20 percent cheaper than the Chinook.

The Air Force chose the most expensive solution--nothing unusual about
that.The Air Force is typically willing to pay a huge premium to bring
its warfighters the best available technology. But it's far from clear
that the Chinook, which first saw action more than 40 years ago in the
Vietnam War, is the best available technology. Further, it's not clear
that the Chinook met the most basic requirements of the RFP. Though
the protests were sustained on the basis of cost, Thompson reported
last month that GAO had informed the Air Force of "numerous other
issues raised by Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky that could be a basis
for further protests if not addressed."

Those other issues may now be moot, as the GAO's lead examiner
explained in an email on March 9:

As a further clarification, we note that because the recommended
remedy includes reopening discussions with offerors and then
requesting revised proposals, necessarily leading to a new evaluation,
it is our view that the
recommended remedy renders the issues not addressed in our decision
academic. Therefore, we do not believe it is appropriate to discuss
the merits of the issues not addressed in our decision.

As an "academic" exercise, it is still worth examining those other
issues, the most troubling of which is that the RFP specifically
called for a "medium lift" aircraft, and according to nearly everyone,
including Boeing at various times, the HH-47 is a "heavy lift"
helicopter. Here's how Defense
Daily described the problem in December:

Although Boeing's own informational materials describe the HH-47
as a "tandem-rotor, heavy-lift, high-altitude" platform, the Air Force
actually considers it to be a medium-lift helicopter, say Susan
Payton, assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition . . .

Payton defended the decision based on an Air Force document, described
as a matrix, which judges the HH-47 to be a medium lift helicopter.
But reporters were suspicious, and repeated requests for the Air Force
to produce this matrix led Defense News to report a month later that
"there is scant
evidence such a document exists."

The Boeing HH-47 costs more and doesn't meet the requirements for
consideration, but that's not all. The aircraft is, simply put, not a
good fit for the search and rescue mission. And this is where Congress
has gotten involved. In February, Air Force chief of staff General
Michael Moseley told a Congressional hearing that "the Chinook would
have not been his first choice, but that the Air Force would make it
work," according to the Hill. And later told reporters that "I am not
sure [the HH-47] is the one that I would have picked, but I am not the
guy that picks." Senator Hillary Clinton took up the issue in front of
the Senate Armed Services Committee last month as well, where Moseley
conceded that "I'm not aware that anyone uses the 47 in a combat
rescue role." And when Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne was
asked by Rep. Joe Sestak, whose district hosts a major Boeing
facility, "Is the HH-47 the correct aircraft, then, for the CSAR
mission?" Wynne responded: "That's the one that we selected." Not a
ringing endorsement.

The Chinook is an impressive heavy-lift helicopter, but it has a raft
of shortcomings as a CSAR platform, which were somehow excluded from
the criteria used to determine a winner in the CSAR-X competition,
according to those same sources. Among the criteria not evaluated:

* Downwash:
The dual-rotor Chinook produces a tremendous downwash that is capable
of knocking soldiers over when coming in for a landing--particularly
in the area directly above the hoist, where both rotors overlap. Both
Sikorsky and Lockheed would have outperformed Boeing in evaluations of
downwash.

* Acoustic Signatu
The Chinook is loud, a major disadvantage when performing search and
rescue.

* Brownout:
In the desert environments of Afghanistan and Iraq, brownout--when the
downwash kicks up dust to an extent that it disorients the pilot--is a
major problem. The Chinook has proved acutely susceptible to brownout--
of the nine Chinooks lost in action in Afghanistan (more than any
other rotorcraft), at least two were the direct result of brownout,
and the phenomenon likely played a role in several other incidents.

* Footprint:
The HH-47 has a significantly larger footprint than either the US101
or the H-92. Further, because of its size the Chinook cannot land on
80 percent of U.S. naval vessels, while the Lockheed U.S. 101 can land
on any vessel with a helicopter landing pad. Both Sikorsky and
Lockheed would have outperformed Boeing in evaluations of footprint.

* Field of Fi
In CSAR missions, there is a high likelihood of encountering enemy
fire. On the HH-47, "sponsons" for carrying extra fuel effectively
obstruct a gunner's field of fire. Further, those sponsons have, on
other variants, been described as the aircraft's "largest potential
vulnerability . . .associated with projectiles entering the fuel tanks
in the volume above the liquid fuel." Sikorsky and Lockheed likely
would have outperformed Boeing in evaluations.

* De-icing:
Early documents show the Air Force was determined to replace the
current fleet of HH-60s, described as "unable to perform tactical
missions in adverse weather," with an all-weather CSAR aircraft. But
the HH-47 has not been certified to fly in moderate icing conditions
as required for the CSAR-X mission. Upgrading the HH-47 with a de-
icing capability will be risky given the chance that ice could fly off
one rotor and hit the other. Both the Sikorsky and Lockheed
helicopters are capable of operating in conditions with moderate ice,
and the US101 can fly in heavy ice conditions.

Of the criteria that were evaluated, some appear irrelevant to the
CSAR mission, and were not included in the initial RFP, while other
crucial factors seem to have been given little weight. The Lockheed
US101 has three engines, and can fly on just two. The Chinook has two
engines and in theory
might fly for a time with one, but "how long and how far it can fly
that way depends on load and conditions," according to the company
spokesmen. For some reason this was not scored by the Air Force in its
evaluation. Cargo requirements, at which the Chinook excels, were
given preference by the Air Force in evaluations--though cargo would
seem to be a secondary consideration in search and rescue missions.

When the Air Force briefed industry representatives in March 2004, the
presentation listed downwash and deployability as two of four "key
performance parameters." Downwash wasn't evaluated in the event, but
deployability was. Each aircraft was to be taken apart in three hours
or less for transport and reassembled just as quickly. Sikorsky and
Lockheed
came in at two hours each; Boeing's HH-47 just barely squeezed in at
two hours and 58 minutes. In that same briefing, under the heading
"concepts,"the presentation listed Sikorsky's S-92 and Lockheed's
US101 as "examples"of a possible "medium lift" replacement for the
current fleet. The Chinook was nowhere mentioned.

So how did Boeing end up winning the competition? The "cozy
relationship" between Boeing and the Air Force has become a primary
focus for reporters and lawmakers alike. John McCain, whose one-man
crusade against a deal the Air Force inked with Boeing in 2001 to
replace an aging fleet of tankers led
to prison terms for top officials from both organizations, recently
sent this letter to Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne
requesting a list of documents related to the acquisition process.
McCain wrote:

Given the regrettable history of the Air Force's plan to update
its aerial refueling fleet, it is critical that the Air Force procure
Combat Search and Rescue Vehicles (CSAR-X) in a manner that befits the
Air Force's second highest acquisition priority--behind only its
current tanker recapitalization plan.

Unfortunately, recent developments in this program do not inspire
confidence that this is the case. From the information available, I am
concerned about the possibility that what arose from a requirement for
medium-lift personal recovery vehicle resulted in a contract award for
a system that provides a very different capability.

According to Chris Paul, a minority staffer on the Senate Armed
Services Committee whose name appears on the letter, the fact that the
Air Force selected "the largest helicopter in the government
inventory" as the winner in a competition for a medium-lift helicopter
immediately "raised red flags." (The Sikorsky H-53E is actually the
largest in the inventory, the H-47 is the second largest; they are the
fifth and sixth largest helicopters ever built, respectively.) But
Paul said the staff would have to review the paperwork before
determining whether "requirements may have been changed to
prejudice [the selection process] against the smaller helicopters."
The letter set today, April 19, as the deadline for delivery of all
related materials.

Paul did say that the Air Force was plagued by a "systemic problem
with acquisition," pointing to the fact that between 17 and 20 percent
of protests filed with the GAO in relation to Air Force contracts are
sustained--for the other services that number stands at roughly 4
percent, he said.

Boeing spokesman Joseph LaMarca defends the HH-47, saying that
determining criteria for selection is "a decision for the Air Force,"
and that based on those criteria the Air Force had determined the
HH-47 to offer "the greatest capability for the least amount of risk."
"It's what the customer wants,"
LaMarca says. The lukewarm statements from General Moseley and
Secretary Wynne cast some doubt on that.

McCain got the Air Force to scuttle the corrupt tanker deal, but that
scandal was about whether the Air Force would pay through the nose for
an aircraft well suited to the mission--an aircraft that remains the
frontrunner still. A corrupted CSAR-X competition, however, risks
saddling the Air Force with a search and rescue helicopter that is
poorly suited to the mission was nobody's first choice.

The Air Force is likely to release a new RFP later this week, which
Thompson says will be "almost identical" to the original. Thompson
also said the Chinook would likely come out on top in a rematch, even
though "it sure isn't the airframe we expected." Maybe. But if McCain
sinks his teeth into this, all bets are off.

Michael Goldfarb is deputy online editor at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

There's already a thread on this at:

http://groups.google.com/group/rec.a...722efb739b880f