About when did a US/CCCP war become suicidal?

In article ,
Peter Skelton writes:
On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
wrote:

2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.

The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC) on
theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
instead or after).

Uhm - _that_ didn't happen until 1990-91, with the adoption of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Europe, on both sidea of the
East/West divide, all through the '60s, '60s, and '80s was a forest of
nuclear warheads and delivery systems. In addition to the airplane
delivered weapons, there were, througn most of the '60s, a huge number
of Mace (TM-61) Cruise missiles. There were scade of short range
ballistic missiles, originally Redstones & Corporals, then Pershing &
Sergeants, and, finally, Pershings & Pershing IIs, and Lances.
Ballistic That doesn't count the battlefield systems like the Honest
John Rockets and AFAPs (Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles).
Most of these systems, on the NATO side, were developed in the U.S.,
but the French had also developed theirs. (MSBS, SSBS, and Pluton).
In the case of systems fieldsd by NATO partners, (With the exception
of the wholly autonomous French systems, and hte Brits), the warheads
were held in a Dual Custody arrangement, as U.S. owned and secured
weapons, where their release required the agreement of the
U.S. Nactional Command Authority (Warhead), and the Host nation;s
Government (delivery System). If things had turned nasty before the
Iron Curtain fell, there would have been Germans, Belgians, Dutch,
Italians, Turks, and Greeks all firing off nukes.

The Warsaw Pact side had similar systems, and similar command
arrangements.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
wrote:

2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.

The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC)

Actually, in 1975 we had a rather complete tactical nuclear arsenal in place
beyond those carried on the aircraft. Included were nuclear rounds for both
155mm and 8 inch artillery, Lance and Pershing I SSM's, and the atomic
demolitions muntions (SADM and MADM). The drawdown of these Army controlled
nuclear warheads did not take place until beginning in the mid eighties
(SADM and MADM) through the later eighties and into the very early nineties
(when the arty and missile warheads were returned to the US and removed from
the active stockpile). Additionaly, in 1975 I believe we also hstill had
some dual control warhead still in Europe (i.e., for older Honest John SSM's
still in use by allied nations, and possibly a few warheads for the Nike
Hercules batteries that remained in both US and allied service at that
time).

Brooks

on
theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
instead or after).



Peter Skelton

In article ,
(Tom Adams) writes:
(Tom Adams) wrote in message . com...
"james_anatidae" wrote in message ...
I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
Americans, but not unsurvivable.

I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
exploded.

Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
politicians on both side put on the brakes.

It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the
USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965,
by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs.

But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what
considerations prevented the development of such a threat.

Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
whopping huge bomb for that.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 09:00:42 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
wrote:

2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.

The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC)

Actually, in 1975 we had a rather complete tactical nuclear arsenal in place
beyond those carried on the aircraft. Included were nuclear rounds for both
155mm and 8 inch artillery, Lance and Pershing I SSM's, and the atomic
demolitions muntions (SADM and MADM).

I wouldn't have thought of Pershing as battlefield, but it was
defintiely there as were the others.

The drawdown of these Army controlled
nuclear warheads did not take place until beginning in the mid eighties
(SADM and MADM) through the later eighties and into the very early nineties
(when the arty and missile warheads were returned to the US and removed from
the active stockpile).

Was this still in Europe? Its imminent absence was part of the
justification for nuclear armament of our F104's. What you're
saying is that the battlefield weapons stayed in Europe past the
fall of the Wall.

Additionaly, in 1975 I believe we also hstill had
some dual control warhead still in Europe (i.e., for older Honest John SSM's
still in use by allied nations, and possibly a few warheads for the Nike
Hercules batteries that remained in both US and allied service at that
time).

Honest Johns lasted into the nineties.



on
theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
instead or after).



Peter Skelton



Peter Skelton

"Carey Sublette" wrote:

:In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
:to the population.

Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
Chernobyl area.

:It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
:death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.

People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 14:23:54 GMT, Fred J. McCall
wrote:

"Carey Sublette" wrote:

:In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
:to the population.

Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
Chernobyl area.

:It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
:death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.

People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.

If you think of infant mortality (before 2) in the 30% range as
normal life span,

If you think of a fifteen year decline in life expectancy as a
few years,

If you think of . . . .

Oh what's the point.



Peter Skelton

"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 09:00:42 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
wrote:

2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.

The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC)

Actually, in 1975 we had a rather complete tactical nuclear arsenal in
place
beyond those carried on the aircraft. Included were nuclear rounds for
both
155mm and 8 inch artillery, Lance and Pershing I SSM's, and the atomic
demolitions muntions (SADM and MADM).

I wouldn't have thought of Pershing as battlefield, but it was
defintiely there as were the others.

The Pershing I did not have the range of the later Pershing II. While it was
not going to be used against targets along the FLOT, it was going to be used
in the interdiction role and against C4/logistics/transportation targets
within the theater army area of responsibility.


The drawdown of these Army controlled
nuclear warheads did not take place until beginning in the mid eighties
(SADM and MADM) through the later eighties and into the very early
nineties
(when the arty and missile warheads were returned to the US and removed
from
the active stockpile).

Was this still in Europe? Its imminent absence was part of the
justification for nuclear armament of our F104's. What you're
saying is that the battlefield weapons stayed in Europe past the
fall of the Wall.

Not all. SADM and MADM had been withdrawn a little bit earlier in the
eighties (my last active duty company CO had just returned from a three year
tour with the ADM company in Vincenza, Italy). The writing had been on the
wall since at least 1985, when the Engineer School finally stopped making
its new LT's spend a couple of days in a secure compound at Belvoir learning
the very basics of ADM employment and planning. But the arty rounds did not
return stateside until about the same time, or shortly after, the Wall came
down. The last ones were withdrawn from the stockpile in 1992 according to
the Nuclear Weapons Archive. The Pershing II and GLCM were of course
governed by the theater nuclear forces treaty (1988 IIRC); not sure about
the arty rounds being covered by that treaty (would have been hard to
verify).


Additionaly, in 1975 I believe we also hstill had
some dual control warhead still in Europe (i.e., for older Honest John
SSM's
still in use by allied nations, and possibly a few warheads for the Nike
Hercules batteries that remained in both US and allied service at that
time).

Honest Johns lasted into the nineties.

Yep. But I believe the nuclear warheads for them had been withdrawn prior to
their final retirement by allied nations.

Brooks




on
theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
instead or after).



Peter Skelton



Peter Skelton

"bw" wrote in message ...
"George Z. Bush" wrote in message
...
Dave Holford wrote:
"George Z. Bush" wrote:

AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of
inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD
became
our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even
a
little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that
the
Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

George Z.


The DEW line was for air-breathers (bombers in those days) now replaced
by North Warning.

BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Warning System) was the missile warning system
based in Alaska, Greenland and the U.K.

Picky! Picky! So when did BMEWS become operational? We're trying to figure
out
when MAD became the joint policies of the US and the USSR. You got any
input?

George Z.

MAD was never a "joint policy" at any time. The idea of MAD goes back a long
way in war planning. It was derived from the game theory guys at the war
colleges. The pentagon generals gave it attention in the years after Sputnik.
I think LeMay was an early advocate. Exactly when it was adopted by the
politicians is unknown but it was in effect before it was publicly
ackowledged by McNamara. If the Martians attacked, it would be put into
effect.

MAD was covered in Kahn's "On Thermonuclear War" published in 1961.
It must have been extensively studied before that. It was probably a
forward-looking strategy in the 1950s anticipating the development of
a Soviet nuclear force.

It was certainly in the US popular mind in the early 1960s. "Dr
Stangelove" in 1964, personal fallout shelters, all that.

Kahn's book had lots of ideas, but MAD proved popular. Kahn proposed
a much more extensive system of bomb shelters and fallout shelters,
but the US politicians did not spring for that one. Kahn proposed all
sorts of limited nuclear war senarios and anti-escalation techniques,
but limited nuclear war was a unsettling idea to the populace.

Kahn thought total nuclear war could be made horrible enough to cause
significant deterrence of the first-striker, but not suicidal.
However, post total-war planning would not be a good thing for
politicians to talk about since it would upset the public.

In a way MAD was kind of soothing to the populace compared with other
aspects of nuclear war strategy, so that is probably why it got some
public promotion.

A bit of smoke and mirrors. Lots of policies, but few were fit for
public consumption. Kahn is interesting in that he aired them without
respect to their political impact.

"Carey Sublette" writes:

The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to the
strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The weight
of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum payload,
and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load. Even
worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long - were
larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be
cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed in
the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A
deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging bomb
bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
drag.


Wouldn't a deployed Tsar Bomba carrier have been a militarized Proton,
aka UR-500 aka 8K82? The space launch version uses only storable
propellants, can put twenty tons into low orbit with the smallest
fairing easily holding a 2 x 8 meter payload, and my references on
the space launch side claim that it was developed with the ICBM role
and the Tsar Bomba payload in mind from the start (1961).

Which was a stupid idea from the start, and so never implemented,
but rather less stupid than trying to send an overladen Bear across
the arctic.


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
* for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *

"Carey Sublette" wrote in message
ink.net...

"WaltBJ" wrote in message
om...
Comments:
1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW.
The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than
expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical
since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under
the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of
the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material
and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of
destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone.

The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to the
strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The
weight
of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum
payload,
and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load. Even
worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long -
were
larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be
cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed
in
the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A
deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging
bomb
bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
drag.

2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.

The U.S. similarly vulnerable to this effect from the eastward fallout
plumes of strikes on the Montana and Wyoming missile fields.

What the heck! Back in the '50s you could buy tickets and go
sit in abandoned uranium mines in Montana and elsewhere.
It was supposed to help cure 'What ails you.'
You could also put your feet in a special box in the shoe store
and watch your toes wiggle. ...let you know how the new shoes fit.
Wish I had one now to check out a broken little toe in my rt. foot.
No pain and no handicap but not worth the doctors big fee.

In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
to the population. It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.

In ten years or so, we may say the same about the Atkins diet.

3) FWIW I spent those Cold War years in Air Defense Command as an 86D,
102 and 104 pilot on active air defense alert, usually every third
day, from 1954 through 1967, when I went to TAC and the F4. One got a
real serious attitude about the Air Defense mission back then.

And this would not have helped those Tu-95s at all.

Carey Sublette