I have a Pearl Harbor question, too!

I believe that the U.S. had information (through breaking the Japanese
"Purple"* code!), that an attack was going to be made on one of several Allied
targets;(including Pearl Harbor!), at the time of the attack. Given that, (IF
it is true!): WHY did the U.S. Navy NOT move the Pacific fleet to a place of
safety; (like, say, the West Coast)? No good ports; (given the existance of the
ports of Los Angeles, San Fransisco, Portland Oregon, Seattle, ect; I DON'T
THINK SO!)?

Even IF the Japanese had a plan to "Pearl Harbor" a West Coast port; I would
think that the U.S., Royal Canadian, and/or Mexican Navies would realize
something was up in time to give SOME warning! (Just from NORMAL military,
fisheries protection, or "Coast Guard"-type activity!)

DBurch7672 wrote:
I believe that the U.S. had information (through breaking the Japanese
"Purple"* code!), that an attack was going to be made on one of
several Allied targets;(including Pearl Harbor!), at the time of the
attack. Given that, (IF it is true!):

That isn't true. Yes, the US had broken purple,, but that was a dimplomatic
code and contianed no tactical details. We hadn't yet fully broken the
relevant naval code, JN-25, but even that would not have helped, as reviews
of Japanese traffic post-war showed that nothing had been sent over air
identifying Pearl Harbor as the target.

At best, the Us had indications that hostilities were due to commence on or
about 7 December. By very early on 7 December, they knew that Japan
intended to reject the US ultimatum and suspend dimplomatic relations.
Clearly, it was likely that hostilities would begin very soon thereafter,
and history suggested a sneak attack was probable. But it was thought that
Japan would leave a bit more time to ensure that the rejection was deliverd
before the trikes. (In the event, they mistimed it and Pearl Harbor
happened just before the Japanese ambassador delivered his note to the
Secretary of State)

However, there was no indication of where, exactly, hostilities would begin.
The IJN had maintained excellent operational security and the US intel
people had the carriers still located in Japanese home waters based on
signals and traffic analysis. IIRC, the one force known to be at sea was
headed south. It was expected that the intial strikes would fall on the
Philipines, with the main IJN fleet held back to intercept the US force
coming to relieve MacArthur (assuming he managed to orgnaize a useful
defense).

WHY did the U.S. Navy NOT move
the Pacific fleet to a place of safety; (like, say, the West Coast)?
No good ports; (given the existance of the ports of Los Angeles, San
Fransisco, Portland Oregon, Seattle, ect; I DON'T THINK SO!)?

Pearl Harbor was in fact considered an advanced base; ships had been pushed
forward to there from their normal bases at San Diego and San Francisco.

Even IF the Japanese had a plan to "Pearl Harbor" a West Coast port;
I would think that the U.S., Royal Canadian, and/or Mexican Navies
would realize something was up in time to give SOME warning! (Just
from NORMAL military, fisheries protection, or "Coast Guard"-type
activity!)

A Pearl Harbor style attck on the West Coast would have been very hard,
thanks to the sheer distance involved. Hawaii was just at the limits of the
IJN's reach. But the West Coast was also too far east for the fleet to have
a chance of immediately relieving the Philipines. So the fleet went to
Pearl.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

"DBurch7672" wrote in message
...
I believe that the U.S. had information (through breaking the Japanese
"Purple"* code!), that an attack was going to be made on one of several
Allied
targets;(including Pearl Harbor!), at the time of the attack.

You belive wrong.

The Purple code was the Japanese diplomatic cipher and
the contents of the messages hinted at war but contained
no attack plans

Given that, (IF
it is true!): WHY did the U.S. Navy NOT move the Pacific fleet to a place
of
safety; (like, say, the West Coast)? No good ports; (given the existance
of the
ports of Los Angeles, San Fransisco, Portland Oregon, Seattle, ect; I
DON'T
THINK SO!)?


Because Pearl Harbor was considered an ideal forward base
from which to intervene in the expected Japanese attack on
the Phillipines

Even IF the Japanese had a plan to "Pearl Harbor" a West Coast port; I
would
think that the U.S., Royal Canadian, and/or Mexican Navies would realize
something was up in time to give SOME warning! (Just from NORMAL military,
fisheries protection, or "Coast Guard"-type activity!)


The commanders at Pearl Harbor had been sent a war
warning, unfortunately their response was inadequate.

Keith

In article ,
(DBurch7672) writes:
I believe that the U.S. had information (through breaking the Japanese
"Purple"* code!), that an attack was going to be made on one of several Allied
targets;(including Pearl Harbor!), at the time of the attack. Given that, (IF
it is true!): WHY did the U.S. Navy NOT move the Pacific fleet to a place of
safety; (like, say, the West Coast)? No good ports; (given the existance of the
ports of Los Angeles, San Fransisco, Portland Oregon, Seattle, ect; I DON'T
THINK SO!)?

The Purple Code was a for diplomatic traffic. The December 6th-7th
(International Date Line - mucks things up, y'know) message to Nomura
was that the U.S./Japanese negotiations that were in process at that
time were hopelessly stalemated adn were to be broken off. It wasn't
a Declaration of War, or anything like that, although most parties
involved knew that the end result of breaking negotiation would be
war.

The Pacific Fleet was based in Hawaii because Pearl Harbor was a major
facility that could support large ships, was well protected from
seaborne attack, and was 5 days closer to the Japanese Fleet than the
U.S. West Coast. If your goal is to ptotect the U.S. Territories in
the Pacific (Guam, Samoa, and the Philippines) those 5 days are going
to be vital.

Even IF the Japanese had a plan to "Pearl Harbor" a West Coast port; I would
think that the U.S., Royal Canadian, and/or Mexican Navies would realize
something was up in time to give SOME warning! (Just from NORMAL military,
fisheries protection, or "Coast Guard"-type activity!)

The Mexican Navy at that time consisted of 4 Sloops (Equivalent to a
U.S. Destroyer Escort but without any AAW or ASW capability, one armed
transport, and 10 harbor patrol boats.

The Canadian Navy was almost entirely comitted to Convoy Protection
duty in the North Atlantic.

The usual sorts of patrol stuff (Fisheries Protection, Aids to
Navigation maintenance, Customs, etc. all took place less than 50
miles from shore. They most certainly weren't going to find anything.

The Pacific is _big_ if your opponent doesn't have stuff like Airborne
Radar, it's not too difficulet to avaid contact. (Shipborne Radar
has too close a horizon for effective coverage.) Nobody had that
available on a large enough scale in 1941.


The Japanese went to great lengths to hide the movements of the
Combined Fleet. They concentrated at a remote anchorage far from
civilian eyes, they kept strict radio silence, and they were covered
by a massive campaign of deceptive radio traffic from shore bases,
even going to the point of pulling Radio Operators off of ships so
that any change in their "Fists" (ideosyncatic Morse Code "accents")
wouldn't be noticed.

All of te U.S. bases in the Pacific were warned that something was
afoot. All took action, but unfortunately, most of teh action wasn't
appropriate. (Anti-sabotage preparations in Hawaii vs, Air Attack,
MacArthur's cancelling Breretan's plans to strike the Japanese
airfields in Formosa when news reached them of Pearl Harbor, etc.)

In one respect, this worked well - The AAW alert plans for the Pacific
Fleet called for it to deploy to a deep-water bay where it was hoped
that they'd hve more room to maneuver. Pearl Horbor is fairly
shallow. (Thought to be soo shallow for torpedo attacks). Most of the
ships sunk at Pearl were raised, salvaged, and returned to service.
That would have been impossible if they'd been hit in deep water.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster