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The Next Steps for Missile Defense.



 
 
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Old April 27th 07, 02:56 PM posted to rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.military.naval
Mike[_1_]
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Posts: 25
Default The Next Steps for Missile Defense.

The Next Steps for Missile Defense.
Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Nat...oad/bg2028.pdf

April 25, 2007
The Next Steps for Missile Defense

On July 4-5, 2006, North Korea test launched a salvo of ballistic
missiles.[1] Iran took the same action on November 2, 2006, and
January 22, 2007.[2] Clearly, the ballistic missile threat to the
United States and its allies is not going away.

Congress and the American people need to under*stand that while the
United States has made progress in putting missile defense systems in
the field in recent years, in most respects the U.S. remains vul*
nerable to this threat. This is no time for the U.S. to slow the pace
of developing and deploying effective defenses against ballistic
missiles. Indeed, the Bush Administration and Congress need to
accelerate the effort by focusing on developing and deploying the
systems that offer the greatest capability.

A detailed proposal for proceeding with the most effective systems was
issued by the Independent Working Group on missile defense in June
2006.[3] The report specifically refers to space-based and sea-based
defenses as the most effective components of the lay*ered missile
defense system design advocated by the Bush Administration. While the
sea-based systems have continued to make progress in recent years, the
effort to develop and deploy space-based interceptors has languished.

Further, the change in party control in Congress has put a number of
missile defense skeptics in lead*ership positions. For example,
Senator Carl Levin (D- MI), the new chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, has stated that he considers it a mistake to buy
missile defense interceptors before they have proven themselves in
operational tests.[4] This seem*ingly anodyne statement actually
reveals his inten*tion to stop many missile defense activities,
because the interceptors and other elements of the defense must be
purchased and fielded in order to be tested. Missile defenses must be
built as an integrated net*work of systems; it is not like buying a
small num*ber of test aircraft and proceeding to procure the fleet
following operational testing.

Under these circumstances, the Bush Adminis*tration and congressional
supporters of missile defense need to take the following steps, which
are consistent with the recommendations of the Inde*pendent Working
Group report:

Formulate a strategy involving missile defense supporters in Congress
and President Bush to protect missile defense programs in defense
authorization and appropriations legislation,
Maintain robust funding for the missile defense program,
Support the construction of a "space test bed" for missile defense;
Rebut charges that the testing and fielding of missile defense systems
will cross a threshold by "weaponizing" space,
Support the deployment of sea-based defenses to protect U.S. coastal
areas against short-range ballistic missiles launched from ships,
Oppose efforts to deny the military the option of putting
developmental missile defense systems on operational alert, and
Shift responsibility for sea-based missile defense systems from the
Missile Defense Agency to the Navy.
Toward Defending America: Progress But Still Vulnerable

The Bush Administration has made significant progress toward fielding
an effective defense against ballistic missiles. The greatest advances
have come in the policy area. President George W. Bush kicked off the
effort to change the Clinton Administration's negative policies toward
missile defense with a speech on May 1, 2001, to the faculty and
students of the National Defense University.[5] In this speech, the
President signaled his intention to put missile defense at the heart
of the effort to transform the military and position it to meet the
security needs of the 21st century.

President Bush followed up this speech by changing missile defense
policy with a dramatic announcement on December 13, 2001, that the
U.S. was withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
with the former Soviet Union.[6] The ABM Treaty blocked the
development, testing, and deployment of effective defenses against
ballistic missiles.

On January 9, 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced the
findings of the Nuclear Pos*ture Review, a new strategic policy that
made defenses a part of a new strategic triad.[7] Under this policy,
defenses were paired with offensive conventional and nuclear strike
capabilities and a robust technology and industrial base to meet U.S.
strategic needs.

Finally, on May 20, 2003, the White House released a description of a
presidential directive signed earlier by President Bush that related
to his policy for developing and deploying a layered mis*sile defense
system as soon as possible to defend the people and territory of the
United States, U.S. troops deployed abroad, and U.S. allies and
friends.[8] When fielded, this layered defense will be able to
intercept ballistic missiles in the boost (ascent), midcourse, and
terminal phases of flight.

The Bush Administration has also made significant advances in
increasing funding levels for missile defense research, development,
and deployment. In fiscal year (FY) 2001, which was the last Clinton
Administration budget, funding for the Ballistic Mis*sile Defense
Organization was $4.8 billion. This level of funding was achieved only
because of aggressive congressional support for ballistic missile
defense in the face of a reluctant Clinton Administration. In FY 2002,
funding for what is now the Missile Defense Agency was increased to
$7.8 billion. The projected expenditure level for FY 2007 is $9.4
billion.[9]

On the other hand, the American people still remain quite vulnerable
to ballistic missile attack because missile defense programs have
lagged behind advances in policy, funding, and-regretta*bly-the
missile threat. To some extent, this is unavoidable. A policy for
deploying effective missile defenses must precede actually fielding
the defenses, and the necessary funding must be in place to move the
programs forward. However, the American people remain vulnerable
because oppo*nents of missile defense have forced the Bush
Administration and proponents in Congress to compromise on the most
effective options.[10]

The most important of these regrettable compro*mises regards the
failure to revive the technologies necessary to complete the
development and ulti*mately to deploy the Brilliant Pebbles space-
based interceptor, pioneered by the Reagan and George H. W. Bush
Administrations. Congress weakened this rapidly advancing concept in
1991,[11] and President Bill Clinton killed it in 1993. The current
Bush Administration's failure to revive these technologies was noted
early on by Ambassador Henry Cooper, former Director of the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization, in a 2001 letter to Lt. General
Ronald Kadish, then Missile Defense Agency Director.[12] The Brilliant
Pebbles option remains dormant today.

The sea-based systems for countering ballistic missiles have fared
better than the space-based pro*grams. The system is based on giving
the Aegis weapons system for air defense deployed on Navy cruisers and
destroyers a capability to track and intercept ballistic missiles. The
interceptors consist of late-model and new-model Standard Missiles.

As of July 2006, 11 Aegis destroyers had been upgraded to track
ballistic missiles in flight.[13] While an incorrect system setting
blocked a test of the Standard Missile-3 on December 7, 2006, prior to
that test, the Standard Missile-3 performed suc*cessful intercepts in
seven out of eight attempts.[14] At this time, three cruisers and
three destroyers are capable of engaging short-range and medium-range
ballistic missiles in the midcourse stage of flight with the Standard
Missile-3.[15] Finally, the Navy successfully tested the existing
Standard Missile-2 Block IV against a short-range target missile in
May 2006.[16] During the test, this system destroyed the incoming
missile in the terminal phase of flight.

Despite the progress with sea-based missile defense systems, they are
not as advanced as they could be. An accelerated approach to fielding
sea-based ballistic missile defenses was described by Ambassador
Cooper and Admiral J. D. Williams in an opinion piece in Inside
Missile Defense on Sep*tember 6, 2000.[17] This approach advocated
build*ing on the existing Aegis infrastructure by increasing the
interceptor missile's velocity to achieve a boost-phase intercept
capability. It would also require changing the operational procedures
that the Navy is permitted to use to perform missile defense
intercepts.

The Bush Administration has taken several steps that have slowed
progress on the sea-based option.

First, it canceled the Navy Area Program in 2001.[18] This program
consisted largely of the same technology that was successfully
demonstrated in the 2006 Navy test of the terminal Standard Missile-2
Block IV. This decision deprived the Navy of a basic building block
for evolving more capable sea-based missile defenses.

Second, the Missile Defense Agency initially sought to replace the
Standard Missile family of interceptors with a variation of the
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), which is too large to fit in the
existing vertical launch system. While the Missile Defense Agency
ultimately abandoned the KEI option for near-term sea-based
deployment, pre*cious time was lost.

Finally, the Bush Administration continues to insist on applying a
firing protocol developed dur*ing the Clinton Administration that
requires Navy ship commanders to wait until the target missile's
rocket motors have burned out before launching the interceptor. This
requirement effectively prohib*its the sea-based defense from
achieving a boost-phase intercept capability.

America's Vulnerability to Missiles: A Failure of Government

The compromises that missile defense propo*nents in the Bush
Administration and Congress have made in deference to the minority of
Ameri*cans who are opposed to missile defense have resulted in a
program that fails to meet the most basic obligation that the
Constitution assigns to the federal government: to "provide for the
common defence." The American people want to be defended, and if they
fully understood how vul*nerable they remain to missile attack and
that this vulnerability is the result of a tendency to accom*modate
the unrepresentative minority's demands for a policy that sustains
U.S. vulnerability, their confi*dence in the nation's leadership would
be shattered.[19]

This misunderstanding is the result of a wide*spread acceptance of the
rhetoric from political leaders who claim that they are seeking to
defend the American people. Regrettably, the American people may come
to understand the extent of their vulnerability only after a
successful attack.

In general terms, the debate over missile defense has reached a
stalemate in which the proponents have won the debate at the
rhetorical level and the opponents have prevailed in preventing the
rapid fielding of effective defenses. The security implica*tions of
this stalemate were demonstrated in 2006 when Israel attempted to
respond to the short-range rocket attacks from Lebanon by Hezbollah
guerillas. The U.S. and the Israelis opted to forgo deployment of the
mobile tactical high energy laser (MTHEL) system for countering short-
range rock*ets because they allowed the promise of more advanced
technology to stand in the way of the quicker deployment of effective
technology.[20] The result was that Hezbollah held the population of
northern Israel hostage to attacks. Deploying MTHEL would not have
provided the Israelis with a perfect defense, but it would have
blunted the effect of the Hezbollah rocket attacks.

The lesson for the Bush Administration and con*gressional proponents
of missile defense is that rhe*torical support is not enough. Support
for missile defense must be defined by the willingness to put readily
available technologies in the field as quickly as possible. This means
that both the Bush Adminis*tration and missile defense proponents in
Congress need to cooperate in fashioning a missile defense program
that will provide an effective defense to the American people,
American military forces, and America's friends and allies, and in
short order.

Seven Steps for Fielding Effective Missile Defenses

Obtaining a missile defense capability for the U.S. that matches the
rhetorical support from the Bush Administration and Congress,
particularly given the strengthened position of missile defense
opponents in Congress, will require achieving cer*tain programmatic
goals. At the outset of the Bush Administration, support for missile
defense re*quired changing prevailing national security and arms
control policies.

The Administration, with support from Congress, has achieved these
important goals. The government is firmly committed to developing and
deploying a layered, global missile defense system, and the U.S. is no
longer bound by the ABM Treaty. Now the Bush Administration and
missile defense supporters in Congress need to take seven specific
steps.

Step #1: Formulate a strategy for vigorously opposing legislative
proposals to weaken the missile defense program.

Further progress on developing and deploying a truly effective missile
defense system starts with a pro*cedural step: President Bush and
missile defense sup*porters in Congress need to work together to
vigorously oppose legislative measures that would weaken the missile
defense program. This effort should be directed at FY 2008 defense
authorization and defense appropriation bills. The cooperative strat*
egy should start with identifying actions by Con*gress-whether of
commission or of omission-that would clearly undermine the federal
government's ability to provide the protection against missile attack
that the American people are demanding and lead to specific measures
for countering these actions.

Step #2: Support adequate funding for the missile defense program.

The missile defense program cannot provide an adequate defense unless
it is properly funded. In general terms, this means maintaining the
missile defense budget at levels in line with recent years- roughly
$10 billion per year. On February 5, 2007, the Bush Administration
presented its $9.9 billion missile defense budget to Congress and the
pub*lic,[21] with the Missile Defense Agency receiving roughly $8.9
billion of that total. Thus, the Admin*istration's FY 2008 budget
request is generally in keeping with the $10 billion benchmark.

The question is whether or not the Congress will move to cut funding
for the missile defense pro*gram. Since some Members of Congress may
attempt to cut funding for missile defense by signif*icant amounts,
supporters need to be prepared with a blocking strategy. In general
terms, this strategy will depend on both President Bush and missile
defense supporters going over the heads of oppo*nents in Congress and
appealing to the public. This approach can work because the idea of
missile defense is reasonably popular with the public.

Step #3: Propose in Congress an effective program for putting missile
defense interceptors in space.

The Bush Administration's missile defense bud*get proposes $10 million
in FY 2008 in initial fund*ing to establish a space test bed.[22]
Funding for this program is envisioned to reach $124 million in FY
2013. The cumulative funding for FY 2008 through FY 2013 is $290
million. The funding proposal is categorized as one of several
"capabilities invest*ments" that are designed to address requirements
beyond FY 2013.

Even though the Bush Administration's proposal to begin work on
establishing a space test bed is very limited and in keeping with a
slow, incremental approach, it is likely to generate heated debate in
Congress. Arms control advocacy groups and their supporters in
Congress will likely insist that the U.S. adopt a position that
prohibits it from develop*ing-much less deploying-missile defense
inter*ceptors in space under any circumstance and for all time. They
will likely argue that denying the $10 million funding request is a
necessary part of estab*lishing a policy to "prevent the weaponization
of space." In short, a funding request for a program of limited near-
term substantive value will carry large symbolic importance.

If Congress intends to have an energetic debate over developing and
deploying the most effective missile defense system available-namely
space-based interceptors-it ought to debate a truly sub*stantive
program. Participants in the Independent Working Group believe that
such a substantive pro*gram would provide $100 million in FY 2008,
$500 million in FY 2009, and $1 billion in FY 2010 to create the space
test bed. This approach should yield a capable development test bed in
three to four years. The effort should be put in the hands of a small,
competent management team and should focus on reviving the
demonstrated technologies in the Brilliant Pebbles program. A
constellation of space-based missile defense interceptors would pro*
vide missile defense to both the U.S. and its friends and allies.

On this basis, missile defense supporters in Con*gress should propose
this alternative approach to the space test bed as amendments to the
defense authorization and appropriations bills for FY 2008 and unite
behind these amendments. The Bush Administration should accept this
alternative approach and move to incorporate it into its own missile
defense program.

Step #4: Rebut the charge that U.S. development and deployment of
space-based missile defense interceptors would constitute an
unprecedented step to weaponize space.

Arms control advocates are currently focused on preventing the
weaponization of space. They base their proposals on the assertion
that space is not already weaponized,[23] which is valid only if prop*
erly defining the term "space weapons" is irrelevant to the exercise
of controlling them.[24]

The fact is that space was weaponized when the first ballistic missile
was deployed, because ballistic missiles travel through space on their
way to their targets. The threat that these weapons pose to U.S.
security and the U.S. population is undeniable. The superior
effectiveness of space-based interceptors in countering ballistic
missiles is based on the fact that ballistic missiles transit space.
As a result, space-based interceptors are ideally located to intercept
ballistic missiles in the boost phase.

Congress needs to reject the charge that space-based ballistic missile
defense interceptors would constitute an unprecedented move by the
U.S. to weaponize space. It can do so by adding a preamble to the
amendment to provide more robust funding for construction of a space
test bed.

This preamble should take the form of a congres*sional finding that
the deployment of ballistic mis*siles weaponized space and that the
government has a fundamental obligation to protect the U.S. popu*
lation and territory against ballistic missile attack. The preamble
should go on to state that space-based interceptors will likely be the
most effective defense against ballistic missiles precisely because
ballistic missiles are space weapons. The preamble should conclude by
stating that the construction of the space test bed and eventual
deployment of space-based interceptors is a response to the weap*
onization of space brought about by the deploy*ment of ballistic
missiles.

President Bush and missile defense supporters in Congress should also
be prepared to counter pro*posals in defense authorization and
appropriations bills calling for the U.S. to enter into an interna*
tional agreement that imposes sweeping prohibi*tions on space weapons,
including by implication all forms of anti-satellite weapons.[25] Such
legisla*tion can be expected to avoid defining "space weap*ons," but
enactment of such legislation, by requiring U.S. acceptance of an
international agree*ment banning space weapons, would likely have a
devastating impact on U.S. national security and cripple the U.S.
missile defense program.

An undefined ban on space weapons could be interpreted as requiring
the U.S. to withdraw all satellites that are elements of broader U.S.
strike weapons systems, all ballistic missiles and rockets capable of
delivering a payload to low-earth orbit or higher, all nuclear weapons
that can be mated to such ballistic missiles or rockets, a wide range
of electronic jamming capabilities, kinetic kill vehicles capable of
space flight, and strike systems capable of destroying satellite
ground stations, just to name a few. The missile defense program would
be crippled because most missile defense systems have some inherent
anti-satellite capabil*ity. An undefined ban on space weapons would
effectively drive the U.S. military back to the mid-20th century.

Step #5: Field a system to protect U.S. coastal areas from sea-
launched shorter-range missiles.

In the near term, lesser missile powers, maybe including terrorist
groups, could attack U.S. terri*tory by launching a short-range Scud
missile from a container ship off the coast. Congress should express
its concern about this threat and direct the Navy to take steps to
counter it.

The best near-term capability for the Navy to counter this short-range
missile threat was identi*fied in the report of the Independent
Working Group and successfully demonstrated by the Navy in 2006.[26]
The Navy conducted a test of the existing Standard Missile-2 Block IV
as a terminal defense against a short-range missile near Hawaii.[27]

Building on this successful test, Congress could direct the Navy to
deploy the existing Standard Mis*sile-2 Block IV interceptors on Aegis-
equipped ships to provide a terminal defense against ballistic mis*
siles. Further, it should direct the Navy to develop upgrades to this
system so that it can perform boost-phase intercepts. Finally,
Congress should provide the necessary funding to the Navy to conduct
these development and deployment activities.

Step #6: Move funding and management authority for sea-based missile
defense systems from the Missile Defense Agency to the Navy.

It has long been the expectation that mature mis*sile defense systems
developed under the manage*ment of the Missile Defense Agency would be
transferred to the services to manage remaining development and
procurement activities. In fact, press reports indicate that Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Kenneth J. Krieg approved a plan in September 2006 to transfer several
ground-based ballistic mis*sile defense systems from the Missile
Defense Agency to the Army.[28]

Press reports do not clearly indicate whether or not Krieg's plan
extends to sea-based systems. As a result, Congress should direct the
Defense Depart*ment to approve the transfer of these programs to the
Navy. The sea-based systems developed by the Missile Defense Agency
have matured to the point that such a transfer is warranted, as
pointed out and recommended in the Independent Working Group's report.
[29] There is no reason to wait any longer. Congress should direct
that this transfer give both management authority and the necessary
funds to the Navy, but also make it clear to the Navy that it may use
the funds only for this purpose.

Step #7: Counter attempts to prohibit the Defense Department from
putting developmental missile defense systems on operational alert.

The Department of Defense is using a spiral development process to
advance missile defense technology and systems. This means that it is
put*ting developmental systems in the field to improve them
incrementally. The spiral development process is not only appropriate
for the missile defense pro*gram, but also essential because the
missile defense "architecture" is a system of systems that must be
built first in order to test it. This characteristic also gives
developmental missile defense systems an inherent, although limited,
operational capability.

The option to put the developmental missile defense on operational
alert on at least an interim basis is now at hand.[30] Opponents in
Congress, however, may be inclined to use expedient proce*dural
arguments to prevent the use of developmental missile defense systems
to defend the American peo*ple against attack. They could include a
provision in defense authorization or appropriations legislation that
would deny the military the option of using the missile defense system
until all system components have passed a full slate of operational
tests.

Such a proposal will be advertised as just "fly before you buy" common
sense. In reality, it will constitute an advertisement of American
vulnerabil*ity to attack. If a country like North Korea is think*ing
about launching a missile at the U.S., it makes little sense for
Congress to announce that the coun*try can take a free shot at the
U.S. because the U.S. will not use its limited missile defense
capability.

Adopting such a prohibition would also set the predicate for an effort
by missile defense opponents to prohibit the procurement of additional
missile defense components until current ones have passed the same
slate of operational tests. This will grind the overall missile
defense program to a halt because the nature of the system is that it
must be built in order to be tested.

Conclusion

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed in his memoirs that
the opponents of stra*tegic defense fashioned a policy during the Cold
War that, "[f]or the first time a major country saw an advantage in
enhancing its own vulnerability." [31] In the current era, in which
there are clear trends in the direction of both missile and nuclear
proliferation, the opponents of strategic defense are attempting to
take the policy of vulnerability to the next level by enhancing
America's vulnerability to any number of powers that obtain nuclear
weapons and the ballis*tic missiles to deliver them, not just its
vulnerability to a single superpower rival. Multilateralizing this
policy of vulnerability would be profoundly desta*bilizing and would
encourage further missile and nuclear proliferation.[32]

The proponents of the policy of vulnerability are focusing their
attention on undermining progress in missile defense programs, paying
special attention to those programs that offer the most promise for
providing an effective defense. Chief among these is a program for
fielding space-based missile defense interceptors.

The end result is that the American people are being deceived. The
rhetoric out of Washington would lead the American people to believe
that their government is committed to defending them against missile
attack. The reality is that they are being provided a very thin
defense of limited effec*tiveness. Congress needs to make good on its
promise to field an effective defense against ballistic missiles, and
President Bush should insist that Congress fulfill this basic
obligation to the Ameri*can people.

-Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security
Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Alli*son Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for Inter*national Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1]Michael A. Needham, "Responding to North Korea's Missile
Provocation," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1142, July 5, 2006, at
http://www.heritage.org/research/Asi...ad/wm_1142.pdf.

[2]Gareth Smyth, "Iran Tests Missiles as Fear of Attack Grows,"
Financial Times, January 22, 2007, at www.ft.com/cms/s/ e8ce4b7c-
aa4e-11db-83b0-0000779e2340.html (March 1, 2007).

[3]Independent Working Group, Missile Defense, the Space Relationship,
& the Twenty-First Century: 2007 Report (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006), at www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWGreport.pdf
(September 18, 2006).

[4]Jen DiMascio, "New Direction for Iraq Tops Levin's Agenda as
Incoming SASC Chairman," Defense Daily Network, November 17, 2006.

[5]George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty
at National Defense University," May 1, 2001, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relea...010501-10.html (April 18,
2007).

[6]George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President on National Missile
Defense," December 13, 2001, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/
2001/12/20011213-4.html (April 18, 2007).

[7]J. D. Crouch, "Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,"
U.S. Department of Defense, January 9, 2002, at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcrip...nscriptid=1108
(April 18, 2007).

[8]The White House, "National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact
Sheet," May 20, 2003, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/
2003/05/20030520-15.html (April 18, 2007).

[9]U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, "Historical
Funding for MDA FY85-07," at www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/histfunds.pdf
(January 25, 2007).

[10]Baker Spring, "The Still Enduring Features of the Debate Over
Missile Defense," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2004, February
6, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Nat...ad/bg_2004.pdf
(March 1, 2007).

[11]Missile Defense Study Team, Defending America: A Near- and Long-
Term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation, 1995), p. 45.

[12]Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, letter to Lt. General Ronald Kadish,
July 16, 2001.

[13]U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, "Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense," July 2006, at www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/aegis.pdf
(January 31, 2007).

[14]U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, "For Your
Information," December 7, 2006, at www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/06fyi0090.pdf
(January 31, 2007), and "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense."

[15]U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, "Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense."

[16]Baker Spring, "Ten Years Later, A Successful Demonstration of a
Sea-Based Terminal Defense Against Ballistic Missiles," Heritage
Foundation WebMemo No. 1125, June 13, 2006, at
http://www.heritage.org/research/nat...ad/wm_1125.pdf (January
31, 2006).

[17]Henry F. Cooper and Admiral J. D. Williams, "The Earliest
Deployment Option-Sea-Based Defenses," Inside Missile Defense,
September 6, 2000.

[18]"Aldridge Kills Navy Area Missile Defense Program," Defense Daily,
December 17, 2001.

[19]Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, "Final Topline as of April 12,
2005," at http://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.or...PLINEFINAL.pdf
(August 22, 2006).

[20]James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Congress Should Act on Directed-Energy
Defenses That Could Protect Israel from Hezbollah's Short-Range
Rockets," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1220, September 22, 2006, at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Nat...ad/wm_1220.pdf
(February 1, 2006).

[21]U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, "Missile
Defense Agency Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08) Budget Estimates," 07-MDA-2175,
January 31, 2007, at www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/budgetfy08.pdf (February
13, 2007).

[22]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[23]Jeffrey Lewis, "What If Space Were Weaponized? Possible
Consequences for Crisis Scenarios," Center for Defense Informa*tion,
July 2004, at www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf (April 18, 2007).

[24]Ibid., p. 12.

[25]Sebastian Sprenger, "House Dems Eye Legislation to Press Bush on
Arms Control for Space," Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 13, No. 4
(February 14, 2007), pp. 9-10.

[26]Independent Working Group, Missile Defense, the Space
Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century, p. 26.

[27]Baker Spring, "Ten Years Later, a Successful Demonstration of Sea-
Based Terminal Defense Against Ballistic Missiles."

[28]Ashley Roque, "Krieg Approves Plan to Transfer BMDS Assets to the
Services," Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 12, No. 26 (Decem*ber 20,
2006), p. 1.

[29]Independent Working Group, Missile Defense, the Space
Relationship, & the Twenty-first Century: 2007 Report, pp. xi and 20-
21.

[30]Michael Sirak, "BMD System Nears Important Milestone, Says
Operational Commander," Defense Daily Network, August 17, 2006.

[31]Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 1979), p. 216.

[32]Nuclear Stability Working Group, Nuclear Games: An Exercise
Examining Stability and Defenses in a Proliferated World (Washington,
D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2005), at www.heritage.org/upload/NuclearGames.pdf

 




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