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#31
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"John Keeney" wrote in message ...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message om... "John Keeney" wrote in message ... Most common reply when asking folks working up the Stryker their opinion: "It tolls real nice." Tolls? snicker Excuse me, "It [tows] real nice." The bad thing is, I knew something was wrong when I wrote it; I just couldn't figure out what it was. That was my guess as to the meaning, but I was not sure, having once observed the results when a Cat 621B scraper humming along at 30-35 MPH clipped a toll/security booth in Honduras...it most definitely did *not* "toll real nice"! g Looked like a bomb had hit that concrete structure (luckily it was empty at the time). But hey, if the Stryker tows well, that is just another advantage over the M1A1 in the early entry role--'cause the M1A1 is a bitch to tow, straining the capabilities of even the M88 series recovery vehicles. Brooks |
#32
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Greg Hennessy wrote in message . ..
On 20 Sep 2003 20:29:31 -0700, (Kevin Brooks) wrote: OK, but if it is so great, why again are the Russians dumping this program that they are a partner in? FWICS most of w.r.t noise w.r.t dumping it comes from single member of the russian brass who doesn't like antonov. Given its Russia we are talking about, one could speculate w.r.t his motivation. But regardless, it does sound as if it is likely to become a dumpee in the case of the Russian Air Force. And how about those engine problems...? Compared to something whose power plants and propeller designs haven't left the drawing board yet. Engines which will have to deliver twice the horse power of any turbo prop ever put into service in the west, methinks it wont be the 1st or last time problems have been seen with a new engine design. Actually, I was not comparing it to the A400 (of which I am no tremendous fan), just noting that the An-70 has to date been a rather troublesome project, and not a very realistic option for the Europeans (despite the past rhetoric out of Germany). Having the prototype go crunch was bad, continued engine reliability problems are just icing on the cake. IMO the Euros would have been better off going with a joint force (similar to the NATO AWACS fleet) of a combination of a few leased C-17's for oversize hauling, complemented by C-130's/C-130J stretches, along with a few Airbus passenger/freighter convertables tossed into the mix. That would have given them a credible short term capability while the A400 is developed; or alternatively, keep that force and dump A400 development. Use of proven aircraft (and the An-70 most definitely does not meet that description) for the near-term would be smart. Brooks greg |
#33
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On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, "Paul Austin"
wrote: "Tony Williams" wrote I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun? By buying A400Ms? Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for C-130 compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The MagicTech remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind "electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or LTA kind of solutions. It is called the C-17 Al Minyard |
#35
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"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message om... "Paul Austin" wrote in message .. . According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT is ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process, unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT using a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with 3 count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to Kandahar with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the lead elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out of gas. Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways in the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN BDE assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space at the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to an aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing the short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an airstrip is not even required). You might want to read what RAND had to say http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/. They are after all professional analysts. Staging and transhipping material from C17s to C130s was analysed and rejected since the time consumed in off-loading, breaking down and reloading payloads made the C130s. RAND analysed the entire chain of deployment and determined that established airport with supporting road networks would move more material than could ad hoc airfields. Can you prove different? As for the size of the force, RAND selected 60 C17s because the USAF (remember them?) consumes a large number of transport sortees itself. In addition, there are and will be other commitments besides this one. .... I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force that isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to sustain a momentary reverse. You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win, but in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't cover between the light and heavy spectrum. And you seem to say that if it's an improvement over current light forces deployments then it's worth having. My position is that the spectrum of opponents that a SBCT can face that e.g. the 82nd Airborne cannot is too small to be worth while. It doesn't take much in the way of armor and artillery to defeat a SBCT. Panama and Afghanistan could not but there are_lots_of places that could. I believe that concentrating on an "interim" SBCT which under a more dovish administration could easily become permanent displaces programs to develop enough lift so that forces with real puissance can be inserted. That said, the logistics challenge of battle at the end of such a slender thread hasn't been addressed. Traditionally, the tonnage of POL, ammunition and other kit dwarfs the TOE tonnage. Given that SBCT's only chance of success in more than constabulary operations is to substitute fires for force size, that's unlikely to change. You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from litterals. Can you support that? |
#36
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"phil hunt" wrote in message . .. On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, Paul Austin wrote: "Tony Williams" wrote I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun? By buying A400Ms? Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for C-130 compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The MagicTech remote sensing/remote fires stuff What's this? Is it related to the "battlefield Internet" I've head about? FCS if the ultimate MagicTech, consisting of ground and airborne recon platforms, data networks, robotic fire and logistics vehicles and incidentally, replacements for the current generation mechanized vehicles for troop carriers, fire support, C&C and direct fire combat. In the interim, "digital battlefield" electronics, wide distribution of ubiquitous and persistent recon imagery and analysis and precision fires from airborne and ground systems help a lot. The USMC completed a wargame about 6 months ago using all of this stuff and a light Marine Blue Force did very well against a conventional mech OPFOR. They also discovered that the Red Force could compensate for the advantages these technologies give US forces by targeting communications and fire support elements. If they can be degraded, then light forces lose the means to stand up to enemy mechanized forces and are often defeated. As usual with military affairs, there's no panacea and the guy you're trying to kill has powerful incentives to circumvent your advantages. isn't ready yet, never mind "electric armor" And this? Britain has done development on large capacitor banks that pass very large currents through shaped charge jets hitting an armored vehicle, melting the jet before it can hit the inner armo(u)r. They say that scaled up versions might be able to do the same to long-rod penetrators. that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small ITYM A400M. Yup. The A300M is obviously the two-engined version intented to replace the G.222 |
#37
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"Alan Minyard" wrote On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, "Paul Austin" wrote: "Tony Williams" wrote I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun? By buying A400Ms? Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for C-130 compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The MagicTech remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind "electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or LTA kind of solutions. It is called the C-17 Think bigger. Much bigger. The real problem with insertion of a combat force by air is in supplying it. Logistical loads dwarf TOE loads. Right now, the only way to meet logistical tonnage requirements is with ships. |
#38
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#39
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"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message om... "Paul Austin" wrote in message .. . According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT is ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process, unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT using a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with 3 count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to Kandahar with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the lead elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out of gas. Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways in the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN BDE assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space at the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to an aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing the short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an airstrip is not even required). You might want to read what RAND had to say http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/. They are after all professional analysts. And frequently on-target; but sometimes not. Staging and transhipping material from C17s to C130s was analysed and rejected since the time consumed in off-loading, breaking down and reloading payloads made the C130s. "made the C-130's" what? RAND analysed the entire chain of deployment and determined that established airport with supporting road networks would move more material than could ad hoc airfields. Can you prove different? Whoah. You just told me that the ramp space was the limiting factor, and when presented with an option that overcomes that problem, all of a sudden the "ad hoc airfields" are worthless? While cross loading the cargo to the C-130's would be less efficient than direct throughput, if the limiting factor really *is* ramp space, then the loss of efficiency involved in the crossload would be more than made up for by the increased in total tonnage delivered to the destination. And BTW, crossloading might not even be required--note that the C-17 is also capable of using austere FLS's (neat picture out there somewhere of one landing on Bicycle Lake at Ft Irwin. As for the size of the force, RAND selected 60 C17s because the USAF (remember them?) consumes a large number of transport sortees itself. In addition, there are and will be other commitments besides this one. Sorry, but when a contingency operation that requires major airlift of this nature arises, the airframes are diverted from lower priority missions. Take that as gospel from a guy who saw his milk-run C-141 flight from Charleston to Honduras cancelled when Golden Pheasant went down in '88. And yes, I remember the USAF; they are the guys fielding the 210 or so C-17's, of which you and Rand apparently think only about 20% of which would be tasked to support a high priority contingency op (not to mention that there are also quite a few C-5A/B's still out there...). I just see that as another manner of weighting the data to suit a desired outcome--it does not make it accurate. I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force that isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to sustain a momentary reverse. You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win, but in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't cover between the light and heavy spectrum. And you seem to say that if it's an improvement over current light forces deployments then it's worth having. My position is that the spectrum of opponents that a SBCT can face that e.g. the 82nd Airborne cannot is too small to be worth while. It doesn't take much in the way of armor and artillery to defeat a SBCT. Panama and Afghanistan could not but there are_lots_of places that could. And if it is a theater that the SBCT is outguned in, then other TTP, forces, etc., will have to be used, granted. But yes, I do think that it would be darned nice of us to give our early entry forces another tool for their bag. Rapidly deployable light armor can greatly enhance the joint force commander's options, and can mean the difference between sustaining higher casualties to accomplish the mission. I think those are *good* things. I believe that concentrating on an "interim" SBCT which under a more dovish administration could easily become permanent displaces programs to develop enough lift so that forces with real puissance can be inserted. That said, the logistics challenge of battle at the end of such a slender thread hasn't been addressed. And just how the hell do you think FCS is going to magically address that logistics concern? Snap your fingers and have FCS fielded *today*, and it faces the same logistical challenges. Not to mention that our *current* early entry force faces the same challenegs--in the ansence of Stryker, the only way you are going to acheive decent ground mobility for those guys is to either bring in a bunch of trucks (which use about the same fuel as Stryker, take up a goodly portion of the haul assets that Stryker would, and don't offer 8any* degree of protection or enhanced firepower), or haul helos in to allow air assault operations--do you *really* think that either of those options results in a significantly reduced log chain in comparison to the SBCT? Traditionally, the tonnage of POL, ammunition and other kit dwarfs the TOE tonnage. See above. Given that SBCT's only chance of success in more than constabulary operations is to substitute fires for force size, that's unlikely to change. Never heard of substituting greater mobility for fires *and* force size? Stryker can, in comparison to current capabilities, do that for the grunts in the early entry force. You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from litterals. Can you support that? No, I have not. But, unlike you, I realize that the SBCT is not the *only* force structure design that requires log support. In order for the current LI force to acheive the same mobility on/over the ground that Stryker offers, you have to either send in a boatload of soft, less useful trucks to haul them around in, or helos--care to guess how much POL those helos will burn? The difference between the two forces, if you force both to acheive significant ground mobility, will be insignificant in terms of log requirements. The *only* way the current force wins in this regard is if you send them in with *no* transport capability--in which case congrats, you just forced us back to the same rate of movement that we enjoyed during the Civil War (if that much, since those poor grunts are going to be carrying about five times the load that their 1860's counterparts were burdened with). Now, one more time--given that urban combat scenario that you snipped, do you want to go in as a naked grunt, or with light armor support? You *really* don't want to answer that question, do you??? Brooks |
#40
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"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Alan Minyard" wrote On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, "Paul Austin" wrote: "Tony Williams" wrote I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun? By buying A400Ms? Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for C-130 compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The MagicTech remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind "electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or LTA kind of solutions. It is called the C-17 Think bigger. Much bigger. The real problem with insertion of a combat force by air is in supplying it. Logistical loads dwarf TOE loads. Right now, the only way to meet logistical tonnage requirements is with ships. Bullcrap. We sustained a significant force in Afghanistan with air only, if you had not noticed. We (and the Brits) supplied West Berling by air. We supplied about a two-brigade equivalent force in Grenada by air (for the most part). We supplied a two-brigade plus force in Honduras by air in 88. Where on earth do you get this notion that the SBCT is unsupportable, and just *how* do you think we run support now? Did the 173rd ABN BDE and the few *heavy* assets from 1st ID(M) that were air deployed into northern Iraq receive any sea support?? Brooks |
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