Greatest Strategic Air Missions?

On 3 Sep 2004 09:13:45 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:


Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?


I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
with you.


Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
the accords by the SVN.

That's a pretty selective interpretation of history. The fact is that
bombing north of 20 degrees was halted in late October when there was
agreement to sign. In late November, the agreement had not been signed
by the North and they walked out of Paris. Establishing a "rooster
crows--sun rises" syllogism based on SVN actions is a stretch. Nothing
happens in a vacuum.

Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
As it is, we can only speculate.

You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
observers. I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
signing and in very short order releasing the guys.

Various historians have viewed Linebacker II and reached different
conclusions. Eschmann seemed to see the campaign as very effective.
Clodfelter drew more subtle conclusions and leaned toward the classic
"bombing alone doesn't win wars" answer. Michel, doing the most recent
work and being the first with major participation with the NVN in his
research, ascribed losses to bureaucratic infighting, ascribed victory
to both sides by their own interpretation, and agreed with most that
there was a direct linkage between the bombing campaign and the
conclusion of the war.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
the accords by the SVN.

Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
As it is, we can only speculate.

....or, propagandize and spin.

If I had been making those decisions for SVN I would have agreed to the
accords only with extreme reluctance. Do you think they did not know
what would happen when the US pulled out its forces? Everyone understood
it was only a matter of time without direct US support on the ground
until SVN was overrun.

Survival is the name of the game, and as has too often been the case,
the piece of mind of the US Left is more important than the commitments
to support the survival of some of our allies -- even when those
commitments were the product of Democratic administrations.

The US has much to be proud of and much to be ashamed of with regard to
VN, but not necessarily what those of your political persuasion might claim.


Jack

Ed Rasimus wrote:

In late November, the agreement had not been signed
by the North and they walked out of Paris.

Ed, that is a misleading description of events. When the NVN walked out in
November, they had nothing to sign. Kissenger had recently submitted changes to
the October agreement, but even if NVN found them acceptable it would have been
weeks before a final signing. Bottom line; NVN walked out because we were
changing an already agreed upon accord AND (more importantly) the anti-war
movement in congress was threatening to give them much more than the Paris
Peace Accord.

You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
observers.

You and I have been over this before Ed, but I don't believe participation in
history makes someone an expert in anything other then your own part in that
event. In this discusion, aircrew perspective doesn't provide much.

I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
signing and in very short order releasing the guys.

Without a doubt, however LBII would have lasted until the dollars ran out if
congress had returned and voted to suspend funding for the war. The bombing
and, as equally important, the silence from congress convinced NVN to return to
Paris and sign *the original October agreeement*.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 04 Sep 2004 00:42:19 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

In late November, the agreement had not been signed
by the North and they walked out of Paris.

Ed, that is a misleading description of events. When the NVN walked out in
November, they had nothing to sign. Kissenger had recently submitted changes to
the October agreement, but even if NVN found them acceptable it would have been
weeks before a final signing. Bottom line; NVN walked out because we were
changing an already agreed upon accord AND (more importantly) the anti-war
movement in congress was threatening to give them much more than the Paris
Peace Accord.

You fail to add one important link to the events: There was an
election on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. And,
you also fail to acknowledge my qualification that causative
relationships in issues like this are not simple.

You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
observers.

You and I have been over this before Ed, but I don't believe participation in
history makes someone an expert in anything other then your own part in that
event. In this discusion, aircrew perspective doesn't provide much.

I'm not going to descend to the level of others who discount anyone
who wasn't there. That's why I added reference to Eschmann, Clodfelter
and Michel as well. When we take on-scene observers (the POWs who were
interacting with the NVN military on a daily basis and had seen
considerable shifts in attitudes, goals, and political positions in
the camp leadership in response to events), participants (lots of them
who had been through multiple tours), senior military leaders who were
in-the-loop on classified and back-channel traffic, and the historians
you should be able to get a much better interpretation of events than
simple archivist reviewer historians (and many with a political ax to
grind.)

I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
signing and in very short order releasing the guys.

Without a doubt, however LBII would have lasted until the dollars ran out if
congress had returned and voted to suspend funding for the war. The bombing
and, as equally important, the silence from congress convinced NVN to return to
Paris and sign *the original October agreeement*.

And, the "silence from Congress" can very clearly be linked to the '68
election and the need to wrap things up without political campaign
positions interfering.

To suggest that LBII would have gone on until the budget tightened is
to be unaware of the initial alerting order for the campaign which
said "three days" of maximum effort. That doesn't sound like an
open-ended campaign to me.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
On 3 Sep 2004 09:13:45 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:


Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?


I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
with you.


Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
the accords by the SVN.

That's a pretty selective interpretation of history. The fact is that
bombing north of 20 degrees was halted in late October when there was
agreement to sign. In late November, the agreement had not been signed
by the North and they walked out of Paris.

Which stil makes it seem rather obvious that it was the SVN resistance
to the Accords that prevented them from being signed in October 1972.
Offhand, I can't say as I blame them.


Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
As it is, we can only speculate.

You can speculate, I was a participant, and the POWs were on-scene
observers. I can find a direct causative relationship between getting
the crap kicked out of them for eleven days and crying "uncle", then
signing and in very short order releasing the guys.

Respectfully, you were not a participant in the negotiations in
Paris. However you have convinced me that that Linbacker II brought
the NVN back to the table. Clearly that was necessary for the Accord
to be signed and that the SVN held out longer (we weren't bombing them)
doesn't change that.

On Fri, 03 Sep 2004 10:45:24 -0600, Ed Rasimus
wrote:


Various historians have viewed Linebacker II and reached different
conclusions. Eschmann seemed to see the campaign as very effective.

From the military point of view, yes, bombing was effective.

Clodfelter drew more subtle conclusions and leaned toward the classic
"bombing alone doesn't win wars" answer. Michel, doing the most recent
work and being the first with major participation with the NVN in his
research, ascribed losses to bureaucratic infighting, ascribed victory
to both sides by their own interpretation, and agreed with most that
there was a direct linkage between the bombing campaign and the
conclusion of the war.

I don't get that. Is the current opinion that North Vietnamese
conquest of South Vietnam was some other, different war from the one
that was "concluded" by Treaty in Paris?

It seems to me that Linebacker II had virtually no strategic effect as
far as South Vietnamese were concerned, they were wiped out from the
map.


Drax

OK guys, I've been following this and i have to admit that I'm not on all the
missions you have listed in this thread but it seems to me that there is one
that is very aparent by it's absense. Since we're talking about strategic
missions, how about the mission of the Strategic Air Command?
For nearly 50 years their mission was to insure that we maintained a viable
nuclear deterence, maintain 2/3 of the US's nuke strike capability and train
for and conduct strategic bombing missions, both conventional and nuke.
While they were never called upon to conduct the nuke missions, they were
called upon at several times to conduct conventional missions. And since there
was never a nuke exchange while SAC was in operation, I'd venture a guess at
saying they were very succesful at the deterence side of their mission.

just my 2 cents

Jim
SAC Cop
78-88

" PEACE WAS OUR PROFESSION AND WE WON "