Lost comm -- what would you do?

Well this sort of happened to me a few weeks ago. Went out to get some
actual on a low visibility / low ceiling evening from MMU to SWF (about
45 nm flight). I don't remember the exact routing, but it was the
typical one that involves flying to the HUO VOR, then a radial off the
VOR to intercept the IAF for the ILS 27 approach. Winds were strong out
of the SW above 1500 feet, so getting up there took all of 20 minutes.

After I was handed off from the "busy" NY approach freq (127.6) to the
one handling SWF's airspace, I tried for about 3 minutes to check-in on
the new freq. I kept hearing a guy who sounded like an approach
controller, but it sure sounded like Boston center. I was thick in the
soup at 4000, about to make that turn at HUO, and couldn't raise
_anybody_ on the freq. Fortunately the plane I was flying has a Garmin
in it, so I toggled back to the previous frequency, said I couldn't
raise anybody, and finally received the correct frequency to dial in.
(I think the controller messed up, not me, but it's moot at this
point).

So I finally check in with the new controller, and he says I'm about to
overshoot the localizer... which I can plainly see on the GPS. I make
the turn pretty tight, and get lined up for the approach. At this
point, I know now I should have called this approach off and asked for
vectors to get lined back up, because up until this point, I had not
had a chance to brief, get weather, tune radios, or anything... I'd
been dealing with what I thought was a lost comm situation.

Let's just say that the approach was less than optimal, and I
definitely should have been more ahead of the plane than I ended up
being. To top off the stress, I broke out literally 100 feet above
minimums, into a VERY thick fog bank that only allowed me to see the
approach lights, not the actual runway. But, that's legal with an ILS,
so I continued down to minimums, dropped the throttle, dropped in flaps
to 30, and finally saw the runway (at least the first half - SWF has a
10k foot strip). When I got on the ground, I think I let the plane roll
out just a bit longer than usual, just so I could finally get my
bearings fully in place - I definitely scared myself on that approach.

The lesson I learned from that is to constantly evaluate where you are
in relation to where you should be - i.e., should you have gotten the
ATIS by now? Should you have briefed the approach? What about the
missed approach procedure? By the time I got to HUO, I had done none of
those things, and it didn't cross my mind as I was shooting the
approach - I dialed in the ILS and basically locked it in as best I
could while reminding myself what the minimum altitude was. I know I
handled the inadvertant "lost comm" part properly by going back to the
previous controller, and not wasting too much time on the wrong
frequency... but I realize now I should have done more to make sure I
didn't fall so far behind the plane.

--
Guy

VOR to intercept the IAF for the ILS 27 approach. Winds were strong out

Whoops, meant the ILS 9 approach.

In article t,
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:

"Michael" wrote in message
ups.com...

Nope, years prior. Can't find the cite anymore. Short version - Baron
on an IFR flight plan over the Gulf, due to crossed wires a fighter is
sent to take a look. Weather is cruddy, pilot botches the intercept
(realize that at 8000 ft, cruise speed for a Baron is just about the
same as stall speed for a fighter) and there's a midair. Fighter pilot
bails out successfully. Baron pilot and his pax go in.

At the time (this was over a decade ago) a huge stink was raised.
There was talk of a lawsuit, but it was squashed via sovereign
immunity. Supposedly, intercept procedures were changed. However, a
friend of mine was flying on a DVFR flight plan from over the Gulf in
his Twin Comanche and looked back, upon hearing a strange noise, to see
an F-16 hanging just off his wing, everything hanging out. Seconds
later, the pilot has do dive away to avoid a stall, coming within
several feet of my friend. So nothing has changed.


Is this it?



NTSB Identification: ATL83MA084B

Accident occurred Sunday, January 09, 1983 in CHERRY POINT, NC

Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas F4C, registration: AFNG
BEECH D55, registration: N7142N

Injuries: 7 Fatal, 2 Uninjured.

THE TWO ACFT COLLIDED AT ABOUT 9,500 FT MSL 30 MI SOUTH OF CHERRY POINT.
AFTER DEPARTING NASSAU, THE PLT OF THE BE-D55 NEVER ACTIVATED HIS FLT PLAN.
AN ADIZ PENETRATION TIME WAS THEREFORE NEVER ESTABLISHED. WHEN THE
UNIDENTIFIED ACFT ENTERED WARNING AREA W-122, THE USAF CONTACTED FAA ATC FOR
IDENTIFICATION INFO. SINCE FAA WAS NOT CONTROLLING ANY TRAFFIC IN THAT AREA
AN INTERCEPT ORDER WAS ISSUED. AT 1637 FAA GOT A POSITION REPORT FROM THE
BE-D55 & RELAYED IT TO MILITARY CONTROL. HOWEVER, THE TWO FIGHTER ACFT
CONTINUED TO CLOSE IN ON THE TARGET FOR RADAR CONTACT. THE LEAD ACFT WAS TO
CLOSE ABOUT 1,000 FT BELOW THE TARGET AT A PREPLANNED CLOSURE RATE OF 50 KTS
(ACTUAL RATE WAS 127 KTS). SECONDS BEFORE THE COLLISION, THE BE-D55 TURNED
LEFT AS REQUESTED BY FAA ATC THUS TURNING IT INTO THE PATH OF THE OVERTAKING
INTERCEPTOR WHICH ALSO HAD TURNED LEFT TO BREAK OFF THE INTERCEPT. THE
SAFETY BOARD DID NOT DETERMINE THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT, BUT
OFFERED STATEMENTS OF CAUSE.

What isn't said in this narrative is the reason the pilot was in this
predicament in the first place was that he was told to clear customs in
Florida. He didn't like that, so he decided in flight that he would
proceed to New Bern (?) or Wilmington (?) to clear customs because that
was the direction he originally wanted to go.

"john smith" wrote in message
...

What isn't said in this narrative is the reason the pilot was in this
predicament in the first place was that he was told to clear customs in
Florida. He didn't like that, so he decided in flight that he would
proceed to New Bern (?) or Wilmington (?) to clear customs because that
was the direction he originally wanted to go.


His destination was Norfolk. There are a few other things not said in this
narrative. The Baron pilot had six passengers in a six place aircraft, he
penetrated an ADIZ without a flight plan, and the intercept was conducted in
IMC.

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR84-07.pdf

"Roy Smith" wrote in message
...

A student and I took off today IFR from HPN. Destination was FWN (Sussex,
NJ). Rhumb line course is 42 NM at 294 degrees.

Clearance was "Westchester 1, RV CMK, CMK 275R to intercept SAX 039R,
SAX, direct FWN, maintain 3000, expect 4000 after 10 minutes".

Departing runway 34, the SID is "climb to 1000, then left turn 295, expect
vectors to departure fix". CMK is 14 miles at 037.

We depart, check in with NY Approach, and get "maintain 4000". Nothing
about heading, so we stay on the SID heading of 295, which conveniently is
pointing us right at our destination.

Here's the question. If you went lost comm, what would you do?
Technically, our next waypoint is still CMK, so "fly the route previously
cleared" would have us head direct CMK then as cleared. But, every mile
we fly on 295 takes us further and further away from CMK, and making a,
say,
150 degree, course change to head back to CMK seems pretty dumb. Yet,
they wouldn't have given us such a circuitous route if there wasn't some
good
reason they needed to keep us away from the rhumbline.

The route is off-airways, but you note that the VOR-A
(http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0511/05412VGA.PDF) MSA is 3100. Assume you're
familiar with the area, and know that 4000 clears all terrain that might
possibly be a factor along any route you might pick.

So, what would you do? Turn back to CMK and proceed from there? Keep on
the 295 heading until you intercept the CMK 275 or the SAX 039, whichever
comes first (assuming that heading even intercepts those at all). Turn
direct SAX? Hit the reset button and start the scenario again?


I'd squawk NORDO briefly then return to the assigned beacon code, turn
towards SAX, fly the VOR-A, land.

"Michael" wrote in message
oups.com...

The other (much scarier) possibility
would be the existence of a flight restricted area - temporary or
otherwise - along the direct course, and the unpleasant possibility of
an incompetently handled military interception in IMC (which has
already killed at least one completely innocent pilot and pax legally
operating IFR on a flight plan) or simply a heat seeking missile up the
exhaust. If that's the case, think twice about that shortcut.


If you're referring to the BE55/F-4C midair near Cherry Point in 1983 there
are a few items you remember incorrectly. That interception wasn't
incompetently handled, the civilian pilot wasn't completely innocent, wasn't
operating legally, and wasn't on an IFR flight plan.

If you're referring to the BE55/F-4C midair near Cherry Point in 1983 there
are a few items you remember incorrectly.

Quite possibly.

That interception wasn't incompetently handled,

The targeted intercept altitude was 1000 ft below the Baron, yet the
intercepting F4C wound up at the same altitude as the Baron. The
targeted closure rate was 50 kts, but the intercepting F4C closed at
120+ kts. I would call that incompetent.

the civilian pilot wasn't completely innocent

So what crime was he guilty of?

wasn't operating legally

Really? At the time of impact, he was making a turn as directed by
ATC. He called in and made a position report prior. There is some
question as to whether his flight plan was opened, but he's not here to
defend himself, and my experience is that crossed wires between
different facilities are not all that rare.

I've had search and rescue called out for me because I supposedly
failed to close a DVFR flight plan. It was only after I called the
facility with which I had closed the flight plan after completing my
ADIZ penetration that they admitted that in fact they had a record of
me closing the flight plan - they simply never forwarded it to the
facility responsible for my destination airport.

So given that the pilot made a position report once in range and was
complying with ATC instructions, I think it more likely that there was
a simple snafu rather than willful failure to activate a flight plan.

and wasn't on an IFR flight plan

That may be true - but he had filed some sort of flight plan, be it IFR
or DVFR.

I've been leery of the possibility of such problems ever since I was
given a clearance through a hot restricted area. That's a no-****ter.
I was vectored for traffic significantly off my route, then was cleared
present position direct destination. I was in and out of IMC, cruising
IFR at 6000 ft, when I realized that the frequency was awfully quiet.
I was unable to raise center on any of the published frequencies for my
area and headed straight for a restricted area (that my original flight
planned route missed by miles). Fortunately, I was able to raise the
tower controller at the military field next to the restricted area, who
then turned me over to the local military approach controller - who
vectored me around the restricted area since it was hot.

I wonder, had I lost comm due to equipment problems rather than poor
radio coverage, if, after I caught a missile up the exhaust pipe,
people would be claiming that I was not operating legally. I'm sure
some fault would be found with what I did, and maybe there would be no
record found of the clearance.

Michael

On 30-Nov-2005, "Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:

That interception wasn't
incompetently handled,

I'm not sure of your definition of "incompetently handled" is, but it seems
the NTSB found the collision more the fault of the Phantom Phlyer than the
Baron pilot. Here's the quote from the end of the report you linked us to:



The Nat.ona1 Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
of this accident was the failure of the F-4C pilot to maintain an
appropriate intercept
c1osir;g speed and a safe separation distance between his airplane and the
Beech Baron.
Contributing to the accident were the Beech Baron pi1o:'s penetration of the
Air Defense
Identification Zone and his faiiure to follow any of several prescribed
procedures which
would have permitted early positive identification after penetration, and
the failure of
the Fertile Controi staff to coordinate information concerning positive
identification of
the Baron in a timely manner, delaying a decision to terminate the intercept
mission.


It must have been awful to find the hair and blood embedded in the Phantom's
wing. I just hope everyone in the Baron died before they even knew what was
happening.
Scott Wilson

"Michael" wrote in message
oups.com...

The targeted intercept altitude was 1000 ft below the Baron, yet the
intercepting F4C wound up at the same altitude as the Baron. The
targeted closure rate was 50 kts, but the intercepting F4C closed at
120+ kts. I would call that incompetent.


The interception was less than perfect but certainly did not descend to the
level of incompetent. The collision occurred after the intercept was broken
off and the F-4 turned away from the Baron and began a climb.
Unfortunately, the Center controller had shortly before that directed the
Baron to turn to the left, placing it in the path of the F-4.



So what crime was he guilty of?


He was in violation of FAR 99.11. He was operating an aircraft in an ADIZ,
he had not filed or activated a proper flight plan.



Really? At the time of impact, he was making a turn as directed by
ATC.


Right, a turn that put him in the path of the interceptors that ATC knew to
be operating in close proximity. Not a stellar move by the controller.



He called in and made a position report prior. There is some
question as to whether his flight plan was opened, but he's not here to
defend himself, and my experience is that crossed wires between
different facilities are not all that rare.


The only flight plan he filed was to Fort Pierce Florida. There's no
question that that flight plan was not opened, the Baron pilot never
established contact with enroute VFR advisory service after departure.



That may be true - but he had filed some sort of flight plan, be it IFR
or DVFR.


Yes, he filed a DVFR flight plan to Fort Pierce. He initially filed a
flight plan to Norfolk. When informed that US regulations required him to
enter the US in Florida he filed a flight plan to Fort Pierce. But after
departing Nassau he headed for Norfolk instead of Fort Pierce and never
activated his filed flight plan. Why would he? His flight plan had him
going to Fort Pierce, but he was going to Norfolk.

wrote in message ...

I'm not sure of your definition of "incompetently handled" is, but it
seems the NTSB found the collision more the fault of the Phantom Phlyer
than the Baron pilot. Here's the quote from the end of the report you
linked us to:

The Nat.ona1 Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the failure of the F-4C pilot to maintain an
appropriate intercept c1osir;g speed and a safe separation distance
between his airplane and the Beech Baron.
Contributing to the accident were the Beech Baron pi1o:'s penetration of
the Air Defense Identification Zone and his faiiure to follow any of
several prescribed procedures which would have permitted early positive
identification after penetration, and the failure of the Fertile Controi
staff to coordinate information concerning positive identification of the
Baron in a timely manner, delaying a decision to terminate the intercept
mission.


Here's another quote from that report:

"The National Transportation Safety Board did not determine the probable
cause of this accident and offered the following statements of cause:"

You quoted only the probable cause statement of NTSB members Patricia
Goldman and Patrick Bursley. Member Vernon Grose saw it a bit differently:

"The probable causes of this accident were (a) the unauthorized penetration
of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), (b) ambiguity in
responsibility
between the Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) and NORAD
SAGE facilities regarding identification and control of unknown aircraft,
(c) deviation by the Baron pilot from a requirement to activate a previously
filed VFR flight plan and thus declare ADIZ penetration, (d) fsilure [sic]
of the Baron pilot to file and activate an instrument flight plan before
operating in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), (e) inadequate
tracking sensitivity for both ground and airborne radar for the intended
mission, (f) use of an excessive closure rate between unidentified aircraft
and F4-C while depending on visual identification in IMC, and (g)
continuation of the F-4C intercept mission after identification of the Baron
hed [sic] been established."