Best dogfight gun?

On 14 Dec 2003 12:48:02 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

Chad Irby wrote in message . com...
In article ,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

So to sum up, the F-35 will be getting the second-best gun because
Mauser's US partners couldn't keep their costs down.

No, the F-35 will be getting a gun that's at least as good, because the
"cheap" gun wasn't nearly as cheap as we'd been led to believe.

This from the Boeing press release in 1999:

'Citing lower costs, greater lethality and improved supportability,
The Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for
its next generation JSF combat aircraft.....The gun is also a
candidate for the Lockheed Martin version of the JSF...."It's the
lightest, most accurate and reliable gun based on our initial studies"
said Dennis Muilenburg, JSF weapon system director for Boeing. "Our
comparative assessment found the 27mm cannon to be more affordable,
more lethal and more supportable than any of its competitors".'

Note that cost is only one of the factors mentioned. Words like 'more
lethal', 'lightest', 'most accurate and reliable' are in there too.
That provides no evidence for claiming that the GAU-12/U is 'at least
as good'.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

The only thing being evaluated at that time were Mauser's press releases.
When they started comparing real numbers the Mauser was toast.

Al Minyard

"Tony Williams" wrote:
| "Brett" wrote in message
...
| "Tony Williams" wrote:
| |
| | 1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
| | Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most
cost-effective
| | gun for the JSF (documented fact).
|
| That isn't a documented fact. The documented fact is that the
GAU-12/U
| has just been selected as the best and most cost-effective gun for
the
| JSF in open competition with the BK 27 (the original selection of
the BK
| 27 in 2000 was not an open competition) by LMT.
|
| It's as well documented as the decision to use the GAU-12/U: the
| source for both being official press statements, placed on the web.
| You seem to be very selective in the press statements you're prepared
| to credit.

I'm not selective, you however appear to have misread more than one in
recent days.

| What makes you say that the original decision in favour of the BK 27
| wasn't 'in open competition'?

How about only one system bid on being included on the other candidate
aircraft. It isn't "the best and most cost-effective" if it is the only
one presented to the customer.

| It was clear that when Boeing decided in
| favour of the BK 27 in 1999, the GAU-12/U WAS in the frame, because GD
| withdrew it from the JSF competition in 2000, just before L-M selected
| the BK 27 as well (which looks very much like a case of 'resign before
| you're sacked').

Or it could be that GD believed the "press" on how effective the BK 27
was. The evaluation by LMT after the JSF contract award would appear to
have determined that the BK 27 wasn't that great an advance and that the
GAU-12/U was just as effective.

"Chad Irby" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Chad Irby" wrote

Which means, on cost terms, shooting down a big drone with a gun is
*very* cost-effective (a million-dollar airframe for a couple of
hundred
bucks worth of ammo).

Which makes using UAVs as justification for a gun, daft.

Not "as justification," just "one more type of target."

By that argument, let's ditch all the expensive AAMs. UAVs are no
more a justification for designing in a gun than is a handwave of
"you never know..." which is a good description of the gun
justifications seen here.

So far, we have several different reasons for having guns in planes,
versus "we only need missiles to shoot down other planes."

The argument for not having guns is, overall, pretty thin.

No. To recapitulate: the first offering was "well, what are you going to do
when the troops call for very, very CAS like they did in Operation
Anaconda?". When Paul Adams fairly clearly demonstrated that gunnery CAS was
remarkably ineffective in the event, needing to be followed up with bombs to
actually do the job (remember bombs? They're an alternative to that gun you
like).

Next up was "Well, how about shooting UAVs? There are bound to be so many
that fighters will run out of missiles or alternatively (it wasn't clear)
UAVs are so cheap and numerous as to not be worth a missile."

I pointed out the on the contrary, the UAVs large enough to be engaged by
fighters, like G-Hawk and Predator are in fact high value platforms, more
than worthy of a missile and you responded with (approximately) "You can too
shoot down a Predator or G-Hawk with a gun", missing the point.

You (and others) still miss the point that I made and that Paul Adams made
that in order to justify putting a gun on a new fighter (no fair, strawmen
about stripping the guns off the current fleet), you have to justify the gun
in terms of mission payoff_against other alternative uses of the budgets of
time, money, weight, volume and power_. Because in real life, that's what
you have to do.

There_is_an argument for building a successor to the 'Hog but it has to
compete with orbiting Heavies stuffed full of JDAMs and developments of
JDAM.

"Tony Williams" wrote in message

What makes you say that the original decision in favour of the BK 27
wasn't 'in open competition'? It was clear that when Boeing decided in
favour of the BK 27 in 1999, the GAU-12/U WAS in the frame, because GD
withdrew it from the JSF competition in 2000, just before L-M selected
the BK 27 as well (which looks very much like a case of 'resign before
you're sacked').

Tony, that almost never happens in US contracting. If you_do_withdraw an
already submitted proposal it will cost you a lot of goodwill with the
customer. Actually, companies commit to submitting a proposal when the RFP
comes out and reneging of that commitment is not done lightly. I don't know
why the GAU-12/U proposal was withdrawn but it was_not_to prevent the
embarassment of losing.

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Trained gun-fitters and repair teams, and the logistic pipeline to
support them, cost money.

But you are claiming we would retain the gun pods--don't they already then
have to maintain these skills?

Sure, but you can scale back sharply when you're maintaining a MTE fit
rather than a fleet-wide fit. Training is more of an issue and a more
significant risk.

Try costing up the aircraft,

They have to bore holes in the sky anyway--having them chunk up hours on the
range instead of doing touch-and-go's seems to be of little impact.

How many fast-jet sorties are flown for purposes of 'wheels up, flew
around, wheels down'?

If you want strafing practice to be useful, the pilots need to know
whether they did well or badly (and if they did badly, what to improve).

None of this is simple, easy or cheap in a modern world.

Keep in
mind that the strafe mission is not their highest priority training event.

Why not, if it's operationally vital?

the range,

The range would undoubtedly be a multi-use facility (i.e., unlikely to have
a range dedicated to strafe only), so that is no argument.

If it's multi-use then time spent strafing is time it's not usable for
other missions. That's a serious cost, especially when you're not
exactly awash in live-fire range facilities to start with.

That's before you even _start_ on the effort needed to keep the range
clear, score the passes, clean up afterwards...

the targets (whether air-to-air
or air-to-ground),

Yeah, putting up a target panel of fabric must be extremely expensive...

How many times have US units been attacked by large stationary panels of
motionless fabric? Real targets move, use camouflage and obscurants, and
are (if guns are required) close to similar-looking friendly units.

the equipment to provide useful feedback and training
(because 'pulled trigger, gun made loud noise, came home, landed' is not
useful training) and it adds up with alarming rapidity.

Gee, they have to grade all kinds of exercises already--I'd suspect a bit of
gun camera footage of the strafe pass would be acceptable.

I bow to your obviously superior experience of gunnery ranges: since
I've only worked the damn things I can't compete with your assertions
and enthusiasm.

I'd heard the A-10s got pulled early due to hot/high problems, and given
the frequent sniping at the F-16's range I'm surprised to hear it doing
significant long-range loiter.

The 354th FW *did* do "significant long-range loiter" during that operation
with their F-16's, so that argument is meaningless.

I'd be interested in some numbers, given the very significant problems
experienced with keeping F-16s stacked in kill boxes during Gulf War 1
(fifteen minutes or less was common, with 'dump targets' getting heavily
hit when aircraft arrived, waited, and left without hot targets)

According to

http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports...irwar_exec.pdf

the US flew 17,500 combat sorties over Afghanistan, of which you've
heard of several failed strafes ('danger close' sorties where the gun
passes failed to stop the enemy, leading to 'even more dangerously
close' use of other munitions) and two cases where the enemy was
'suppressed'. Guesstimate two aircraft in each case for eight sorties
with a 50% success rate.

Failed to stop the enemy? How much suppression did they achieve?

The description by a participant of the enemy in a static defensive
position continuing to fire despite repeated strafes, until they were
taken out by a LGB, indicates a lack of effectiveness.

And here
you go with your McNamaresque number crunching again...

Hey, Kevin, _you're_ the one suggesting that "rounds fired = results".
Perhaps we should count the 20mm rounds fired during those strafes and
calculate the body count?

The strafing passes were intended to deter, defeat or destroy the enemy
in that position. They clearly failed to do so.

war cannot always be
resolved into neat little statistical piles. Witness the recognition lately
of the fact that the old attrition models for simulations are just plain
inaccurate as all get out.

'Lately'?
It's not an enormously convincing argument that the existing gun
armament is a potent and essential CAS tool, is it?

Your strawman. I have said from the beginning that it is a last resort,
only-when-nothing-else-should-be-tried-first tool,

One which is important enough to be fitted to all tactical aircraft, now
and forever, without doubt or question.

and as such preserves
flexibility for the system beyond that which exists sans guns. But hey, you
tell me what the groundpounder who finds himself with a nasty situation
located in that 25-to-500 meter danger-close gap in CAS coverage that
results when no gun is available is supposed to do.

Get your head down and use available ordnance.

Now, what do you say to the groundpounder who finds a strafing pass or
two _doesn't_ stop the enemy?

Either the gun needs
to be made significantly more effective in order to increase its
lethality and utilisation... or it needs replacing with something better
able to provide _effective_ close fire to troops in combat.

But this is, by my own admission, a "niche" capability that probably does
not merit much more resource dedication than it has already received.

And yet it is a sacrosanct future fit.

Can't do without it... but can't possibly improve on it either.

See the contradiction yet?

A
nice-to-have capability for use when none of the other tools are initially
suitable or acceptable.

Is there a real need or not? (The evidence suggests there is). Is a
fixed aircraft gun the best solution? (The evidence strongly suggests
not).

Burdening most of your tactical air fleet with a thousand pounds of
ballast that's used on 0.05% of combat sorties is

I guess the USAF is utterly clueless then, as they seem to disagree with
you.

They don't pay my salary or ask my advice.

I notice that the USMC do seem to agree with me, as far as their version
of the JSF goes.

I'd note that a fair portion of your own RAF was apparently not happy
with the loss of the gun from the Typhoon. Do you know something none of
these folks do?

That it's a lot more expensive to maintain the capability than most seem
to think (the idea that sorties are free, ranges sit fully manned but
unused for opportunity use, and logistic pipelines cost nothing).

I'd personally argue that once you've designed the gun into the aircraft
you might as well bite the bullet and keep it, but to do so means
finding the same saving in a different area: and the gun was the least
indispensible capability.

And you describe above how in at least one case, strafing failed to
deter the enemy and heavier weapons had to be resorted to.

You are really having a problem with the idea that the ground commander
would prefer to work *up* the risk ladder, don't you?

When the "low risk" option failed and the "high risk" option needed
using anyway, then it's a problem. (If the enemy had been advancing,
then the "high risk" option that actually succeeded might instead have
become OBE...)

An "option" that actually just wastes time is not a good option in my
opinion.

Not jumping in and
placing his ground troops at maximum risk from the outset?

Is the only risk from your own CAS?

Odd, since you
were so risk adverse when it came to allowing the CAS assets down into the
weeds to make these sort of attacks.

Particularly since 'danger close' target identification is a very
difficult art even when you can give it full attention.

Similarly, one drag on developing a weapon for danger-close CAS is the
airy claim that "that's what the gun is for" when its effectiveness is
patchy (some reports of 'suppression' when it was used, but others where
the enemy declined to be deterred)

Gee, if it really sucked so much, why did those CCT's keep calling for
strafe as opposed to bombs in the first place?

How many times had they called for strafe against live enemies and seen
the results before? Combat is a learning experience.

Sounds like there's a need for a similar weight and accuracy of fire as
the AC-130 can deliver, but with the survivability of a fast jet.

In your scenario, neither aircraft is particularly suitable: if the
AC-130 can't survive the SAM threat, repeated passes by fast movers will
also get them speared by those improved MANPADS (especially since
they're delivering a lot less firepower and so *need* to make multiple
passes through the weapon envelope of an alerted enemy... this is what
is technically known as a Really Bad Idea).

Really Worse Idea is not being able to deliver support when the risk is
assessed and accepted.

Which is where you end up with an enemy with improved air defences, if
your only 'danger close' argument is a fixed gun.

So where's the evidence for that?

The same place as your evidence that the gun is worthless--a product of the
argument. If you don't have a gun, and the bad guys are in so tight that you
*can't* resort to a bomb,

Not the case here, note - or rather, when the guns failed then bombs had
to be used risks or not.

Suppose the enemy are even closer and the guns still don't stop them.
What then?

then you are effectively saying CAS is out of the
picture, so any increased losses could be attributed to that, at least in
part.

Trouble is, saying "whether the gun is effective or not, it's all we've
got, so we must have it" is a thoroughly circular argument.

Why the fevered opposition to considering alternatives? "The USAF don't
use that", "that's an Army weapon", "nobody's cleared it for fast
movers" all sound suspiciously like excuses rather than reasons.

And the only options are 20mm cannon or 2000lb bombs? Think again. If
this is a genuine and frequent need, neither weapon is appropriate.

Nobody said "frequent". I have noted before that you seem ready to place
combat into the "nice neat box" category, where all things happen according
to plan, and there is a playbook for handling the proceedings.

Your imagination, not reality. (I'm not the one advocating keeping a
'marginal infrequent' capability on the entire TacAir fleet).

That just is
not the way it happens. Which is why flexibility is important. And I hate to
say it, but I think your empathy is a bit lacking--if it *were* you hugging
the dirt up close and personal and well within the danger close margin for
bombs, and you had the option of starting with guns and then working up
through higher risk alternatives, I suspect you'd do that as opposed to
starting with the more risky "big bang". It is a bit easier to say you
wouldn't when you are not facing that dilemma.

And when that decision is made, and the Bad Guys keep shooting despite
strafe passes, and you take casualties?

Life isn't simple, and working your way up from "safe" to "risky"
options is sometimes a luxury.

Just out of interest, how close is "danger close" for mortar fire?
Officially it's 250 metres, but what's the _real_ danger close?

No, we're talking about current and future procurement.

We have been using Anaconda as the point of discussion-the M61 was used in
that role by both USAF and (IIRC) USN aircraft during that operation.

And using the results of that to inform future planning. Some new kit
may be integrated onto existing platforms, other issues may be for the
future.

Existing aircraft have the fit they do, it's the next step that's
controllable.

Unless you plan your only combat to be action replays, then you need to
learn what worked and what didn't; decide what lessons are valid and
which were special cases; and then plan for the future so you do more of
what worked, less of what didn't work and learn from the Lessons
Identified.

Well, since it looks like the 25mm is going to be our next major gun caliber
for the fast movers, maybe that will satisfy some of your concern.

So the F/A-22 is flying with a deficient weapon? How many lives will
_that_ cost? (I'll wager that USAF F-22s take as many air-to-air gun
shots as F-15s have)


About as acceptable as declaring that there's no particular problem that
a few strafing passes won't completely solve.

Why would you claim that? I did not say any such thing.

So what did thegun actually _achieve_? Wasted some time while failing
to prevent the enemy returning fire, seems to be all.

What I have been
saying is that when the ground guys find themselves in such a knife fight
and CAS is available, it is sure nice for that CAS to be able to contribute
to the fight.

No argument at all. It needs to destroy the enemy: failing that, to
suppress and disrupt them enough to seriously interfere with their
operations.

If it is successful in suppressing the bad guys (and I imagine
that it usually will at least be able to achieve short-term suppression),

"Imagining" is not much use, Kevin.

I can't understand what you find disagreeable about allowing
those ground troops to escalate the risk level as needed, as opposed to
having to accept that greater risk of fratricide from the outset if you have
no gun capability.

Nothing at all - I want them to have an _effective_ option to use.

I'm not the one claiming four situations in 17,500 sorties demonstrates
a completely untouchable situation, Kevin.

Neither am I; I shy away from such meaningless statistics.

But you're claiming that all tactical aircraft *must* have guns for just
this option.

I recognize that
strafe is the least preferable manner of delivering effective CAS.

So would a more effective and survivable method not be desirable?

Apparently not: it's "guns or nothing" for close engagements, now and
forever.

I also
recognize that there is a lot of ground radiating out from between 25 meters
and (let's assume for the SDB which will shortly be in the inventory) maybe
200 meters, and retaining the ability to conduct immediate CAS requests
against such targets may very well mean the difference between
success/failure for the mission or life/death for the troops.

Then why is the idea of looking at alternatives to cover that zone so
abhorrent?

Who has the option of operating above the light AAA, though MANPADS are
a problem there too.

It does not matter how high he is operating-we don't like using the gunships
for daylight operations. Khafji put paid to that approach.

It's a bloody expensive capability if you're limited to 50% utilisation,
but that's just my opinion.

You're happy to have fighters make predictable passes through MANPADS
and AAA come what may, but flying an AC-130 in daylight is Completely
Impossible? Weird priorities.

Given that the mortars should be one to two miles back at least (for
81mm tubes, more for 120s) and artillery five to ten miles, that is one
_hell_ of a light AA gun or man-portable SAM that can detect and hit a
cargo flight at that distance while in contact with friendly troops and
under artillery fire. It's a *lot* easier to acquire and shoot at the
Big Loud Plane that just flew overhead.

Here is where your "should be" falls apart on the rocks of reality.

How many ammunition resupply flights were shot down, then?

During
Anaconda the troops found themselves engaged a lot earlier, and a lot more
heavily, than they predicted-that is war, with all of its uncertainty.

This is true, but irrelevant. How many resupply flights were shot down?

(The lesson might be "it hurts to underestimate an opponent" and
learning it might be more useful than bolting guns into yet another
generation of aircraft, but that's just me)

So, I
'd assume (though I have not read anything to corroborate this) that the
plan was to have the mortars set up somewhere near the initial LZ's to cover
the troops movement to contact.

I'm wary of assumptions - bear in mind the troops allegedly went in
without artillery support, it not being judged necessary. (Whoops...)

By making contact a lot earlier than
anticipated, that put the mortars up near the close fight, and made the
resupply mission rather hazardous.

It seemed more that they had more missions than capability to fire,
rather than having their resupply destroyed.

Tube arty in this case was another
matter-Hagenbach, the MG in charge, has to shoulder the load for failing to
have a firebase set up within range, but he apparently did not anticipate
getting into a knifefight that precluded the use of the usual CAS delivered
bombs from the outset. Which is why those CCT's ended up begging for
strafing runs, again and again.

Precisely how many runs, out of interest? Both accounts of the battle
we've discussed indicate strafe was called but ineffective at the
start... and indicate that while bombs were called and used throughout,
strafe only seemed to feature in the first phase (against the bunker
that resisted it, until a PGM solved the problem)

And again, this comes into the category of planning for failure and
obsessing about "if we can't supply our mortars, don't bring artillery,
and then land right on top of the enemy, _then_ we need this capability"
- this isn't a convincing argument of why every tactical fighter in the
US inventory needs to have it available.

In at least one case the main armament had to be used anyway,
danger-close be damned.

ONLY as a last resort.

Point being that the strafing runs were a time-wasting distraction.

Common sense dictates that you don't start off
treating a simple puncture wound to your hand by amputating the arm at the
elbow, though that option may be exercised later if the mere cleaning and
bandaging of the wound does not prevent blood poisoning.

Unless the septicaemia has spread by then or developed into gangrene
while you fiddle about with bandages. (Also, perhaps you need somewhere
between 'bandage and pray' and 'chop it off at the elbow'?)

Likewise, those CCT
's did not jump directly to the risky use of bombs in a danger close
situation until they had exhausted their other less risky options.

Luckily, the target wasn't advancing.

In four cases, with patchy results at best.

They DID it, which is more than they could have done had they lacked
those guns.

And they got very little result from it where results are available.

How about improving ground-to-air comms to shorten the targeting cycle?
More fuel, meaning more loiter time per aircraft, for more responsive
support? Both reduce the time needed from call-for-fire to delivery;
meaning instead of 'suppressing' the enemy with strafing passes, they
can be engaged with destructive weapons because they've had less time to
close. Or more payload, for a new munition that's got both short
danger-close and high lethality on target

Huh? They "closed" almost instantaneously in this event, from what I
have read. There was no detection of the bad guys in strength at 1000 meters
followed by maneuver to within danger-close limits-for gosh sakes, they
would have just pasted the guys with CAS delivered PGM's at the outset if
they had known they were there.

So you're now defining capability based on one battle?

How many missions did they fly the next day? None. How much ordnance did
they deliver? None.

And they hung around because the guys on the ground were in deep do-do
and needed that support right then, not tomorrow. Tomorrow is meaningless if
you are likely to die today.

Who's "you", Kevin? One unit of troops in contact? Don't the units
moving through them tomorrow who will be in contact but with less
support count?

Either this is an essential capability, or it isn't. If it's not
essential and the troops can cope without it, what's the problem with
doing without? If it _is_ essential but you lose a lot of aircraft
delivering it, there's a clear need to improve it.

And how many helicopters were available to fly sorties the next day, and
the day after, and how many men could have died as a result? Or, what
was cancelled because the air support they needed for backup suddenly
wasn't there?

They were able to bring in replacement helos: IIRC some USMC AH-1W's
showed up to handle the attack helo role subsequent to having those Apaches
get shot up.

And where were they brought in _from_? Okay, if you've got so much
capability you totally overwhelm the foe then who cares? But that's not
always the case: realistically, "brought in as replacements" in one
theatre means "taken away from" another area.

Losing a half-squadron of AH-64s in a single incident suggests that
there's a serious capability gap, not that the existing systems are just
fine.

Similarly, 88% attrition is _not_ sustainable.

Any source for that number? ISTR reading that most of those helos were
back up within the week (I only recall one being a write off at the time)?

My sources said seven of eight grounded for repairs of which two were
repaired and five never flew again (at least not in that conflict)

Because those were the only two options available to them, and neither
sound satisfactory: the LGBs worryingly lethal over too large an area,
the gun runs inadequately lethal.

And they requested the gun runs in preference to the bombs-case
closed.

Case reopened when they called for the bombs _anyway_ because the guns
failed to do the job.

By all means plan your procurement on "first request". I'll stick to
"what actually worked".

Tells me they need another option available to them.

That may be, but I know of no other option that we can count on always
being onboard the loadout of the CAS packages.

In other words, every US tactical aircraft _must_ have a gun, no debate,
no question.

Even if APKWS was adopted by
the USAF it would not be an integral weapon. As it stands now we can get
some kind of CAS support at the 25 meters-from- friendlies- range from every
fast mover CAS aircraft we have-that is called flexibility.

It's also called "ineffective" on the limited results available.

It must be wonderful having that much budget.

It is. And as we discussed earlier, the gun is a marginal part of the
total program cost.

Not when you run the numbers. $100 million up front and $8m a year
in-service adds up to some genuine money.

But the STOVL version is more, not less, likely to be performing CAS.
How then can the gun be optional, if it's so effective and essential.

I did not say it was the most effective weapon-that is you twisting my
words (again). I said it affords a greater degree of flexibility, especially
in the very close fight, that you lose without the gun, and I believe that
flexibility is very important.

So why delete it from the airframe most likely to have a heavy CAS
tasking?

Yet again, armament suites are not fixed forever.

Ever try to specify what loadout you want from the air force side?

So you're now trying to solve institutional and doctrinal problems with
procurement?

Having the enemy "suppressed" for a pass or two is not a great return on
investment either.

It is if it allows you to disengage, or if it allows you to maneuver
to a position offering better cover, or if it allows you to conduct an
assault to dislodge the bad guys.

None of which were true even after multiple gun passes, in the
documented combat example.

I believe if you asked the average ground
guy which he'd prefer to have, the ability to achieve short-term
suppression, or the inability to suppress at all, he'd take the former

Actually, he'd want the Bad Guys made into Dead Guys (or at least Gone
Guys) and I doubt he'd care too much how it was done so long as it
worked.

So you don't have the right weapons for the job? (20mm lacks
effectiveness, current PGMs too generous in their danger zones)

Bear in mind you're making force-wide assertions on the basis of 0.05%
of the offensive air sorties here.

Paging Mr. McNamara.

Not sure what this means - you're the one using assertion and opinion to
inform decisions, not me.

Glad to see you found the article, Paul. Too bad you can't understand
the basic fact that those ground guys kept asking for strafing attacks
because they did not want to escalate their own risk until/unless they had
to.

And at some point you'll notice they switched ordnance because the
strafing runs failed and they needed something better, risks or not.

Luckily, this time the target was static and they had the time for this
progression.


I say that something better is needed. You're insisting that the status
quo is just fine and no improvement is possible. Something of an
impasse.


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In article ,
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Chad Irby" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Chad Irby" wrote

Which means, on cost terms, shooting down a big drone with a gun is
*very* cost-effective (a million-dollar airframe for a couple of
hundred
bucks worth of ammo).

Which makes using UAVs as justification for a gun, daft.

Not "as justification," just "one more type of target."

By that argument, let's ditch all the expensive AAMs. UAVs are no
more a justification for designing in a gun than is a handwave of
"you never know..." which is a good description of the gun
justifications seen here.

So far, we have several different reasons for having guns in planes,
versus "we only need missiles to shoot down other planes."

The argument for not having guns is, overall, pretty thin.

No. To recapitulate: the first offering was "well, what are you going to do
when the troops call for very, very CAS like they did in Operation
Anaconda?". When Paul Adams fairly clearly demonstrated that gunnery CAS was
remarkably ineffective in the event, needing to be followed up with bombs to
actually do the job (remember bombs? They're an alternative to that gun you
like).

So you want to carry bombs on every flight for impromptu CAS.

Next up was "Well, how about shooting UAVs? There are bound to be so many
that fighters will run out of missiles or alternatively (it wasn't clear)
UAVs are so cheap and numerous as to not be worth a missile."

Not what I said, but go on...

I pointed out the on the contrary, the UAVs large enough to be engaged by
fighters, like G-Hawk and Predator are in fact high value platforms, more
than worthy of a missile and you responded with (approximately) "You can too
shoot down a Predator or G-Hawk with a gun", missing the point.

They might be "more than worthy," but once again, if you can see them
well enough to kill with a missile, you can certainly see them well
enough to kill with a gun. For a fraction of the cost (since you like
dollar comparisons), and more reliably.

You (and others) still miss the point that I made and that Paul Adams made
that in order to justify putting a gun on a new fighter (no fair, strawmen
about stripping the guns off the current fleet), you have to justify the gun
in terms of mission payoff_against other alternative uses of the budgets of
time, money, weight, volume and power_. Because in real life, that's what
you have to do.

That's what guns *do*. By adding one relatively small weapon, you get
something that can handle multiple tasks (air-to-ground, dogfighting,
UAV hunting, et cetera), while not excluding it from doing other
missions.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Tony Williams" wrote in message
...
Alan Minyard wrote in message
. ..
On 12 Dec 2003 12:51:59 -0800, (Tony
Williams) wrote:

Chad Irby wrote in message
. com...
In article ,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large
numbers
for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew
all
about the GAU-12/U then.

Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
structure that fell through on closer examination.

Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
work on hard info rather than forum gossip.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

The Mouser was to be a completely new system, using linkless ammunition.
It has never been demonstrated, much less placed in service.

The linkless feed was developed years ago and is used in the
Eurofighter Typhoon installation, so is just about to enter service.

So what have we determined?

1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most cost-effective
gun for the JSF (documented fact).

2. The cost of the gun rose well over budget (documented fact)
probably because Mauser's US partners spent far too much on adapting
it to US use (reasonable assumption).

3. GD, in their position of gun armament integrator, took advantage of
the situation to slip in a lower bid for the GAU-12/U, which was
accepted by L-M (clear conclusion from press statement).

So to sum up, the F-35 will be getting the second-best gun because
Mauser's US partners couldn't keep their costs down.

While your conclusion may or may not be accurate, it was certainly
sloppily arrived at.
If the most "cost-effective" gun goes up in cost that necessarily
impacts its cost effectiveness.

Alan Minyard wrote in message . ..
On 14 Dec 2003 12:48:02 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

Chad Irby wrote in message . com...
In article ,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

So to sum up, the F-35 will be getting the second-best gun because
Mauser's US partners couldn't keep their costs down.

No, the F-35 will be getting a gun that's at least as good, because the
"cheap" gun wasn't nearly as cheap as we'd been led to believe.

This from the Boeing press release in 1999:

'Citing lower costs, greater lethality and improved supportability,
The Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for
its next generation JSF combat aircraft.....The gun is also a
candidate for the Lockheed Martin version of the JSF...."It's the
lightest, most accurate and reliable gun based on our initial studies"
said Dennis Muilenburg, JSF weapon system director for Boeing. "Our
comparative assessment found the 27mm cannon to be more affordable,
more lethal and more supportable than any of its competitors".'

Note that cost is only one of the factors mentioned. Words like 'more
lethal', 'lightest', 'most accurate and reliable' are in there too.
That provides no evidence for claiming that the GAU-12/U is 'at least
as good'.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

The only thing being evaluated at that time were Mauser's press releases.
When they started comparing real numbers the Mauser was toast.

If you believe that the US companies involved would have made such a
decision based on press releases, your opinion of them is far lower
than mine.

Incidentally, in contrast to the above, I recall that the recent
statement switching the choice to the GAU-12/U made no mention at all
of it being 'better'. Only cheaper.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Brett" wrote in message ...
"Tony Williams" wrote:
| "Brett" wrote in message
...
| "Tony Williams" wrote:
| |
| | 1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
| | Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most
cost-effective
| | gun for the JSF (documented fact).
|
| That isn't a documented fact. The documented fact is that the
GAU-12/U
| has just been selected as the best and most cost-effective gun for
the
| JSF in open competition with the BK 27 (the original selection of
the BK
| 27 in 2000 was not an open competition) by LMT.
|
| It's as well documented as the decision to use the GAU-12/U: the
| source for both being official press statements, placed on the web.
| You seem to be very selective in the press statements you're prepared
| to credit.

I'm not selective, you however appear to have misread more than one in
recent days.

| What makes you say that the original decision in favour of the BK 27
| wasn't 'in open competition'?

How about only one system bid on being included on the other candidate
aircraft. It isn't "the best and most cost-effective" if it is the only
one presented to the customer.

| It was clear that when Boeing decided in
| favour of the BK 27 in 1999, the GAU-12/U WAS in the frame, because GD
| withdrew it from the JSF competition in 2000, just before L-M selected
| the BK 27 as well (which looks very much like a case of 'resign before
| you're sacked').

Or it could be that GD believed the "press" on how effective the BK 27
was. The evaluation by LMT after the JSF contract award would appear to
have determined that the BK 27 wasn't that great an advance and that the
GAU-12/U was just as effective.

You think that a company like GD would withdraw from a competition
because they're frightened of the opposition's press releases? That's
not my perception of US business attitudes.

Can you point me please to the source for the statement that "the BK
27 wasn't that great an advance and that the GAU-12/U was just as
effective".

I'm trying to sort out the facts of what happened here amongst the
usual forum smoke and mirrors. I mean, the arguments are fun but I do
prefer them to lead to some daylight.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message ...
"Tony Williams" wrote in message

What makes you say that the original decision in favour of the BK 27
wasn't 'in open competition'? It was clear that when Boeing decided in
favour of the BK 27 in 1999, the GAU-12/U WAS in the frame, because GD
withdrew it from the JSF competition in 2000, just before L-M selected
the BK 27 as well (which looks very much like a case of 'resign before
you're sacked').

Tony, that almost never happens in US contracting. If you_do_withdraw an
already submitted proposal it will cost you a lot of goodwill with the
customer. Actually, companies commit to submitting a proposal when the RFP
comes out and reneging of that commitment is not done lightly. I don't know
why the GAU-12/U proposal was withdrawn but it was_not_to prevent the
embarassment of losing.

Fascinating. I'd love to know why they pulled out, then. I vaguely
recall there were business manoeuverings going on at the time - was GD
trying to buy Mauser's US partner? If so, they might have regarded the
BK 27 as one of 'theirs' and decided that was the one to push.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/