Cat peeking out of the bag?

José,
I'm glad you found the book interesting.

Nevertheless, I notice some scepticism regarding the "claims" we've
published in it, so let me just add here, that we have very carefully
researched them. In fact, 95% of the claims you can find in the list
on pages 85 thru 88 were cross-examined with what can be found in
different USAF and USN documents, during interviews with Iraqi pilots
and officers. Given some quite useful reactions on that book from Iraq
we're currently getting, I can say that the actual number of confirmed
kills could eventually easily go over 200.

Of course, there is a legitime question of how is one getting a
confirmation for a kill scored over a range of between 70 and 150km.
But, we all should actually know that such kills can be confirmed as
well - especially when one finally establishes good contacts to both
involved sides and gets confirmation even from the opposition. So, for
example, when an Iranian pilot claims he fired two AIM-54s and two
AIM-7s from BV-ranges to engage a group of eight Iraqi fighters and
shot down two, but surviving Iraqi pilots from that formation say
they've seen with their own eyes as three of their pals went down in
flames, and an USAF document confirms this, then I'd say we've been
cautios enough for that case, and do not see a particular reason to
question that statement from the Iranian pilot.

Regarding why was the F-14 always getting tumbs down when it came to
political decisions in the USA: well, that remains unclear to anybody
Farzad and me were able to ask. It was certainly not the performance
of the aircraft - neither that in the USA nor combat performance in
Iran, then especially the later was actually well-known to relevant
circles in Pentagon.

Certain is that if Iran remained a US ally through the 1980s they
would re-engine and futher upgrade their whole fleet (which by 1985
would consist of some 150 Tomcats), and this process would very likely
cause the USN to do something similar as well. After all, it was Iran
who saved the whole project already in 1974....


--
************************************************** ***********************
Tom Cooper
Freelance aviation journalist

Author:
- Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S7875

- Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S6550

- Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S6585

- African MiGs
http://www.acig.org/afmig/

- Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
************************************************** ***********************

On 11/6/04 12:52 AM, in article
, "Tom" wrote:

José,
I'm glad you found the book interesting.

Nevertheless, I notice some scepticism regarding the "claims" we've
published in it, so let me just add here, that we have very carefully
researched them. In fact, 95% of the claims you can find in the list
on pages 85 thru 88 were cross-examined with what can be found in
different USAF and USN documents, during interviews with Iraqi pilots
and officers. Given some quite useful reactions on that book from Iraq
we're currently getting, I can say that the actual number of confirmed
kills could eventually easily go over 200.

Of course, there is a legitime question of how is one getting a
confirmation for a kill scored over a range of between 70 and 150km.
But, we all should actually know that such kills can be confirmed as
well - especially when one finally establishes good contacts to both
involved sides and gets confirmation even from the opposition. So, for
example, when an Iranian pilot claims he fired two AIM-54s and two
AIM-7s from BV-ranges to engage a group of eight Iraqi fighters and
shot down two, but surviving Iraqi pilots from that formation say
they've seen with their own eyes as three of their pals went down in
flames, and an USAF document confirms this, then I'd say we've been
cautios enough for that case, and do not see a particular reason to
question that statement from the Iranian pilot.


What USAF document?

Admittedly, I'm a skeptic when it comes to statements by Iranian and Iraqi
pilots--in fact, from all pilots involved in combat because most tend to
"stretch the truth" a bit.

Unless these guys were actually cleaning up the merges and seeing smoke
trails and also brining tapes back to be verified by an impartial USAF intel
officer on the ground reviewed them as source material to write the
document, I'd still doubt their veracity.

For example, I read one interview from an Iraqi pilot (fairly senior too
IIRC) in some UNCLAS Israeli article who was certain that the Apex was an
active missile. When stooging down range towards each other in the heat of
battle, these guys are sure to get their facts mixed up--on both sides.

Regarding why was the F-14 always getting tumbs down when it came to
political decisions in the USA: well, that remains unclear to anybody
Farzad and me were able to ask. It was certainly not the performance
of the aircraft - neither that in the USA nor combat performance in
Iran, then especially the later was actually well-known to relevant
circles in Pentagon.


USAF mafia always throws the Eagles to the front of the line. They can be
very good though--and have very many systems upgrades that the Tomcat never
got.

Certain is that if Iran remained a US ally through the 1980s they
would re-engine and futher upgrade their whole fleet (which by 1985
would consist of some 150 Tomcats), and this process would very likely
cause the USN to do something similar as well. After all, it was Iran
who saved the whole project already in 1974....


Certain? No. Likely? Perhaps.

--Woody

Doug- Admittedly, I'm a skeptic when it comes to statements by Iranian and
Iraqi
pilots--in fact, from all pilots involved in combat because most tend to
"stretch the truth" a bit. BRBR

No kiddin. I went to an ROE brief in Alexandria Egypt, and we(2 O-4s) came into
an auditorium filled with just about every Egyptian pilot they had. MANY
General officers and many veterans of the '73 war with Israel. If you added up
all their 'kills' tho, it would have been 3-4 times as many A/C that Israel has
ever had...

The F-14 languished and was never the A-A platform needed after the USSR was
seen to be not a threat to the CVBG. Another attempt to make it something it
wasn't, like making a really good bomber out of the F-4, when the A-7 was
technically lightyears ahead.

The F-15/6 was a better design from the ground up and was modified/improved
constantly.

I was in Oceana when the first F-14s were on the ramp(VF-32/14, 1977 or so)...a
decade later I flew the same A/C that had not been modified at all(VF-31).
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...

The jet was intelligently designed. The diagnostic MSP codes it pumps out
(while not 100% accurate) significantly reduce trouble shooting--for
instance leading AT's to the correct LRU the first time--as opposed to the
(admittedly more "romantic") troubleshooting techniques on older Grumman
jets. This is the result of a systems engineering approach to
maintenance.
(F-35 is even better OBTW.) A ground-up redesign on the Tomcat might be
able to incorporate some of these features, but you're still saddled with
the constraints of the basic airframe.

You hit the nail right on the head. As a former Tomcat avionics tech, I will
admit the F-14 challenged me to be a better tech - however the learning
curve was very steep. When I transferred to Pax in the late 80's I was
shocked to learn how easy the Hornets were to work on (all us avionics types
worked out of the same workcenter at the late great SATD). The lessons
learned then serve me well now as an R&M engineering tech.

One minor nit - "LRU" is usually a USAF term. We tend to call boxes WRA's in
the Navy. (Weapons Replaceable Assembly).

-CJ

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...


Of course, there is a legitime question of how is one getting a
confirmation for a kill scored over a range of between 70 and 150km.
But, we all should actually know that such kills can be confirmed as
well - especially when one finally establishes good contacts to both
involved sides and gets confirmation even from the opposition. So, for
example, when an Iranian pilot claims he fired two AIM-54s and two
AIM-7s from BV-ranges to engage a group of eight Iraqi fighters and
shot down two, but surviving Iraqi pilots from that formation say
they've seen with their own eyes as three of their pals went down in
flames, and an USAF document confirms this, then I'd say we've been
cautios enough for that case, and do not see a particular reason to
question that statement from the Iranian pilot.


What USAF document?

Woody, I have a case with over 6.000 pages of relevant USAF, USN, US Army
and State Department documents (approx two times the size of Red Baron II
and III - if you've ever seen these). I haven't found time yet to sort them
out by any system, just put them there as they arrived after being released
according to FOIA procedures. If you're seriously interested I'll find the
specific one. That's no problem.

In the example I mentioned above the story went like this:

- In one of the NGs that is now operated by Google, years ago, somebody
mentioned a case where a single IRIAF F-14 fired six AIM-54s to shot down
something like six Iraqis; this caught our attention so we started
researching

- During our research we've found several Iranian F-14-pilots that scored
three or four kills during a single engagement. Three of these have scored
multiple kills with a single Phoenix (usually against IrAF MiG-23s flying in
very tight formatzions) so they were out of question for this example. Then
we found several who used between two and four AIM-54s to score between two
and four kills during a single engagement. Comparing the story we've found
on that NG, we concluded that the one we were searching for was Capt.
Mustafa Khosrodad, who engaged eight IrAF fighters in November 1982 and
claimed two of them as shot down after firing two AIM-54s, followed by two
AIM-7s during a single engagement. Maj. Khosrodad supplied his full
narrative about this engagement, with all the relevant informations he was
able to recall - but without the date, then he couldn't recall exactly.

- Then we started asking our Iraqi contacts if they could recall any such
engagement that occurred in November 1982, and found a Mi-8-pilot, Capt.
Samir Mousa. He recalled a VIP-transport mission from November 1982, when a
formation of eight IrAF fighters was suddenly hit by "something" and three
fighters got shot down.

- Then we started a FOIA inquiry, asking USAF specifically for a document
mentioning a multiple-AIM-54-engagement for a specific part of November
1982, in which IRIAF F-14s shot down "several" IrAF MiGs. I recall we've got
an answer within less than two months, including a confirmation that there
was such an engagement on November 21st, 1982, and that three IrAF fighters
were shot down. As said, if you're really interested, I'll find you that
document, that's not so much of a problem.

Eventually, when we put all the three things together (plus a narrative from
an IRIAF Boeing 707-tanker crew that was there as well), we were able to
reconstruct the whole story. You can read this in the volume 104 of AIR
Enthusiast magazine (article "Fire in the Hills"), together with our
findings on the topic of that well-known claim for Mi-24 downing an IRIAF
F-4, in October 1982.

Concluding that we're likely to be confronted with massive scepticism
regarding the results of our work - after all we all know what was
previously published about this air war by all the "authoritative" sources
so far - we subsequently did exactly the same for something like 150 other
claims from IRIAF F-14-pilots, and at least some 90 other Iranian and Iraqi
claims too. This took something like five years to do (and quite an amount
of bucks). But, eventually, I can ascertain that we've checked our stuff as
tightly as possible and are sure about things we're talking about.

For comparission, I'm sure that no author who ever published about the
Israelis did anything similar (a comprehensive cross-examination of Israeli
and Arab claims, and available US documents). Yet, would anybody here put
their publications in doubt?

Admittedly, I'm a skeptic when it comes to statements by Iranian and Iraqi
pilots--in fact, from all pilots involved in combat because most tend to
"stretch the truth" a bit.

Unless these guys were actually cleaning up the merges and seeing smoke
trails and also brining tapes back to be verified by an impartial USAF
intel
officer on the ground reviewed them as source material to write the
document, I'd still doubt their veracity.

Clearly, neither the Iraqis nor Iranians were bringing tapes to anybody for
"impartial" analysis. But, all possible US intel agencies - and especially
the USAFIA - were tracking this war as closely as possible. ONI's SPEARTIPs
documents for 1980s and early 1990s are particularly full of reports about
air-to-air battles between Iranian and Iraqi fighters fought over the
Persian Gulf, just for example. Plus, the CIA, USAFIA, ONI etc. also
debriefed well over 100 ex-Iranian pilots who emigrated into the USA in the
early 1990s.

I don't know - and do not care - why nobody else requested the release of
these documents so far. Perhaps nobody came to the idea - or knew enough to
ask for them - that they exist. But the documents are available. Of course,
not all; and, of course, many have large sections blotted out. But, what is
left is still sufficient to confirm - or deny - what one gets to hear from
involved pilots (clearly - and I'd like to stress this - we've had also a
number of claims that were never confirmed).

For example, I read one interview from an Iraqi pilot (fairly senior too
IIRC) in some UNCLAS Israeli article who was certain that the Apex was an
active missile. When stooging down range towards each other in the heat
of
battle, these guys are sure to get their facts mixed up--on both sides.

Indeed, we were confronted with such cases as well. For example, there is a
former IrAF Brig.Gen., who fought the whole war with Iran and even
interrogated a number of captured IRIAF pilots. Until today he refuses to
believe that IRIAF F-14s were capable of using AIM-7s in combat. He would
not deny the use of AIM-54s: he knows these are used and is also ready to
confirm the cases where IrAF fighters were shot down by Phoenix. But, he
would not accept that Iranian Tomcats could use AIM-7E-4s. No way - and this
even after I've shown him photos clearly showing IRIAF F-14s carrying
Sparrows in flight, or explained him technical details about the AWG-9.

The reason? Well, he said he's got F-14 flying manual from USA in the late
1980s, where it was stated that Iranian F-14s were downgraded so they
couldn't use AIM-7s at all. So, although the Brig.Gen. in question is
otherwise having excellent infos and plenty of IrAF documents about dozens
of air battles from that war, whenever we mention IRIAF F-14s using AIM-7s
against his former colleagues, we can only expect to cause another fierce
reaction from him.

Certain is that if Iran remained a US ally through the 1980s they
would re-engine and futher upgrade their whole fleet (which by 1985
would consist of some 150 Tomcats), and this process would very likely
cause the USN to do something similar as well. After all, it was Iran
who saved the whole project already in 1974....


Certain? No. Likely? Perhaps.

Surely it would. Already in 1978 Iran issued a "Letter of Intent" for order
of 75 additional F-14As. The order for AIM-54s was increased from 424 to
over 700. You don't need to trust me: go and ask State Dept. for related
documents. Negotiations about deliveries were going on when the Shah left
the country. Equally, already since 1977 there were "private" negotiations
between P&W and IIAF for re-engining Iranian F-14-fleet by 1982. The
Iranians knew very well about the basic weakness of the TF-30. They have
also lost two F-14s during training missions in the 1970s - both in
engine-related accidents. So they were interested in improving the
situation; they have had the means, and their intentions were clear. There
is no uncertainity about this.

I could now add stuff about Iranian intentions to equipp their F-14s with
stand-off PGMs too, but that would make little sence given your -
understandable - scepticism. Yet, the point is this: from today's standpoint
the relations between the USA and Iran at the time are almost unimaginable.
So, it's extremely problematic to understand specific relations and
connections. But, bear in mind: after the Vietnam War the US aerospace
industry was in deep troubles, as domestic orders were massively cut. Now,
remember what was "Nixon Doctrine" standing for, and then recall that
contrary to Israelis and the South Vietnamese the Iranians have had money to
buy the stuff they needed. So, even if there was quite some resistance -
especially in the US Congress - they were getting stuff they were
requesting. In "worst" cases, i.e. those where even the Shah's influence and
charme couldn't help, the US military would deliver stuff from own stocks
instead (as done with USAF RF-4Cs, for example).

Now, ask yourself the following: the USN wasn't standing by and looking when
Iranians saved the F-14-project in 1974 in order to get their 80 Tomcats.
What would the USN do if Iran would've then re-engined its 150 F-14s and
then also upgrade them for air-to-ground tasks?

Stand beside and watch, without doing anything?

--
************************************************** ***********************
Tom Cooper
Freelance aviation journalist

Author:
- Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S7875

- Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S6550

- Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/titl...hp/title=S6585

- African MiGs
http://www.acig.org/afmig/

- Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
************************************************** ***********************

Woody wrote:

Most of the 2-seaters in existence now are still coupled cockpits.

Pardon my ignorance, but what is meant by "coupled cockpits"?

Scott Seders

Most of the 2-seaters in existence now are still coupled cockpits.

Pardon my ignorance, but what is meant by "coupled cockpits"?

The back station is about the same as the front station. IIRC, VFA-103 is
going to be the first fleet squadron with decoupled cockpits, that is the
WSO station has a lot of stuff that the pilot's doesn't have, and
vice-versa.
_____________
José Herculano

On 11/6/04 9:10, in article , "CJ "Smut"
Martin" wrote:

You hit the nail right on the head. As a former Tomcat avionics tech, I will
admit the F-14 challenged me to be a better tech - however the learning
curve was very steep. When I transferred to Pax in the late 80's I was
shocked to learn how easy the Hornets were to work on (all us avionics types
worked out of the same workcenter at the late great SATD). The lessons
learned then serve me well now as an R&M engineering tech.

One minor nit - "LRU" is usually a USAF term. We tend to call boxes WRA's in
the Navy. (Weapons Replaceable Assembly).

-CJ

Good call. I'm surprisingly bi-lingual though... LRU/WRA... Step/walk...
2-ship/section...

But I'll take it on board.

--Woody

On 11/6/04 10:41, in article , "Scott
Seders" wrote:

Woody wrote:

Most of the 2-seaters in existence now are still coupled cockpits.

Pardon my ignorance, but what is meant by "coupled cockpits"?

Scott Seders



Scott,

The current F/A-18B/D/F have "coupled" cockpits which means that even though
the pilot and WSO can independently select displays for their respective
Digital Display Indicators (DDI's), whatever the WSO does to his radar
attack display (for example) will also happen to the pilot's radar attack
display in the front. They are "coupled" from front to back cockpit.

Decoupled means that the pilot could be working an air-to-air problem with
the radar while the WSO works an air-to-ground targeting problem.

--Woody

Tom,

My opinions against your research, of course.

I am mildly interested, but frankly, I don't have the time in my life to
read that much documentation. The SPEAR stuff sounds interesting though...
Do you have SPEAR documents?

--Woody

On 11/6/04 10:04, in article , "Tom
Cooper" wrote:

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...


Of course, there is a legitime question of how is one getting a
confirmation for a kill scored over a range of between 70 and 150km.
But, we all should actually know that such kills can be confirmed as
well - especially when one finally establishes good contacts to both
involved sides and gets confirmation even from the opposition. So, for
example, when an Iranian pilot claims he fired two AIM-54s and two
AIM-7s from BV-ranges to engage a group of eight Iraqi fighters and
shot down two, but surviving Iraqi pilots from that formation say
they've seen with their own eyes as three of their pals went down in
flames, and an USAF document confirms this, then I'd say we've been
cautios enough for that case, and do not see a particular reason to
question that statement from the Iranian pilot.


What USAF document?

Woody, I have a case with over 6.000 pages of relevant USAF, USN, US Army
and State Department documents (approx two times the size of Red Baron II
and III - if you've ever seen these). I haven't found time yet to sort them
out by any system, just put them there as they arrived after being released
according to FOIA procedures. If you're seriously interested I'll find the
specific one. That's no problem.

In the example I mentioned above the story went like this:

- In one of the NGs that is now operated by Google, years ago, somebody
mentioned a case where a single IRIAF F-14 fired six AIM-54s to shot down
something like six Iraqis; this caught our attention so we started
researching

- During our research we've found several Iranian F-14-pilots that scored
three or four kills during a single engagement. Three of these have scored
multiple kills with a single Phoenix (usually against IrAF MiG-23s flying in
very tight formatzions) so they were out of question for this example. Then
we found several who used between two and four AIM-54s to score between two
and four kills during a single engagement. Comparing the story we've found
on that NG, we concluded that the one we were searching for was Capt.
Mustafa Khosrodad, who engaged eight IrAF fighters in November 1982 and
claimed two of them as shot down after firing two AIM-54s, followed by two
AIM-7s during a single engagement. Maj. Khosrodad supplied his full
narrative about this engagement, with all the relevant informations he was
able to recall - but without the date, then he couldn't recall exactly.

- Then we started asking our Iraqi contacts if they could recall any such
engagement that occurred in November 1982, and found a Mi-8-pilot, Capt.
Samir Mousa. He recalled a VIP-transport mission from November 1982, when a
formation of eight IrAF fighters was suddenly hit by "something" and three
fighters got shot down.

- Then we started a FOIA inquiry, asking USAF specifically for a document
mentioning a multiple-AIM-54-engagement for a specific part of November
1982, in which IRIAF F-14s shot down "several" IrAF MiGs. I recall we've got
an answer within less than two months, including a confirmation that there
was such an engagement on November 21st, 1982, and that three IrAF fighters
were shot down. As said, if you're really interested, I'll find you that
document, that's not so much of a problem.

Eventually, when we put all the three things together (plus a narrative from
an IRIAF Boeing 707-tanker crew that was there as well), we were able to
reconstruct the whole story. You can read this in the volume 104 of AIR
Enthusiast magazine (article "Fire in the Hills"), together with our
findings on the topic of that well-known claim for Mi-24 downing an IRIAF
F-4, in October 1982.

Concluding that we're likely to be confronted with massive scepticism
regarding the results of our work - after all we all know what was
previously published about this air war by all the "authoritative" sources
so far - we subsequently did exactly the same for something like 150 other
claims from IRIAF F-14-pilots, and at least some 90 other Iranian and Iraqi
claims too. This took something like five years to do (and quite an amount
of bucks). But, eventually, I can ascertain that we've checked our stuff as
tightly as possible and are sure about things we're talking about.

For comparission, I'm sure that no author who ever published about the
Israelis did anything similar (a comprehensive cross-examination of Israeli
and Arab claims, and available US documents). Yet, would anybody here put
their publications in doubt?

Admittedly, I'm a skeptic when it comes to statements by Iranian and Iraqi
pilots--in fact, from all pilots involved in combat because most tend to
"stretch the truth" a bit.

Unless these guys were actually cleaning up the merges and seeing smoke
trails and also brining tapes back to be verified by an impartial USAF
intel
officer on the ground reviewed them as source material to write the
document, I'd still doubt their veracity.

Clearly, neither the Iraqis nor Iranians were bringing tapes to anybody for
"impartial" analysis. But, all possible US intel agencies - and especially
the USAFIA - were tracking this war as closely as possible. ONI's SPEARTIPs
documents for 1980s and early 1990s are particularly full of reports about
air-to-air battles between Iranian and Iraqi fighters fought over the
Persian Gulf, just for example. Plus, the CIA, USAFIA, ONI etc. also
debriefed well over 100 ex-Iranian pilots who emigrated into the USA in the
early 1990s.

I don't know - and do not care - why nobody else requested the release of
these documents so far. Perhaps nobody came to the idea - or knew enough to
ask for them - that they exist. But the documents are available. Of course,
not all; and, of course, many have large sections blotted out. But, what is
left is still sufficient to confirm - or deny - what one gets to hear from
involved pilots (clearly - and I'd like to stress this - we've had also a
number of claims that were never confirmed).

For example, I read one interview from an Iraqi pilot (fairly senior too
IIRC) in some UNCLAS Israeli article who was certain that the Apex was an
active missile. When stooging down range towards each other in the heat
of
battle, these guys are sure to get their facts mixed up--on both sides.

Indeed, we were confronted with such cases as well. For example, there is a
former IrAF Brig.Gen., who fought the whole war with Iran and even
interrogated a number of captured IRIAF pilots. Until today he refuses to
believe that IRIAF F-14s were capable of using AIM-7s in combat. He would
not deny the use of AIM-54s: he knows these are used and is also ready to
confirm the cases where IrAF fighters were shot down by Phoenix. But, he
would not accept that Iranian Tomcats could use AIM-7E-4s. No way - and this
even after I've shown him photos clearly showing IRIAF F-14s carrying
Sparrows in flight, or explained him technical details about the AWG-9.

The reason? Well, he said he's got F-14 flying manual from USA in the late
1980s, where it was stated that Iranian F-14s were downgraded so they
couldn't use AIM-7s at all. So, although the Brig.Gen. in question is
otherwise having excellent infos and plenty of IrAF documents about dozens
of air battles from that war, whenever we mention IRIAF F-14s using AIM-7s
against his former colleagues, we can only expect to cause another fierce
reaction from him.

Certain is that if Iran remained a US ally through the 1980s they
would re-engine and futher upgrade their whole fleet (which by 1985
would consist of some 150 Tomcats), and this process would very likely
cause the USN to do something similar as well. After all, it was Iran
who saved the whole project already in 1974....


Certain? No. Likely? Perhaps.

Surely it would. Already in 1978 Iran issued a "Letter of Intent" for order
of 75 additional F-14As. The order for AIM-54s was increased from 424 to
over 700. You don't need to trust me: go and ask State Dept. for related
documents. Negotiations about deliveries were going on when the Shah left
the country. Equally, already since 1977 there were "private" negotiations
between P&W and IIAF for re-engining Iranian F-14-fleet by 1982. The
Iranians knew very well about the basic weakness of the TF-30. They have
also lost two F-14s during training missions in the 1970s - both in
engine-related accidents. So they were interested in improving the
situation; they have had the means, and their intentions were clear. There
is no uncertainity about this.

I could now add stuff about Iranian intentions to equipp their F-14s with
stand-off PGMs too, but that would make little sence given your -
understandable - scepticism. Yet, the point is this: from today's standpoint
the relations between the USA and Iran at the time are almost unimaginable.
So, it's extremely problematic to understand specific relations and
connections. But, bear in mind: after the Vietnam War the US aerospace
industry was in deep troubles, as domestic orders were massively cut. Now,
remember what was "Nixon Doctrine" standing for, and then recall that
contrary to Israelis and the South Vietnamese the Iranians have had money to
buy the stuff they needed. So, even if there was quite some resistance -
especially in the US Congress - they were getting stuff they were
requesting. In "worst" cases, i.e. those where even the Shah's influence and
charme couldn't help, the US military would deliver stuff from own stocks
instead (as done with USAF RF-4Cs, for example).

Now, ask yourself the following: the USN wasn't standing by and looking when
Iranians saved the F-14-project in 1974 in order to get their 80 Tomcats.
What would the USN do if Iran would've then re-engined its 150 F-14s and
then also upgrade them for air-to-ground tasks?

Stand beside and watch, without doing anything?