Hard Deck

At 10:32 02 February 2018, wrote:
This has been an interesting and pretty civil discussion involving
primaril=
y two polar opposites, personal freedoms and restrictive
structures.
Thanks=
to everyone who has posted here without flares that normally
result when
d=
ealing with such a flammable topic lol.

One aspect I would like to introduce to the discussion is one of the
elemen=
tal nature of racing or record setting. Racing/record setting are by
nature=
games of managing risk for maximum achievement. The very fact
that there
a=
re those who want to attempt to "manage" the risk of others flies
in the
fa=
ce of the very nature of the sport. Are some
"guidlines/disincentives"
need=
ed? Yes, but I feel we are trending into the realm of trying to
micromanage=
the sport.

Second, historically, races are not only won by those flying the
perfect
fl=
ight, with decisions made that minimized risk and maximized
speed, but
ALSO=
days are won by those same pilots who chose or had to take a
major
calcula=
ted risk to win the day. Those who are trying to eliminate that side
of
the=
contest also eliminate a whole grouping of pilots who have
developed the
s=
kill set for that method of fast flying. This new rule schema/trend
that
is=
developing, in essence, penalizes guys like moffat, reichman scott
and
str=
eideck who knew how to fly very aggressively. Karl has commented
on this
th=
read saying basically the same thing. Do all of you "new
generation"
fliers=
who want a more regulated form of racing think his opinion is
unqualified
=
or out of touch with what sailplane racing is all about? I think
many of
yo=
u actually do and think that form of flying has no place in todays
game.

I think much of this argument has been caused by the
charactoristics of
mod=
ern sailplanes themselves. Low saves, landing out, higher risk
decisions
we=
re normative for racing in the older generation of competition. If
you
coul=
dn't fly that way, at times, then you could not be competative.
Today,
perf=
ormance is such that the game is more a game of micro decisions,
not macro
=
ones. When guys today are forced into macro decisions like a low
save or
ev=
en a land out for that matter, they are ill equiped to handle them.
That's
=
the true problem underlying a majority of the racing accidents
today.
Expan=
ded rules implimentation does'nt really address the that
fundamental
proble=
m but it definitely does redefine the nature of the race.

I think that's a pretty good summary of the issue. You can add
Ray Gimmey to the above list. He won the 1988 STD Nats in
Minden (actually, Klaus Holighaus won, but he was a guest) due
to a very low save on a difficult day. Ray told me that he had
already rolled out on final to land on a dirt road when he hit an
8 Kt thermal and wrapped into it to get home. Ray told me that
he was down around ~100' IIRC.

Yes, Evan, there were no recorders back then, so it is a story, but
I have known Ray to be a pretty "straight shooter" so I have no
reason to doubt his version of this. He told me right after we
landed at Minden.

Here is another story. My father told me how they did it in German
glider contests before WWII. If they got low, they picked a good
plowed field to land in which might also be a thermal generator.
Then, they would dive down and make a high speed low pass over
the field in order to try and break loose/trigger a building thermal
bubble. After the low pass, they would pull up (similar to one of
our high speed flying finishes) and make a circle or two. If the
maneuver was successful, the bubble would have been broken
loose and they would climb away. If not successful, they would
land, as they had already given the field a "close" inspection. I
have not yet tried this method myself, and I don't know if I ever
will, but it is/was a skill set that pilots have used in the past, so
it is probably relevant to this discussion because if one dives
down from above 300', one would violate the proposed "hard
deck" even if one were to zoom back up above it....

RO

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 2:32:30 AM UTC-8, wrote:
Second, historically, races are not only won by those flying the perfect flight, with decisions made that minimized risk and maximized speed, but ALSO days are won by those same pilots who chose or had to take a major calculated risk to win the day. Those who are trying to eliminate that side of the contest also eliminate a whole grouping of pilots who have developed the skill set for that method of fast flying.


This summarizes the two poles of the argument. Those who believe taking 'major calculated' risks should continue to be part of the game, and those who would like to minimize those as a means to win.

I do not believe though, that "Those who are trying to eliminate that side of the contest also eliminate a whole grouping of pilots who have developed the skill set for that method of fast flying." It does not eliminate those pilots from competition, only to the extent that their success was born exclusively on taking those major calculated risks. The really good pilots are going to win anyway - even with airspace restricted to someone's idea of safe. There are a very few who would do less well, because major risk taking is a large part of their success. Is the success rate of taking major calculated risks what we are trying to measure in soaring competition? Should taking major calculated risks be weighted with, or above, picking thermals, centering them quickly, and managing energy in-between?

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 9:45:06 AM UTC-5, Michael Opitz wrote:

I think that's a pretty good summary of the issue. You can add
Ray Gimmey to the above list. He won the 1988 STD Nats in
Minden (actually, Klaus Holighaus won, but he was a guest) due
to a very low save on a difficult day. Ray told me that he had
already rolled out on final to land on a dirt road when he hit an
8 Kt thermal and wrapped into it to get home. Ray told me that
he was down around ~100' IIRC.

Yes, Evan, there were no recorders back then, so it is a story, but
I have known Ray to be a pretty "straight shooter" so I have no
reason to doubt his version of this. He told me right after we
landed at Minden.

Here is another story. My father told me how they did it in German
glider contests before WWII. If they got low, they picked a good
plowed field to land in which might also be a thermal generator.
Then, they would dive down and make a high speed low pass over
the field in order to try and break loose/trigger a building thermal
bubble. After the low pass, they would pull up (similar to one of
our high speed flying finishes) and make a circle or two. If the
maneuver was successful, the bubble would have been broken
loose and they would climb away. If not successful, they would
land, as they had already given the field a "close" inspection. I
have not yet tried this method myself, and I don't know if I ever
will, but it is/was a skill set that pilots have used in the past, so
it is probably relevant to this discussion because if one dives
down from above 300', one would violate the proposed "hard
deck" even if one were to zoom back up above it....

RO

Awesome stories! Thanks Mike.

Those are obviously very different scenarios from the ones John has given as examples. Both could easily lead to fatal results even in skilled hands with just a smidge of bad luck. Was Ray's save a reasonable thing to do in the circumstances (it's easiest just to say "NO!")? What I know for sure is that your odds absolutely suck if you fly into sink at 100 agl in a 45 degree bank and 50 kts.

I can see this issue both ways... which is why I'm asking for data. Absent tangible evidence of people doing really dangerous stuff motivated by point

When I see spaghetti traces like the ones in John's report, I don't think "this guy's trying to stay in the contest", I think "this guy is desperately afraid to land for some reason", e.g. bad field, inexperience, borrowed or shared glider, whatever. Helpful to ask the pilot (thanks WH).

best,
Evan Ludeman / T8

I looked at all of the 15M podium finishers flight traces (day or overall contest depending on which was made available), going back to 2006. The only really low save I found was Rick Walters on Day 2 at Montague in 2006. His low point appeared to be 567 ft AGL near town over the low ground. Garner came very close at Mifflin in 2012, but his low point of 470 ft AGL was over a 1000 ft MSL ridge. BB got down to 1050 AGL at Hobbs in 2013. P7 down to 958 AGL in Elmira 2015. Retting down to 1213 in Cordele last year. That's the extent of the heroics I could find in 15M and Standard when co-located with 15M. There was a fair amount of rock polishing in the mountain contests. Enough to have me thinking twice about ever doing one! But I think the message is clear: you can do very, very well in soaring without ever having to thermal at 500 ft. Not sure what anyone was doing many decades ago in gliders with ? wing loading is relevant today, but now I'm talking over my pay grade.

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 7:32:47 AM UTC-5, wrote:
Our gliders have evolved allot in the past 5 decades - I know as technology advanced in a bunch of high speed sports ( cars, bobsleds, skiing....) the playing field and/or the rules had to adapt.


Today's gliders are safer. They handle better with more benign stall/spin characteristics (though most will still spin if provoked). Gliders in general and Schleicher gliders specifically are safer in crashes due to stronger materials and newer impact-absorbing cockpits and landing gears (they won't save you if you go straight in, of course). DG has done some good work on safety and I think all the glider manufacturers are paying much more attention to it.

We're carrying more safety equipment: e.g., ELTs, FLARMs. We're more aware of the hazards of dehydration, medications, etc. We're flying fewer hours (shorter tasks) and with more sleep (fewer, often no long retrieves).

I'd say that audio variometers have contributed to safety because they help keep our heads out of the cockpits but the proliferation of electronics in our panels has pushed us in the wrong direction, even allowing for the benefit of not having to study a Sectional chart closely.

I don't have data on earlier accident and fatality rates but it would be great if someone smart who's inclined that way could analyze it (9B???).

It's a tiny sample but here are the stats for pilots I have been able to recall I knew who were killed in glider crashes, by year:

1979
1980 (2)
1981
1984
1986
1992 (2)
1994
1999 (3 pilots, in two incidents)
2004
2010
2012

I wouldn't want to draw any real conclusions, not least because these are just pilots I knew/met. And in my early years, I simply hadn't met as many. Plus I don't know how many total pilots and contest days are involved, and not all of these deaths occurred during contest flights. But my sense is that it's not getting worse, and perhaps a bit better.

Chip Bearden

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 12:40:04 PM UTC-5, Clay wrote:
I looked at all of the 15M podium finishers flight traces (day or overall contest depending on which was made available), going back to 2006. The only really low save I found was Rick Walters on Day 2 at Montague in 2006. His low point appeared to be 567 ft AGL near town over the low ground. Garner came very close at Mifflin in 2012, but his low point of 470 ft AGL was over a 1000 ft MSL ridge. BB got down to 1050 AGL at Hobbs in 2013. P7 down to 958 AGL in Elmira 2015. Retting down to 1213 in Cordele last year. That's the extent of the heroics I could find in 15M and Standard when co-located with 15M. There was a fair amount of rock polishing in the mountain contests. Enough to have me thinking twice about ever doing one! But I think the message is clear: you can do very, very well in soaring without ever having to thermal at 500 ft. Not sure what anyone was doing many decades ago in gliders with ? wing loading is relevant today, but now I'm talking over my pay grade.

thank you clay! this is basically one of the two things that i'm saying. very few low saves in competition take place below 500 feet. it would be interesting to look at not just the podium, but all competitors. i don't think its a question of just the folks who do well. no one sets out to dive down to 500 feet and find a whopper. the probability of success is low, and the result is usually a very slow speed.

the other thing i'm saying is that imposing a hard deck wont stop someone (like the ray gimmey story) from trying to get away once below the hard deck. so my question is, whats the point?

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:26:27 AM UTC-5, jfitch wrote:


This summarizes the two poles of the argument. Those who believe taking 'major calculated' risks should continue to be part of the game, and those who would like to minimize those as a means to win.


Not sure if that's what I'm coming away with. I actually think most/all of us agree that "major" risks (where major = a high likelihood of injury or death) should NOT be part of the game. I certainly feel that way, and that attitude (along with a lack of skill, time, and commitment) have limited me to a few near-podium finishes at Nationals.

My strong feeling is that the accidents BB is ascribing to bad-behavior driven by a quest for points is a complete red herring. Clay's analysis (if proven to be true) along with all I've seen in the accident report seems to support my point of view. While taking a break from sanding gelcoat in the shop last night, 3 of us (with a combined racing experience in excess of 120 years) had a hard time naming even one attempt to climb out below 600 feet, much less 500, 400, or 300.

So the question is - what exactly would a hard deck solve? More importantly, what other unintended behaviors will it drive, and at what cost in complexity of administration etc. My take is that it's a solution looking for the wrong problem to solve.

Erik Mann (P3)
ASG-29

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 12:40:04 PM UTC-5, Clay wrote:
I looked at all of the 15M podium finishers flight traces (day or overall contest depending on which was made available), going back to 2006. The only really low save I found was Rick Walters on Day 2 at Montague in 2006. His low point appeared to be 567 ft AGL near town over the low ground. Garner came very close at Mifflin in 2012, but his low point of 470 ft AGL was over a 1000 ft MSL ridge. BB got down to 1050 AGL at Hobbs in 2013. P7 down to 958 AGL in Elmira 2015. Retting down to 1213 in Cordele last year. That's the extent of the heroics I could find in 15M and Standard when co-located with 15M. There was a fair amount of rock polishing in the mountain contests. Enough to have me thinking twice about ever doing one! But I think the message is clear: you can do very, very well in soaring without ever having to thermal at 500 ft. Not sure what anyone was doing many decades ago in gliders with ? wing loading is relevant today, but now I'm talking over my pay grade.

Thanks Clay, that's an interesting sample.

best,
Evan Ludeman / T8

Chip's great stories reminded me of one of my most magnificent experiences in a glider. This was coming back to Crystaire after a long flight decades ago. The sun had set and the gliderport was closed and completely vacated.. I did a long low pass westbound down the length of the runway then pulled up for a right downwind. As I pulled up, right there, were two eagles circling together to the right in a 1 knot end-of-day thermal. I joined the two eagles across that thermal for a few hundred feet of climb before continuing my landing.

Obviously I was quite low when I made those thermalling turns yet I am as sure now as I was then that making those turns was perfectly safe for me and for all other human beings. The air was still -- there was essentially no chance of encountering any degree of sink or turbulence at that particular occasion.

Exactly that will never happen again. But something similar might. I choose liberty please. Pretty please.

I retract all of my previous suggestion about how to do an equivalent of hard deck more simply. I want none of it now after thinking more on the subject. At the same time, I commend BB for bringing forward this thoughtful ideas to keep us safer while I remain skeptical that a hard deck could have more than a miniscule impact on our dismal accident statistics. It's been an interesting discussion.

BB has said: What's the big deal? A hard deck is no different than the 17,500 ceiling that we all have agreed to live with. Well; I, for one, never would have chosen to agree to that. I'm sure I'm not the only racing pilot that routinely gets ****ed off every time I get to 17,400 in a strong thermal and have to break off 500 feet early to accommodate the rules. I don't want another airspace constraint to be ****ed off about. I especially don't want to have to deal with contest airspace issues when I'm at pattern altitude.

There are people here in Arizona that will advocate for red light cameras, for banning cell phone use in cars and for banning citizens from carrying guns. All those safety things get routinely voted down around here. It seems a lot of us humans value liberty over personal safety. It's a DNA thing.

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 2:11:27 PM UTC-5, Papa3 wrote:
On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:26:27 AM UTC-5, jfitch wrote:


This summarizes the two poles of the argument. Those who believe taking 'major calculated' risks should continue to be part of the game, and those who would like to minimize those as a means to win.


Not sure if that's what I'm coming away with. I actually think most/all of us agree that "major" risks (where major = a high likelihood of injury or death) should NOT be part of the game. I certainly feel that way, and that attitude (along with a lack of skill, time, and commitment) have limited me to a few near-podium finishes at Nationals.

My strong feeling is that the accidents BB is ascribing to bad-behavior driven by a quest for points is a complete red herring. Clay's analysis (if proven to be true) along with all I've seen in the accident report seems to support my point of view. While taking a break from sanding gelcoat in the shop last night, 3 of us (with a combined racing experience in excess of 120 years) had a hard time naming even one attempt to climb out below 600 feet, much less 500, 400, or 300.

So the question is - what exactly would a hard deck solve? More importantly, what other unintended behaviors will it drive, and at what cost in complexity of administration etc. My take is that it's a solution looking for the wrong problem to solve.

Erik Mann (P3)
ASG-29

Perhaps the unintended consequence is that a guy who is at 800 ft over a good field in the valley makes a run at the ridge to get away from the hard deck...........

WH