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Best dogfight gun?



 
 
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  #81  
Old December 10th 03, 02:55 PM
Urban Fredriksson
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In article ,
Scott Ferrin wrote:

The would really surprise me as the thing tries to use control
surfaces to account for little bumps and gusts on the runway :-)


The article in Flight International was quite clear on the
matter with a quote that didn't leave room for
interpretation. I'm still trying to figure out exactly why
it doesn't (if the information is right), apart from the
reason it's not told the gun is fired because that's not
something which happens often.
--
Urban Fredriksson http://www.canit.se/%7Egriffon/
A boundary between the known and the unknown always exists.
  #82  
Old December 10th 03, 03:28 PM
Alan Minyard
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On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

Alan Minyard wrote in message . ..
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Alan Minyard
writes
Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat proven,
and has a useful rate of fire.

Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50" was
a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the MiG-15s
of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
impressive.


And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.


Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/


Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Al Minyard
  #83  
Old December 10th 03, 03:53 PM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
news
On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony

Williams) wrote:

Alan Minyard wrote in message

. ..
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"

wrote:

In message , Alan Minyard
writes
Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat

proven,
and has a useful rate of fire.

Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50"

was
a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the

MiG-15s
of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
impressive.

And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable,

heavy, slow
cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough

to
make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the

M-61.

Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/


Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun

range
you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.


Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks


Al Minyard



  #84  
Old December 10th 03, 05:15 PM
Ed Rasimus
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
news
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun
range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.


Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks


The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

1. The M-61, with roughly fifty years of experience is a reliable gun.
It's been modded and carried in a lot of different systems and made a
number of A/A kills.

A.) It doesn't jam. (It is possible, but it definitely isn't
common.)

B.) The the internal gun and several pod variants are linkless
feed. Some pods are link-fed.

C.) Spin-up time is virtually negligible. Consider that in the
F-105, the barrel in which the cartridge was sparked was still
internal, meaning the gun must rotate to the exposed barrel position
before the bullet leaves the barrel. Pass through of unfired rounds
on spin-up/down was usually counted as six. On scored strafe, the
rounds limiter was traditionally set at 150 round. With that, you
could get four or five strafe passes. A good shooter could score 80%
or higher out of rounds fired and every pass counted those six unfired
rounds. That means spin up is virtually instantaneous. Trigger squeeze
to release on strafe was taught to be .5 seconds. Good strafers could
get a shorter burst. Spin up is negligible.

D.) Projectile size/payload is important, but a trade-off.
Yes, a kill with a 37mm hit is more likely than a 20mm hit. But, if I
can't carry enough projectiles to give me a good density or chance to
hit, then the higher Pk is meaningless.

2. Dogfighting, meaning one-v-one maneuvering to a gun kill is a
foolish endeavor. You might wind up there, but you should studiously
avoid it. Once there, shoot and scoot. This isn't an airshow display
and no one but the survivor will recount the aeronautical skill
displayed. Shoot with missiles. Shoot at the maximum range. Get the
kill confirmed by AWACS.

3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion. The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.
It's great for SAR and can be effective on close-in CAS, but it's
better done with an A-10 type system than an A/A optimized platform
(which was what the thread has been talking about.)

E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

At least, those are some of my impressions on the argument.



  #85  
Old December 10th 03, 05:26 PM
Alan Minyard
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Posts: n/a
Default

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" wrote:


"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
news
On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony

Williams) wrote:

Alan Minyard wrote in message

...
On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"

wrote:

In message , Alan Minyard
writes
Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat

proven,
and has a useful rate of fire.

Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50"

was
a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the

MiG-15s
of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
impressive.

And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable,

heavy, slow
cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough

to
make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the

M-61.

Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/


Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun

range
you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.


Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks

In which case an M-61 works quite well.

Al Minyard


  #86  
Old December 10th 03, 05:36 PM
Chad Irby
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:

Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.


Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

It's funny to hear someone call a gun "unreliable," since the failure
rate for modern aircraft guns is *miniscule*...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.
  #87  
Old December 10th 03, 06:49 PM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
news
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into

gun
range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch,

desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.


Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks


The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.


When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.


That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.


B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.


But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.


C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.


And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
seems to share that view.


D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.


Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

It's great for SAR and can be effective on close-in CAS, but it's
better done with an A-10 type system than an A/A optimized platform
(which was what the thread has been talking about.)


As to "what this thread has been talking about", this thread has also the
comment, "Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s
that isn't healthy." And the fact is that the majority of CAS missions are
being flown by F-15E's, F-16's, F/A-18's, and most likely in the future by
platforms like the F-35 and even (gasp!) the F/A-22, not by A-10's. See
below for the types of aircraft flying strafe during Anaconda.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.


It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

"Then F-15s were overhead and the combat controller was directing them to
the enemy according to my
instructions. I told the combat controller to have the F-15s to strafe the
bunker and have them come in from our right to our left....I told him to
clear them and the rounds hit right by the bunker. I told him to have them
do that over and over again. I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s
and F-16s." (globalspecops.com/sts.html )

Go to Google and search based upon "Operation Anaconda strafe" and you can
find quite a few specific reports.


F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.


That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Brooks


At least, those are some of my impressions on the argument.





  #88  
Old December 10th 03, 07:19 PM
Ed Rasimus
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .



The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.


When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.


The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.

The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.


That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.


The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.


B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.


But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.


It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
conclusions.


C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.


And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
seems to share that view.


Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
"Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
the right time and the right place.

I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios. I'm not willing
to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
wise.


D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.


Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.


Prosecution rest time again.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.


It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?


It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )


The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
the reliability of PGMs.

Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
"winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
out the bunker.

Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
I don't know.


F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.


That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
not arguing that would be the way to go.


Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
resort in modern aircraft.


  #89  
Old December 10th 03, 08:00 PM
Paul J. Adam
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.


Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.


It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.


"We're not training our crews properly, aren't using our weapons
correctly, and are employing poor tactics that make us very vulnerable"
is much less palatable than "the only problem is the aircraft imposed on
us doesn't have a gun!"

Note that the missiles have improved very significantly since 1972,
while the M61 - though a fine weapon -has had only incremental
modifications.

[1] Stats from "Clashes" by Marshal Michel III
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
  #90  
Old December 10th 03, 08:11 PM
Paul J. Adam
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In message , phil hunt
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 04:51:34 GMT, Kevin Brooks wrote:

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?


How much does a Mauser BK 27 cost, I wonder? I bet removing it would
save them no more than the cost of one plane, over the entire
programme.


The official explanation follows...

http://www.publications.parliament.u...cmpubacc/136/1
011710.htm#note12
+++++
Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
APPENDIX 2
Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Defence Procurement Agency
00-01/62)

QUESTIONS 264 AND 306. BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION NOT TO EQUIP
EUROFIGHTER WITH A GUN

7. Since the introduction of air-to-air missiles, a gun has been
used in an air-to-air role for very close range engagements where the
target was inside a short-range air-to-air missile's minimum range.
Notably during the early years of the Vietnam war, the probability of
kill in short-range engagements of the air-to-air missiles then
available proved so low that the very modest capability of gun systems
added significantly to overall effectiveness. The probability of success
with guns has advanced little over the years[12]. By contrast, the
performance of air-to-air missiles has improved dramatically. Indeed, in
short-range engagements, the minimum range capability and agility of the
missiles that Eurofighter will carry, together with its planned
helmet-mounted sight targeting system, offers the pilot a shot with a
very high probability of success in almost every conceivable situation.
A gun could be seen as a defence of last resort when all the aircraft's
missiles had been fired. However, even then the gun's usefulness would
be severely limited because of the possibility of engagement by missile
armed aircraft from well outside the gun's range.

8. Firing "warning shots across the bow" with a gun is not an
effective means of coercion in modern operations. The cockpit
environment of modern aircraft is such that the pilot is extremely
unlikely to hear such warning shots and would only see them if they were
tracer rounds. The value of such a display against a civilian aircraft
is dubious and against a military aircraft it may well be misconstrued.

9. Against some threats, missiles may be susceptible to
counter-measures employed by the opposing aircraft. However, ASRAAM has
already proven itself against typical current countermeasure doctrines
and is designed to overcome extreme levels of countermeasures. Even
should an advanced hostile aircraft have decoyed Eurofighter's
air-to-air missiles successfully, there is again little benefit in
adding a gun to Eurofighter's armament. If the UK pilot were then to
close on that hostile target to within the range of the gun, he would be
placing the aircraft—and himself—at unnecessarily high risk of being
shot down by the hostile aircraft's own missiles. Moreover, gun systems
are not completely invulnerable to countermeasures, not least because
most depend on accurate radar range

10. As for air-to-ground combat, it is worth noting that the original
European Staff Requirement, signed by the Chiefs of Air Staffs from the
partner nations in December 1985, specifies the gun only in an
air-to-air role. So, even then, experienced airmen in the partner
nations did not regard the gun as a valuable weapon for ground attack.
It remains the view of experts that it is difficult to justify using the
gun in Eurofighter's offensive support role, owing to:

— the risk of collateral damage resulting from the relative
inefficiency of gun firing from a fixed-wing aircraft, especially in
this age of precision-guided munitions, with which Eurofighter will be
armed; and

— the increased vulnerability of the aircraft because the gun's short
range would leave the aircraft very exposed to surface-to-air missiles
and anti-aircraft gunfire.

11. Overall, therefore, it is clear that the utility of a gun on an
aircraft such as Eurofighter in modern operations is questionable. To
perform its roles effectively, Eurofighter's armament should emphasise
not the very short-range capability that a gun would offer, but the
long-range capability to be offered initially by the Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). and later by the Meteor beyond
visual range air-to-air missile.

12. The minimal combat value that the gun does provide is more than
outweighed by the support, fatigue and training cost penalties of
retaining it. Specific disadvantages of the gun include:

— the damaging effects of the shock of its recoil on the electronics
(approximately 4 tons recoil shock 30 times a second);
— the corrosive effects of its exhaust gas;
— the strain which it puts on the airframe, reducing the aircraft's
useful life. (Even the weight of 80kg of ammunition can add well over
half a tonne load at the wing roots of the aircraft when it is subject
to high gravitational pull in manoeuvre. Each aircraft has a finite
design fatigue life. Using up this life much more rapidly would require
us to purchase a greater number of aircraft or to undertake a life
extension programme, the cost and operational penalties of which cannot
be justified by the minimal operational benefits of the gun.); and
— a range of training costs, including the provision of new targets,
the increased demands on the Hawk aircraft towing the targets (which
must shortly be replaced by new aircraft), and the cost of removing
training rounds from the environment.

13. We understand that our partner nations currently intend to retain
the gun on Eurofighter. The American F-14, F-15, F/A-18 all have
internal guns, though the F-117 does not; and the F-22 is planned to
have one. The Russian MiG-29 and the Su-27/31 also have guns as do
Gripen and Rafale. Some of these aircraft types entered service many
years ago when missile technology was far less advanced. However, it is
not currently planned to fit an internal gun to the Short Take-Off and
Vertical Landing variant of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), although it will
be able to carry an externally mounted gun which can be put on and
removed from the aircraft for particular missions.

14. Our assessment remains that, in the future operational roles for
which we require Eurofighter, the minimal value of a gun is more than
outweighed by its considerable associated costs and disadvantages.
+++++



--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
 




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