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Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was: #1 Jet of World War II)



 
 
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  #11  
Old August 21st 03, 12:04 PM
John Halliwell
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
I'll disagree here. You want two pilots so they can take turns flying tight
formation. For night ops it was no big deal to put the a/c on george and have
the first and second pilots swap out (before they replaced the 2nd pilot with
a FE). That's not an option when flying in a combat box. With only a single
pilot the formations are going to be looser, and that's the last thing the
Brit heavies need, as they're already going to be the ground bait.


Hmmm, we're assuming here that tight combat boxes are the only way to
go. Whilst I haven't looked at it in depth, I reckon that with
sufficient long range fighter escort, smaller, loser formations might
have worked out fine. The combat box seems to me to make a large target
for flak.

Once air
superiority is won and the invasion has happened it's not as big a deal,
becaue there's less need to fly tight formation for as long, but we're talking
about the period before that occurs. Both Lanc and Halifax have FE seats next
to (and slightly aft) of the pilot, so the space shouldn't be a too much of a
problem.


Space may not have been a problem, but the FE seats (certainly on the
Lanc, not sure about the Halifax) were fold out types to allow for the
bomb aimer to take up his station. I remember reading reports that some
bomb aimer's were able to crawl under the seat whilst the FE occupied
it, but on the whole it sounds a difficult manoeuvre. The only
recommended escape route (apart from the rear gunners station) was
through the bomb aimer's hatch, getting the crew out with the 2nd pilot
in his seat would be a major problem.

In the Halifax, the pilot sat above the radio operator, I think with a
walkway down the right hand side (level with the radio ops floor), not
sure where/how the FEs seat was arranged (looks to me like he'd be
hanging in mid-air if sat next to the pilot!).

I wasn't aware that these two a/c had provisions for dual controls
built in, although I knew that some had them; when we were trying to figure
out what mods we'd have to make to run these a/c by day, we had allowed a fair
amount of time to design and develop a production dual control system, so it
seems that we were overcautious in estimating how much time that would take.


The dual controls available were very crude connections to the existing
controls. For operational use these may require re-working (along with
the addition of a better 2nd seat and harness). Whether a 2nd pilot was
required for daylight ops might be irrelevant, whether the command would
agree to it is another question (all resources were tight).

The BBMF Lanc has proper dual controls and two pilots.

--
John
  #12  
Old August 21st 03, 09:52 PM
Guy Alcala
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 06:53:31 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
of Fighter OperationsGuy Alcala
wrote:

Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.


I'm still the only one of the three of us to appoint himself to the
Air Council, so start bribing me now if you want me to rubber-stamp
your promotion to Air rank.


At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
humble and obedient servant.

P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.

snip internal tank capacity

[snip next test report]

Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint,


Nope, you've now moved onto the next tankage problem: the wing tanks!

Notice how I've been using a figure of 12.5 Imperial gallons for them?
Well, their size seems to fluctuate from 12.5 galls up to 16-or even
18 in some later Spits. 12.5 seems to be the most common as this
report bears out: 85 galls forward fuselage plus two 12.5 galls in
the wing giving 110 gallons.


I've seen a precise figure of 13 point (something) given for the Mk. VII/VIII, which often gets
rounded up to 14 gallons, although rounding to 27 total is closer.

a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
particular day?


My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.


Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.

Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.


Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.


Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
possible.


Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.

snip unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable areas of agreement

The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.


Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems.


I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
(or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
tanks?


The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.

snip musings on tank plumbing

I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
consideration.


What kind of air speed does that give you?


180 IAS according to the (rather small-scale) graph at 15,000 feet.
It claims to be valid from 10,000-25,000 feet, but not fully accurate
for rpm at different heights.

Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
TAS at escort altitudes.


By November 1942 the Spit Vs at least seem to be cruising at 300mph
TAS at 20,000 feet when anticipating enemy contact. 2,400 rpm +4 lbs
seems to have been one target setting recorded in some primary
documentation I've seen from that time. 2,400 rpm at +4lbs would
increase consumption to 66 galls per hour, but should permit
(according to the graph) 200 IAS within the acceptable revs range.
The Air mpg drops to 6, and we'd need to increase that consumption for
external tank drag, but it doesn't change things much. The relatively
low consumption of the Merlin seems to stand it in good stead there,
but I've always thought the P-47 cruised faster.


I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.

snip even more general agreement

Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
involved at this stage.


I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
involved?


Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
investigate that nightmare much further.


snip

Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
the delivery van breaking down.

No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.


We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs.


This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
being shipped out to overseas theatres.


Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.

If you want the whole of Mk
VIII production, when does this decision get made?


End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.

My Mk V speculation was based on what would be likely with existing
resources. 12 Group needed that range, and FC didn't give a stuff
what they did with their Mk Vs (e.g. the LF Vb conversions at this
time). Increasing internal tankage would be a small step to them,
without major political considerations. I can only see this whole
scenario working if FC actually have some resources capable of
supporting a daylight effort; even the CAS can't complelely dictate
operational tactics to an RAF C-in-C.


We'll have to wait on AVM Stickney's Cg calcs, I think.

Mk. VIII production rate

Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month,


I'd agree, but frankly you're hitting the limit of the relevant
production resource, i.e. the Hampshire production group focused on
Supermarine's dispersed work. You might get 120 or so out of them per
month of they packed up everything else, bar a couple of PR Spits and
the beginnings of the Mk XIV. The next focus I suggest would be
getting Westlands, finishing off their Mk V production run with
Seafires to move to Mk VIIIs while tackling Castle Bromwich. I think
you could fully convert to Mk VIII-based production by spring 1944,
with an increasing number of rear-tank versions available within that
output, and with the Mk XIV entering service at the same time.


snip

Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month, that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.

Guy



  #13  
Old August 21st 03, 09:52 PM
Guy Alcala
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 06:53:31 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
of Fighter OperationsGuy Alcala
wrote:

Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.


I'm still the only one of the three of us to appoint himself to the
Air Council, so start bribing me now if you want me to rubber-stamp
your promotion to Air rank.


At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
humble and obedient servant.

P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.

snip internal tank capacity

[snip next test report]

Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint,


Nope, you've now moved onto the next tankage problem: the wing tanks!

Notice how I've been using a figure of 12.5 Imperial gallons for them?
Well, their size seems to fluctuate from 12.5 galls up to 16-or even
18 in some later Spits. 12.5 seems to be the most common as this
report bears out: 85 galls forward fuselage plus two 12.5 galls in
the wing giving 110 gallons.


I've seen a precise figure of 13 point (something) given for the Mk. VII/VIII, which often gets
rounded up to 14 gallons, although rounding to 27 total is closer.

a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
particular day?


My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.


Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.

Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.


Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.


Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
possible.


Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.

snip unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable areas of agreement

The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.


Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems.


I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
(or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
tanks?


The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.

snip musings on tank plumbing

I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
consideration.


What kind of air speed does that give you?


180 IAS according to the (rather small-scale) graph at 15,000 feet.
It claims to be valid from 10,000-25,000 feet, but not fully accurate
for rpm at different heights.

Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
TAS at escort altitudes.


By November 1942 the Spit Vs at least seem to be cruising at 300mph
TAS at 20,000 feet when anticipating enemy contact. 2,400 rpm +4 lbs
seems to have been one target setting recorded in some primary
documentation I've seen from that time. 2,400 rpm at +4lbs would
increase consumption to 66 galls per hour, but should permit
(according to the graph) 200 IAS within the acceptable revs range.
The Air mpg drops to 6, and we'd need to increase that consumption for
external tank drag, but it doesn't change things much. The relatively
low consumption of the Merlin seems to stand it in good stead there,
but I've always thought the P-47 cruised faster.


I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.

snip even more general agreement

Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
involved at this stage.


I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
involved?


Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
investigate that nightmare much further.


snip

Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
the delivery van breaking down.

No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.


We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs.


This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
being shipped out to overseas theatres.


Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.

If you want the whole of Mk
VIII production, when does this decision get made?


End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.

My Mk V speculation was based on what would be likely with existing
resources. 12 Group needed that range, and FC didn't give a stuff
what they did with their Mk Vs (e.g. the LF Vb conversions at this
time). Increasing internal tankage would be a small step to them,
without major political considerations. I can only see this whole
scenario working if FC actually have some resources capable of
supporting a daylight effort; even the CAS can't complelely dictate
operational tactics to an RAF C-in-C.


We'll have to wait on AVM Stickney's Cg calcs, I think.

Mk. VIII production rate

Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month,


I'd agree, but frankly you're hitting the limit of the relevant
production resource, i.e. the Hampshire production group focused on
Supermarine's dispersed work. You might get 120 or so out of them per
month of they packed up everything else, bar a couple of PR Spits and
the beginnings of the Mk XIV. The next focus I suggest would be
getting Westlands, finishing off their Mk V production run with
Seafires to move to Mk VIIIs while tackling Castle Bromwich. I think
you could fully convert to Mk VIII-based production by spring 1944,
with an increasing number of rear-tank versions available within that
output, and with the Mk XIV entering service at the same time.


snip

Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month, that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.

Guy



  #14  
Old August 21st 03, 09:53 PM
Guy Alcala
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 06:53:31 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
of Fighter OperationsGuy Alcala
wrote:

Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.


I'm still the only one of the three of us to appoint himself to the
Air Council, so start bribing me now if you want me to rubber-stamp
your promotion to Air rank.


At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
humble and obedient servant.

P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.

snip internal tank capacity

[snip next test report]

Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint,


Nope, you've now moved onto the next tankage problem: the wing tanks!

Notice how I've been using a figure of 12.5 Imperial gallons for them?
Well, their size seems to fluctuate from 12.5 galls up to 16-or even
18 in some later Spits. 12.5 seems to be the most common as this
report bears out: 85 galls forward fuselage plus two 12.5 galls in
the wing giving 110 gallons.


I've seen a precise figure of 13 point (something) given for the Mk. VII/VIII, which often gets
rounded up to 14 gallons, although rounding to 27 total is closer.

a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
particular day?


My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.


Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.

Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.


Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.


Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
possible.


Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.

snip unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable areas of agreement

The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.


Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems.


I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
(or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
tanks?


The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.

snip musings on tank plumbing

I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
consideration.


What kind of air speed does that give you?


180 IAS according to the (rather small-scale) graph at 15,000 feet.
It claims to be valid from 10,000-25,000 feet, but not fully accurate
for rpm at different heights.

Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
TAS at escort altitudes.


By November 1942 the Spit Vs at least seem to be cruising at 300mph
TAS at 20,000 feet when anticipating enemy contact. 2,400 rpm +4 lbs
seems to have been one target setting recorded in some primary
documentation I've seen from that time. 2,400 rpm at +4lbs would
increase consumption to 66 galls per hour, but should permit
(according to the graph) 200 IAS within the acceptable revs range.
The Air mpg drops to 6, and we'd need to increase that consumption for
external tank drag, but it doesn't change things much. The relatively
low consumption of the Merlin seems to stand it in good stead there,
but I've always thought the P-47 cruised faster.


I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.

snip even more general agreement

Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
involved at this stage.


I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
involved?


Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
investigate that nightmare much further.


snip

Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
the delivery van breaking down.

No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.


We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs.


This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
being shipped out to overseas theatres.


Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.

If you want the whole of Mk
VIII production, when does this decision get made?


End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.

My Mk V speculation was based on what would be likely with existing
resources. 12 Group needed that range, and FC didn't give a stuff
what they did with their Mk Vs (e.g. the LF Vb conversions at this
time). Increasing internal tankage would be a small step to them,
without major political considerations. I can only see this whole
scenario working if FC actually have some resources capable of
supporting a daylight effort; even the CAS can't complelely dictate
operational tactics to an RAF C-in-C.


We'll have to wait on AVM Stickney's Cg calcs, I think.

Mk. VIII production rate

Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month,


I'd agree, but frankly you're hitting the limit of the relevant
production resource, i.e. the Hampshire production group focused on
Supermarine's dispersed work. You might get 120 or so out of them per
month of they packed up everything else, bar a couple of PR Spits and
the beginnings of the Mk XIV. The next focus I suggest would be
getting Westlands, finishing off their Mk V production run with
Seafires to move to Mk VIIIs while tackling Castle Bromwich. I think
you could fully convert to Mk VIII-based production by spring 1944,
with an increasing number of rear-tank versions available within that
output, and with the Mk XIV entering service at the same time.


snip

Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month, that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.

Guy



  #15  
Old August 21st 03, 10:46 PM
Guy Alcala
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Guy Alcala wrote:
snip

Sorry for the multiple posts. My browser kept telling me that my ID was incorrect, and that the message
hadn't been posted. Obviously, neither was correct.

Guy

  #16  
Old August 22nd 03, 05:40 AM
Peter Stickney
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In article ,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 22:46:44 -0400, Air-Vice Marshal Stickney, Air
Member for Research and Development, wrote:

By all means, except I also note a depressing lack of nationalistic
abuse in this post.


Oh, well then, how's this: The last time a Brit tried to hand my
family a line like that we threw his tea in the harbor.


Now that was the kind of atrocity that should have featured in "the
Patriot"....


It did, in the 1773 original version. (Well, what really happened was
that Charlie, the guy unloading the tea, sorta miscalculated with the
block & tackle. So he and the Shop Steward cooked up this story about
how some of the patriot guys were down at the tavern, getting all
riled up about the tea tax, and after they had a snootful, dressed up
like Indians and chucked the tea in the harbor...)

In truth, though, the Revolutionary period, and the years leading up
to it were a turbulent time. Neither side was above a bit on
intimidation or downright terrorism. For example, Kingston, NH, right
near me, has a memorial plaque for one Dr. Josiah Bartlett, who was
delegate to the Continental Congress, and the second signature on the
Declaration of Independance. What they don't tell you is that while
he was down in Philadelphia, his peace-loving, Rule of Law Loyalist
neighbors burned his house, looted his farm, and, I believe, killed at
least one of his sons.

Still, an innovative approach to evading custioms duties and personal
taxation which I'm sure is maintained as a family tradition under the
IRS and the enlightened leadership of Lord Dubya of Shrub. Shame
about Shay's rebellion, not to mention Sam Adam's interesting
post-colonial take on sedition and the level of property ownership
required to participate in a representative democracy.


It takes all sorts. And we have all sorts.

Ah, that feels better, now back to the mud-slinging of rational
discourse.

[rear fuselage tanks in Spit Vcs]

That's going to take a lot of fiddly meaduring & figuruing to say for
sure, but, looking over the inboard profiles (X-ray views) of both
aircraft, one thing does stand out - a Spitfire's cockpit is aft of
the wing, and well aft of the CG. And the fuselage ahead of the
cockpit is already full of stuff. (Fuel, mostly) The available space
behind the cockpit is a long way aft of the CG, which isn't good.
A Mustang's cocpit is over the wing. The aft tank location is
basically right at the trailing edge. Not only is the airplane more
tolerant of how it's loaded, the tank location is in a better place.


There's no denying it's a real problem.


That's the difficulty with small airplanes. The slightest change has
big effects. R.J. Mitchell's successors at Vickers-Supermarine did an
absolutely incredible job keeping the Spitfire not only viable, but at
the top end of things during the war. Of course, Rolls helped, too,
by buiding three world-beating engines that were not only private
ventures, but, at least originally, not favored officially.
(For the record, those are the original Merlin, the two-stage Merlin
60 series, and the Griffon. The Air Ministry had been planning on
curtailing Merlin production in the '42-'43 timeframe, and, after teh
failure of the Vulture, using the Napier Sabre for high power
applications. Luckily, Lord Hives was a manager who not only could
perceive the real need, but was persuasive enough to sway the
government.

Agreed, but is this insoluable? The question doesn't appear as easily
to definatively answer (either way) as it first appeared to me.


Well, for teh Mk VIII and Mk XIV, it indeed was. FOr a Mk V, I'm not
sure.


See what you think over the sums when you get a chance.

Actually, according to the A&AEE's reports on testing Mustang Is, and
various Mk Vs, I don't see a whole lot of difference in altitude
performance, even without the Mustang II's higher-supercharged engine.


At 25,000 feet? There's no doubt the Alison Mustang was very useful
below that height, but we need an escort force which performs well in
the 20-25,000 or even 30,000 feet band. I'm dubious about the Mustang
I in that environment, even more so with the Mustang II which I
thought had a lower-altitude supercharger peak.


At 25,000, there's not a whole lot of difference between a Mk V Spit
and a Mustang I. Both were gettig pretty ahsmatic at that point.
in static conditions, (no ram) a Merlin 45's Full Throttle Height for
Max Power was 9250' (3000RPM/+16) Climb Power FTH was 16,000', (2850
RPM/+9). A Merlin 46's FTM was 14,000' for max power, and 19,000' for
climb power. There wasn't a whole lot of difference there than the
Mustan'gs Allisons, and the Mustang had a bit better ram recovery.
Note also that as the Merlin 40 series was progressively re-rated for
higher boosts, the FTH dropped quite a bit. The supercharger could
only compress the air so much, after all, and so, in order to get a
higher boost, it has to start with thicker air.

It didn't climb as well as a Spit, and it didn't quite turn as well,
but it did out-speed, out-turn and out-zoom the Fw 190As that the
Abbeville boys were flying. (Speaking of which, is Holly Hills still
extant? I know he was recovering from his stroke a few years back.)


Sorry, I don't know.


I hope he is. He used to show up here, and had corresponded with some
of us, back about the turn of the century. Among his other
accomplishments, he was the first pilot to score a kill while flying a
Mustang. He bagged an Fw 190 over Dieppe during the attempted raid,
while flying with an RCAF squadron. He later joined the U.S. Navy,
and partidcipated in the Marianas Turkey Shoot.

Precisely. We need to posit a sufficient instiutional change of
policy and interest to even begin this, but as nothing would happen
without it, we might as well take it as a given.


Well, I could begin my somewhat-factually based Nationalistic Rant
about how the Brits, and Europeans in general never figured out how to
put long range into fighter airplanes becasue their countries are so
danged small, and that you can't ever be more than an hour from a
National Border or coastline, unlike those of us who need to be able
to fly stuff from San Francisco to Honolulu routinely, but I won't.


Actually, I don't think that's sufficiently chauvanistic, in that I
think there is a cultural dynamic relatesd to geography at work.
However, the flip side of that is that the Europeans produced better
interceptors in the early war period partly because of their
willingness to cut weight (and fuel carried) to the minimum required
for an area-defence fighter. Now I actually think the early US
fighters (even the P-40 and P-39) were better than their later press
made them out to be, but in this instance I think that for all it's
shortcomings, the Spitfire in 1942-3 was the best type available in
meaningful quantity for altitude combat, which is one reason the USAAF
got it to replace the P-39.


Well, we could, if we wanted to, produce small, short-ranged fast
climbing interceptors. Take a look at teh Curtiss CW-22 Demon. One
way to look at it was that it was the American Zero. Basically, it
was a Wright R1820 with a pistol grip. Consider, if you will, a 1940
airplane with a climb rate of 5,000'/ minute, adn a lower wing loading
than a Mitsubishi A6M. The Flying Tigers got 3, which crashed on a
delivery flight due to poor fuel and bad weather (Erik Shilling flew
it and liked it), and the Dutch East Indies had a couple of squadrons
of them. They didn't fare at all well when the Japanese came - they
didn't have hte endurance to fly standing patrols, and Java had no
early warning system or GCI. All thich climb and maneuverability
meant nothing when the Zeros dropped on them like a box of rocks when
they were trying to take off.

Getting more fuel into the Spitfire airframe, for all the
difficulties, is a better option than trying to make the P-40 or P-39
a competitive high-altitude fighter.


Oh, I certainly agree. I've got the NACA Tech Report on full-size
drag tests done on single-engin service airplanes in the Langley Full
Size Tunnel. (Not models, mind you, but the real airplanes) One of
the airplanes tested was the Turbosupercharged XP-39. With the turbo
& intercooler, it was a very draggy airplane that would have never met
its performance guarantees. The small wing limited ceiling as much as
the lack of engine power, and there wasn't any room for growth.

[2 pilot regime]

The loading on the training infrastructure would increase, and the
attritionally-supportable force would shrink, but then again BC took
heavy casualties and expanded, and I'm not aware of a critical aircrew
shortage: aircrew training slots seem to be over-subscribed since
1941, with pools of aircrew forming everywhere except in Bomber
Command. The output of trained pilots is an issue, but then I'm not
aware of it being inadequate historically. If anything, the British
prioritised aircrew training too much in the period 1941-43 with
repercussions elsewhere on the war effort (e.g. infantry replacements
in 1944-45).


It's a good question, though. If you suddenly start needing twice as
many bomber pilots, the repercussions will be far & wide.


Agreed, but look how many pilots BC were going through in 1943. 100%
losses over 6 months is not insubstantial. If we can keep daylight
raid losses within bounds, which I think is possible, we'll be no
worse off even if we half the size of 3 Group's initial operational
strength.


Perhaps.

Yes, but even the Wright Field Spits also had 43 gallon tanks behind
the pilot, against 33 gallons in the wings (according to the A&AEE
report summary on MK210 in S&M). Wing tanks have always been a given
with me, as you & Guy have already specified Mk VIII airframes, which
had 25 gall leading-edge tanks, but as Quill states, the only
available space for major increases in internal fuel was behind the
pilot.


43 of _whose_ gallons?


I thought Imperial - were the 62.5 gallon Mustang underwing tanks used
in that trial US or Imperial? They look bigger than 44/45 gallon RAF
tanks.


They were the U.S. streamlined tanks. that would give each one 450#
of fuel. 62.5 Imperial, or 75 US.

It's worth pointing out that the Wright Field
modded aircraft used a somewhat smaller tank behind the cockpit, adn
stuck 150 U.S. Gallons of fuel under the wings, where CG wasn't an
issue. I'll admit to being a bit puzzled about why the RAF never went
for wing rack mounted drops on a Spit, until it occurred to me that
there isn't any significant amount of fuel in the wing, and teh
plumbing and pumping is going to be a royal pain.


I think some of this was dealt with with the Vc, in terms of structure
and stressing for under-wing stores. I think 44 gallon ferry tanks
should be a possibility.


The stressing was there, the plumbing wasn't. It's not 100% sinple to
rig up a drop tank. You need the fuel line, of course, but also a
pressure source to force the fuel out of the tanks when you want them
to feed, and some sort of overflow vant to deal with a tank being
pressurized, but not feeding - It adds up to a lot of plumbing,
really, sort of like taking an old carbureted car and rigging it up
for Bosch fuel injection.

Well, the elevator balance change will add to the stabilizer/elevator
combination area, and that's good. It also will reduce the control
forces for pitch, possibly to the point whre the controls are
over-balanced, and once you start waving the stick around, it wants to
amplify the action, and that's bad, leading to overcontrolling at
beast, and breaking the airplane at worst, especially with an airplane
that's already pretty light on the controls, like a Spit. The
bobweight tends to resist this overbalancing, at a cost in stick
forces. The thing is, the amount of influence from the bobweight
changes, like the elevator balance, with deflection.


Absolutely. Over-tightening in turns was an issue, and this could
only be evaded, not resolved, in a regime putting more weight behind
the CoG datum.

It's confusing,
and there's no intuitive answer other than make the tail bigger.
The same applies to the rudder, as well.


I'm going to give you those in new-production Mk VIIIs and IXs as a
priority. I took that as granted for the LR VIII with a 75 gallon
rear-fuselage tank.


Yes. They did, indeed solve the problems there.

For the LR Vc, we don't need as much in a rear tank, and we only need
it for 3 months or so as a proof of concept demonstrator before doing
it for real with the LR VIII.


I'd leave the Mk V and put the effort into the Mk VIII. In the 3
months that it would take to get the Mk VIIIs going, you can use the
heavies on targets in Western France that can be covered by the Mk Vs,
giving them some valuable experience. That's how we did it, anyway.

Granted. But none of this works without the hierarchy breathing fire
from the CAS on down for long-range escorts a la Arnold. Let me know
what you think could be done with a range of figures, from 4 inches
rearward travel on up, which seems a reasonable conjectural starting
point for me. Don't forget to use the Vc airframe as a reference
rather than a Vb in regard to landing gear.


I'll get round to it, after...


Demotion may follow as a consequence of disobeying my petty whims.
Now, about those performance figures for Sabre-engined Lancasters....


The Sabre engined Lanc is easy. Given a glide ratio of about 9:1, it
should be able to achieve a ferry range of about 10 miles. After
Bomber Command's experience with the Napier-[un]powered Hereford, the
only Motor-glider Medium Bomber, I don't think you could push that one
through. What might work, though, is after you retring the Lanc with
a bigger wing and 2-stage Merlins, you stick a set of Griffons on it.
Change the shape a bit, call it after some explorer, and sell it to
Coastal Command, if need be.


[beer]

After the Great Blaster Worm and Sobig Hydra chases I've had this
week, that's top priority. (Work real job, than travel up to the
North COuntry to help out some former clients)


No beer for bad AMRD's. Just explain the priorities to your clients
would you, there's a good chap?


Thus sayeth the Air Ministry - Sole Agents for Air.
Applications to be sent to Hercules Grytpype-Tynne, the Bladders Hot
Air Pipe.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
  #17  
Old August 22nd 03, 01:28 PM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 20:52:34 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
of Fighter Operations wrote:

At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
humble and obedient servant.


I'm only holding this Production job down until I can replace
Coningham in 2 TAF, which will let me play with all those new toys I'm
producing for his command meanwhile. That's one of the reasons I want
the XIV and I'm also breathing fire down people's necks to get the
long-nacelled Meteor III available ASAP.

P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.


Hill followed by Robb sounds good. You've already got some good Wing
leanders, like Lloyd Chadburn at Digby and Laddie Lucas at Coltishall.
Once the experiment is demonstrated to be successful, and the numbers
of LR Spits expand , 11 Group bases like Martlesham, Bradwell Bay,
Hornchurch and North Weald can be included. They'll be seeing more
combat than the 11 Group Spit squadrons, so you can count on the more
enthusiastic and aggresive squadron and wing commanders trying to get
in on the act.

My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.


Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.


Initially my aim is to replace the Spit Vs in the 2 TAF squadrons with
short-ranged XIVs and IXs for the invasion period. I also want to
replace the LR Spit VIIIs and IXs in ADGB with Mustang III (LRs), with
the deleted rear fuselage tank in 1944. Hopefully this can begin in
the second half of 1944, and allow 2 TAF to re-equip with LR Spit
VIII/IXs and LR XIVs to allow strategic escort operations to take
place from 2 TAF bases in France and Belgium. By the second half of
1944, all Merlin-engined Spit production will be to an LR standard
(enlarged 96 gallon front tanks, 27 gallon wing tanks and 75 gallon
rear tank) so supply shouldn't be a problem.

The leanest time will be in spring 1944, as LR wastage will only be
replaceable from the Mk VIII production from the Eastleigh group as
Castle Bromwich converts, and operational wastage will be high. There
should be an easing during D-Day and Normandy, as the Germans move
back to France to face the tactical fighters, and Castle Bromwich
comes on stream. This should allow extensive re-equipment at the same
time as Mustangs become available. There should be enough Mustangs to
re-equip two wings (as in OTL; in this TL less Mustangs are being lost
in spring 1944 as the LR Spits are taking some of the strain) which
should go to 12 Group, and allow 11 Group to re-equip.

Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
possible.


Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.


The maximum loss to Mk VIII production will be 10 airframes per month
in December 1943 - January 1944, any further increase being covered by
new production of Mk VIIIs, or more likely from increasing LR IX
production at Castle Bromwhich thereafter. I think you should be able
to rely on a minimum allocation of 90 Spit VIIIs in October, November
and December 1943, moving up to 100 to 120 per month for the first
three months of 1944, and some of these appearing with rear-fuselage
tanks. In return, I should be getting deliveries of 10 Mk XIVs per
month from December to March 1944, going up to 20 and thirty per month
thereafer as Griffon 65 production increases. Remember that the XIVs
will be taking the short-ranged airframes first, and we won't start
producing LR XIVs until you're getting about 200 LR series ii Spit
VIII/IXs per month in April or May 1944.

On the other hand, this will give us an excellent tactical fighter to
counter the Fw190D, and one that can have rear-fuselage tankage
installed at the end of 1944 to give us more intermediate-range
escorts with Mustang-equivalent performance.

I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
(or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
tanks?


The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.


Yes, I think a direct feed from the rear tank and drop tank might be
less of a handling problem, providing it was used after take-off and
the initial climb, and the switch to the other tanks was done at the
right time..

I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.


2,400 rpm + 4lbs and 66 gallons per hour it is then.

Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
investigate that nightmare much further.


snip

Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
the delivery van breaking down.


Thankfully, this sort of detail generally isn't recorded at the PRO,
although the odd bureucratic struggle between the MAP and Air Ministry
and suppliers does emerge over troublesome embodiment loan equipment.
This gives you some acerbic comments about Lucas electrics not
delivering the generators required under contract x/xxxx-xx for
Manchesters, but this not being a problem as Avro hadn't got the right
mountings for the generators made yet anyway.

The level of detail you want will be stored at the supplier and
contractor's end, if it is recorded at all. Good luck!

This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
being shipped out to overseas theatres.


Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.


This is easier the earlier it is done: by September 1943 a lot of Mk
VIIIs are on merchant ships, and you've only got a pool of a couple of
dozen available to you in MU storage waiting to be shipped out.

If you want the whole of Mk
VIII production, when does this decision get made?


End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.


What provokes this at the strategic and political level? I'd suggest
an earlier date, maybe June 1943 before Hamburg and before Schweinfurt
collectively hyped BC and depressed the fortunes of daylight bombing.
It would take a couple of months for the procurement decisions to be
made and things shaken out to the point of doing something at the
squadron end.

[snip LR Vc on hold pending AMR&D AVM Stickney's report from RAE and
A&AEE]

Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month,


That will need CBAF: it's beyond the capacity of Supermarine's at
Eastleigh even with the marginals like Westland thrown in.

that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.


Yes, I think it should break down something like this. [Fantasy time,
but this should have some rational basis after the thrashing we've
given the subject]

R&D

1. Development on Seafires at Eastleigh (Mk XV, etc) to stop
immediately. FAA will survive Vc's being converted to Seafire IIIs
and L.IIIIs from storage; i.e. no new output of Seafires once Westland
have converted to the Spitfire Mk VIII. FAA to get by on US supply
otherwise.

2. Development on F.21 at Eastleigh to cease and all R&D priority to
switch to fitting LR tankage as detailed below to Mk VIII and IX
airframe. Final production work on Mk XIV to continue, any further
airframe allocation for R&D purposes to be cleared by AMR&D. Top
priority on increasing Mk IX internal tanage to Mk VIII standard, then
installing and clearing 75 gallon rear tank for operations in Mk VIII
and IX no later than December 1943. Subsequently development work to
be completed on installing same tank in MK XIV when supplies are
available.

Production

1. Eastleigh to continue maximum production of Mk Spitfire Mk VIIIs,
to a minimum MAP quota of 100 per month, increasing to 120 per month
by December 1943 as the highest priority. Entire output to go to
ADGB.

2. All Spitfire production from all sources to standardise on
enlarged Mk VIII tail on all production as soon as possible.

3. Eastleigh to begin production of maximum 10 Mk XIVs per month in
December (plus quota of 10 in October for existing airframes),
providing Mk VIII delivery minimum is fully completed.

4. Eastleigh to install 75 gallon rear-fuselage tanks in production
(Mk VIII LR), beginning December 1943, with priority for equipping
entire production output by March 1944.

5. Eastleigh to install 75 gallon RF tanks in production Mk XIVs (Mk
XIV LR) when tankage becomes available (i.e. when assigned minimum of
200 LR Spit VIII/IXs are being produced with rear-tanks). Target
date, July 1944.

6. Castle Bromwich to plan switch to Mk VIII airframe production,
with report on required machine tools and assesment of impact on
production output of Mk IXs. No action to be taken pending approval
from AMP with consultation from DFO and AMR&D on acceptability of any
production shortfall. [Marginal note scrawled by AMP: "No point
accepting any shortfall of deliveries just for retractable tailwheels
in all our Spitfire production when we're already getting the internal
tankage which is the main point at issue."]

7. Castle Bromwich to maintain full production of Mk IXs, adding Mk
VIII internal tankage (enlarged forward tanks and wing tanks) as a
priority as soon as supplies of tanks become available after meeting
Eastleigh's needs. Production to be spliced with Mk IX (LR series i)
to be Mk VIII-equivalent. Supplies to be directed to ADGB as
priority.

8. Castle Bromwich to install 75-gallon rear tank to begin June 1944
as Mk IX [LR series ii). Supplies to be directed to ADGB as priority.

Taking a wild stab in the dark, I'll make some
hopefully-not-totally-ridiculous minimum estimations of production.

[figures for Mk VIII/IX [LR]/Mk XIV]

Oct '43 - 90/10/10
Nov '43 - 100/10/10
Dec '43 - 120/10/10
Jan '44 - 110/20/10
Feb '44 - 110/30/10
Mar '44 - 110/50/10
Apr '44 - 100/80/20
May '44 - 100/100/20
Jun '44 - 100/100/20
Jul '44 - 90/120/20
Aug '44 - 90/120/30
Sep '44 - 90/120/30
Oct '44 - 80/150/30
Nov '44 - 80/150/30
Dec '44 - 80/150/30

I think there were about 300 Spitfires being produced per month in
this period as a an approximate rule of thumb. These figures leave a
remaining balance of shorter-ranged Spitfires for supply to other
theatres and reverse-lend lease. All Spitfires built by October 1943
were Mk IX or better, as the Mk V production run ended at CBAF that
month with the last half-dozen to be produced, so Merlin 60 supply
shouldn't be an issue.

By March 1944, I think it might be possible to have the entire
production of Mk VIIIs with RF tanks, and the same for the LR IXs by
the summer. The tank production is of course the biggest unknown and
consequently the largest bit of fantasy, but the scaling up here
shouldn't be too far from what Supermarine actually did with the Mk
VII/VIII production earlier in 1943 and what CBAF did with the
rear-tanked IXs and XVIs in late 1944.

Gavin Bailey



--

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"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

  #18  
Old August 24th 03, 01:05 PM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 04:01:24 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[tank plumbing]

I'm not sure that accords with RAF standards. I finally got my hands on Price, and reading the specs for
F.7/30, Part 2(B) "Fuel and Oil Systems," I'm not sure that would be allowable. OTOH, the spec may have
changed.


The re-armament sepcs were definately modified as a result of combat
experience. The external slipper tanks which appeared in 1941 were
unforseen in the original contracts, just like the need for bomb
shackles and so on. I should just scan the Pilots Note's and send
them to you.

What provokes this at the strategic and political level?


Nothing. As explained in my other post, this was originally a 'what if' thought experiment from ACM
Kramer.


Fair enough. But from my perspective it's more fun to ground this in
a believeable context for a departure from the historical policy.

[Spit range]

at least 250-300 mile radius would seem doable when carrying a 90 gal. tank.
What gives? The 85 gallon Mk. IX will be somewhat worse, but not all that much.


The RAF were very conservative when planning fuel usage on operations.
They gave a Spit LF IX a range of 365 miles on internal fuel, or 785
with a 90 gallon external tank. Yet the figures the planners for
Cirucs ops used were 100 miles radius for big formations of Spit V/IXs
and only 150 miles for "long-range" [external tank] profiles*.

[* PRO AIR 14/407 "Co-ordinated Operations, Bombers & Fighters
(Circus ops) Vol.2, 78B: Fighter Command Operational instruction
13/1943 - "Operational Endurance of Fighters", Appendix A. This gives
the following breakdown:

Type long sea-crossing/short-sea crossing/large formation

Spit V/IX short-range 300m/240m/100m
Spit V/IX long-range 420m/300m/150m]

Using these figures, actual deployment in regard to operational ranges
used on operations seems to be conservative: after D-Day, Spit V
units based on 11 Group bases and ALGs were sweeping from Manston to
Verdun on 90-gallon tanks, and Spit IX wings based on similar ALGs
were escorting and sweeping to Paris and back. This was on a tankage
profile that was identical to that available in 1942.

The high-altitude Circus ops of 1941-42 did involve large and
complicated wing assemblies over the southern coast of England at high
altitude, which consumed time and fuel, and involved formating on
slower bomber formations with zig-zag courses which all suppressed
available range. Things did change in 1942-43, with low-altitude
assemblies and mid-Channel climbs, as well as increasing external
tankage. Nobody seems to have put two and two together and actually
acknowledged the fact that they could actually escort a bomber force
all the way to the German border and back with sequential waves of
Spitfire escorts covering different sections of the route.

In this respect, the USAAF benefitted from a strategic bombing policy
which pulled the fighters out in support. British escorted bomber
operations didn't dicate fighter operational deployment in the same
manner.

The conservative figures used for Group planners (i.e. understating
the available fuel to avoid disaters like 133 Sqn's escort to Morlaix
in September 1942) leave a big difference between the known individual
range figures they used. BTW, those figures for the Mustang III from
the same source (individual a/c stats) give it a range of 690 miles on
internal fuel, or 1180 with a 90 gallon tank, while the planning
figure for short sea-crossing, small number of a/c range (the best
range figure) gives it just 600 miles. Speculatively using the same
divisor for large formations on a big-sea crossing would indicate a
contemplated range for operational planning purposes of only 200
miles.

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

  #19  
Old August 27th 03, 06:07 AM
Peter Stickney
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In article ,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
On Fri, 22 Aug 2003 00:40:42 -0400,
(Air
Vice-Marshal Stickney, Air Member for Research & Developent) wrote:

In truth, though, the Revolutionary period, and the years leading up
to it were a turbulent time. Neither side was above a bit on
intimidation or downright terrorism. For example, Kingston, NH, right
near me, has a memorial plaque for one Dr. Josiah Bartlett, who was
delegate to the Continental Congress, and the second signature on the
Declaration of Independance. What they don't tell you is that while
he was down in Philadelphia, his peace-loving, Rule of Law Loyalist
neighbors burned his house, looted his farm, and, I believe, killed at
least one of his sons.


As I see it, a civil war between to elites clashing for power. The
ordinary people were a little closer to the power in the revolutionary
colonial administrations than they were under Gubernatorial rule, but
not as much as the propaganda would have it. I reckon North could
have avoided it all by ramming through an "America Act" after the
Quebec one, giving the colonies a couple of MPs apiece, recognising
the colonial assemblies rights to levy inland taxation and reserving
trade, navigation and mercantile taxes for Parliament. There was
still going to be a collision between the British national debt and
American taxation yields at some point, but maybe it would't have come
to blows in the way that it did. I'm convinved American independence
would follow, although not in quite the same manner, but that's a
different piece of speculation altogether. Now where were we... oh
yes.


I was going to post ans incisive and fact-filled rebuttal, mentioning
the cultural drift that had taken place in the 150 years previous to
the American Revolution, and the sea change that occurred during the
French and Indian Wars, when the Colonists realized that they could,
indeed form organized troops of European quality, and the inconsistant
and, in general foolish policies of His Majesty King George III's
Governments, But it gre to about 500 lines. FOr brevity's sake,
might I refer you to James Stokesbury's "Navy and Empire". which
covers the era in a rather fair and factual manner - even if he is a
Brit.

Smash the gringos! American colonialist oppressors [insert further
nationalistic abuse here]


Hey, I really don't mind being Overpaid, Oversexed, and Over Here.
Beats formating on the South end of a Northbound mule.

Ah, the Sabre... the great white hope of British planners in 1940, and
the single biggest indictment of British production engineering and
management. Can I mention MAP reports of the level of swarf in Sabre
IIs in 1943 at this point? Hives and Freeman did the right thing by
insisting on continued Merlin development in 1941, no question about
it. Having said that, the Air Ministry investment in Merlin
production was massive, but only for the Merlin 20 series. The Merlin
60 and Griffon were definately outside chances and not part of the
great MAP "plan" of 1940 (lots of Merlin 20s from Rolls, Ford, and
Packard, but the new types to get, yes, as you said, Sabres or better
still, Vultures. Vulture-engined Typhoons, yes that would have had
the Jagdwaffe quaking in their shoes.....) .


Oh, yes. the Vulture. inline engines, if they aren't horizontally
opposed pancakes, like to be upright or inverted. Both upright and
inverted is not a good idea. It's danged fortunate that the 12"
supercharger impeller from the Vulture matched the requirements to
build a 1st (Aux) stage for the 2-stage Merlin. That almost made it
worth the trouble.

At 25,000 feet? There's no doubt the Alison Mustang was very useful
below that height, but we need an escort force which performs well in
the 20-25,000 or even 30,000 feet band. I'm dubious about the Mustang
I in that environment, even more so with the Mustang II which I
thought had a lower-altitude supercharger peak.


At 25,000, there's not a whole lot of difference between a Mk V Spit
and a Mustang I. Both were gettig pretty ahsmatic at that point.


Yes, but relatively the Mustang was worse. The RAF gave it a service
ceiling of 25,000 feet, so I think it's out of the running for
operations at or above that height. Where it could really stand out,
though, was on operations from ground level up to 15,000 feet, where
it really did have superb performance, un-matched by any other type at
the time. I'm confident they could have been used very successfully
and more agressively in that environment than they were.


The AAF's numbers for the P-51 gove a Combat Ceiling (500'/min) for
Military Power at 'bout 27,500', at 8600#, and roughly 30,000' for the
-81 engined P-51A. Normal power is, of course, rather a bit lower.

The only real problem as I see it is supply: by the summer of 1943
production has ceased, and the existing Mustang Is are being expended
from a stock imported a year or so earlier. Given that production
ended in favour of the Merlin Mustang, which we want in this ATL just
as much as historically, and the Mustang II was produced in too little
quantity to be relevant, we're stuck with a dwindling supply of ageing
aircraft.


Well, there were a lot of Mustang IIs (P-51A), you just weren't
getting them. Most were going to the MTO, and some to the CBI
Theaters. Perhaps some horse-trading could have been done.


Good aircraft nonetheless, with plenty of scope for more effective
employment, but as far as I can see not available in the numbers
required to maintain substantive attritional losses. What I would say
is that there's no reason Army Co-Operation Command can't lose them
and the potential LR Spit Vc wings in 12 Group swap their LF Spit Vbs
for them. I think a 4-6 squadron force should be operable in 1943,
swtiching to Merlin Mustangs as they become available.


Makes sense. Merlin Mustangs is really the way to go, once you get
them.

Note also that as the Merlin 40 series was progressively re-rated for
higher boosts, the FTH dropped quite a bit. The supercharger could
only compress the air so much, after all, and so, in order to get a
higher boost, it has to start with thicker air.


In this instance we're on stock Merlin 46 engines on 1941 Circus and
Rodeo heights.



[European vs American geographical influence on fighter design]

Well, we could, if we wanted to, produce small, short-ranged fast
climbing interceptors. Take a look at the Curtiss CW-22 Demon.


Well, yes, and the British could produce equally practical and
effective aircraft. Like the Brabazon. And let's not forget US
efforts like the Goblin here. Not much excess structural weight on
display there....


Well, pratical if you're building something to take the Royal Mail and
a few King's Messengers out to Inja, with stops along the way. The
payload/structure weight ratio's still pretty unfavorable. Even BOAC
bought Constallations and Strats, postwar.

Getting more fuel into the Spitfire airframe, for all the
difficulties, is a better option than trying to make the P-40 or P-39
a competitive high-altitude fighter.


Oh, I certainly agree. I've got the NACA Tech Report on full-size
drag tests done on single-engine service airplanes in the Langley Full
Size Tunnel. (Not models, mind you, but the real airplanes) One of
the airplanes tested was the Turbosupercharged XP-39. With the turbo
& intercooler, it was a very draggy airplane that would have never met
its performance guarantees. The small wing limited ceiling as much as
the lack of engine power, and there wasn't any room for growth.


Didn't they do that with a Spit Vb? I've got a NACA report on that
filed away somewhere. I was suprised they used such an example (early
production Vb, IIRC) in 1943 when they did it. I presume it had been
sitting around at Wright Field as I know some British pilots sent to
tour the US in late 1941 flew one there, although I don't know the
serial.


The Cranfield Tech Reports Server, which is an echo of the NACA tech
reports server, has a lot of Air Ministry and MoS tech reports on all
manner of subjects. One of which is model tests of the Spit, the
Mustang, adn the Spiteful, Most interesting stuff.

Yes, but even the Wright Field Spits also had 43 gallon tanks behind
the pilot, against 33 gallons in the wings (according to the A&AEE
report summary on MK210 in S&M). Wing tanks have always been a given
with me, as you & Guy have already specified Mk VIII airframes, which
had 25 gall leading-edge tanks, but as Quill states, the only
available space for major increases in internal fuel was behind the
pilot.

43 of _whose_ gallons?

I thought Imperial - were the 62.5 gallon Mustang underwing tanks used
in that trial US or Imperial? They look bigger than 44/45 gallon RAF
tanks.


They were the U.S. streamlined tanks. that would give each one 450#
of fuel. 62.5 Imperial, or 75 US.


That would indicate the rear tank was measured in imperial gallons as
well, which brings us back to the pleasant synchronicity of
Supermarine, A&AEE and Wright Field preferring 40-43 gallons as a
stable rear tank load in a Spit IX (I forget the weight of petrol in
pounds 7 or 8 lbs per gallon? This would make a Mk IX tolerably
stable with 240lbs behind the pilot with the CoG movement somewhere
about 10 inches behind the datum). I have to admit, that sounds well
beyond a balanced, bob-weighted, enlarged-horn-balanced Mk Vc.


1 Imperial Gallon is 7.2# of petrol, for most purposes. But I agree,
I'd say that the Mk V is pretty much out, as far as more fuselage fuel
goes. Wing tanks, on the other hand...


I think some of this was dealt with with the Vc, in terms of structure
and stressing for under-wing stores. I think 44 gallon ferry tanks
should be a possibility.


The stressing was there, the plumbing wasn't.


Agreed, but Wright Field did it. I have to admit I've never seen a
Spit with under-wing tanks, however. Even post-war. However, I don't
see the plumbing as a show-stopper.


It's a matter of will and resources. As the Wright Field experiment
showed, it could be done. But, then, that's not what Spits were used
for, what?

It's not 100% sinple to
rig up a drop tank. You need the fuel line, of course, but also a
pressure source to force the fuel out of the tanks when you want them
to feed, and some sort of overflow vant to deal with a tank being
pressurized, but not feeding - It adds up to a lot of plumbing,
really, sort of like taking an old carbureted car and rigging it up
for Bosch fuel injection.


Sure but this was done for various under-fuselage drop tanks, and was
done for under-wing drop tanks on the Hurricane II and Typhoon Ib.
Clearly the engineering capacity was there; my question is was there
a strucutural reason (as Supermarine claimed with MK210) to prevent
it?


The only thing that I can thing of is torsional strength of the wing -
It micht be prone to flutter. Failing that, it's easier to plumb drop
tanks into already exixting wing tanks. The fuel line runs are
shorter, and there aren't so many joints.

For the LR Vc, we don't need as much in a rear tank, and we only need
it for 3 months or so as a proof of concept demonstrator before doing
it for real with the LR VIII.


I'd leave the Mk V and put the effort into the Mk VIII.


As I said to the Director of Fighter Operations, this hinges upon the
timing and approach. If this comes from the top down, then Mk VIII
allocations and production are changeable. This demands major changes
in RAF strategic and operational leadership.

If it evolves from the ground up, it demands less of a sea-change on
behalf of the RAF brass but consequently makes the allocation of the
optimal type of Spitfire for the operations in question more subject
to the existing political and strategic dynamics.


Yeah - the Ground-up scenario will be pretty much Come as You Are.
Then again, there micht be a call for a slightly enlarged
Merlin-powered Westland Whirlwind. (With a properly sorted out fuel
system)


Pick and chose the scenario you prefer out of the two; I've made it
clear that the I feel the second is more credible on a historical
basis, not on any engineering grounds (as you have demonstrated). The
LR Vs make sense in the second, but obviously not in the first.

I'll get round to it, after...

Demotion may follow as a consequence of disobeying my petty whims.
Now, about those performance figures for Sabre-engined Lancasters....


The Sabre engined Lanc is easy. Given a glide ratio of about 9:1, it
should be able to achieve a ferry range of about 10 miles.


I find your cavalier disregard for the entertainment value of multiple
engine failure on maximum all-up-weight take-off to be most
disappointing.

After
Bomber Command's experience with the Napier-[un]powered Hereford, the
only Motor-glider Medium Bomber, I don't think you could push that one
through.


Not even when I point out that any fighter attempting to engage in a
classical curve of pursuit attack from behind would have to deal with
the dense defensive smoke-screen produced by four Sabres burning oil
like an Iraqi making self-destructive gestures against the Coalition
occupation?


Sounds like the USAF's MiG Evasion tactics for the COllege Eye
EC-121s, Turn away, and METO power on all operating engines. The
flood of oil would cover the MiG's canopy and force him to break off
the attack. If that didn't work, the Radar would render him sterile.

What might work, though, is after you retring the Lanc with
a bigger wing and 2-stage Merlins, you stick a set of Griffons on it.
Change the shape a bit, call it after some explorer, and sell it to
Coastal Command, if need be.


And end up using it as a keystone AEW platform in national defence
against the Warsaw pact for fifty years? No, your counterfactual
speculation has really departed from the path of rationality at this
point. Let's get back to something more credible, like a
sky-blackening horde of Lanc B.V's (Sabre) deafening the population of
the Ruhr.


Oh, I don't know - if you've got some hand-me-down Air Search radars
that have managed to outlive 2 previous airframes, it might just
work...


No beer for bad AMRD's. Just explain the priorities to your clients
would you, there's a good chap?


Thus sayeth the Air Ministry - Sole Agents for Air.
Applications to be sent to Hercules Grytpype-Tynne, the Bladders Hot
Air Pipe.


Like the Mexican bandit accomplices around el Jefe in a spaghetti
western, nobody can risk laughing until the CAS signals his approval
of the AMR&D's jokes by laughing himself. Anybody ill-advised enough
to continue displaying signs of amusement after the CAS stops smiling
will of course find themselves on an interesting posting to Burma.


If you take such action sir, you will hear from my Soliciters, the
firm of Lamb, Curry, and Rice are on retainer.

Oddly enough, this post is rather delayed because I was laid low by
the recurrence of some dratted Intestinal thing that I picked up in
the Tropics. That's what I get for not drinking Gin.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
  #20  
Old August 27th 03, 06:20 AM
Peter Stickney
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In article ,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 04:01:24 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[tank plumbing]

I'm not sure that accords with RAF standards. I finally got my hands on Price, and reading the specs for
F.7/30, Part 2(B) "Fuel and Oil Systems," I'm not sure that would be allowable. OTOH, the spec may have
changed.


The re-armament sepcs were definately modified as a result of combat
experience. The external slipper tanks which appeared in 1941 were
unforseen in the original contracts, just like the need for bomb
shackles and so on. I should just scan the Pilots Note's and send
them to you.


If you do, I respectfully request a copy as well. I'm more than
willing to trade.

Using these figures, actual deployment in regard to operational ranges
used on operations seems to be conservative: after D-Day, Spit V
units based on 11 Group bases and ALGs were sweeping from Manston to
Verdun on 90-gallon tanks, and Spit IX wings based on similar ALGs
were escorting and sweeping to Paris and back. This was on a tankage
profile that was identical to that available in 1942.

The high-altitude Circus ops of 1941-42 did involve large and
complicated wing assemblies over the southern coast of England at high
altitude, which consumed time and fuel, and involved formating on
slower bomber formations with zig-zag courses which all suppressed
available range. Things did change in 1942-43, with low-altitude
assemblies and mid-Channel climbs, as well as increasing external
tankage. Nobody seems to have put two and two together and actually
acknowledged the fact that they could actually escort a bomber force
all the way to the German border and back with sequential waves of
Spitfire escorts covering different sections of the route.


Y'know, I get the feeling that the RAF didn't really trust the
navigation skills of its fighter pilots. I don't know what
justification they had, but they did seem to think that having relays
of escorts would be too complicated. Mark you, it _was_ complicated,
and there were some serious Eighth Air FOrce errors, on this score,
where the relief relay didn't make it, and the bombers were exposed,
but it did work often enough.


In this respect, the USAAF benefitted from a strategic bombing policy
which pulled the fighters out in support. British escorted bomber
operations didn't dicate fighter operational deployment in the same
manner.


The conservative figures used for Group planners (i.e. understating
the available fuel to avoid disaters like 133 Sqn's escort to Morlaix
in September 1942) leave a big difference between the known individual
range figures they used. BTW, those figures for the Mustang III from
the same source (individual a/c stats) give it a range of 690 miles on
internal fuel, or 1180 with a 90 gallon tank, while the planning
figure for short sea-crossing, small number of a/c range (the best
range figure) gives it just 600 miles. Speculatively using the same
divisor for large formations on a big-sea crossing would indicate a
contemplated range for operational planning purposes of only 200
miles.


The AAF figures for a Merlin Mustang give ita Radius in internal fuel
of about 400 miles, includeng takeoff, form-up and climbout, 20
minutes of combat, and 30 minutes of reserve.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
 




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