Cle Elum crash on NTSB

On Oct 28, 5:49*am, Paul Tribe wrote:

However, given what I've read on here over the last few days,
some of you, particularly the pilots with no winch launch
experience, will find the BGA winch launch safety initiative
informative:

http://www.gliding.co.uk/bgainfo/saf...hlaunching.htm

Fascinating Condor (I assume) simulations.

It would appear that "Spin Clip 2" is a candidate for what might have
occured at Cle Elum.

"Spin Clip 1" is a cockpit view which is especially chilling.

Condor seems to be a very nice tool to experience what you don't ever
want to experience, just like the ATP's do in the big simulators.

On Oct 28, 1:55*pm, JohnDeRosa wrote:
On Oct 28, 5:49*am, Paul Tribe wrote:



However, given what I've read on here over the last few days,
some of you, particularly the pilots with no winch launch
experience, will find the BGA winch launch safety initiative
informative:

http://www.gliding.co.uk/bgainfo/saf...hlaunching.htm

Fascinating Condor (I assume) simulations.

It would appear that "Spin Clip 2" is a candidate for what might have
occured at Cle Elum.

"Spin Clip 1" is a cockpit view which is especially chilling.

Condor seems to be a very nice tool to experience what you don't ever
want to experience, just like the ATP's do in the big simulators.

Sailors of the Sky, I think. There's an article someplace about
the Lasham setup. These planes are different from what are in
Condor, also. Still, I'd expect Condor will show the same.

-- Matt

On Oct 28, 2:32*pm, mattm wrote:
On Oct 28, 1:55*pm, JohnDeRosa wrote:



On Oct 28, 5:49*am, Paul Tribe wrote:

However, given what I've read on here over the last few days,
some of you, particularly the pilots with no winch launch
experience, will find the BGA winch launch safety initiative
informative:

http://www.gliding.co.uk/bgainfo/saf...hlaunching.htm

Fascinating Condor (I assume) simulations.

It would appear that "Spin Clip 2" is a candidate for what might have
occured at Cle Elum.

"Spin Clip 1" is a cockpit view which is especially chilling.

Condor seems to be a very nice tool to experience what you don't ever
want to experience, just like the ATP's do in the big simulators.

Sailors of the Sky, I think. *There's an article someplace about
the Lasham setup. *These planes are different from what are in
Condor, also. *Still, I'd expect Condor will show the same.

-- Matt

Condor does an excellent job of simulating stall/spin sequences.
Scary good. The SSF has several videos on their website produced using
Condor. They do a really nice job, I think, of illustrating a bad day
at the gliderport.

http://www.soaringsafety.org/school/badvideo.html

On Oct 28, 10:23*am, Ramy wrote:
On Oct 27, 9:28*pm, Steve Leonard wrote:



What else about their “intentions” were you hoping the NTSB would
state in a preliminary accident report? *Were you expecting them to
detail the entire planned flight path, launch sequence, acceleration
rate, tow car speed for the climb, film crew briefings? *Not gonna
happen with with the NTSB. *They provided some eye-witness information
which may or may not be misleading, and some facts about the airport,
the registered owner of the plane, etc. *We have been told what their
intentions were. * We have been told they were filming a commercial
for Cadillac. *We have been told they used the vehicle for the ground
launch. *We have been told they planned to tow the DG up with their
rope (which the NTSB reports as 234 feet long, made from 5/16th
nylon. *Although, I suspect it is polypropylene.), do a 180, and land
back the other direction. *As for the rest of the sequence, I was not
there, but am presenting what I believe is a plausible explanation of
how the events may have transpired.

We can assume that the rope was intact after the launch, as the NTSB
report reports the length of the rope, and makes no comments about it
being broken, or rings found in the glider, etc. *They would have
stated the rope was broken it if had been. *So, this does not appear
to be any sort of rope overload, as some were presuming.

The witnesses stated that the takeoff appeared normal. *There is
enough confusing information after this if you start putting the math
to it about distance down the runway, altitude, etc to make one
suspicious of the distance and height observations. *The witnesses
reported that the plane "pitched to a steep nose high attitude." *We
know that at some point in the climb (estimated to be 100 to 125
feet), the rope “slackend”. *Three ways the rope can "slacken". *Tow
vehicle slows down, glider pushes over, or rope disconnects. *They say
the glider continued to ascend to about 200 feet of altitude and
leveled off. *Based on what they say happened next, I believe the rope
disconnected and the pilot pushed over.

In an auto tow launch, you lift off, bring the nose up *a little, get
some altitude, then bring the nose on up. *As you near the top of the
climb, the nose comes back down to pretty close to level. *Watch any
video of a winch launch on YouTube. *Very similar, but on car tow, you
don't accelerate as rapidly. *Depending on how the launch is
conducted, you will be rotating to full climb between 100 and 200
feet. *Unfortunately, if you try for the same profile with a 234 foot
rope as you would with a 2000 foot rope (be rotating to full climb
angle at 100 feet AGL), the rope to hitch angle will likely hit the
"back release" angle at somewhere between 100 and 150 feet AGL. *So,
if you try to fly a "normal" launch profile on a short rope, you will
likely get a low altitude back release, as the pilot in this accident
probably got.

So, here you are, about 100 to 150 or so feet AGL, 35-40 degrees or so
nose up, about right on speed for the climb, and the release does its
backrelease thing. *You are surprised, but put the stick on the
forward stop as you are trained. *The plane keeps going up and keeps
slowing down as you are going over the top. *By the time you go over
the top at about 200 feet or so, and have the nose back down to normal
gliding attitude, your airspeed is pretty well gone. *Do the math to
see how much altitude you will gain in slowing from 60 to 30 knots or
so, no drag losses. *Unless you keep the stick forward to get the nose
well below the normal gliding attitude to get flying speed back (and
give up what precious little altitude you have), you will stall.
Pilot probably came across the top at about two hundred or so feet
after this, less than one g and slower than 1 g stall speed. *He then
likely attempted to initiate the turn, as things were "back to normal,
per the plan." *Meaning, he was near the far end of the runway, at
about 200 feet, ready to turn around. *Trouble is, he was below stall
speed. *Attempted to turn and entered a spin.

As to the max speed the towcar attained, I would be very surprised if
they were attempting other than a "normal" ground launch sequnce, but
with a very short rope. *"Normal" being accelerate the car to flying
speed for the plane plus safety margin (no wind, say 65 MPH or so for
the DG? *Remember, his airspeed would go up as soon as he starts to
climb, and the intention was to climb), hold that speed, drive to near
the end, and stop.

A very sad and tragic accident.

Respectfully,
Steve Leonard
What else about their “intentions” were you hoping the NTSB would
state in a preliminary accident report?

This is precisely the problem with NTSB reports, they don't provide
enough facts to make any conclusion. The final report usually come a
year later and often does not have much more information than the
preliminary reports. So so much for the requests to "wait for the NTSB
report". We waited, and now we need the facts so we can draw our own
conclusions and learn the lessons.
And I am pretty sure that some of the readers know more.

As for the plan to do a 180 to land, there is no mention of it in the
NTSB report, only from Gary's comment. I think this is the key to be
able to categorize this accident as "something went terribly wrong" vs
"someone made a terrible decision" or did not know what they were
doing. There is no much we can do to prevent the "something went
terribly wrong" type of accidnets, *but there is much we can do to
prevent the later and learn the lessons. Perhaps someone reading this
will, as a result, *think twice before attempting an auto tow with a
short rope on a short runway with limited straight ahead options.
Incidentally, I recently visited such an airport were they attempted
an autolaunch on a short runway, slightly uphill with no straight
ahead option, and quickly learned they will be better off finding a
tow plane.

Ramy


Ramy,
Being very close to this and in the information stream has not been a
lot of fun. The first glider I ever flew in was this DG1000 and the
pilot was this pilot, Lynn, who became my primary CFIG. I have 50
flights in the glider and soloed in it and my logbook is full of sign-
offs from Lynn who was a very careful pilot and seemed very risk
adverse. As the current president of the club he was part of (and a
CFIG for) I have been copied on most of the information and if there
is a smoking gun I am not aware of it. If this occurred because of a
defect or problem with the glider we won't know until the final NTSB
report comes out. Even when you are close to the details there is a
lot of confusion. I was told several times that the tow row was 1"
nylon 200' long, the NTSB says it was 230' and 5/16". From
eyewitnesses to the accident and to the 4 video feeds that the NTSB
has the rope broke before it released (or was released) from the
glider. Multiple accounts also describe a complete cycle prior to the
accident where the glider was launched and landed ahead of the SUV and
that this was another take. The information from the witness on the
youtube video appears to be describing the previous days shooting in
which the glider was areo-towed so it could be filmed with a
helicopter, and the idea that there was a plan to turn around and land
back I have only seen or heard about here on RAS, although there could
have been such a plan.

This weekend I was talking to a glider pilot who was there that day
and his comment was that this probably will not be an accident where
some mysterious aerodynamic factor or aircraft defect is discovered.
The lesson will most likely be found in so many examples where complex
human factors having nothing to do with aviation influenced highly
skilled and trained professionals to start cutting the margins closer
and closer. The book "Into Thin Air" comes to mind. When I first got
into gliding I was surprised by how many accidents involved high time
pilots, but it seems that at some point pilots stop being scared and
start accepting more risks. Sort of like russian roulette where you
pull the trigger 5 times and start to feel like it isn't very
dangerous after all.

Or, maybe it will turn out that something in the glider broke at the
worst possible moment. In any case, one thing I would change about
the set up going in is: Lynn should not have been the one to get all
the credit, take all the blame, make all the decisions, and fly all
the tasks. That was just too much workload. There should have been
one or two other people making the go/nogo decisions free of ego and
careless of blame or any outcome other than a living pilot at the end
of the day. There was no shortage of people with vast auto tow and
aerodynamic knowledge to choose from.

I hope this doesn't come off as trying to lecture or pontificate, but
after this year and all the accidents, maybe all it comes down to is
trying to increase the margin of safety of every part of flying.

Please fly safe,
Brian

On Fri, 28 Oct 2011 10:55:24 -0700, JohnDeRosa wrote:

It would appear that "Spin Clip 2" is a candidate for what might have
occured at Cle Elum.

"Spin Clip 1" is a cockpit view which is especially chilling.

Both show what we are exhaustively trained against: assuming that you're
OK once you've pushed over to a normal gliding attitude. You're not of
course, because you'll be too slow and, unless you reacted IMMEDIATELY
and got the stick far enough forward for a zero G push-over you'll be
below stall speed, from where any turn will spin immediately.

The rule of thumb[*] is to push over until your dive attitude is as steep
as you were going up and then hold the attitude without attempting to
turn until you've reached the landing approach speed you'd chosen for the
day. Then, and only then you decide whether you've space to land ahead or
whether you need to turn.
[*] unless, of course, its a low break where you'd become a lawn dart if
you used the above technique. Off a winch you'll always have plenty of
specs ahead, so a shallower recovery attitude is OK once you're
combortable above stall speed and anyway you won't need to turn.


Sadly, I think Steve Leonard has probably called this about right. IMO
whether the rope broke or not isn't relevant, but the fact that no
witnesses reported an immediate push-over into a speed recovery attitude
is.


--
martin@ | Martin Gregorie
gregorie. | Essex, UK
org |

Those clips are quite good. We used to do RC aerotow and winching
with scale ships and occasionally it would go bad. If you werent
keeping wings level, the grass could grab a wing tip and look exactly
like that if you didnt pull the release(or the release servo was weak
and failed).

‘There is no much we can do to prevent the "something went terribly
wrong" type of accidents . . . ‘

Sorry, don’t agree, other than such things a wings folding up through
e.g. structural failure, or collision coming from an intruder in the
blind spot.

A properly conducted autotow or winch launch should be conducted such
that ANY eventuality can be handled safely. If there is some
circumstance where that is not possible, it should be foreseeable and
the flight not commenced.

At any stage of the launch, the nose should not be raised to a greater
angle than will allow push over and resumption of normal flying
attitude AND SPEED before needing to commence round out.

I was taught that on autotow, for the first 100 feet, the nose should
be raised very little – the far end of the runway should still be
visible. If power fails or rope breaks, as Martin said, lowering the
nose to the same angle that it was raised (in this case only a small
change of attitude) should therefore be possible.

Higher up, more pitch up is OK because there is more height to
recover. If you can’t, you were too steep too low, and it is the
second kind of accident (‘"someone made a terrible decision" or did
not know what they were doing.’)

That is not to say we don’t have such accidents in the UK. Such UK
accidents have become thankfully more rare But you never HAVE TO have
an accident, if you do it right.

Chris N.
* |

On Oct 28, 2:29*pm, brianDG303 wrote:
On Oct 28, 10:23*am, Ramy wrote:





On Oct 27, 9:28*pm, Steve Leonard wrote:

What else about their “intentions” were you hoping the NTSB would
state in a preliminary accident report? *Were you expecting them to
detail the entire planned flight path, launch sequence, acceleration
rate, tow car speed for the climb, film crew briefings? *Not gonna
happen with with the NTSB. *They provided some eye-witness information
which may or may not be misleading, and some facts about the airport,
the registered owner of the plane, etc. *We have been told what their
intentions were. * We have been told they were filming a commercial
for Cadillac. *We have been told they used the vehicle for the ground
launch. *We have been told they planned to tow the DG up with their
rope (which the NTSB reports as 234 feet long, made from 5/16th
nylon. *Although, I suspect it is polypropylene.), do a 180, and land
back the other direction. *As for the rest of the sequence, I was not
there, but am presenting what I believe is a plausible explanation of
how the events may have transpired.

We can assume that the rope was intact after the launch, as the NTSB
report reports the length of the rope, and makes no comments about it
being broken, or rings found in the glider, etc. *They would have
stated the rope was broken it if had been. *So, this does not appear
to be any sort of rope overload, as some were presuming.

The witnesses stated that the takeoff appeared normal. *There is
enough confusing information after this if you start putting the math
to it about distance down the runway, altitude, etc to make one
suspicious of the distance and height observations. *The witnesses
reported that the plane "pitched to a steep nose high attitude." *We
know that at some point in the climb (estimated to be 100 to 125
feet), the rope “slackend”. *Three ways the rope can "slacken". *Tow
vehicle slows down, glider pushes over, or rope disconnects. *They say
the glider continued to ascend to about 200 feet of altitude and
leveled off. *Based on what they say happened next, I believe the rope
disconnected and the pilot pushed over.

In an auto tow launch, you lift off, bring the nose up *a little, get
some altitude, then bring the nose on up. *As you near the top of the
climb, the nose comes back down to pretty close to level. *Watch any
video of a winch launch on YouTube. *Very similar, but on car tow, you
don't accelerate as rapidly. *Depending on how the launch is
conducted, you will be rotating to full climb between 100 and 200
feet. *Unfortunately, if you try for the same profile with a 234 foot
rope as you would with a 2000 foot rope (be rotating to full climb
angle at 100 feet AGL), the rope to hitch angle will likely hit the
"back release" angle at somewhere between 100 and 150 feet AGL. *So,
if you try to fly a "normal" launch profile on a short rope, you will
likely get a low altitude back release, as the pilot in this accident
probably got.

So, here you are, about 100 to 150 or so feet AGL, 35-40 degrees or so
nose up, about right on speed for the climb, and the release does its
backrelease thing. *You are surprised, but put the stick on the
forward stop as you are trained. *The plane keeps going up and keeps
slowing down as you are going over the top. *By the time you go over
the top at about 200 feet or so, and have the nose back down to normal
gliding attitude, your airspeed is pretty well gone. *Do the math to
see how much altitude you will gain in slowing from 60 to 30 knots or
so, no drag losses. *Unless you keep the stick forward to get the nose
well below the normal gliding attitude to get flying speed back (and
give up what precious little altitude you have), you will stall.
Pilot probably came across the top at about two hundred or so feet
after this, less than one g and slower than 1 g stall speed. *He then
likely attempted to initiate the turn, as things were "back to normal,
per the plan." *Meaning, he was near the far end of the runway, at
about 200 feet, ready to turn around. *Trouble is, he was below stall
speed. *Attempted to turn and entered a spin.

As to the max speed the towcar attained, I would be very surprised if
they were attempting other than a "normal" ground launch sequnce, but
with a very short rope. *"Normal" being accelerate the car to flying
speed for the plane plus safety margin (no wind, say 65 MPH or so for
the DG? *Remember, his airspeed would go up as soon as he starts to
climb, and the intention was to climb), hold that speed, drive to near
the end, and stop.

A very sad and tragic accident.

Respectfully,
Steve Leonard
What else about their “intentions” were you hoping the NTSB would
state in a preliminary accident report?

This is precisely the problem with NTSB reports, they don't provide
enough facts to make any conclusion. The final report usually come a
year later and often does not have much more information than the
preliminary reports. So so much for the requests to "wait for the NTSB
report". We waited, and now we need the facts so we can draw our own
conclusions and learn the lessons.
And I am pretty sure that some of the readers know more.

As for the plan to do a 180 to land, there is no mention of it in the
NTSB report, only from Gary's comment. I think this is the key to be
able to categorize this accident as "something went terribly wrong" vs
"someone made a terrible decision" or did not know what they were
doing. There is no much we can do to prevent the "something went
terribly wrong" type of accidnets, *but there is much we can do to
prevent the later and learn the lessons. Perhaps someone reading this
will, as a result, *think twice before attempting an auto tow with a
short rope on a short runway with limited straight ahead options.
Incidentally, I recently visited such an airport were they attempted
an autolaunch on a short runway, slightly uphill with no straight
ahead option, and quickly learned they will be better off finding a
tow plane.

Ramy

Ramy,
Being very close to this and in the information stream has not been a
lot of fun. *The first glider I ever flew in was this DG1000 and the
pilot was this pilot, Lynn, who became my primary CFIG. *I have 50
flights in the glider and soloed in it and my logbook is full of sign-
offs from Lynn who was a very careful pilot and seemed very risk
adverse. *As the current president of the club he was part of (and a
CFIG for) I have been copied on most of the information and if there
is a smoking gun I am not aware of it. If this occurred because of a
defect or problem with the glider we won't know until the final NTSB
report comes out. *Even when you are close to the details there is a
lot of confusion. *I was told several times that the tow row was 1"
nylon 200' long, the NTSB says it was 230' and 5/16". *From
eyewitnesses to the accident and to the 4 video feeds that the NTSB
has the rope broke before it released (or was released) from the
glider. *Multiple accounts also describe a complete cycle prior to the
accident where the glider was launched and landed ahead of the SUV and
that this was another take. *The information from the witness on the
youtube video appears to be describing the previous days shooting in
which the glider was areo-towed so it could be filmed with a
helicopter, and the idea that there was a plan to turn around and land
back I have only seen or heard about here on RAS, although there could
have been such a plan.

This weekend I was talking to a glider pilot who was there that day
and his comment was that this probably will not be an accident where
some mysterious aerodynamic factor or aircraft defect is discovered.
The lesson will most likely be found in so many examples where complex
human factors having nothing to do with aviation influenced highly
skilled and trained professionals *to start cutting the margins closer
and closer. *The book "Into Thin Air" comes to mind. *When I first got
into gliding I was surprised by how many accidents involved high time
pilots, but it seems that at some point pilots stop being scared and
start accepting more risks. *Sort of like russian roulette where you
pull the trigger 5 times and start to feel like it isn't very
dangerous after all.

Or, maybe it will turn out that something in the glider broke at the
worst possible moment. *In any case, one thing I would change about
the set up going in is: *Lynn should not have been the one to get all
the credit, take all the blame, make all the decisions, and fly all
the tasks. *That was just too much workload. *There should have been
one or two other people making the go/nogo decisions free of ego and
careless of blame or any outcome other than a living pilot at the end
of the day. *There was no shortage of people with vast auto tow and
aerodynamic knowledge to choose from.

I hope this doesn't come off as trying to lecture or pontificate, but
after this year and all the accidents, maybe all it comes down to is
trying to increase the margin of safety of every part of flying.

Please fly safe,
Brian- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Brian, thanks for your comments and your thoughts, which are perhaps
the most relevant and most informative about this accident so far (far
more than the NTSB report will likely ever be) and I am glad you came
forward and shared it with us. As you say, chances are that this is a
classic case of "human factors having nothing to do with aviation
influenced highly skilled and trained professionals to start cutting
the margins closer and closer." This is what I believe most of us
suspected. And the lesson learned for all of us is not to cut margins,
but instead, as you said, increase the margin of safety.

Ramy

On Oct 28, 4:29*pm, brianDG303 wrote:
On Oct 28, 10:23*am, Ramy wrote:









On Oct 27, 9:28*pm, Steve Leonard wrote:

What else about their “intentions” were you hoping the NTSB would
state in a preliminary accident report? *Were you expecting them to
detail the entire planned flight path, launch sequence, acceleration
rate, tow car speed for the climb, film crew briefings? *Not gonna
happen with with the NTSB. *They provided some eye-witness information
which may or may not be misleading, and some facts about the airport,
the registered owner of the plane, etc. *We have been told what their
intentions were. * We have been told they were filming a commercial
for Cadillac. *We have been told they used the vehicle for the ground
launch. *We have been told they planned to tow the DG up with their
rope (which the NTSB reports as 234 feet long, made from 5/16th
nylon. *Although, I suspect it is polypropylene.), do a 180, and land
back the other direction. *As for the rest of the sequence, I was not
there, but am presenting what I believe is a plausible explanation of
how the events may have transpired.

We can assume that the rope was intact after the launch, as the NTSB
report reports the length of the rope, and makes no comments about it
being broken, or rings found in the glider, etc. *They would have
stated the rope was broken it if had been. *So, this does not appear
to be any sort of rope overload, as some were presuming.

The witnesses stated that the takeoff appeared normal. *There is
enough confusing information after this if you start putting the math
to it about distance down the runway, altitude, etc to make one
suspicious of the distance and height observations. *The witnesses
reported that the plane "pitched to a steep nose high attitude." *We
know that at some point in the climb (estimated to be 100 to 125
feet), the rope “slackend”. *Three ways the rope can "slacken". *Tow
vehicle slows down, glider pushes over, or rope disconnects. *They say
the glider continued to ascend to about 200 feet of altitude and
leveled off. *Based on what they say happened next, I believe the rope
disconnected and the pilot pushed over.

In an auto tow launch, you lift off, bring the nose up *a little, get
some altitude, then bring the nose on up. *As you near the top of the
climb, the nose comes back down to pretty close to level. *Watch any
video of a winch launch on YouTube. *Very similar, but on car tow, you
don't accelerate as rapidly. *Depending on how the launch is
conducted, you will be rotating to full climb between 100 and 200
feet. *Unfortunately, if you try for the same profile with a 234 foot
rope as you would with a 2000 foot rope (be rotating to full climb
angle at 100 feet AGL), the rope to hitch angle will likely hit the
"back release" angle at somewhere between 100 and 150 feet AGL. *So,
if you try to fly a "normal" launch profile on a short rope, you will
likely get a low altitude back release, as the pilot in this accident
probably got.

So, here you are, about 100 to 150 or so feet AGL, 35-40 degrees or so
nose up, about right on speed for the climb, and the release does its
backrelease thing. *You are surprised, but put the stick on the
forward stop as you are trained. *The plane keeps going up and keeps
slowing down as you are going over the top. *By the time you go over
the top at about 200 feet or so, and have the nose back down to normal
gliding attitude, your airspeed is pretty well gone. *Do the math to
see how much altitude you will gain in slowing from 60 to 30 knots or
so, no drag losses. *Unless you keep the stick forward to get the nose
well below the normal gliding attitude to get flying speed back (and
give up what precious little altitude you have), you will stall.
Pilot probably came across the top at about two hundred or so feet
after this, less than one g and slower than 1 g stall speed. *He then
likely attempted to initiate the turn, as things were "back to normal,
per the plan." *Meaning, he was near the far end of the runway, at
about 200 feet, ready to turn around. *Trouble is, he was below stall
speed. *Attempted to turn and entered a spin.

As to the max speed the towcar attained, I would be very surprised if
they were attempting other than a "normal" ground launch sequnce, but
with a very short rope. *"Normal" being accelerate the car to flying
speed for the plane plus safety margin (no wind, say 65 MPH or so for
the DG? *Remember, his airspeed would go up as soon as he starts to
climb, and the intention was to climb), hold that speed, drive to near
the end, and stop.

A very sad and tragic accident.

Respectfully,
Steve Leonard
What else about their “intentions” were you hoping the NTSB would
state in a preliminary accident report?

This is precisely the problem with NTSB reports, they don't provide
enough facts to make any conclusion. The final report usually come a
year later and often does not have much more information than the
preliminary reports. So so much for the requests to "wait for the NTSB
report". We waited, and now we need the facts so we can draw our own
conclusions and learn the lessons.
And I am pretty sure that some of the readers know more.

As for the plan to do a 180 to land, there is no mention of it in the
NTSB report, only from Gary's comment. I think this is the key to be
able to categorize this accident as "something went terribly wrong" vs
"someone made a terrible decision" or did not know what they were
doing. There is no much we can do to prevent the "something went
terribly wrong" type of accidnets, *but there is much we can do to
prevent the later and learn the lessons. Perhaps someone reading this
will, as a result, *think twice before attempting an auto tow with a
short rope on a short runway with limited straight ahead options.
Incidentally, I recently visited such an airport were they attempted
an autolaunch on a short runway, slightly uphill with no straight
ahead option, and quickly learned they will be better off finding a
tow plane.

Ramy

Ramy,
Being very close to this and in the information stream has not been a
lot of fun. *The first glider I ever flew in was this DG1000 and the
pilot was this pilot, Lynn, who became my primary CFIG. *I have 50
flights in the glider and soloed in it and my logbook is full of sign-
offs from Lynn who was a very careful pilot and seemed very risk
adverse. *As the current president of the club he was part of (and a
CFIG for) I have been copied on most of the information and if there
is a smoking gun I am not aware of it. If this occurred because of a
defect or problem with the glider we won't know until the final NTSB
report comes out. *Even when you are close to the details there is a
lot of confusion. *I was told several times that the tow row was 1"
nylon 200' long, the NTSB says it was 230' and 5/16". *From
eyewitnesses to the accident and to the 4 video feeds that the NTSB
has the rope broke before it released (or was released) from the
glider. *Multiple accounts also describe a complete cycle prior to the
accident where the glider was launched and landed ahead of the SUV and
that this was another take. *The information from the witness on the
youtube video appears to be describing the previous days shooting in
which the glider was areo-towed so it could be filmed with a
helicopter, and the idea that there was a plan to turn around and land
back I have only seen or heard about here on RAS, although there could
have been such a plan.

This weekend I was talking to a glider pilot who was there that day
and his comment was that this probably will not be an accident where
some mysterious aerodynamic factor or aircraft defect is discovered.
The lesson will most likely be found in so many examples where complex
human factors having nothing to do with aviation influenced highly
skilled and trained professionals *to start cutting the margins closer
and closer. *The book "Into Thin Air" comes to mind. *When I first got
into gliding I was surprised by how many accidents involved high time
pilots, but it seems that at some point pilots stop being scared and
start accepting more risks. *Sort of like russian roulette where you
pull the trigger 5 times and start to feel like it isn't very
dangerous after all.

Or, maybe it will turn out that something in the glider broke at the
worst possible moment. *In any case, one thing I would change about
the set up going in is: *Lynn should not have been the one to get all
the credit, take all the blame, make all the decisions, and fly all
the tasks. *That was just too much workload. *There should have been
one or two other people making the go/nogo decisions free of ego and
careless of blame or any outcome other than a living pilot at the end
of the day. *There was no shortage of people with vast auto tow and
aerodynamic knowledge to choose from.

I hope this doesn't come off as trying to lecture or pontificate, but
after this year and all the accidents, maybe all it comes down to is
trying to increase the margin of safety of every part of flying.

Please fly safe,
Brian

Brian mentioned INTO THIN AIR, a book glider pilots, or anyone who
participates in activities that have a higher than average risks,
ought to read.

On Everest, the real pros didn’t make a push for the summit. They
possessed unwavering safety principles. They did not put others at
risk. In fact, they were in the position to save many people who put
personal goals ahead of safety concerns. I do not draw any conclusions
about the recent tragedies. Rather, I am suggesting that we goal-
oriented pilots could use this book as a reminder that part of being
an expert is knowing when to abandon high risk tasks. Most of us have
felt moments when it's not easy to think safety when the goal is so
very close. We have to rely on our own code of conduct and remember
that sometimes there are higher rewards for not doing something
instead of being “brave enough” to do it..

Val

On 10/28/2011 3:29 PM, brianDG303 wrote:

On Oct 28, 10:23 am, wrote:

Major snip of another's excellent 'possible accident contributors' analysis...


This is precisely the problem with NTSB reports, they don't provide
enough facts to make any conclusion.

Additional valid grousing snipped...


Ramy


Ramy,
Being very close to this and in the information stream has not been a
lot of fun. The first glider I ever flew in was this DG1000 and the
pilot was this pilot, Lynn, who became my primary CFIG. I have 50
flights in the glider and soloed in it and my logbook is full of sign-
offs from Lynn who was a very careful pilot and seemed very risk
adverse. As the current president of the club he was part of (and a
CFIG for) I have been copied on most of the information and if there
is a smoking gun I am not aware of it. If this occurred because of a
defect or problem with the glider we won't know until the final NTSB
report comes out. Even when you are close to the details there is a
lot of confusion. I was told several times that the tow row was 1"
nylon 200' long, the NTSB says it was 230' and 5/16". From
eyewitnesses to the accident and to the 4 video feeds that the NTSB
has the rope broke before it released (or was released) from the
glider. Multiple accounts also describe a complete cycle prior to the
accident where the glider was launched and landed ahead of the SUV and
that this was another take. The information from the witness on the
youtube video appears to be describing the previous days shooting in
which the glider was areo-towed so it could be filmed with a
helicopter, and the idea that there was a plan to turn around and land
back I have only seen or heard about here on RAS, although there could
have been such a plan.

This weekend I was talking to a glider pilot who was there that day
and his comment was that this probably will not be an accident where
some mysterious aerodynamic factor or aircraft defect is discovered.
The lesson will most likely be found in so many examples where complex
human factors having nothing to do with aviation influenced highly
skilled and trained professionals to start cutting the margins closer
and closer. The book "Into Thin Air" comes to mind. When I first got
into gliding I was surprised by how many accidents involved high time
pilots, but it seems that at some point pilots stop being scared and
start accepting more risks. Sort of like russian roulette where you
pull the trigger 5 times and start to feel like it isn't very
dangerous after all.

Or, maybe it will turn out that something in the glider broke at the
worst possible moment. In any case, one thing I would change about
the set up going in is: Lynn should not have been the one to get all
the credit, take all the blame, make all the decisions, and fly all
the tasks. That was just too much workload. There should have been
one or two other people making the go/nogo decisions free of ego and
careless of blame or any outcome other than a living pilot at the end
of the day. There was no shortage of people with vast auto tow and
aerodynamic knowledge to choose from.

I hope this doesn't come off as trying to lecture or pontificate, but
after this year and all the accidents, maybe all it comes down to is
trying to increase the margin of safety of every part of flying.

Please fly safe,
Brian

Thank you for this (and all your) post(s) on this sad and painful accident,
Brian. By way of psychological preparation...IME, future exposure to (fatal or
otherwise) accidents involving your soaring friends and acquaintances won't
get any easier...

FWIW, I think you've touched above upon a couple of fundamental and crucial
points worth bearing continually in mind (and - hopefully - presumably in
related action) by all practicing soaring pilots, regardless of experience,
currency or anything else:

1) (referencing your thoughts...)
The lesson will most likely be found in so many examples where complex
human factors having nothing to do with aviation influenced highly
skilled and trained professionals to start cutting the margins closer
and closer. The book "Into Thin Air" comes to mind. When I first got
into gliding I was surprised by how many accidents involved high time
pilots, but it seems that at some point pilots stop being scared and
start accepting more risks. Sort of like russian roulette where you
pull the trigger 5 times and start to feel like it isn't very
dangerous after all.

Indeed the acceptance of increasing risks is 'the natural progression' of
increasing soaring pilot knowledge and activity. IMO, the "trick" (if there is
one) is for Joe Growing Pilot to always/continually/actively remain *aware*
that such a process and progression is occurring, and to recognize and act in
ways respecting his/her ever-changing margins. Be vary aware/wary of any
thoughts touching upon 'my growing experience is my protection.'

Which leads to...

2) (also referencing your thoughts...)
In any case, one thing I would change about
the set up going in is: Lynn should not have been the one to get all
the credit, take all the blame, make all the decisions, and fly all
the tasks. That was just too much workload. There should have been
one or two other people making the go/nogo decisions free of ego and
careless of blame or any outcome other than a living pilot at the end
of the day. There was no shortage of people with vast auto tow and
aerodynamic knowledge to choose from.

"Spot on!" (I'd *still* say the same thing even had everything turned out
as-planned.) Knowing nothing of the particulars, but also knowing very few
people (much less soaring pilots) with direct 'film industry experience,' I'd
be statistically astounded if 'all of this situation' was NOT essentially new
ground for the pilot involved. It sure would've been for me. If proposed to
me, the whole 'dynamic' of a situation as this would have instantly raised
multiple alarm bells in my mind, entirely for 'newness' - and therefore safety
- reasons. Clint Eastwood was right: "A man's got to know his limitations." I
like to imagine that - as a minimum - I'd've done as you suggest. Soaring is
sufficiently demanding an activity withOUT complicating the situation with
hopes and desires of folks experienced enough in their own fields, but (almost
certainly) 100% ignorant about the things they'll be requesting of Joe Pilot.

Respectfully and Sadly,
Bob W.