#1 Jet of World War II

"John Halliwell" wrote in message
...
In article , Guy Alcala
writes
No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's
performance
would be within a few % either way of the B-17's.

But why drag the performance of an aircraft down by using it in a way
that is clearly inefficient? All this discussion has confirmed to me is
how inefficient the big box formations actually were. Dragging the
performance of a heavy bomber down to the point where it is carrying a
similar load to a Mossie, whilst remaining considerably vulnerable (and
with a crew of ten), doesn't make much sense to me.


Its a good job they didnt do that then isnt it ?

A couple of Mossies with a light load, perhaps 2,000lbs each start to
sound more and more promising. Small, fast formations may have been very
effective.


In daylight they would have suffered excessive losses. The Mosquitoes
of Bomber Command were excellent night bombers but unless
you have long range fighter escorts they would not have survived
over Germany in 1943.

The Mosquito's that were used in daylight raids were mostly
the FB variety typically carrying 1000lb bomb loads and
making relatively shallow penetration raids into France
and the low countries


Nowhere did I say that you
had
to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc
vs. B-17
threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges.

The B-17 bomb bay was not the best arrangement for carrying large loads.
As such had it been used in night ops, the range/payload may not have
been able to be improved to compensate for lighter fuel (or fewer
guns/crew) loads. On that basis, it's easier to drag the Lanc down by
hampering it with US practises than boost the B-17 by using RAF
practises.


Not really. Discarding the waist gunners and fairing over the positions
would have saved several hundred pounds and cruising at 30,000 ft
the B-17 would have been a tough target for German nightfighters.

Indeed bomber command used Fortress III's (B-17G) in 214
squadron in the Radio countermeasures role. Their operational loss
rate was 1.1%

Keith

"Joe Osman" wrote in message
...
Peter Stickney wrote:

In article ,
Guy Alcala writes:
Cub Driver wrote:

SNIP

That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime
development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane
had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would
crash if it had to go around.

This is not accurate. However, I once saw a British-produced video dealing
with the Comet/Nomrod in which this canard apparently first appeared. The
narration suggested that US jetengine was so deficient that the B-47
NEEDED JATO assist for ALL takeoffs, and confused the use of drag 'chutes
for reduced landing distances with a lack of power for a go-around.

The B-47 used six engines approximately the same as the four used for
supplementary power on B-36s; as fas as spool-up times are concerned, in the
typical useage by the B-36, the pilots would start and bring the four
engines up to speed even as the a/c was in its takeoff roll under the power
of its six piston engines. By the time the B-36 reached takeoff speed, all
four jets were at maximum thrust. Not a long spool-up time at all.

Subject: #1 Jet of World War II
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/24/03 12:45 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: #1 Jet of World War II
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/23/03 7:33 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

bombs and dropping from higher up, but it's by no means certain that's the
case
(unlike some on the NG, I don't rule out the possibility, but the only way
to
find
out for sure would have been to actually try it, and that didn't happen).


I guess it is possible to destroy Berlin one house at a time, But that
isn't
the best way to get the job done.



I see the analogy sauled way over your head unrecogniosed for what it was.


s a practical matter the U.S. stopped
worrying
about doing area bombing with the heavies from the fall of 1943 on to the end

Stopped worrying? What does that ,mean exactly?
of


the war. If we could see to bomb visually, great; otherwise, we'd bomb by
radar
or other radio navaids with a 2 or 3 mile CEP, which is area bombing by
anyone's
standard. Of course, even when the heavies could bomb visually, 'precision'
was
relative. Here's Elmer Bendiner, a B-17 Nav. in the 379th BG(H), talking
about
the June '43 mission against the I.G. Farben synthetic rubber plant at Huls,
in
the Ruhr. Writing some 35 years later, he says:

"Our losses, including those of the main and diversionary forces, amounted to
20
planes, two hundred men, roughly ten percent. Nevertheless, our superiors
were
pleased with us because we had dropped 422 tons bombs and, according to the
reconnaissance photos, only 333.4 tons had been wasted on homes, streets,
public
parks, zoos, department stores and air-raid shelters. This passed for
precision.

"Actually Huls might have been put out of comission permanently if there had
been
a follow-up. After our mission the city went almost unscathed right to the
end of
the war. We had devastated buidlings and shaken morale, but tire production,
although on a limited scale, was resumed within a month. Synthetic-rubber
production suffered perhaps six months but soon was reaching new peaks. I
have
searched the records and find no explanation for our failure to return and
finish
the job. The Germans were astonished at the time. After the war American
scholars of our air strategy were surprised, but nobody nitpicks a victory.
A
cold analysis of the balance sheet at Huls indicates that the lives lost that
day
Huls raid was considered by us at the time to have
achieved excellent bombing results. IIRR, "Impact" devoted an article to the
mission.

Guy

You seem to miss the point of the air war over Europe. Let me explain ., It
was to hit he enemy and hurt him all the time every time. In good weather and
bad. With high losses or low losses. But never ever stop the raids. Some were
more successful than others. Some were more accurate than others. But never the
less the missions would be flown, the losses taken and we would never stop.
Your petty backbighting criticism made up of 100% hindsight takes no
recognition of the determinantion we had to erase Germany. And in all the
missions you criticise with such contempt I doubt if you could have doe any
better than we did under the circumstances. In fact there is no evidence that
you could even have made the cut as aircrew at all. So replace your attacks on
our performance and just say thank you and let it go at that...



Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: #1 Jet of World War II
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/24/03 10:18 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

No, the point of the war was to fly the missions at a cost we could afford
(preferably the lowest cost to ourselves) and the highest co

You live in a dream world of unreality. Many missions had to be flown no
matter what the cost. And we flew them. And paid the price.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: #1 Jet of World War II
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/24/03 10:18 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

No, the point of the war was to fly the missions at a cost we could afford
(preferably the lowest cost to ourselves) and the highest co

You live in a dream world of unreality. Many missions had to be flown no
matter what the cost. And we flew them. And paid the price.

Whatever, Art, I'm not going to waste any more energy arguing with you.

Guy

In article , Keith Willshaw keithNoSpa
writes
In daylight they would have suffered excessive losses. The Mosquitoes
of Bomber Command were excellent night bombers but unless
you have long range fighter escorts they would not have survived
over Germany in 1943.

I was assuming long range fighter escort as that was the only way
daylight bombing was ever going to work. Without it, losses would be
high as they were with all other types.

Not really. Discarding the waist gunners and fairing over the positions
would have saved several hundred pounds and cruising at 30,000 ft
the B-17 would have been a tough target for German nightfighters.

On that basis, removing the waste guns (of questionable use anyway) and
fairing over might have been a better idea for daylight ops.

--
John

In article ,
"Lawrence Dillard" writes:

"Joe Osman" wrote in message
...
Peter Stickney wrote:

In article ,
Guy Alcala writes:
Cub Driver wrote:

SNIP

That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime
development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane
had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would
crash if it had to go around.

This is not accurate. However, I once saw a British-produced video dealing
with the Comet/Nomrod in which this canard apparently first appeared. The
narration suggested that US jetengine was so deficient that the B-47
NEEDED JATO assist for ALL takeoffs, and confused the use of drag 'chutes
for reduced landing distances with a lack of power for a go-around.

The B-47 used six engines approximately the same as the four used for
supplementary power on B-36s; as fas as spool-up times are concerned, in the
typical useage by the B-36, the pilots would start and bring the four
engines up to speed even as the a/c was in its takeoff roll under the power
of its six piston engines. By the time the B-36 reached takeoff speed, all
four jets were at maximum thrust. Not a long spool-up time at all.

The B-47 did have, as they say today, some "issues" with taking off
and landing. The airplane was entirely opimized for cruising at 'bout
500 kts/35,000', with all other considerations being very much
secondary. This meant that it had a pretty small wing/high wing
loading, very low drag, and even more than most other early jets, was
seriously underpowered at low speeds. It didn't matter what the
engine spoolup times were (About 8-12 seconds, IIRC). The biggest
probelm were wer getting the thing to speed up at all at low speeds,
or takeoff, and getting it to slow down. (The bicycle gear, which
meant that you couldn't adjust AOA on takeoff or landing didn't help,
either.) A B-47 certainly could take off withoug JATO, it just took,
for a B-47E, about 10,500' of ground run to do so. the JATO buttle cut
about 3500' off of that. (Standard day, don't try it in the summer.)
The lack of drag was a problem in the approach and landing. The
airplane didn't respond well to power changes. You could haul the
throttles all the way back, and it just kept going. Maintaining
proper speeds in the pattern (And, with that bicycle gear, you only
landed at the exact right speed - too fast, and you'd either glide the
length of the runway or bounce it off the nose truck) made things
rather tough. The solution was to carry and stream an "Approach
Chute", a 16 diameter parachute that added enough drag that it would
actually slow down when you chopped the throttles. The Braking Chute
was a 32' job. (Ground roll was 4600' without the Brake Chute, and
2600' with. If you could take it off from a field, you could land it.
(All numbers from the B-47E-IV SAC Chart, Feb. 1966)
The difficulties of getting a B-47 off of, and onto the ground, and
the very dicey takeoff behavior of the Comet I (A Comet I had to be
rotated to an AOA of 10 degrees at exactly the right spot in the
takeoff run. At 9 degrees, it wouldn't fly from any runway known to
Man, God, or Republic Aviation (Who knew a lot about long ground runs)
At 11 degrees, you generated so much induced drag that you'd never
reach takeoff speed. Most of the COmet accidents were takeoff
crashes, not the two in-flight breakups. (Nearly half the Comet I/IAs
wer written off) U.S. airlines rather suspicious of jet airliners in
general. It took live demonstrations of tbe Boeing 367-80 to convince
the airlines that a jet airliner that flew like an airliner was possible.

That being said, it does sound like the Brit Documentary makers were
waxing a bit hyperbolic. Not that USAnian documentarists are any
better.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

John Halliwell wrote:

In article , Keith Willshaw keithNoSpa
writes
In daylight they would have suffered excessive losses. The Mosquitoes
of Bomber Command were excellent night bombers but unless
you have long range fighter escorts they would not have survived
over Germany in 1943.

I was assuming long range fighter escort as that was the only way
daylight bombing was ever going to work. Without it, losses would be
high as they were with all other types.

Not really. Discarding the waist gunners and fairing over the positions
would have saved several hundred pounds and cruising at 30,000 ft
the B-17 would have been a tough target for German nightfighters.

On that basis, removing the waste guns (of questionable use anyway) and
fairing over might have been a better idea for daylight ops.

No real need to fair over the waist hatches, as they either already have
removable hatches (pre-B-17G) or fixed windows with the ball mount for the
..50 installed in it. As I noted in another post, removing the waist guns
and/or gunners was done from mid-44 on in the ETO. ETO B-24s, about the
same time, removed the ball turret and the gunners were sent to the MTO.
the other advantage of removing guns/gunners aft of the wing was that it
allowed the Cg to move back forward, closer to where it was supposed to be.
Like most a/c, weight had been constantly added, and it usually seems to be
added behind the Cg. This was a problem with both the B-17 and B-24, making
them less stable and more difficult to fly in formation/on instruments.

Guy

On Fri, 25 Jul 2003 00:11:48 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

As to that, I've seen loads like a cookie plus a 4,000 lb. incendiary cluster being a fairly
typical load.

The standard area-bombing load throughout most of the war as one 4,000
lb HC "Cookie" and various Small Bomb Containers making up the rest of
the useable bombload, mostly with 4 lb stick incendiaries.

On the low-level daytime Lanc raid on Augsburg in 1942, admittedly an unusual
case, the a/c apparently only carried 4 x 1,000 lb. bombs each.

I think they were still playing around with the maximum all-up weight.
Mason in his book on the Lanc quoted a 44 Sqn pilot who lost the
wing-tips and had to perform a crash landing when carrying six 1,500
lb mines in that period after the all-up weight had been raised to
allow that load, which prompted Chadwick himself to turn up and
question the crew before beginning correctional airframe
strengthening.

One thing Middlebrook or maybe it was Max Hastings noted was that at some point during the
Battle of Berlin, the bomb loads were increased.

They seem to be for some groups. 1 Group certainly took advantage of
a further increase in all-up wieght (to 65,000 lbs IIRC) to hang yet
more bombs on their Lancs, to the detriment of the handling,
performance and inevitably the attrition rate as a consquence.

The Jagdwaffe noticed this because there was
an immediate increase in the shootdown rate, presumably because the a/c were cruising at lower
altitudes and/or were less maneuverable and more highly stressed, making them easier pickings.

I think this is what Bennett's criticism of Cookies being jettisoned
over the North Sea, which he saw with his own eyes, refers to. Having
said that, 5 Group's loads remained relatively stable at the lower
AUW, but their losses also increased over the period. So the German
defences were adapting to the Hamburg era tactics and improving over
time (more SN-2 sets becoming operational, Stirlings disappearing with
their ability to soak up the easist initial interceptions, etc) but
there's no doubt increasing the bombload at that stage carried too big
a performance penalty, with a consequent increase in losses and
decrease in morale.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

In article ,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 07:52:14 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

This was common practice: although I was suprised to see 3 Group
getting the lower height bands even as they started to re-equip with
Lancasters in early 1944.

The other cause may be that 3 Group had a couple of Lanc Mk. II squadrons in
roughly that period, 115 and 514. Come to think of it, 61 Squadron had a single
Lanc Mk. II flight early in the a/c's career, but I don't know if the crew you
were studying was flying Merlin or Hercules-engined a/c.

Merlins, the Herc-engines ones in 61 Sqn went to 3 Group fairly
swiftly and before 1944. The aircraft involved were a mixture of B.1s
and IIIs (W4950, ED314, EE176, EE186, ME310 and LM310, although I
suspect the odd transposition in the serials) .

The latter seem to have
had a service ceiling a two or three thousand feet lower than the Merlin-engined
a/c, so possibly that explains it.

That would indeed explain it, but I believed this was a bit later on
when they were getting Merlin-engined variants (15 and 622 Sqn) even
though the IIs were still operational at the time.

Then again, given the legitibility of my own notes, they might have
been allocated 26 - 28,0000 feet for all I know....

As a somewhat side note. I have some doubts about the reputation of
the Lancaster II wrt having a lower ceiling than the Lanc I/III.
The power available at height isn't really all that much different,
and you don't see a similar disparity, (or, for that matter, an
absolute difference) between the Merlin-powered Halifaxes (Which used
the same engine as the Lanc I), and the Herculese engined
aircraft. (Which used the same engine as the Lanc II).

I've nearly rebuilt my analysis tools that were lost when that hard
drive failed (And don't lecture me on backups - the lack of restorable
backups was part of the trigger for the upgrade in the first place.
Sometimes cascading failures can fork you over real good), adn I'll
make the Lancs II and Lanc III my test cases. We'll see how
Historical References stack up against the Fundamentals of
Werodynamics.

It wouldn't be the first time that the accepted references are
repeating bogus data. For example, I see the incorrect numbers for
the Merlin XX-23 series that were published in the '45-'46
_Jane's_All_the_World's_Aircraft repeated all over the place.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster