Best dogfight gun?

In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
Chad Irby writes
Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm
installation.

Not really. Fuel is heavy as hell, and missiles (plus the hardpoints,
plus the fire controls for them) aren't as light as you'd think for a
useful one.

So you can shovel a thousand pounds of ballast into a F-16 without any
concerns?

Here's a hint - modern aircraft are more limited by fuel and payload,
than by numbers of pylons.

Then there's the external drag and area issues. As long as
you're not hauling around GAU-8 installs, the weight isn't that extreme.

A thousand pounds is a thousand pounds.

And especially when you consider the weight per shot (a half-dozen 20mm
bursts versus even one or two missiles) is pretty darned reasonable.

If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation,
maintenance and training.

It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change.

Not compared to keeping even *more* missiles in the inventory,

Which weapons actually get the kills?

and the
increased inventory of very expensive hardware to keep checking them and
making them work.

And you don't think there's a significant overhead in keeping aircraft
guns maintained, reliable, boresighted, and (crucially) their crews
trained in their use?

Even something as simple as an AIM-9 takes a boatload
of work to keep functional, whether you fire them or not.

So does a M61.

And when you
*do* fire them in practice, you're burning off, in one shot, most of the
lifetime cost of a small gun system...

Does the "lifetime cost" of a gun system include training? Or are the
pilots supposed to just pick it up as they go?





--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

(Tony Williams) wrote in
m:

Greg Hennessy wrote in message
. ..
On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 07:45:39 GMT, Chad Irby wrote:


Whats the avarage gun burst time in a dogfight...

Whatever it is, you're going to have to hold the trigger down for
over three times that to get the same amount of fire downrange.

Given the that the designer of the mig-29 is on record as saying that
he should have halved the number of rounds carried for its gsh-30L.
Tony Williams has a table on his website which details why a single
barrelled cannon will get there 1st with the mostest when compared to
a gatling.

This is from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and
myself, due to be published in March next year:

"There are three competing philosophies when it comes to gun design
for fighter aircraft. One is the US rotary; fast-firing but (to date)
only 20 mm in calibre, and a very bulky system. The second is the West
European preference for a 27 – 30 mm revolver cannon; no lighter,
but slimmer and hard-hitting. The third is represented by the Russian
GSh 301; a minimalist gun but with an equally hard-hitting
performance. The twin-barrel GSh-30 also deserves mention, even though
it has not been used in fighter aircraft. It weighs about the same as
the western guns at 105 kg, but fires powerful 30 mm ammunition at up
to 3,000 rpm.

The merits of the 27 mm BK 27 revolver as opposed to the M61A1 can be
clearly demonstrated. In the first 0.5 seconds of firing, the M61
fires 18 rounds massing 1.8 kg in total weight of projectiles, the BK
27 fires 14 rounds weighing 3.7 kg. In the first full second, the M61
fires 68 rounds weighing 6.9 kg, the BK 27 fires 28 rounds weighing
7.4 kg. In weight of fire, as well as the destructiveness of the
individual projectiles, the Mauser clearly has an advantage, albeit
one that the faster-accelerating M61A2 reduces somewhat. This is
significant in that dogfights frequently permit only the briefest of
firing opportunities, and although a skilled pilot anticipating a
firing opportunity can 'spin up' a rotary in advance, such notice
cannot always be guaranteed.

The Mauser projectiles are also relatively heavier, resulting in a
sectional density (SD) of .507 compared to .363 for the 20 mm, which
means they will retain their initial velocity out to a greater range.
The 30 mm GSh-301 offers similar performance to the BK 27 with about
half the weight. On paper, this is an impressive fighter gun, although
its maintenance requirements have been criticised. The choice of a
heavy projectile (with an SD of .616) at a moderate velocity for the
Russian 30 mm guns implies that ground attack has a higher priority
than aerial combat in Russian thinking.

The ideal gun for aerial combat will of course combine the best of all
worlds: a high rate of fire, instantly achieved; a high muzzle
velocity to minimise flight time; and projectiles large enough to
inflict serious damage with each hit (requiring a calibre in the 25
– 30 mm range). The optimum weapon among those currently developed
may well be the new GIAT 30M791 revolver, although its weight means
that two GSh 301s (or a GSh-30) could be carried instead, with a
higher rate of fire. If the Russian guns' 30 x 165 ammunition were
loaded with lighter projectiles for a higher muzzle velocity, its
aerial combat capabilities would be improved, at the cost of some loss
of ground attack effectiveness."

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/


Careful! don't praise the GIAT gun--Al Minard is going to **** his pants
again.

In article , Paul J. Adam
wrote:

Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the
F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way
towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well.

Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every
aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument.

Let's be fair, this was an aircraft that grew out of a program with the
slogan "Not a pound for air to ground". If you're building a multirole
aircraft from the start (and, let's face it, what isn't these days -
stand fast the F-22 as originally intended), you have to give
consideration to the face that the pilots might actually have to
influence the ground directly.

Aetherem Vincere
Matt
--
To err is human
To forgive is not
Air Force Policy

In article , Chad Irby
wrote:

But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have
guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to
*not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very
good reasons at all),

Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm
installation.

Not really. Fuel is heavy as hell,

Well, only because you carry an awful lot of it. It's got a specific
density less than one, so it's a fair assumption that replacing a gun
installation with a fuel tank saves you weight - even if you assume that
50% of the volume of a gun installation is free air.

the only thing left is to think about cost, and
since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price
of a modern plane...

If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation,
maintenance and training.

It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change.

Not compared to keeping even *more* missiles in the inventory, and the
increased inventory of very expensive hardware to keep checking them and
making them work.

Actually, no. It's the fact that a gun adds a completely different
support line than "more of the same" missiles which drives the whole
life cost up.

Aetherem Vincere
Matt
--
To err is human
To forgive is not
Air Force Policy

In article ,
Matt Clonfero ] wrote:

In article , Chad Irby
wrote:

But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have
guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to
*not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very
good reasons at all),

Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm
installation.

Not really. Fuel is heavy as hell,

Well, only because you carry an awful lot of it. It's got a specific
density less than one, so it's a fair assumption that replacing a gun
installation with a fuel tank saves you weight - even if you assume that
50% of the volume of a gun installation is free air.

But compared to the amount of fuel you get, it's not a massive savings
by any stretch. You're also forgetting that fuel tanks weigh a *lot*,
not to mention their associated piping and pumping systems.

It's the fact that a gun adds a completely different
support line than "more of the same" missiles which drives the whole
life cost up.

Not really. Missiles are *bloody* expensive to buy, store, maintain,
and use. Guns are cheap in comparison. A gun and a few hundred
thousand rounds of ammunition are less than the price of a couple of
plane's worth of missiles, and that's before you add in maintenance
costs.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 16:59:45 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 08:15:44 -0800, Mary Shafer
wrote:

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

Mary adds some info and makes some big errors:

They were back at base. Bomber and attack and SEAD F-4Es only have
guns to defend themselves.

Absolutely incorrect! All, repeat ALL F-4s always carried Sparrows. We
didn't always have room for AIM-9s, but I never saw a combat sortie
flown by an F-4 when I was there without Sparrows.

I have spent the time since you posted this trying to figure out where
I got the idea that they left the Sparrows at home when they went out
with bombs. I'd have sworn I read it somewhere, but I can't find it
now. Either it was a) another airplane, b) a total misunderstanding,
or c) a work of fiction I can't find now.

Whatever. As you say, it's not true.

Fewer than half the USAF F-4 were fighters with AAM. Since the
non-fighter F-4s would have been carrying their ordnance during the
inbound half of the flight and only been able to get into the fur ball
outgoing, I'd say guns were under-represented in kills. This probably
proves that the escort F-4s had more chances at MiGs than the
home-going non-fighters.

The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".

I read both those and remembered the discussion just well enough to
know that I couldn't produce a coherent version of it here, so I just
skipped it entirely. I remember Chuck de Bellevue (is that right? I
have a terrible memory for names) talking about the ace-building
competition and one of the USN guys grousing about it.

I still think that having bombing a target as one's mission on a
sortie will incline the person to press on toward the target, rather
than jettisoning the bombs to close on an enemy airplane. After all,
that's letting the enemy pilot succeed in keeping you from bombing
your target. It's not as spectacular as blowing your airplane out of
the sky, but it's just as effective, at least for that one mission.
Of course, it wouldn't be just F-4s. The F-105s, for example, would
be in the same situation.

Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.

Since the NVAF used ground controllers heavily, did they monitor all
the frequencies? I know it's too much for pilots to manage, but a
ground facility should have a little more monitoring capability.

Is the 555th now at Nellis flying the A-10 or is that the 5555th? Or
should I say "was" instead? The numbers seem to be remarkably
unstable considering.

Thanks for the corrections, Ed. I dunno where I got the wrong ideas
from, but I have, I hope, extirpated them.

Mary


--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

In message , Mary Shafer
writes
Since the NVAF used ground controllers heavily, did they monitor all
the frequencies? I know it's too much for pilots to manage, but a
ground facility should have a little more monitoring capability.

Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called 'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

Having a ground-based centre intercept signals, translate them,
correlate them and confirm them, and then get warning to the relevant
aircraft is a non-trivial task even when everyone is amply supplied with
working radios and free frequencies and you've got a complete and
accurate air picture.

Uncertainty over exactly who is where increases the problems. Add in
"protect the source" constraints to hide the fact that you're
successfully eavesdropping from enemy intelligence, and it gets very
tricky indeed. And having busy pilots get vague warnings from "who he?"
doesn't help when they believe they have more immediate threats to their
survival.


Eavesdropping isn't trivial but it's doable. Turning that into immediate
tactical information and communicating it in a usefully timely manner,
is a still a challenge today.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Mary Shafer
writes
Since the NVAF used ground controllers heavily, did they monitor all
the frequencies? I know it's too much for pilots to manage, but a
ground facility should have a little more monitoring capability.

Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called 'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

I thought there was an EC-121 usually performing this kind of work?

Brooks


Having a ground-based centre intercept signals, translate them,
correlate them and confirm them, and then get warning to the relevant
aircraft is a non-trivial task even when everyone is amply supplied with
working radios and free frequencies and you've got a complete and
accurate air picture.

Uncertainty over exactly who is where increases the problems. Add in
"protect the source" constraints to hide the fact that you're
successfully eavesdropping from enemy intelligence, and it gets very
tricky indeed. And having busy pilots get vague warnings from "who he?"
doesn't help when they believe they have more immediate threats to their
survival.


Eavesdropping isn't trivial but it's doable. Turning that into immediate
tactical information and communicating it in a usefully timely manner,
is a still a challenge today.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called 'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

I thought there was an EC-121 usually performing this kind of work?

Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon (usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working": Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called
'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

I thought there was an EC-121 usually performing this kind of work?

Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon (usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working": Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

Based upon a quick perusal, it appears what you are presenting is true, but
not the "whole truth", so to speak. The EC-121's apparently were indeed
performing at least some of the same kind work in support of the
inbound/outbound fighters--FAS mentions that the EC's of the 193rd TEWS
(PaANG) apparently did also have some interception gear onboard, and another
source indicates linguists were indeed included in the crew loads when the
EC's were operating over SEA.

Brooks